No King Cotton

[whitworth]

What if the Southern leadership had realized that cotton wasn't that important in 1861-1862?

What if the Southern leadership had assessed their manufacturing and production ability and realized it was far inferior to the North?

What if the South had realized that Great Britain had too many interests and had no intention of getting involved in a North American War?

What if the Southern leadership realized that the United States was not going to easily give up the land that was part of the United States?

What if the South had realized that the war would last more than six months or a year?

What if Virginians had realized they had no ability to protect the western part of the state and counties near Washington, D.C.?
The ability to defend the counties west of the Allegheny Mountains was so weak, George McClellan became an early hero, by military successes in western Virginia.
It seemed Virginians, including Robert E. Lee, had blinders on in the first month of secession by Virginia. They seemed not to have a clue?

 

[larry_cockerham]

Lee had a clue. He stated as much.

 

[OpnDownfall]

Hind sight is 20/20. There were a small number of prescient thinkers across the country that did realize some of the above liabilities but they were not in any positions of real authority to affect the actions of their leadership, who were mesmerized by the siren call building a new nation (and of course saving their slaves)

 

[trice]

What if the Southern leadership had realized that cotton wasn't that important in 1861-1862?

At a minimum, they would have avoided putting an embargo on cotton shipments in 1861 to threaten/pressure the Europeans. Instead, they would have sold cotton as fast as they could, and thus have had more cash to work with while they could actually get shipments back.

What if the Southern leadership had assessed their manufacturing and production ability and realized it was far inferior to the North?

I don't think it would have mattered to them all that much. In the short run (i.e., a "quick war") it wouldn't matter. If they were actually thinking "long war" in 1861, they might have paused.

What if the South had realized that Great Britain had too many interests and had no intention of getting involved in a North American War?

Well, IMHO, that would require that Southern leaders be an entirely different sort of people than they seem to have been. All the rhetoric of the people stampeding into secession avoids such topics, or simply proclaims that it can only be as they want it to be. Cold, hard-headed evaluation of possibilities and probablities seemed very foreign to them.

What if the Southern leadership realized that the United States was not going to easily give up the land that was part of the United States?

I think the possibility of being "let go" existed *IF* the South had proceded peacefully through the legal methods available, so I'd suggest this question should be phrased a little differently. Perhaps they might have refrained from the use of armed force and seizures of property and funds, choosing to act through the courts and the Congress, and a compromise might have been arranged.

What if the South had realized that the war would last more than six months or a year?

Well, very few countries actually start a war when they think it won't be over quickly.

What if Virginians had realized they had no ability to protect the western part of the state and counties near Washington, D.C.?
The ability to defend the counties west of the Allegheny Mountains was so weak, George McClellan became an early hero, by military successes in western Virginia.
It seemed Virginians, including Robert E. Lee, had blinders on in the first month of secession by Virginia. They seemed not to have a clue?

The western part of the state might not have bothered them too much. That part was opposed to secession anyway, and was overwhelmed in the vote.

But cold, realistic appraisal of such things is anathema to popular movements, which are generally based on emotion instead. If they were the sort of people to sit around calculating such things, they probably would not have been pushing such a rash course of action at all.

Regards,
Tim

 

[ole]

I think the possibility of being "let go" existed *IF* the South had proceded peacefully through the legal methods available, so I'd suggest this question should be phrased a little differently. Perhaps they might have refrained from the use of armed force and seizures of property and funds, choosing to act through the courts and the Congress, and a compromise might have been arranged.

Amen, Trice. Lincoln was quite adamant about slavery in the territories, but he was also a politician with the ability and willingness to put his most treasured convictions to the test of compromise. He might well have relented back to the Missouri Compromise line, and he might even have supported the Crittenden Compromise.

We'll never know, will we?
Ole

 

[trice]

Amen, Trice. Lincoln was quite adamant about slavery in the territories, but he was also a politician with the ability and willingness to put his most treasured convictions to the test of compromise. He might well have relented back to the Missouri Compromise line, and he might even have supported the Crittenden Compromise.

We'll never know, will we?

The problem with all "what-if's" is that we can never know! <g>

Lincoln had asserted that as President he did not intend to, nor did he think he had the power to, interfere with slavery where it already existed. He was also definitely opposed to allowing it to extend into the territories.

I think that is where he was opposed to the Crittenden Compromise. In early 1861, he did (reluctantly) approve of the attempt to pass a constitutional amendment that would protect slavery in the states where it already existed, so he was clearly willing to concede something on that -- but he seems to have felt it must be barred from expanding.

