Night attacks.

[Nathan Stuart]

At Chancellorsville, Sickles launched an unsuccessful night attack with Birney's Division at midnight (along the woods road from Hazel Grove to the Orange Plank Road). He did so without sending out scouts or skirmishers first.

The night attack was spearheaded by Ward's Brigade, with fixed bayonets and rifles uncapped. The attacking columns of Union troops were fired on from all sides by Confederates in the surrounding darkened woods. The result was pandemonium and panic for the Union attackers.

It is relevant here, to know the experiences of the Union soldiers that participated in the night attack. Private John Haley of the 17th​ Maine wrote,

…"The scare wasn't confined to the privates; officers dodged hither and thither, some of them so frightened that they couldn't have told their names…..General Ward, was in such haste to get to the rear that he rode down two of his men. The muzzle flashes of volleys in the dark were terrifying"…

(Source - 'Chancellorsville', by Stephen W, Sears, at page 301)

Reported Union casualties in this midnight battle totaled 196 – a proportion of them were from friendly supporting fire.

 

[Kentucky Derby Cavalier.]

At Chancellorsville, Sickles launched an unsuccessful night attack with Birney's Division at midnight (along the woods road from Hazel Grove to the Orange Plank Road). He did so without sending out scouts or skirmishers first.

The night attack was spearheaded by Ward's Brigade, with fixed bayonets and rifles uncapped. The attacking columns of Union troops were fired on from all sides by Confederates in the surrounding darkened woods. The result was pandemonium and panic for the Union attackers.

It is relevant here, to know the experiences of the Union soldiers that participated in the night attack. Private John Haley of the 17th​ Maine wrote,

…"The scare wasn't confined to the privates; officers dodged hither and thither, some of them so frightened that they couldn't have told their names…..General Ward, was in such haste to get to the rear that he rode down two of his men. The muzzle flashes of volleys in the dark were terrifying"…

(Source - 'Chancellorsville', by Stephen W, Sears, at page 301)

Reported Union casualties in this midnight battle totaled 196 – a proportion of them were from friendly supporting fire.

I didn't know that, I've learned alot from this thread.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

I didn't know that, I've learned alot from this thread.

I am learning all of the time from these threads.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

The bold action taken by Sickles at Chancellorsville was a precursor to what he did at Gettysburg.

 

[dennmorr]

At Chancellorsville, Sickles launched an unsuccessful night attack with Birney's Division at midnight (along the woods road from Hazel Grove to the Orange Plank Road). He did so without sending out scouts or skirmishers first.

The night attack was spearheaded by Ward's Brigade, with fixed bayonets and rifles uncapped. The attacking columns of Union troops were fired on from all sides by Confederates in the surrounding darkened woods. The result was pandemonium and panic for the Union attackers.

It is relevant here, to know the experiences of the Union soldiers that participated in the night attack. Private John Haley of the 17th​ Maine wrote,

…"The scare wasn't confined to the privates; officers dodged hither and thither, some of them so frightened that they couldn't have told their names…..General Ward, was in such haste to get to the rear that he rode down two of his men. The muzzle flashes of volleys in the dark were terrifying"…

(Source - 'Chancellorsville', by Stephen W, Sears, at page 301)

Reported Union casualties in this midnight battle totaled 196 – a proportion of them were from friendly supporting fire.

I have a letter from my Great Great Uncle decrying the losses of his unit-the 86th NY in that attack.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

I have a letter from my Great Great Uncle decrying the losses of his unit-the 86th NY in that attack.

The ambush of that night attack must have been a frightening experience for those in his unit

 

[dennmorr]

The ambush of that night attack must have been a frightening experience for those in his unit

