Never had a chance.

[lurid]

Out of my "perfunctory reading" and spinelessly following a "liberal consensus" I´d like to share my ideas
(and do sincerely hope that they are not too provoking):

1) The fact alone that a lot of people are contributing and debating here should be a sign that more than only a few people are somehow impressed by the "confederate performance" - as this forum would probably decease very early if we all were of the same opinion.

2) People who are impressed with the "confederate performance" are not inevitably disdaining the performance of the Union. I (eg.) am readily embracing Lincoln´s political wisdom, Grant´s clever maneuvering, the fighting spirit of the AoP, the immense organisational accomplishments of the Union etc.pp.

3) To prevent inflating this post I´d just like to bear upon the points you introduced:

a) the Confederates being "fortified":
In a territory that vast you can of course fortify positions but you´ll have to leave them as soon as you are flanked - especially when armies are depending on their railroad connections (as they were). Johnston tried this tactic and it never worked out - to stop the Union advance he HAD to attack somewhen / somewhere - and then he should better be **** sure about success because his attacking troops obviously wouldn´t have any numerical superiority (as that famous war theory 101 demands....by the way...the Japanese took Singapore heavily outnumbered...)

b) the Union always in the offensive (without having a 2:1 superiority)
Well, having understood a) Lee always tried to act offensively himself - the Union could have also used decidedly defensive tactics (which they did at Gettysburg to their benefit).

c) contemporary armies bombed into oblivion but fighting longer than the Confederates
I am a bit unsure.
Do you mean contemporary armies of the age of the Civil War? All of the wars of the 19th century were decisively shorter than the Civil War. If you should allude to today´s armies: what armies do you have in mind?

d) Mujaheddin / NVA lasted longer
Well...they waged a guerilla war - something Lee declined (which you obviously know).

But I don´t think that this anyway would have been an option:
The motivation of people to fight on the side of the Confederates seems a bit ambiguous to me (they fought for slavery, resentment to the North because of being morally reproached [regardless if WE regard that reproach as justified...THEY did probably not...], out of enthusiasm, war fever, Dixie patriotism, misled by propaganda....).
And I am pretty sure that many of them still shared a feeling of affiliation to the US somewhere in the back of their minds.
Those were definitely not crazy Vietcong people - if the Confederacy wouldn´t have harvested some laurels (Lee´s business) she would have collapsed even earlier I think.

And they (NVA/Mujaheddin) were not dependent on only a few denser populated regions / cities.
What was the Confederacy worth without Atlanta, Memphis, New Orleans, Richmond?
It was possible to reach the suburbs of Richmond and Atlanta in a tad more than 3 to 4 months [something Grant / Sherman proved in 1864] - but it took three years in reality to achieve it (and not because the Union wasn´t trying...- but please remember, I do not want to tell you that the Union blundered or didn´t fight well....).

You are just parroting the consensus: superiority of numbers, resources, technology advances, along with excuses why the Confederates underperformed. Your hypothesis is rejected, IMO..

 

[Piedone]

You specifically said, "I beg the differ to disagree." I followed up with a mock, because your terminology, syntax and grammar seem a little strange on the internet, like you are masquerading as a 17th century aristocrat. LOL.

You must be a Confederate sympathizer because you seem to get easily offended? I specifically said it was my "opinion" and didn't need you to point that out, which you obviously missed it. I never said anything about an alternate opinions were not allowed, and again, I stressed that my post was my opinion and yes, you obviously missed that as well. What are you talking about over-simplification? I never read anywhere on this board about the Confederates overperforming, I personally said they underperformed. I specifically said the consensus believes the opposite, which you obviously missed again.

The so-called impressive myriad books about the Civil War is not what I am talking about, I'm sure they are great but I was talking about books on war theory and experience fighting in a ground war, so you obviously misunderstood it. I am willing to acquiesce your dissent just for the sake of the board, by all means post anything you like because I don't make the rules.

Okay, you were in the Army, but asked if anyone served in infantry or operational level so they can give their account on how ground wars are/were conducted. It is very relevant which I stated in post #110 because I was talking about armies being dug in(fortified) and lacked the resources, man power, technocracy and were "bombed" into a oblivion and still lasted way longer than the Confederates, which you missed my comparison of contemporary armies to old-fashioned armies as well. I believe you don't know what I am talking about after this post, so I advise you to respond to a post you might understand.

