Golden Thread Nathaniel Lyon: Hero, Devil, or both?

[Lusty Murfax]

One of the lackeys wrote an account the same day or next day, and submitted it to the press. The other lackey waited 25 years and wrote an account when he knew the Lost Cause would approve of, and cover his dishonesty.

Are you telling us that in June, 1861 the press in St. Louis was reliable? This was after Lyon had initiated armed conflict with Missouri and Union military authorities had full control of St. Louis. Do you honestly believe a true and honest appraisal of the situation in Missouri would be allowed to be published there when the military and domestic environment were in doubt? Are you not aware that a little more than one month earlier, after Lyon's unwarranted attack on Camp Jackson and the arrest of the Missouri State Militia trainees, he marched the trainees through the streets of St. Louis at gunpoint of privately raised German militia soldiers? As Lyon marched his prisoners through streets lined with crowds of civilians, the German troops panicked and fired wildly , killing and wounding several. Under these circumstances, do you believe it likely a Union controlled press could be depended on to report honestly? Have you thought this through?

 

[DanSBHawk]

You are entitled to your opinion, however much it reveals your own disdain for Snead. It seems to me that both subordinates would naturally try to put their commanders in a favorable light. Further, why is it assumed that Snead drew his account from memory? It is
reasonable to believe that each man kept a journal of their impressions of the meeting. And why is it assumed that Snead was dishonest?

You're right that I should not assume that Snead was dishonest. But there's no doubt that he was biased. And there's no doubt that 25 years is a long time to wait to write details of a meeting.

But Snead also wrote some positive things about Lyon as well, such as this in 1877:

"Lyon was the greatest man I ever saw. That has been my statement​

everywhere. I felt it and said it the day we held that memorable interview​

with him at the Planter's House in Saint Louis,"​

​

"He was Jefferson Davis all over again, but not as narrow and​

prejudiced as Davis. He was like Davis, however, in his intensity and​

tenacity and about of the stature and leanness of Davis. We were to hold​

that interview in order to see if war could be prevented. I am the only​

survivor of it. Claiborne Jackson and Sterling Price were the ablest​

politicians of Missouri; Price had become the head of the State's​

Democratic Party after the death of Senator Benton."​

​

"Lyon came there with Frank Blair and Major Conant. Price was a​

successful military officer and Major General in the War with Mexico, Lyon​

was nothing but a little captain of the infantry but such was his clearness,​

force and real genius, that he met those old politicians on every point,​

conceding nothing but never discourteous—his reason and his will equal."​

​

"The whole party felt him to be the master mind. and Federal historians​

do not err when they put him down as the greatest man the North produced​

—greater than any produced on both sides—west of the Mississippi River."​

​

"Lyon advanced into that room, a small, red-bearded. red-haired,​

precise, positive, plain man. He sat down and crossed one leg over the​

other stiffly, and his face was serious and stem. He spoke each word​

separate from the other, pronouncing the little words as my and to with as​

much emphasis as the longer words. Occasionally. he raised his right hand​

automatically as the conversation proceeded, and brought it down with a​

jerk, with forefinger extended, yet never speaking in higher or lower tones​

than at first. We felt the sense of war and government in all his bearing."​

 

[Lusty Murfax]

nm

 

[archieclement]

You're right that I should not assume that Snead was dishonest. But there's no doubt that he was biased. And there's no doubt that 25 years is a long time to wait to write details of a meeting.

But Snead also wrote some positive things about Lyon as well, such as this in 1877:

"Lyon was the greatest man I ever saw. That has been my statement​

everywhere. I felt it and said it the day we held that memorable interview​

with him at the Planter's House in Saint Louis,"​

​

"He was Jefferson Davis all over again, but not as narrow and​

prejudiced as Davis. He was like Davis, however, in his intensity and​

tenacity and about of the stature and leanness of Davis. We were to hold​

that interview in order to see if war could be prevented. I am the only​

survivor of it. Claiborne Jackson and Sterling Price were the ablest​

politicians of Missouri; Price had become the head of the State's​

Democratic Party after the death of Senator Benton."​

​

"Lyon came there with Frank Blair and Major Conant. Price was a​

successful military officer and Major General in the War with Mexico, Lyon​

was nothing but a little captain of the infantry but such was his clearness,​

force and real genius, that he met those old politicians on every point,​

conceding nothing but never discourteous—his reason and his will equal."​

​

"The whole party felt him to be the master mind. and Federal historians​

do not err when they put him down as the greatest man the North produced​

—greater than any produced on both sides—west of the Mississippi River."​

​

"Lyon advanced into that room, a small, red-bearded. red-haired,​

precise, positive, plain man. He sat down and crossed one leg over the​

other stiffly, and his face was serious and stem. He spoke each word​

separate from the other, pronouncing the little words as my and to with as​

much emphasis as the longer words. Occasionally. he raised his right hand​

automatically as the conversation proceeded, and brought it down with a​

jerk, with forefinger extended, yet never speaking in higher or lower tones​

than at first. We felt the sense of war and government in all his bearing."​

Perhaps this is where his bad memory you allege shows.......

 

[SWMODave]

Patrick - if there were any journals kept at the time, they have been apparently lost. Snead's papers are available, as are his notes to his book, but no journal is present. Three of the six present were dead by the end of 1862 (Lyon in battle, Conant and Jackson from illness).

The question at hand appears to be whether Conant's first hand account was correct, or Snead's first hand account was correct. There were six men in that room, and Snead waited until Blair died, leaving him the 'only' survivor of the meeting, before he was interviewed about the conference. In his first interview, these three magical words, these three words that have become the three most important words in Missouri Civil War history, were not in his version then. (numerous papers copied it see Bossier Banner July 26,1877 online) The day after the conference, Snead was 'not in the field' as someone earlier claimed, but in Jefferson City, the state captiol, penning a proclamation for Governor Jackson where they laid out what had just happened in the conference and calling for 50,000 men to 'repel the invaders'. In his attempt to convince a state full of citizens, determined to stay in the Union, to do otherwise, strangely enough, no mention was made of the little St Louis general making a statement that the President of the United States could not constitutionally make.

I appreciate the two Dan's in this last few pages trying to discuss a topic using actual sourcing. Booner - of the three sources Phillips gives, only Snead's book mentions the three words, and as I have stated before, his first 1877 interview given on the subject after Blair died in 1875, did not mention the words either. By 1881, in another interview, they did. And I have to respectfully disagree with you on it didn't matter if he stated it or not. To carry on a legitimate conversation, facts matter. Or at least they should. It was a generally held belief, in both the North and South, that Governor Jackson declared war when he called for 50,000 men the day after the conference. The North accused him, the South praised him. Now after 150 plus years, who is to blame? History should not come to Missouri to die.

Snead's book came at a time when many veterans were authoring books, and the interest in the Trans-Mississippi was apparently about as high then as it is now, as the book did not do well. But a year after he published, two editors from the Century Magazine decided to publish a four volume set of books and primarily used stories they had published in their magazine, and used Snead's book version to fill a hole and tell the Missouri story. When it was published in Volume 1 of Battles and Leaders, it became 'the' version many decided was legit.

So what was Snead's motivation for the book? He wrote John F Snyder on April 21, 1882 that "I am not willing that they and we shall go down in history as we have been painted by our foes, - or by those who have heretofore written on our side." (Snyder collection, MSHS) And he wrote Jefferson Davis on June 13, 1889 that "I have never failed to say on any proper occasion that it was the pride of my life to have been a Confederate soldier, and that it was my chiefest regret that we did not succeed in establishing our independence; and, such being the fact, I cannot but hold in the highest honor and in the truest affection the staunchest and most unyielding of the Confederate leaders." (Constitutionalist Volume 10)

It is kind of humorous. One of our members responded (#109) to one of my earlier posts (#105) on this thread where I deferred to Snead who stated in his book that Lyon was the greatest soldier he ever met. The negative response got me to thinking. If Snead was lieing and was too "Lost Causey" about Lyon, maybe he was lieing elsewhere in his book. So I started investigating this on my own. I gathered the evidence to prove maybe Snead was 'Lost Causey", that other member is arguing Dan on Snead's version must be legitimate. How time does change.