Here is the letter as written.
May the 15 63

Dear brother and sister as i have a little leisure time i take the opotuneity to wright a fue lines to let you know that a am well exsept i have the ereisipliss in my wright leg that bothers me by spells. Other ways i am well an i hope these fue lines will finds you all enjoying the same blessing we have had another battle thay say it was the hardest battle that has been fought sine the was comencet wether it was or not it was hard fiting as i wanted to be in. i was in the hotest of the battle an under fire tow day thay was the longest days that i ever saw in my life the way this battle was planed Gen Hoker sent three corpes down on the left of fredrickburg for faints. They laid the poontune bridge on to division cross the river an laid on the banck that draw the rebels all down on the left. When our mane force went up on the right to united states foard an cross the rappahanick an got in the rear. when the battle camence the rebels smelt the rat an turn on us an we could gaine the day but at the turn of the battle the eleven corps broke an run an through the left of the rebels on our corps witch being the theard corps as we had to fall back an fite to hope the rebels in check an while falling back the rebels maid a charge an took one rigiment an we turn around an maid a charge an took them back again an tehn fell back behind our batterys when they came up they had thare hats puled down over thare eyes. That way thay maid charges one after another an our men loaded thare guns with doubel carg of grape (?) an canister an moad them down as fast as they came up. Thay soon got satsfide an left while we was fiting on the right. The three corps on the left too the hights back of fredreckburg an took fifteen hundred prisoners an twenty seven pieces of c seaye (sedye?) guns an got them on this side of the river. Thay was reinforcement to the rebels camp up river. After the mane army had fortifide then strong a nuff agants eny force that the rebels minte send. We was order back acrost the river an now we lay on our old campt ground at present. An why we was order back I can't say. The loss in the battle was heavy. What we seen and could learn of the rebels prisners thare was to (2) to our one. Our cavalry maid a raid while we was fiting. Went within to (two) miles of richmon. Tore up the rail road an canal an destroyed a grate deal of goverment property an took good meny prisners. Got back to camp saft it is stated that we took five thousans prisners as we took prisners thare canteen all had whiskey in an nothing to eat. Thay sed thare rashion was a pint a flour a day. Old 86 cut up bad our company. Had fifteen privits wounded an our captin kiled. We have loss him a good captin
I have choisin christ as my captin an my leder an all you that havent chose him for you leder chouse him at wonce. He will keep you in that narro path that lede to life ever lastin. May we all chose him an by the grace of god may we press our way onward an upward so when we come to leve this unfrendly wourld we can be so unspeckble happy so we can gane that hevenly home whare parting will be no more. My dear sister i am bound to live so we never mete on this earth. We will mete in heaven. We have nice weather here now. Evry thing is all green an nice.
I send
My best respect to all inquiring frends. You must let mister brown foulk no (know) how I am. It is a task for me to wright. If i am taking sick i will wright an let you no it. The 107 rigiment was in the fite when you wright. let me no wether jhon come out safe or not
Wright
Good by for this time
A W Canfield
A W Canfield
Co. D. 86 Regt.
N Y Vol
Washington DC

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Here is the letter as written.
May the 15 63

Dear brother and sister as i have a little leisure time i take the opotuneity to wright a fue lines to let you know that a am well exsept i have the ereisipliss in my wright leg that bothers me by spells. Other ways i am well an i hope these fue lines will finds you all enjoying the same blessing we have had another battle thay say it was the hardest battle that has been fought sine the was comencet wether it was or not it was hard fiting as i wanted to be in. i was in the hotest of the battle an under fire tow day thay was the longest days that i ever saw in my life the way this battle was planed Gen Hoker sent three corpes down on the left of fredrickburg for faints. They laid the poontune bridge on to division cross the river an laid on the banck that draw the rebels all down on the left. When our mane force went up on the right to united states foard an cross the rappahanick an got in the rear. when the battle camence the rebels smelt the rat an turn on us an we could gaine the day but at the turn of the battle the eleven corps broke an run an through the left of the rebels on our corps witch being the theard corps as we had to fall back an fite to hope the rebels in check an while falling back the rebels maid a charge an took one rigiment an we turn around an maid a charge an took them back again an tehn fell back behind our batterys when they came up they had thare hats puled down over thare eyes. That way thay maid charges one after another an our men loaded thare guns with doubel carg of grape (?) an canister an moad them down as fast as they came up. Thay soon got satsfide an left while we was fiting on the right. The three corps on the left too the hights back of fredreckburg an took fifteen hundred prisoners an twenty seven pieces of c seaye (sedye?) guns an got them on this side of the river. Thay was reinforcement to the rebels camp up river. After the mane army had fortifide then strong a nuff agants eny force that the rebels minte send. We was order back acrost the river an now we lay on our old campt ground at present. An why we was order back I can't say. The loss in the battle was heavy. What we seen and could learn of the rebels prisners thare was to (2) to our one. Our cavalry maid a raid while we was fiting. Went within to (two) miles of richmon. Tore up the rail road an canal an destroyed a grate deal of goverment property an took good meny prisners. Got back to camp saft it is stated that we took five thousans prisners as we took prisners thare canteen all had whiskey in an nothing to eat. Thay sed thare rashion was a pint a flour a day. Old 86 cut up bad our company. Had fifteen privits wounded an our captin kiled. We have loss him a good captin
I have choisin christ as my captin an my leder an all you that havent chose him for you leder chouse him at wonce. He will keep you in that narro path that lede to life ever lastin. May we all chose him an by the grace of god may we press our way onward an upward so when we come to leve this unfrendly wourld we can be so unspeckble happy so we can gane that hevenly home whare parting will be no more. My dear sister i am bound to live so we never mete on this earth. We will mete in heaven. We have nice weather here now. Evry thing is all green an nice.
I send
My best respect to all inquiring frends. You must let mister brown foulk no (know) how I am. It is a task for me to wright. If i am taking sick i will wright an let you no it. The 107 rigiment was in the fite when you wright. let me no wether jhon come out safe or not
Wright
Good by for this time
A W Canfield
A W Canfield
Co. D. 86 Regt.
N Y Vol
Washington DC