Nevertheless, if you want to engage, please re-read my posts carefully and not from a perfunctory perspective, which you missed that part when I stated that also.

Well...I am just a foreigner...having learnt English mainly from reading (admittedly outdated) books.

 

[wausaubob]

Could the Confederates have won tactically? Sure, but not on Atlantic coast, the Gulf coast, or the internal rivers. Could there have been a period of separation? Maybe.
But international immigration was going to resume. The Confederates would soon be facing an industrial giant in the east, a Midwest section that was the equal of the Confederacy, and a western section which wanted a strong and unchallenged national government.
A period of separation doesn't change the situation much. It just means the outcome is postponed.
The rate of technical change was accelerating, especially with respect to telegraphic communication and railroads.
Telegraphic methods were leading to operational telegraphs, and voice communication was not far off.
Every year the railroad engines were heavier and more powerful. Steel rails, automatic couplers, air breaks, and Pullman cars were coming. And agriculture everything was changing. Even something as basic as needle and thread was giving way to sewing machines.
And the US was almost completely untouched by the war. If a second round had been required, the US would have deployed ships with laminated armor. It would have had a domestic firearms industry, and it would have adapted French breech loading artillery, in the size of the guns was limited only the speed at which RR track could be laid down in the fields laid out for deployment.
War was becoming more industrialized and the gap between the US and the potential Confederate nation was only growing.

 

[Andersonh1]

I would disagree with the idea that Confederate defeat was inevitable. The Confederates had a chance to win, certainly. They were probably always the underdog, but there were a number of paths to victory when the war began. As time went on, the odds got longer, and in the end the final chance was just to make the US population tired of war and ready to make a deal, because a military win wasn't going to happen.

 

[wausaubob]

President Lincoln was very worried at times. But he was not indispensable. The historical forces were what author Foote was commenting on, not President Lincoln's worst case scenario worries.

 

[wausaubob]

I would disagree with the idea that Confederate defeat was inevitable. The Confederates had a chance to win, certainly. They were probably always the underdog, but there were a number of paths to victory when the war began. As time went on, the odds got longer, and in the end the final chance was just to make the US population tired of war and ready to make a deal, because a military win wasn't going to happen.

And that explains why so many of our countrymen of that time died in a war that ended in complete victory of the US.
The Confederates had no chance at sea, no chance on the Mississippi River and no chance in the far west. This is what the US could deploy by December 1864:

https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1860/statistics/1860d-01.pdf p. xvi.

 

[Piedone]

I would disagree with the idea that Confederate defeat was inevitable. The Confederates had a chance to win, certainly. They were probably always the underdog, but there were a number of paths to victory when the war began. As time went on, the odds got longer, and in the end the final chance was just to make the US population tired of war and ready to make a deal, because a military win wasn't going to happen.

As much as I'd like to agree I am a bit more pessimistic - the Confederates could only hope that the North was not willed to go at any lengths - if that happened the prospects were rather bleak. I read some of the resignation letters of southern officers to Scott - not a few of them seem to have been somehow aware of that.

 

[Lost Cause]

"Never had a chance"

Didn't Lincoln (according to some here: all wise/all knowing/all seeing/omnipotent) on more than one occasion express doubts about winning the war?

Certainly enough doubt that his 1864 reelection prospect was in doubt, thereby bringing about questionable practices to help ensure his success.

 

[wausaubob]

https://books.google.com/books?id=c...al review of immigration 1820 to 1910&f=false

This is what Mr. Foote was referring to. By the end of 1867, in the northern and western sections of the US, one could not detect that there had been a civil war.

