Book Launch New Frank Varney Book

[DanSBHawk]

Looking at the Google Books preview, I don't have much hope that this book is going to be any better than Varney's first book. He has an appendix titled "Rosecrans Revisited," which I thought he might address some of the many errors in the first book. Instead he just doubles down on specious arguments such as this one:

As if preparing the next line of defense is the same as completely taking yourself out of the battle with no idea what's going on.

 

[GwilymT]

I'm just amazed that anyone takes Varney or the Rosey fan boys seriously.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I'm just amazed that anyone takes Varney or the Rosey fan boys seriously.

One thing I don't understand is why good solid history authors even associate with authors that don't have any interest in writing honest history.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Uggh. Read more of the Google Books preview. Painfully biased. I'll leave it at that.

 

[Library Lady]

For anyone who is interested and will be in the Chicago area, the Lincoln/Davis Civil War Round Table is hosting a presentation by Mr. Varney on US Grant on the Rewriting of History on Tuesday, May 16, 2023, at the Country House Restaurant, 5400 W. 127th Street in Alsip, Illinois. This is in the (far) south suburbs. For more information, contact the Round Table at [email protected] .

 

[uaskme]

Looking at the Google Books preview, I don't have much hope that this book is going to be any better than Varney's first book. He has an appendix titled "Rosecrans Revisited," which I thought he might address some of the many errors in the first book. Instead he just doubles down on specious arguments such as this one:

View attachment 468821

As if preparing the next line of defense is the same as completely taking yourself out of the battle with no idea what's going on.

David Powell has written extensively about Chickamauga disagrees with you. Jim Ogden who is the Chickamauga and Chattanooga NPS historian with 40 years of experience disagrees with you.

You have NEVER studied this to any extent. Nor others who spew about Rosecrans on here.

The one who has "no idea what's going on", is you and your analysis. Hilarious!

 

[DanSBHawk]

David Powell has written extensively about Chickamauga disagrees with you. Jim Ogden who is the Chickamauga and Chattanooga NPS historian with 40 years of experience disagrees with you.

You have NEVER studied this to any extent. Nor others who spew about Rosecrans on here.

The one who has "no idea what's going on", is you and your analysis. Hilarious!

I seriously doubt that Powell would say that Rosecrans retreating to Chickamauga is the same as Grant forming his last line. Why don't email him and ask if he agrees with Varney. Otherwise you probably shouldn't presume to be speaking for Powell and Ogden.

 

[breckod]

Looking at the Google Books preview, I don't have much hope that this book is going to be any better than Varney's first book. He has an appendix titled "Rosecrans Revisited," which I thought he might address some of the many errors in the first book. Instead he just doubles down on specious arguments such as this one:

View attachment 468821

As if preparing the next line of defense is the same as completely taking yourself out of the battle with no idea what's going on.

Rosecrans stopping in Rossville would have been a passable analogy for Grant returning to the Landing, but that was not the choice that Roseceans made.

 

[uaskme]

Rosecrans stopping in Rossville would have been a passable analogy for Grant returning to the Landing, but that was not the choice that Roseceans made.

That is exactly what Rosecrans did. He fell back to Roseville Gap. Had the conversation with Garfield. He decided to go on to Chattanooga to prepare for the Army. He made many directives in doing so. One of them was for all troops to be stopped and formed at Roseville Gap. Rosecrans starting vacating the wounded and non essential personnel. Reporting to Washington and reading messages he had recently received. One of those was that Grant and Burnside had been ordered to come to his aid. Sent his subordinate to Thomas, Garfield. With the order for Thomas to fall back to Chattanooga. 1/3 of the Federals left the field during Longstreet's advance. Optics were bad for Rosecrans to go to Chattanooga. But as a command decision, it was the correct one.

 

[breckod]

That is exactly what Rosecrans did. He fell back to Roseville Gap. Had the conversation with Garfield. He decided to go on to Chattanooga

I assume you're aware these two points are directly contradictory and that you're doing this deliberately for some reason?

 

[Nathan Towne]

@breckod

I poked into the new Varney book, but haven't read it yet much. I wasn't very impressed with the first one.