 

[DanSBHawk]

The day after the conference, Snead was 'not in the field' as someone earlier claimed, but in Jefferson City, the state captiol, penning a proclamation for Governor Jackson where they laid out what had just happened in the conference and calling for 50,000 men to 'repel the invaders'. In his attempt to convince a state full of citizens, determined to stay in the Union, to do otherwise, strangely enough, no mention was made of the little St Louis general making a statement that the President of the United States could not constitutionally make.

I appreciate the two Dan's in this last few pages trying to discuss a topic using actual sourcing. Booner - of the three sources Phillips gives, only Snead's book mentions the three words, and as I have stated before, his first 1877 interview given on the subject after Blair died in 1875, did not mention the words either. By 1881, in another interview, they did. And I have to respectfully disagree with you on it didn't matter if he stated it or not. To carry on a legitimate conversation, facts matter. Or at least they should. It was a generally held belief, in both the North and South, that Governor Jackson declared war when he called for 50,000 men the day after the conference. The North accused him, the South praised him. Now after 150 plus years, who is to blame? History should not come to Missouri to die.

I looked up the governor's proclamation, written with Snead. It seems very hot-headed. And treasonous.

IMPORTANT FROM MISSOURI.; TRAITOROUS PROCLAMATION OF GOV. JACKSON. (Published 1861)

www.nytimes.com

"But it is equally my duty to advise you that your first allegiance is due to your own State, and that you are under no obligation whatever to obey the no constitutional edicts of the military despotism which has introduced itself at Washington, nor submit to the infamous and degrading sway of its wicked minions in the State."​

 

[archieclement]

Patrick - if there were any journals kept at the time, they have been apparently lost. Snead's papers are available, as are his notes to his book, but no journal is present. Three of the six present were dead by the end of 1862 (Lyon in battle, Conant and Jackson from illness).

The question at hand appears to be whether Conant's first hand account was correct, or Snead's first hand account was correct. There were six men in that room, and Snead waited until Blair died, leaving him the 'only' survivor of the meeting, before he was interviewed about the conference. In his first interview, these three magical words, these three words that have become the three most important words in Missouri Civil War history, were not in his version then. (numerous papers copied it see Bossier Banner July 26,1877 online) The day after the conference, Snead was 'not in the field' as someone earlier claimed, but in Jefferson City, the state captiol, penning a proclamation for Governor Jackson where they laid out what had just happened in the conference and calling for 50,000 men to 'repel the invaders'. In his attempt to convince a state full of citizens, determined to stay in the Union, to do otherwise, strangely enough, no mention was made of the little St Louis general making a statement that the President of the United States could not constitutionally make.

I appreciate the two Dan's in this last few pages trying to discuss a topic using actual sourcing. Booner - of the three sources Phillips gives, only Snead's book mentions the three words, and as I have stated before, his first 1877 interview given on the subject after Blair died in 1875, did not mention the words either. By 1881, in another interview, they did. And I have to respectfully disagree with you on it didn't matter if he stated it or not. To carry on a legitimate conversation, facts matter. Or at least they should. It was a generally held belief, in both the North and South, that Governor Jackson declared war when he called for 50,000 men the day after the conference. The North accused him, the South praised him. Now after 150 plus years, who is to blame? History should not come to Missouri to die.

Snead's book came at a time when many veterans were authoring books, and the interest in the Trans-Mississippi was apparently about as high then as it is now, as the book did not do well. But a year after he published, two editors from the Century Magazine decided to publish a four volume set of books and primarily used stories they had published in their magazine, and used Snead's book version to fill a hole and tell the Missouri story. When it was published in Volume 1 of Battles and Leaders, it became 'the' version many decided was legit.

So what was Snead's motivation for the book? He wrote John F Snyder on April 21, 1882 that "I am not willing that they and we shall go down in history as we have been painted by our foes, - or by those who have heretofore written on our side." (Snyder collection, MSHS) And he wrote Jefferson Davis on June 13, 1889 that "I have never failed to say on any proper occasion that it was the pride of my life to have been a Confederate soldier, and that it was my chiefest regret that we did not succeed in establishing our independence; and, such being the fact, I cannot but hold in the highest honor and in the truest affection the staunchest and most unyielding of the Confederate leaders." (Constitutionalist Volume 10)

It is kind of humorous. One of our members responded (#109) to one of my earlier posts (#105) on this thread where I deferred to Snead who stated in his book that Lyon was the greatest soldier he ever met. The negative response got me to thinking. If Snead was lieing and was too "Lost Causey" about Lyon, maybe he was lieing elsewhere in his book. So I started investigating this on my own. I gathered the evidence to prove maybe Snead was 'Lost Causey", that other member is arguing Dan on Snead's version must be legitimate. How time does change.