 

[wausaubob]

See page 615. The US almost tripled locomotive production during the Civil War decade.
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1870/wealth-industry/1870c-28.pdf

 

[lurid]

IMO, through my experience and study I don't know how anyone could give the Confederates much praise for their debacle and complete underperformance, at least from a military strategic and logistic standpoint. I give the Confederate rank -n- file props for fighting, no matter their reason(s). However, I think the Union showed how they could adapt to any type of war and circumstance and ultimately win. I don't believe that nonsense for a second that Confederates never had a chance to win. The Confederates believed they had a real good chance, which they expressed explicitly. Didn't the Confederacy believe that they were the favorites and thought they had a 10:1 kill ratio advantage that never materialized? Didn't the Confederacy have more military installations, that didn't have much of a military impact? The Confederates had a classic triad military advantage for ground war success: fortified, knew the terrain and a vast intel support network. But according to bloggers, the Union won because of superior numbers and resources. The only problem with that theory is that a high command of a military apparatus has to know how to utilize the men and the resources to overcome their disadvantages, it's called grand strategy.

As for war of attrition, the Confederacy didn't do so well at that either. If anyone studies casualties and it is evident that the Confederates cooked the books, but that didn't matter anyway because the aggregate battle death toll percentage favored the Union. Between 1.5 million and 2.4 million Union soldiers served during the Civil War, whereas 750,000 to 1 million Confederate soldiers served. Consequently, the Union had an a estimated 40-50% more men than the Confederates, and took only an estimated 16,000 more casualties. Battle death percentages are a good metric: the Union battle casualties were 110,000 and the Confederacy was 94,000, that equates to the Union had roughly 16-17% battle mortality rate and the Confederacy had a 20% battlefield death mortality rate. The problem is that when people read about casualties they don't notice that they are reading the sum total of deaths: battle deaths, disease and prisoners of war and that's why they misconstrue the mortality rate of 15% for the Union and 12% for the Confederacy, but strictly from a battlefield mortality the Confederacy had a 20% mortality rate and the Union around 16-17%. Back to hubris statement the Confederates made that they had a 10:1 kill rate advantage over the Yankees, but according to accurate economics percentages the Yankees ended up with a 3:1 kill ratio favor. The Confederates fortification with their flanking maneuvers in conjunction with those poorly guided Union frontal attacks accounted for easy kills, but nowhere near enough, which is mind boggling. I'm not making fun at the Confederates, I'm puzzled to why they didn't do much better than what they did.

I don't know how anyone else feels about surrender but when was in the USMC surrender was out-of-the question, and was worse than being KIA'ed. If anyone does a Civil War prisoner study, they will find 211,000 Union soldiers were POW's and 460,000 Confederate POWs, and that was half it's army. The Confederates had 50% more POWs. The 50% POWs along with 20% battle mortality rate and a another 30% from disease and other miscellaneous reasons the Confederates were completely wiped out. I don't know how many POWs were released and then KIA'ed, but that don't matter they were captured and could have been disposed of in a hurry.

As for territory gains, the Union took the entire southeast within four years, the Confederacy did not have one stronghold at the end of the war.

I don't know if the Confederacy never had a chance but if they did they squandered it hard. They were vanquished on every level, period.

 

[atlantis]

IMO, through my experience and study I don't know how anyone could give the Confederates much praise for their debacle and complete underperformance, at least from a military strategic and logistic standpoint. I give the Confederate rank -n- file props for fighting, no matter their reason(s). However, I think the Union showed how they could adapt to any type of war and circumstance and ultimately win. I don't believe that nonsense for a second that Confederates never had a chance to win. The Confederates believed they had a real good chance, which they expressed explicitly. Didn't the Confederacy believe that they were the favorites and thought they had a 10:1 kill ratio advantage that never materialized? Didn't the Confederacy have more military installations, that didn't have much of a military impact? The Confederates had a classic triad military advantage for ground war success: fortified, knew the terrain and a vast intel support network. But according to bloggers, the Union won because of superior numbers and resources. The only problem with that theory is that a high command of a military apparatus has to know how to utilize the men and the resources to overcome their disadvantages, it's called grand strategy.