Since those leading the secession movement were seemingly unalterably opposed to any limitation on where they could have slaves, it is hard to see how this can work out unless the South was willing to give up on this demand. Perhaps if they had been willing to live with the deal in the Compromise of 1850, they could have arranged some accomodation in 1861; perhaps nothing like secession and the Civil War would have come about. But the fact is they had overturned the Compromise of 1850 by 1854.

When I look at all this, what I see from the Republicans is a platform that calls for the limitation of slavery (with a belief that would in the end cause slavery to die away). From the secessionists, what I see is a demand that there be no limits on slavery, or they would secede. Neither was willing to budge from that, but the Republican position is clearly closer to a middle ground and compromise than the secessionist position.

Regards,
Tim

 

[whitworth]

The Indefensible Parts of Virginia

"The western part of the state might not have bothered them too much. That part was opposed to secession anyway, and was overwhelmed in the vote."

"But cold, realistic appraisal of such things is anathema to popular movements, which are generally based on emotion instead."

Well we know secession was based on a lot of emotion and not enough clear thinking. I think Margaret Mitchell said it best, when though the voice of the fictional character Rhett Butler, he indicated the economic advantage the North had over the South, and no great agreement with him at the time.

There were a couple of voices that asked -how do we protect Virginia, now - just before the war began.
Nothing more sobering than reading a reply from Robert E. Lee on the state of Virginia's action to defend Wheeling and the western counties. Wheeling fell early, never to return to Virginia.
Just as sobering was Lee's reply to a former U.S. Senator on Virginia's inability to protect counties near Washington, D.C.
A seemingly private citizen asking how his area, just over the mountains from the Shenandoah Valley, was going to survive unprotected.

Studing logistics one sees the impossible task of Virginia and the Confederacy to protect the plantations and slaves in the Kanawha valley, near Charleston. The Allegheny Mountains was a barrier to both armies. But to the Kanawha valley, the U.S. had waterways and steamboats to bring in supplies.

Yet, perhaps because of the lack of large battles, the loss of the western counties by Virginia remains virtually undiscussed over the last 145 years.

Just studying great battles, one misses so much.

 

[trice]

"The western part of the state might not have bothered them too much. That part was opposed to secession anyway, and was overwhelmed in the vote."

"But cold, realistic appraisal of such things is anathema to popular movements, which are generally based on emotion instead."

Well we know secession was based on a lot of emotion and not enough clear thinking. I think Margaret Mitchell said it best, when though the voice of the fictional character Rhett Butler, he indicated the economic advantage the North had over the South, and no great agreement with him at the time.

There were a couple of voices that asked -how do we protect Virginia, now - just before the war began.
Nothing more sobering than reading a reply from Robert E. Lee on the state of Virginia's action to defend Wheeling and the western counties. Wheeling fell early, never to return to Virginia.
Just as sobering was Lee's reply to a former U.S. Senator on Virginia's inability to protect counties near Washington, D.C.
A seemingly private citizen asking how his area, just over the mountains from the Shenandoah Valley, was going to survive unprotected.

Studing logistics one sees the impossible task of Virginia and the Confederacy to protect the plantations and slaves in the Kanawha valley, near Charleston. The Allegheny Mountains was a barrier to both armies. But to the Kanawha valley, the U.S. had waterways and steamboats to bring in supplies.

Yet, perhaps because of the lack of large battles, the loss of the western counties by Virginia remains virtually undiscussed over the last 145 years.

Just studying great battles, one misses so much.

Yes, that is so.

The Western counties were not closely connected to the rest of the state, physically or economically. In 1860, the best way to get to Richmond from that area was generally to go north to catch the B&O, then travel East by train to Baltimore, then take a steamer South to the James River.

Not surprisingly, the normal interaction of the people tended to be more towards the Ohio River and Pittsburgh than toward Richmond. A lot of their market was the iron & steel industry in Pittsburgh, which accounts for the fact that the western VA counties favored the Morrell Tariff in 1860-61 while the rest of the state was against it.

If any military man had done a cold-eyed study of the problems involved, he would immediately have noticed the practical difficulties involved in defending what is now West Virginia. Logistics and communications alone would make it extremely difficult, even if the locals had been whole-heartedly in support of secession. At the same time, the network of Union RRs and the proximity of Cincinatti and Pittsburgh combined with Union dominance on the rivers conferred big advantages to the US forces.

Regards,
Tim