My bad, I forgot they used their star trek teleporters to beam themselves to Jefferson City, I had assumed he accompanied Price and his Staff to get there, which would involve leaving St Louis, didn't realize accompaning a military staff on movements wouldn't qualify as in the field.......as it is often otherwise described.

 

[Booner]

As far as "bringing war to the state," there was already a war and as Kentucky found out, neutrality was not going to keep the fighting out of the state.

I understand that some people blame Blair and Lyon. But I also get the impression that there is a residual bias in the historiography.

It will be interesting to see how current and future historians judge the participants.

That there was already a war is true, but the fighting had not come to Missouri yet, (forgetting for a moment of the St. Louis massacre), Lyon and Blair's aggressive actions brought the fighting to the state. Blair had some extraordinary authority from Washington in the handling of the state. Perhaps it was due to his father being one of the Republican parties founders, or his brother being in Lincoln's cabinet at postmaster general along with his friend Edward Bates (from St. Louis) as attorney general. Perhaps the authority that Blair had from Washington was due to Missouri being "way out west," and Washington had their hands full with developments with other things. What ever it was, Blair was the political leader of the Lincoln administration who was on site and in charge. So the state suffered under his thoughts and motives. He certainly distrusted all southern slave owners, (while he owned slaves himself), which was an attitude that many in and out of the military had at the time. And the actions he took in Missouri were not questioned back in Washington. Lyon was his military arm and enjoyed Blair's protection, and together they managed to stay a few steps ahead of Gov. Jackson and Price. So it was Blair and Lyon who controlled the situation in Missouri. Jackson and Price were always reacting to what Blair and Lyons did; they were never able to take the initiative.

Since it's been 150 years since the end of the war, I'd like to think that the more recent studies coming out present a more un-biased view of what happened and the personalities involved in the war. I think the most important thing in judging any historical work is that you have to approach it with an open mind, as free from any preconceived notions as possible. My current opinion of Lyon has changed about 180 degrees from my earlier opinion. Since I had not know much about Blair prior to my recent studies, It may take some very hard convincing for me to change my opinion of him.

 

[archieclement]

Patrick - if there were any journals kept at the time, they have been apparently lost. Snead's papers are available, as are his notes to his book, but no journal is present. Three of the six present were dead by the end of 1862 (Lyon in battle, Conant and Jackson from illness).

The question at hand appears to be whether Conant's first hand account was correct, or Snead's first hand account was correct. There were six men in that room, and Snead waited until Blair died, leaving him the 'only' survivor of the meeting, before he was interviewed about the conference. In his first interview, these three magical words, these three words that have become the three most important words in Missouri Civil War history, were not in his version then. (numerous papers copied it see Bossier Banner July 26,1877 online) The day after the conference, Snead was 'not in the field' as someone earlier claimed, but in Jefferson City, the state captiol, penning a proclamation for Governor Jackson where they laid out what had just happened in the conference and calling for 50,000 men to 'repel the invaders'. In his attempt to convince a state full of citizens, determined to stay in the Union, to do otherwise, strangely enough, no mention was made of the little St Louis general making a statement that the President of the United States could not constitutionally make.

I appreciate the two Dan's in this last few pages trying to discuss a topic using actual sourcing. Booner - of the three sources Phillips gives, only Snead's book mentions the three words, and as I have stated before, his first 1877 interview given on the subject after Blair died in 1875, did not mention the words either. By 1881, in another interview, they did. And I have to respectfully disagree with you on it didn't matter if he stated it or not. To carry on a legitimate conversation, facts matter. Or at least they should. It was a generally held belief, in both the North and South, that Governor Jackson declared war when he called for 50,000 men the day after the conference. The North accused him, the South praised him. Now after 150 plus years, who is to blame? History should not come to Missouri to die.