As for war of attrition, the Confederacy didn't do so well at that either. If anyone studies casualties and it is evident that the Confederates cooked the books, but that didn't matter anyway because the aggregate battle death toll percentage favored the Union. Between 1.5 million and 2.4 million Union soldiers served during the Civil War, whereas 750,000 to 1 million Confederate soldiers served. Consequently, the Union had an a estimated 40-50% more men than the Confederates, and took only an estimated 16,000 more casualties. Battle death percentages are a good metric: the Union battle casualties were 110,000 and the Confederacy was 94,000, that equates to the Union had roughly 16-17% battle mortality rate and the Confederacy had a 20% battlefield death mortality rate. The problem is that when people read about casualties they don't notice that they are reading the sum total of deaths: battle deaths, disease and prisoners of war and that's why they misconstrue the mortality rate of 15% for the Union and 12% for the Confederacy, but strictly from a battlefield mortality the Confederacy had a 20% mortality rate and the Union around 16-17%. Back to hubris statement the Confederates made that they had a 10:1 kill rate advantage over the Yankees, but according to accurate economics percentages the Yankees ended up with a 3:1 kill ratio favor. The Confederates fortification with their flanking maneuvers in conjunction with those poorly guided Union frontal attacks accounted for easy kills, but nowhere near enough, which is mind boggling. I'm not making fun at the Confederates, I'm puzzled to why they didn't do much better than what they did.

I don't know how anyone else feels about surrender but when was in the USMC surrender was out-of-the question, and was worse than being KIA'ed. If anyone does a Civil War prisoner study, they will find 211,000 Union soldiers were POW's and 460,000 Confederate POWs, and that was half it's army. The Confederates had 50% more POWs. The 50% POWs along with 20% battle mortality rate and a another 30% from disease and other miscellaneous reasons the Confederates were completely wiped out. I don't know how many POWs were released and then KIA'ed, but that don't matter they were captured and could have been disposed of in a hurry.

As for territory gains, the Union took the entire southeast within four years, the Confederacy did not have one stronghold at the end of the war.

I don't know if the Confederacy never had a chance but if they did they squandered it hard. They were vanquished on every level, period.

I think the root of the high pow and desertion rate for confederates is due to the conscription acts. The acts extended enlistments and this undermined morale and sense of purpose.

 

[lurid]

I think the root of the high pow and desertion rate for confederates is due to the conscription acts. The acts extended enlistments and this undermined morale and sense of purpose.

So what. The point of my thread is to debunk that mythology that the Confederates never had a chance but simultaneously show that they were defeated on every front, and should not have been so soundly defeated. It could be that once the Union got going the Confederates' best strategy would have been to exit stage left.

 

[atlantis]

So what. The point of my thread is to debunk that mythology that the Confederates never had a chance but simultaneously show that they were defeated on every front, and should not have been so soundly defeated. It could be that once the Union got going the Confederates' best strategy would have been to exit stage left.

And my point is they would not have been so soundly defeated if they had a more reliable army instead of an army of deserters.

 

[Piedone]

So what. The point of my thread is to debunk that mythology that the Confederates never had a chance but simultaneously show that they were defeated on every front, and should not have been so soundly defeated. It could be that once the Union got going the Confederates' best strategy would have been to exit stage left.

Well...somehow you are obviously right.
People who lost a war after four and a half years could of course have done better when losing that war after five and a half years.
They obviously could have done even a lot better when winning that war.

I am eager to hear about your advice: what exactly would YOU have done when having been in charge of the confederate war effort?

 

[lurid]

Well...somehow you are obviously right.
People who lost a war after four and a half years could of course have done better when losing that war after five and a half years.
They obviously could have done even a lot better when winning that war.

I am eager to hear about your advice: what exactly would YOU have done when having been in charge of the confederate war effort?

You mean the Confederacy lasted only four and the contemporary armies I used as a reference lasted ten years, so I don't know where you got 5 1/2 years? Down playing ten years is rather absurd, even though you didn't know it.

To be honest, the Confederates were finished after Gettysburg, so they really lasted only 2 years. Lee lost the war for the Confederacy early. Lee lost a 1/3 of his army at Gettysburg, 2 more major battles in PA he would have lost his entire army. I never would have went on the offensive in PA, that had to be one of the worst moves in military history. I know bloggers say Lee was trying to terrorize the civilian population in PA in order to garner support to end the war, but it is obvious he did not know or understand Pennsylvanians because I do know them and IMO, all he did was further irk the north. An inept move by Lee, he should have stayed put because he had it made at his assignment.