Thank you for sharing his letter. That's a raw and interesting account.

 

[th'anchoriticsybarite]

In another thread they are discussing the Battle of Shiloh. I am uncertain if the Confederate forces there were even capable of conducting a night attack. All in all, night attacks were not very common during the Civil War. Attacks or battles during the hours of darkness were not very successful. To better understand why, I was tying to look at night battles and why they were successful or not successful.

1. Is it possible that at night, the advantage went from the attacker to the defender? If so, generals would be hesitant to attack at night when the advantages were with the defenders. Based on Civil War tactics and command and control issues, I could see where coordinating an attack during the night would be difficult. Would the defending general have less of a command and control issue?

2. I do not believe that officers or soldiers were well trained in night time fighting. Although extensive and realistic night time fighting techniques training could help overcome command and control issues, I have not seen where officers or soldiers were well schooled in night time battles, but perhaps other forum members are more knowledgeable than I.

3. Next question would be, if all the day time marching and fighting had made soldiers and officers just too exhausted to engage in a night battle. Hungry and exhausted soldiers would need a simple to understand attack plan that was easy to conduct with limited command and control. Unknown terrain experienced during the dark, would make a simple attack more difficult.

Really you conflate 2 seperate issues in your post. You ask about night fighting and immediately mention Shiloh.

First as to night fighting you have to remember that in the CW, the entire populace, not just the soldiers but society in general considered darkness to end almost any activity. At least since WWI almost anyone given the prevalance of artificial lighting considers nighttime to be a nonimportant distinction.

But looking at Shiloh you have a different situation. The South moved an entire army to within smelling distance of its opponent but maintained total tactical and strategic surprise. The problem was that to come to grips with their opponent they had to pass through a wooded area. I don't know if anyone has experienced a hedge on a property line. It can easily be 10'-12' high and you have to look closely to find even a single point where you can squeeze through, generally sideways. At Shiloh this wooded area was very similar, to pass through you had to turn sideways every single step. You might have to move several yards left or right just to take one step forward.

As a result companies became intermingled, as did regiments, as did brigades....etc. What entered the wood as a cohesive unit capable of immediate organized attack, emerged as a disorganized mob. Officers and non-coms became seperated from their men. There was no one there who could be recognized as their leader.

The overall Confederate attack consisted of 3 seperate lines and each suffered the same fate. Once they emerged they faced a totally disorganized Union army. Some were asleep, some were eating, some were just wandering around. A battle between two seperate disorganized armies meant that the defenders were granted just enough time to put up just enough resistance that the attackers despite have surprise were not able to fully take advantage of the fact, giving Grant that brief interval to organize enough of a defense to extend the battle in to a 2nd day where he could use his numerical advantage to turn defeat into victory.

 

[Stone in the wall]

Although more like raids, Mosby and McNeil were able to use to darkness of night to their advantage and slip through enemy lines. Capturing trains, horses, supplies and even several Generals.

 

[JerryD]

Really you conflate 2 seperate issues in your post. You ask about night fighting and immediately mention Shiloh.

First as to night fighting you have to remember that in the CW, the entire populace, not just the soldiers but society in general considered darkness to end almost any activity. At least since WWI almost anyone given the prevalance of artificial lighting considers nighttime to be a nonimportant distinction.