Snead's book came at a time when many veterans were authoring books, and the interest in the Trans-Mississippi was apparently about as high then as it is now, as the book did not do well. But a year after he published, two editors from the Century Magazine decided to publish a four volume set of books and primarily used stories they had published in their magazine, and used Snead's book version to fill a hole and tell the Missouri story. When it was published in Volume 1 of Battles and Leaders, it became 'the' version many decided was legit.

So what was Snead's motivation for the book? He wrote John F Snyder on April 21, 1882 that "I am not willing that they and we shall go down in history as we have been painted by our foes, - or by those who have heretofore written on our side." (Snyder collection, MSHS) And he wrote Jefferson Davis on June 13, 1889 that "I have never failed to say on any proper occasion that it was the pride of my life to have been a Confederate soldier, and that it was my chiefest regret that we did not succeed in establishing our independence; and, such being the fact, I cannot but hold in the highest honor and in the truest affection the staunchest and most unyielding of the Confederate leaders." (Constitutionalist Volume 10)

It is kind of humorous. One of our members responded (#109) to one of my earlier posts (#105) on this thread where I deferred to Snead who stated in his book that Lyon was the greatest soldier he ever met. The negative response got me to thinking. If Snead was lieing and was too "Lost Causey" about Lyon, maybe he was lieing elsewhere in his book. So I started investigating this on my own. I gathered the evidence to prove maybe Snead was 'Lost Causey", that other member is arguing Dan on Snead's version must be legitimate. How time does change.

It is odd some members seem to continually refer to him as a "confederate apologist", when I have read in his day some considered him the opposite and too reconstructed........ he apparently can't win.

Not sure what you find humorous as I agreed with you that accounts wrote in the heat of moment are often grossly biased, decades later after one has time to reflect it indeed can be less biased and not motivated by the passions of the original time. Sneads and Conants accounts of the time both seem rather passioned spin. Snead's account in 1886 is far more measured and not seem some hit piece on Lyon at all, that some don't like parts of his account is all they need to try to spin at such though. His attempts to praise Lyon strike of purposely trying to maintain a spirit of postwar conciliation rather then biased partisanship.

If Sneads account falls short in any area, it would be in how aware was he of all the behind the scenes intrigue between Lyon, Blair, and Harney? I doubt he had as much information as more modern scholars, such as Frank and Appoline personal correspondence, ect

 

[Booner]

I looked up the governor's proclamation, written with Snead. It seems very hot-headed. And treasonous.

IMPORTANT FROM MISSOURI.; TRAITOROUS PROCLAMATION OF GOV. JACKSON. (Published 1861)

www.nytimes.com

"But it is equally my duty to advise you that your first allegiance is due to your own State, and that you are under no obligation whatever to obey the no constitutional edicts of the military despotism which has introduced itself at Washington, nor submit to the infamous and degrading sway of its wicked minions in the State."​

I don't view that statement as necessarily being traitorous; It's a very 19th century view. Was it Shelby Foote who said that prior to the war, people (at least southerner's) referred to the U.S. as "are," and after the was as "is." This points out the change of mind that people were having about their view of the federal government. Perhaps it was a hold over from the stance of the central government from the Articles of Confederation, where the states are primary and the central government take a secondary role? But it seems to me that that was the view of southerners at least, (Lee said he couldn't fight against Virginia), that they owed allegiance to their state first, and the Federal government second, which may have been a part of the "State Rights" attitude. The Civil War certainly ended that notion.

 

[Booner]

........
Booner - of the three sources Phillips gives, only Snead's book mentions the three words, and as I have stated before, his first 1877 interview given on the subject after Blair died in 1875, did not mention the words either. By 1881, in another interview, they did. And I have to respectfully disagree with you on it didn't matter if he stated it or not. To carry on a legitimate conversation, facts matter. Or at least they should. It was a generally held belief, in both the North and South, that Governor Jackson declared war when he called for 50,000 men the day after the conference. The North accused him, the South praised him. Now after 150 plus years, who is to blame? History should not come to Missouri to die.
........