Lee was given sufficient forces to defend a constricted operational theater. He was tasked with defending the axis between Washington, D.C. and Richmond Virginia, a fairly constrained, predominantly land-bound geographical corridor with good communications and reasonable defensive terrain. He did so at a time when the defense was particularly effective. People overlook that Lee was a better engineer building fortification than he was a general making decisions and in conjunction with above mentioned advantages it should be no surprise he was somewhat successful.

Moreover, McClellan actually did a competent job at executing the role assigned him in Gen. Scott's Anacondas plan: "sit tight, hold Washington, and let the Navy squeeze the Confederacy." Problem was, Scott died before he could remind Lincoln and the Eastern press of this plan, so McClellan and his successor were spurred, repeatedly, into spasmodic efforts to take Richmond and points South. Interestingly this suggests that McClellan's notoriously defensive instincts may well have been sound for the theater… and that Lee had the luck of a cushy but highly visible assignment, as well as the luck of facing undistinguished Union Generals plagued by the ongoing surveillance of an armchair audience. Lee built his reputation in part because he was present at the juncture of a fundamental Union weakness in its conduct of the war: in Clausewitz's terms he was able — wittingly or unwittingly — to take advantage of the North's ongoing and dysfunctional tug-of-war between people, government and army.

Lee should have stayed put and saved his army and waited for Grant to arrive, his chances of winning would have been greater if he never stepped foot in PA.

And my point is they would not have been so soundly defeated if they had a more reliable army instead of an army of deserters.

I suppose you are correct.

 

[Piedone]

You mean the Confederacy lasted only four and the contemporary armies I used as a reference lasted ten years, so I don't know where you got 5 1/2 years? Down playing ten years is rather absurd, even though you didn't know it.

To be honest, the Confederates were finished after Gettysburg, so they really lasted only 2 years. Lee lost the war for the Confederacy early. Lee lost a 1/3 of his army at Gettysburg, 2 more major battles in PA he would have lost his entire army. I never would have went on the offensive in PA, that had to be one of the worst moves in military history. I know bloggers say Lee was trying to terrorize the civilian population in PA in order to garner support to end the war, but it is obvious he did not know or understand Pennsylvanians because I do know them and IMO, all he did was further irk the north. An inept move by Lee, he should have stayed put because he had it made at his assignment.

Lee was given sufficient forces to defend a constricted operational theater. He was tasked with defending the axis between Washington, D.C. and Richmond Virginia, a fairly constrained, predominantly land-bound geographical corridor with good communications and reasonable defensive terrain. He did so at a time when the defense was particularly effective. People overlook that Lee was a better engineer building fortification than he was a general making decisions and in conjunction with above mentioned advantages it should be no surprise he was somewhat successful.

Moreover, McClellan actually did a competent job at executing the role assigned him in Gen. Scott's Anacondas plan: "sit tight, hold Washington, and let the Navy squeeze the Confederacy." Problem was, Scott died before he could remind Lincoln and the Eastern press of this plan, so McClellan and his successor were spurred, repeatedly, into spasmodic efforts to take Richmond and points South. Interestingly this suggests that McClellan's notoriously defensive instincts may well have been sound for the theater… and that Lee had the luck of a cushy but highly visible assignment, as well as the luck of facing undistinguished Union Generals plagued by the ongoing surveillance of an armchair audience. Lee built his reputation in part because he was present at the juncture of a fundamental Union weakness in its conduct of the war: in Clausewitz's terms he was able — wittingly or unwittingly — to take advantage of the North's ongoing and dysfunctional tug-of-war between people, government and army.

Lee should have stayed put and saved his army and waited for Grant to arrive, his chances of winning would have been greater if he never stepped foot in PA.


I suppose you are correct.

Yes, that idea about staying on the defensive being the more clever way is talked a lot of.
And especially Longstreet gave Lee the very same advice at Gettysburg as far as I recall.

I hope it's not annoying to you if I ask for a bit more detailed strategy:
Let's assume it's May 6, 1863 - where would you reposition the ANV to await the return of the Federals?
And what would be a achievable goal to them? Hold out until when?

 

[Piedone]

You mean the Confederacy lasted only four and the contemporary armies I used as a reference lasted ten years, so I don't know where you got 5 1/2 years? Down playing ten years is rather absurd, even though you didn't know it.