But looking at Shiloh you have a different situation. The South moved an entire army to within smelling distance of its opponent but maintained total tactical and strategic surprise. The problem was that to come to grips with their opponent they had to pass through a wooded area. I don't know if anyone has experienced a hedge on a property line. It can easily be 10'-12' high and you have to look closely to find even a single point where you can squeeze through, generally sideways. At Shiloh this wooded area was very similar, to pass through you had to turn sideways every single step. You might have to move several yards left or right just to take one step forward.

As a result companies became intermingled, as did regiments, as did brigades....etc. What entered the wood as a cohesive unit capable of immediate organized attack, emerged as a disorganized mob. Officers and non-coms became seperated from their men. There was no one there who could be recognized as their leader.

The overall Confederate attack consisted of 3 seperate lines and each suffered the same fate. Once they emerged they faced a totally disorganized Union army. Some were asleep, some were eating, some were just wandering around. A battle between two seperate disorganized armies meant that the defenders were granted just enough time to put up just enough resistance that the attackers despite have surprise were not able to fully take advantage of the fact, giving Grant that brief interval to organize enough of a defense to extend the battle in to a 2nd day where he could use his numerical advantage to turn defeat into victory.

Your assumption is wrong. In the thread he mentioned the discussion was about the possibility of night attack between the first and second days.

 

[JerryD]

Your post immediately brought to mind a story I remember reading about Jackson where (I dont remember the battle) he proposed a night attack, and to help with command and control suggested that his attacking force be totally naked expect for shoes, so men could know who were friend or foe. Sadly, it didn't happen, but just imagine the Mort Kunstler depiction....

Just read a great quote from Ewell who said he admires Jackson's genius, but is certain of his lunacy. Based on this proposal, you can see why.

 

[Sheltowee]

Your post immediately brought to mind a story I remember reading about Jackson where (I dont remember the battle) he proposed a night attack, and to help with command and control suggested that his attacking force be totally naked expect for shoes, so men could know who were friend or foe. Sadly, it didn't happen, but just imagine the Mort Kunstler depiction....

Just read a great quote from Ewell who said he admires Jackson's genius, but is certain of his lunacy. Based on this proposal, you can see why.

Have never heard before- intriguing.

Would love to have seen the look on Marse Robert's face, when Jackson laid out his plan!

 

[Stone in the wall]

Your post immediately brought to mind a story I remember reading about Jackson where (I dont remember the battle) he proposed a night attack, and to help with command and control suggested that his attacking force be totally naked expect for shoes, so men could know who were friend or foe. Sadly, it didn't happen, but just imagine the Mort Kunstler depiction....

Just read a great quote from Ewell who said he admires Jackson's genius, but is certain of his lunacy. Based on this proposal, you can see why.

A guy named Pollard wrote a wild story about Jackson wanting to attack at night at Fredericksburg naked and armed with bowie knifes.
I don't believe any truth to it, or what Jackson would hope to gain, as with day light he would be right under the Unions big guns.
On Jackson's retreat from Winchester 1862 he had wanted to turn back at night and attack but the supply wagons had been pulled to far south.

 

[JerryD]

A guy named Pollard wrote a wild story about Jackson wanting to attack at night at Fredericksburg naked and armed with bowie knifes.
I don't believe any truth to it, or what Jackson would hope to gain, as with day light he would be right under the Unions big guns.
On Jackson's retreat from Winchester 1862 he had wanted to turn back at night and attack but the supply wagons had been pulled to far south.

That may be the source, and to be honest, I didnt really give it much credit either. Thanks for the source, though!

 

[Stone in the wall]

NY Times has a story about Stonewall and a night attack. I'm not a subscriber so I don't know what that contains.

 

[Stone in the wall]

That may be the source, and to be honest, I didnt really give it much credit either. Thanks for the source, though!

Robert Kreek is who wrote about that about Fredericksburg.

 

[eBrowne]

The 86th NY was not involved in the night attack from Hazel Grove on May 2. They would have been at Hazel Grove but not part of Sickles' disastrous night attack. The 86th N.Y. was in BG Whipple's 3rd Division, 1st Brigade of the 3rd Corps. Canfield's (86th N.Y.) letter describes the action previous to the night attack and other events that occurred at Chancellorsville.