Perhaps I didn't make my argument clear, it was in response to the 2 or 3 pages of treads here where it went along the lines of "He said it!" "No, he didn't." My point being that perhaps if Lyon didn't say "those three little words" if didn't matter as the whole speech he made before he said or didn't say those words, his intent was clear, the State of Missouri would bow to the will of the federal Government, (or heads will roll). I will admit that since this thread was started, I've come to the conclusion that Lyon probably didn't say that three word sentence, that that sentence was someone's conclusion of his statement in total. I also think that if Lyon had uttered those words, That Jackson would have used them in his call to arms. It would have made his plea to the citizens of Missouri that much stronger.
For histories sake, it would be nice to know if that sentence was said or not, and I really like your turn of phrase, "History should not come to Missouri to die." But is is necessary that Lyon said it? I think not. Because after his speech, and his storming out of the room, it was clear to all present that the time for talking and negotiations was over.

I had recently said that the actions of Blair and Lyon were always in advance of the actions of Jackson and Price. I think that Jackson's "Call to Arms' to the citizens of Missouri may be the only time that Jackson took the lead. But I think that Jackson, as the chief executive officer of the state had to do it to protect his state. I'll note that the call to arms was defensive in nature, and allowed Lyon and Blair to begin military action under the cover that it was a declaration of war.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I had recently said that the actions of Blair and Lyon were always in advance of the actions of Jackson and Price. I think that Jackson's "Call to Arms' to the citizens of Missouri may be the only time that Jackson took the lead. But I think that Jackson, as the chief executive officer of the state had to do it to protect his state. I'll note that the call to arms was defensive in nature, and allowed Lyon and Blair to begin military action under the cover that it was a declaration of war.

I get the impression that Jackson and Price wanted secession before Lyon ever entered the picture, so I find it hard to believe they were simply reacting to Federal actions. Perhaps on the other hand, they were trying to provoke Federal actions, while preparing for war. This article makes a case that Jackson was actively trying to foster a Missouri secession:

Page 389

digital.shsmo.org

Particularly this letter to David Walker a week after Sumter indicates that Jackson was disloyal, and taking steps to ensure secession.

 

[Patrick H]

I get the impression that Jackson and Price wanted secession before Lyon ever entered the picture, so I find it hard to believe they were simply reacting to Federal actions. Perhaps on the other hand, they were trying to provoke Federal actions, while preparing for war. This article makes a case that Jackson was actively trying to foster a Missouri secession:

Page 389

digital.shsmo.org

Particularly this letter to David Walker a week after Sumter indicates that Jackson was disloyal, and taking steps to ensure secession.
View attachment 369554

There is no doubt that Jackson wanted secession. I said at the outset of this thread that he was a hot head, too. I don't believe Price was necessarily a secessionist at this stage of the conflict. Price advised against a fight at Boonville to Jackson. There could have been a variety of reasons for this, but we must include the possibility that he didn't want war.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I don't believe Price was necessarily a secessionist at this stage of the conflict. Price advised against a fight at Boonville to Jackson. There could have been a variety of reasons for this, but we must include the possibility that he didn't want war.

According to the Missouri Historical Society article posted above, Price was complicit in preparing for war ("arming and equipping") as he waited for the ideal time to call another secession convention... which he claimed to KNOW that an ordinance of secession would be passed immediately.

So, it seems there was a clear disloyalty on the part of Jackson and Price that was being purposefully hidden, in order to buy time to prepare for war. And this was in obvious contravention of what they knew was the will of the people in Missouri: to stay in the Union.

I'd say that makes Jackson and Price both traitors to their country, and also traitors to their state.

 

[archieclement]

There is no doubt that Jackson wanted secession. I said at the outset of this thread that he was a hot head, too. I don't believe Price was necessarily a secessionist at this stage of the conflict. Price advised against a fight at Boonville to Jackson. There could have been a variety of reasons for this, but we must include the possibility that he didn't want war.

A distinction should also be made between ones personal views and his job.