To be honest, the Confederates were finished after Gettysburg, so they really lasted only 2 years. Lee lost the war for the Confederacy early. Lee lost a 1/3 of his army at Gettysburg, 2 more major battles in PA he would have lost his entire army. I never would have went on the offensive in PA, that had to be one of the worst moves in military history. I know bloggers say Lee was trying to terrorize the civilian population in PA in order to garner support to end the war, but it is obvious he did not know or understand Pennsylvanians because I do know them and IMO, all he did was further irk the north. An inept move by Lee, he should have stayed put because he had it made at his assignment.

Lee was given sufficient forces to defend a constricted operational theater. He was tasked with defending the axis between Washington, D.C. and Richmond Virginia, a fairly constrained, predominantly land-bound geographical corridor with good communications and reasonable defensive terrain. He did so at a time when the defense was particularly effective. People overlook that Lee was a better engineer building fortification than he was a general making decisions and in conjunction with above mentioned advantages it should be no surprise he was somewhat successful.

Moreover, McClellan actually did a competent job at executing the role assigned him in Gen. Scott's Anacondas plan: "sit tight, hold Washington, and let the Navy squeeze the Confederacy." Problem was, Scott died before he could remind Lincoln and the Eastern press of this plan, so McClellan and his successor were spurred, repeatedly, into spasmodic efforts to take Richmond and points South. Interestingly this suggests that McClellan's notoriously defensive instincts may well have been sound for the theater… and that Lee had the luck of a cushy but highly visible assignment, as well as the luck of facing undistinguished Union Generals plagued by the ongoing surveillance of an armchair audience. Lee built his reputation in part because he was present at the juncture of a fundamental Union weakness in its conduct of the war: in Clausewitz's terms he was able — wittingly or unwittingly — to take advantage of the North's ongoing and dysfunctional tug-of-war between people, government and army.

Lee should have stayed put and saved his army and waited for Grant to arrive, his chances of winning would have been greater if he never stepped foot in PA.


I suppose you are correct.

I pondered a bit more about your posting. Regarding the reactions Lee provoked with his intrusion into PA you are absolutely right.

And maybe we are even not that far apart with our view on the matters as I explicitly do not want to say that the Confederates didn't blunder - they did - and on more than one occasion.
As you remarked in your post there also was some blundering and in-fight in the Union.
Hence derives my reluctance to accept a bland statement like "they could have done much better" because it cannot be denied that there were a lot of bumbling and incompetent people in charge on both sides.

With those "5 1/2 years" I just wanted to say that it of course would have been possible for the Confederacy to hold out longer - and that every day they held out longer (than 4 1/2 years) would lead to accredit a better performance to them - regardless if we talk about 10 years or just 10 months more...

I think the only real disagreement between us might be that you deem a victory of the Confederacy quite possible - if they just played out their cards right.
I am deeming such an outcome really improbable.

And regarding the rather mixed quality of leading figures (on both sides) I think the Confederates performed not disappointingly.
Of course we all can elaborate better plans - but there were people like Pope, Bragg, Polk, Burnside to execute those plans.

But IF you want me to accept your verdict of underperforming Confederates I'd at least ask for some reasons - and especially for a viable strategy that had a reasonable chance to be executed under the conditions of the reality in 1861-65.
Because until now I just couldn't come up myself with something Lee should have done to get himself a better prospect of success.

 

[lurid]

I pondered a bit more about your posting. Regarding the reactions Lee provoked with his intrusion into PA you are absolutely right.

And maybe we are even not that far apart with our view on the matters as I explicitly do not want to say that the Confederates didn't blunder - they did - and on more than one occasion.
As you remarked in your post there also was some blundering and in-fight in the Union.
Hence derives my reluctance to accept a bland statement like "they could have done much better" because it cannot be denied that there were a lot of bumbling and incompetent people in charge on both sides.

With those "5 1/2 years" I just wanted to say that it of course would have been possible for the Confederacy to hold out longer - and that every day they held out longer (than 4 1/2 years) would lead to accredit a better performance to them - regardless if we talk about 10 years or just 10 months more...