From: https://amberandchaos.net/?p=272
The attack was formed from two brigades of Birney's division, Brigadier-General J.H. Hobart Ward's (2/1/III) and Colonel Samuel B. Hayman's (3/1/III). General Ward's Brigade was in the front, along with the 63rd PA of Brigadier-General Charles K. Graham's Brigade (1/1/III) and the 17th ME of General Hayman's Brigade (3/1/III) . General Hayman's Brigade formed the rear echelon. General Whipple's Division (3/III) and General Barlow's Brigade (2/2/XI) remained at Hazel Grove, guarding the artillery. The sky was clear, and the moon glinted off the bayonets of Birney's men as they marched silently north along the road leading to the Plank Road, caps taken off their guns to prevent the men from firing before they reached the enemy. The orders were not to fire until the Plank road was reached. There were no skirmishers ahead of the troops, and no scouting had been done to locate the enemy ahead of time; no one knew what was ahead

The actual attack lasted about one half an hour, and was something close to ludicrous. The left of the Federal line met and contacted the enemy, Confederate Brigadier-General James H. Lane's Brigade (4/1/II). The right of the Federal line brushed against the center of the Federal XII Corps, and charged a battery of General Williams' division (1/XII) who, not knowing of the attack, fired on the Federals as if they were the enemy. The III Corps men fired on both friend and foe, not knowing who was who. The III Corps center continued straight north and managed to attain the Plank road, briefly, and reestablish a stronger line with the rest of the Union army, as well as re-capture several guns and caissons, but did not significantly improve their position and were eventually repulsed. The men fled from their position with something resembling a panic back to the Hazel Grove position. Though General Sickles had not taken the Plank road, he had achieved some gains in position, one from which he could cut a road to the rest of the Federal army.

From the point of view of the common soldier, this attack had a nightmarish quality. Accounts of different soldiers give differing versions of what was going on in this attack. Some saw themselves as fighting their way through a ring of a surrounding , victorious Confederate army. Others saw themselves as running a gauntlet of fire, from their own troops on the right, who didn't know who was moving across their front, to the enemy on their left, who also didn't know what was happening, as the Third Corps moved North against an enemy in front of them who was also firing. Wyman S. White, a member of Berdan's Brigade saw this charge as a desperate attempt to avoid being cut off and surrounded. He describes breaking through two Rebel Battlelines and taking a battery of Federal Guns, before realizing that the III Corps had broken through the Confederates to reach the Federal lines.

General Williams (1/XII) describes the action this way:

"A tremendous roll of infantry fire, mingled with yellings and shoutings, almost diabolical and infernal, opened the conflict on the side of Sickles' division. For some time, my infantry and artillery kept silent, and in the intervals of the musketry, I could distinctly hear the oaths and imprecations of the rebel officers, evidently having hard work to keep their men from stampeding. In the meantime, Sickles' artillery opened fire over the heads of the infantry, and the din of arms and inhuman yellings and cursings redoubled. All at once, Berry's division (2/III) across the road on our right, opened fire in heavy volleys, and Knipe (1/1/XII), commanding my right brigade next to the road on the South, followed suit…"

 

[Jim Heen]

Hard call really too many variables like if the defenders were expecting to be attacked, obstacles, ext. Although I can only think of one night attack that worked due to the enemy not expecting it but it was a century earlier on Christmas day when Washington crossed the Delaware River. That turned out pretty well, Better a Union Billy than a Union Jack!

One other successful night attack in the Revolution was in September 1777 when a British force of 1200 conducted a surprise midnight attack on Mad Anthony Wayne's force of 4000 at Paoli (Wayne lived near Paoli and should not have been surprised). The British were told not to fire their guns but only to use swords and bayonets. Therefore, anyone who fired a gun was presumed to be an American and the gun's discharge gave away their position in the dark. The British inflicted between 300-500 casualties on the Americans at the cost of 3 dead and 8 wounded. Many Americans were killed while attempting to surrender and the battle became known as the Paoli Massacre. Still, the British idea of not firing their guns during a night attack was sound. It should be noted, however, that this operation involved a relatively small number of well-trained British soldiers, so its application to larger actions fought in the Civil War is unclear.

 

[Stone in the wall]

Although more like raids, Mosby and McNeil were able to use to darkness of night to their advantage and slip through enemy lines. Capturing trains, horses, supplies and even several Generals.

I had forgotten about the Mosby-Stringfellow night attack on Cole's forces on Loudoun Heights January 10th 1864. In the bitter cold and deep snow the attack didn't go as planned and turned out to be one of Mosby's worst defeats.