Regarding, Rosecrans' actions on the 20th, amazingly, I am not sure that I would say that that is a perfect analogy. What is true though is that in the face of the evidence, some people actually seem to believe that Rosecrans "fled" the field, or "skulked" away, or some other silly suggestion along those lines. That is definitely a concern in that the available evidence really weighs massively against that conclusion. One can certainly argue that Rosecrans should have tried to ride south himself first, in order to see if he could get through to whatever was still on the field. That is fine. However, if you really look at all of the available evidence, the suggestion as to fleeing, or skulking away, is just not really in the cards. There is really no other conclusion which can be come to that I can see.

Now, again, moving back to the quote provided above, the analogy which Varney makes there is not a perfect one, but it does have some merit. The distances involved on September 20th at Chickamauga were greater and there were other additional considerations which had to be factored into Rosecrans' decision, though. If Rosecrans were to have stopped at Rossville, which was also an option, he could have tried to coordinate the dual purposes from there, once he knew the situation as it existed on the field. The question as to how much sense that would make if it was possible that much of the Army had been driven in, is a serious question though. If he had known that as substantial an element of the Army still remained as it did, stopping in Rossville makes the most sense that way and he may have done it. My principle concern with that though, is that the government in Washington needed to be notified that the Army had sustained a serious defeat and if the Army had been driven in to a substantial degree, the threat of the telegraph line with Chattanooga being cut by Confederate cavalry would have probably been heightened. Furthermore, if he was not going to ride back towards the field, I am not sure that the argument that remaining in Rossville is sufficient, as it certainly would be beneficial to handle the situation involving the trains directly, seeing first-hand what had come in. The argument from Varney there seems a bit overstated to me, but the situation of not knowing what the scale of the remaining defense was would impact that decision.

Also, remember, it seems as though Rosecrans was intending to ride back to Rossville that night after receiving word from Garfield and corresponding with the government. Garfield, after originally communicating along those lines, ultimately told him that he wouldn't be needed and that it was probably best for him to remain the night at Chattanooga.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I'm just amazed that anyone takes Varney or the Rosey fan boys seriously.

I wasn't much of a fan of the first book.

Amusingly, I have been put into the "fan boy" club by some on here, which is obviously silly and took me by surprise.

Had the picture been more clear, Rossville may have made alot of sense. I do believe that there is enough evidence to indicate that Rosecrans was in something akin to a state of exhaustion, maybe even shock, for a time. But, there is just no possible way in which someone can agree with the skulking, or fleeing, narrative, if you look at all of the evidence.

 

[dlofting]

One of those was that Grant and Burnside had been ordered to come to his aid.

My principle concern with that though, is that the government in Washington needed to be notified that the Army had sustained a serious defeat and if the Army had been driven in to a substantial degree, the threat of the telegraph line with Chattanooga being cut by Confederate cavalry would have probably been heightened.

If the first statement is true why did Rosecrans need to notify Washington of the defeat immediately or with high priority.

 

[breckod]

@breckod

I poked into the new Varney book, but haven't read it yet much. I wasn't very impressed with the first one.

Regarding, Rosecrans' actions on the 20th, amazingly, I am not sure that I would say that that is a perfect analogy. What is true though is that in the face of the evidence, some people actually seem to believe that Rosecrans "fled" the field, or "skulked" away, or some other silly suggestion along those lines. That is definitely a concern in that the available evidence really weighs massively against that conclusion. One can certainly argue that Rosecrans should have tried to ride south himself first, in order to see if he could get through to whatever was still on the field. That is fine. However, if you really look at all of the available evidence, the suggestion as to fleeing, or skulking away, is just not really in the cards. There is really no other conclusion which can be come to that I can see.

Now, again, moving back to the quote provided above, the analogy which Varney makes there is not a perfect one, but it does have some merit. The distances involved on September 20th at Chickamauga were greater and there were other additional considerations which had to be factored into Rosecrans' decision, though. If Rosecrans were to have stopped at Rossville, which was also an option, he could have tried to coordinate the dual purposes from there, once he knew the situation as it existed on the field. The question as to how much sense that would make if it was possible that much of the Army had been driven in, is a serious question though. If he had known that as substantial an element of the Army still remained as it did, stopping in Rossville makes the most sense that way and he may have done it. My principle concern with that though, is that the government in Washington needed to be notified that the Army had sustained a serious defeat and if the Army had been driven in to a substantial degree, the threat of the telegraph line with Chattanooga being cut by Confederate cavalry would have probably been heightened. So, the argument from Varney there seems a bit overstated to me, but the situation of not knowing what the scale of the remaining defense was would impact that decision.