I think the only real disagreement between us might be that you deem a victory of the Confederacy quite possible - if they just played out their cards right.
I am deeming such an outcome really improbable.

And regarding the rather mixed quality of leading figures (on both sides) I think the Confederates performed not disappointingly.
Of course we all can elaborate better plans - but there were people like Pope, Bragg, Polk, Burnside to execute those plans.

But IF you want me to accept your verdict of underperforming Confederates I'd at least ask for some reasons - and especially for a viable strategy that had a reasonable chance to be executed under the conditions of the reality in 1861-65.
Because until now I just couldn't come up myself with something Lee should have done to get himself a better prospect of success.

I already gave the board my reasoning behind the Confederate underperformance, so accept it or don't accept it. I'm not a military strategist and neither are you, and neither is any other blogger. I simply use eco data to come with my assessments, and you and other people seem to come up with your assessments on how you feel and emotions.

Before I go any further let's get some straight in our thinking: we are critiquing 19th century military strategy and capability, so we should take everything we say with a grain of salt. We are armchair quarterbacking on the internet, so people should not take it too serious because hindsight is always 20/20.

I think the Union strategy is worth discussing more than the Confederate strategy. This is a copy and paste from some of my post(s).

McClellan had the best strategy fighting Lee, hold and fight when he felt was necessary, and wait for someone like Sherman to come to Lee's rear. McClellan actually did a competent job at executing the role assigned him in Gen. Scott's Anacondas plan: "sit tight, hold Washington, and let the Navy squeeze the Confederacy." Problem was, Scott died before he could remind Lincoln and the Eastern press of this plan, so McClellan and his successor were spurred, repeatedly, into spasmodic efforts to take Richmond and points South.

Interestingly this suggests that McClellan's notoriously defensive instincts may well have been sound for the theater… and that Lee had the luck of a cushy but highly visible assignment, as well as the luck of facing undistinguished Union Generals plagued by the ongoing surveillance of an armchair audience.

Sherman understood the very constitution of the southern elite, and he understood the very fundamental reason to why they wanted war. He knew the southern aristocracy was a patrician society with excess pride and their fundamentally reason for fighting was to protect their patrimony: slaves, land and mansions. Conversely, the average Confederate soldier's well being was never considered.

Sherman is misunderstood by just about everyone, that's because he didn't follow the Marquess of Queensbury rules of boxing, he threw off the gloves. He demolished the heartland of the Southern aristocrats: their land and slaves—and left them impotent and discredited before their helpless women and children. Facing little opposition once they left Atlanta, Sherman's men destroyed the very infrastructure that supported slavery and upheld the slaveholding elites—plantations, communications, factories, and government facilities. Southern military officers put great capital in the idea of the sanctity of the Southern homeland. They deemed themselves great raiders and marauders, who harassed fixed garrisons and terrorized timid populations. Sherman, however, gave the Confederacy the raid of its life. The central objective could be summed up quite simply: Freeing the unfree and humiliating the arrogant.

Sherman goes down in history similar to a Greek tragic hero, like Ajax. He was the only general of the entire CW who could have done the job to end the war. But that's never discussed, the manner he did it in is constantly discussed because sanctimonious people who think they're sober and judicious shout out their fraudulent accusations from their fictional ivory tower. Ajax deserved Achilles armor and Sherman deserves Lee's armor.

I think if the Union would kept McLellan in charge of the east and cut Sherman Loose a little earlier the war could been over sooner, both generals, IMO, had the right strategy to end the Confederates reign of terror. I do believe that the Confederates would have been doomed no matter what that strategy.

 

[wausaubob]

What Mr. Foote was talking about was a nice of way of summarizing Mark Twain's observations. The Confederacy was not going to end the tidal wave of immigration sweeping into the Midwest. They weren't going to change the mechanization of basic tasks such as threshing wheat, and sewing clothes. Steel, petroleum products, voice transmission, and electric lights were right around the corner. War itself was becoming increasing industrialized, and the nations with a military industrial complex were going dominate the next century.
Foote is also noting the basic asymmetry of the experience. The Civil War that the Confederacy experienced was a traumatizing disaster. But in the US, the loss of working age men was barely noticeable, and there was not physical destruction. Much of life went on perfectly normal.