Also, remember, it seems as though Rosecrans was intending to ride back to Rossville that night after receiving word from Garfield and corresponding with the government. Garfield, after originally communicating along those lines, ultimately told him that he wouldn't be needed and that it was probably best for him to remain the night at Chattanooga.

Yes, I suppose to make my stance on the issue clear, I don't think it was cowardice, I think it was the type of snap judgement you get from a chronic micromanager who's under pressure and hasn't slept.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Yes, I suppose to make my stance on the issue clear, I don't think it was cowardice, I think it was the type of snap judgement you get from a chronic micromanager who's under pressure and hasn't slept.

Yeah, I mean, I certainly would agree that there is more than enough evidence to support the exhaustion and probably the pressure element l, as well.

On the basis of what we know now, I think that the answer was pretty clearly for Rosecrans to ride back to the front and send Garfield back to Chattanooga to handle the trains and telegraph Washington. That wasn't the information available at the time though.

If you are not going to try to go back to the field, it seems to me that the next most important thing is to personally see to it that the Army trains are guided into Chattanooga, to ensure that Chattanooga can be defended and to notify the government. You may be able to notify the government from Rossville, but the former objectives wouldn't be attained firsthand. Then, once this is seen to, you can always ride back to Rossville, if necessary, or appropriate. If you aren't going to try to ride through to the field, though, that makes the most sense to me.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I actually know exactly what Dave Powell's take on this is, because he is a friend and so I took the time to ask.

But, I will let people ask him themselves.

 

[Rebforever]

I wasn't much of a fan of the first book.

Amusingly, I have been put into the "fan boy" club by some on here, which is obviously silly and took me by surprise.

Had the picture been more clear, Rossville may have made alot of sense. I do believe that there is enough evidence to indicate that Rosecrans was in something akin to a state of exhaustion, maybe even shock, for a time. But, there is just no possible way in which someone can agree with the skulking, or fleeing, narrative, if you look at all of the evidence.

I have been following along an just out of curiosity, have you been to
Chickamauga and Chattanooga battle field to see if your facts line up with
all your evidence? That would be a nice yes or no if you please .
Not a four page answer.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I have been following along an just out of curiosity, have you been to
Chickamauga and Chattanooga battle field to see if your facts line up with
all your evidence? That would be a nice yes or no if you please .
Not a four page answer.

Still never been. Have only used topographical maps. That is part of why I am reserved in many of the judgements which I pass. I try to be careful everywhere though.

Going to Chickamauga for the first time in October.

 

[Jamieva]

Looking at the Google Books preview, I don't have much hope that this book is going to be any better than Varney's first book. He has an appendix titled "Rosecrans Revisited," which I thought he might address some of the many errors in the first book. Instead he just doubles down on specious arguments such as this one:

View attachment 468821

As if preparing the next line of defense is the same as completely taking yourself out of the battle with no idea what's going on.

Oddly I was watching a talk Varney did for the america civil war museum on YouTube today. In that talk he said Grant wasn't on the field at Shiloh, he was on the river gunboat for the battle. So which is it? He just can't keep his story straight.

Side note in the presentation he repeated the 7000 casualty figure for Cold Harbor which Rhea debunked years and years ago. Again someone with an anti grant bias would use that number.

I read both books because I want to be open minded to all scholarship. But I have to be honest when he starts out saying well known reputable historians have looked at the same info he did and they got it wrong, that always makes me pause. Like they're nit all idiots and you are the only one with a brain to see it.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Oddly I was watching a talk Varney did for the america civil war museum on YouTube today. In that talk he said Grant wasn't on the field at Shiloh, he was on the river gunboat for the battle. So which is it? He just can't keep his story straight.

Side note in the presentation he repeated the 7000 casualty figure for Cold Harbor which Rhea debunked years and years ago. Again someone with an anti grant bias would use that number.

I read both books because I want to be open minded to all scholarship. But I have to be honest when he starts out saying well known reputable historians have looked at the same info he did and they got it wrong, that always makes me pause. Like they're nit all idiots and you are the only one with a brain to see it.

When Varney criticizes other historians he often gets it wrong. He'll accuse reputable historians of not providing a source to something (when in fact they did) or that they only sourced Grant's Memoirs (when in fact they did not.)

I think he relies on readers to simply believe him and not verify his claims.