 

[mofederal]

I am somewhat on the fence about Price, he was without a doubt a Conditional Unionist, probably up until the real fighting began. He believed in his political position, and he proved it, and Price most likely went to war still believing in the Union. Now Gov. Claiborne F. Jackson is another story. I have no doubt of his beliefs, he was a secessionist, but he was a governor of a state that voted against secession. When Lincoln asked for volunteers from Missouri, to put down the rebellion, Jackson responded with this statement:

"Sir: Your dispatch of the 15th instant, making a call on Missouri for four regiments of men for immediate service, has been received. There can be, I apprehend, no doubt that the men are intended to form a part of the President's army to make war upon the people of the seceded states. Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its object, inhuman, and diabolical and cannot be complied with. Not one man will the State of Missouri furnish to carry on any unholy crusade." [1]

Jackson carried on a secret correspondence with CSA President Jefferson Davis, planning on taking Missouri out of the Union by a military coup. His idea was to gain the arms in the St. Louis Arsenal. I will not go into detail on the Camp Jackson Affair as this has been discussed in the thread. to me it seems like Price and Jackson would be at odds with one another. Despite this Price was ready to take on Lyon's and Blair Federal forces. The plain fact is Price was theoretically, and I would guess actually promising that the MSG, the state forces; and the state government, would hold the state for the Union and prevent the entry into Missouri of any Confederate forces. Of course Jackson again went around Price and secretly dispatched agents to CSA President Jefferson Davis and the Confederate commanders in Arkansas asking for an immediate invasion of Missouri. Jackson also promised the cooperation of the MSG. So Price was being forced out of his beliefs on Conditional Unionism, by Jackson's actions to force Missouri into the Confederacy. At what point did Price change his beliefs and cross over into a secessionist political belief. It must have been hard for Price to drop his beliefs and adopt the stance of a secessionist, or maybe he never did.


1. Christensen, Lawrence O., Dictionary of Missouri Biography, University of Missouri Press, 1999, pp. 423–425

 

[archieclement]

I am somewhat on the fence about Price, he was without a doubt a Conditional Unionist, probably up until the real fighting began. He believed in his political position, and he proved it, and Price most likely went to war still believing in the Union. Now Gov. Claiborne F. Jackson is another story. I have no doubt of his beliefs, he was a secessionist, but he was a governor of a state that voted against secession. When Lincoln asked for volunteers from Missouri, to put down the rebellion, Jackson responded with this statement:

"Sir: Your dispatch of the 15th instant, making a call on Missouri for four regiments of men for immediate service, has been received. There can be, I apprehend, no doubt that the men are intended to form a part of the President's army to make war upon the people of the seceded states. Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its object, inhuman, and diabolical and cannot be complied with. Not one man will the State of Missouri furnish to carry on any unholy crusade." [1]

Jackson carried on a secret correspondence with CSA President Jefferson Davis, planning on taking Missouri out of the Union by a military coup. His idea was to gain the arms in the St. Louis Arsenal. I will not go into detail on the Camp Jackson Affair as this has been discussed in the thread. to me it seems like Price and Jackson would be at odds with one another. Despite this Price was ready to take on Lyon's and Blair Federal forces. The plain fact is Price was theoretically, and I would guess actually promising that the MSG, the state forces; and the state government, would hold the state for the Union and prevent the entry into Missouri of any Confederate forces. Of course Jackson again went around Price and secretly dispatched agents to CSA President Jefferson Davis and the Confederate commanders in Arkansas asking for an immediate invasion of Missouri. Jackson also promised the cooperation of the MSG. So Price was being forced out of his beliefs on Conditional Unionism, by Jackson's actions to force Missouri into the Confederacy. At what point did Price change his beliefs and cross over into a secessionist political belief. It must have been hard for Price to drop his beliefs and adopt the stance of a secessionist, or maybe he never did.


1. Christensen, Lawrence O., Dictionary of Missouri Biography, University of Missouri Press, 1999, pp. 423–425

Exactly when and how was this alleged military coup going to occur?.......if it existed it would seem a valid question.

I have no issue Jackson was personally pro south, and at least initially believed the state was also.

I have no issue Jackson took steps in procuring arms to prepare Missouri to be in a position to defend itself if it secedes, a good governor would prepare his State for what he thinks might be likely.

But after the convention overwhelming rejected secession I see little that suggests any actual plan for some coup...........in fact at the planter house meeting he had offered to disband the the MSG in an effort to maintain peace.......replacing the MVM with a more pro south MSG after Camp Jackson is the only solid thing he had done that perhaps could have been a step towards secession, yet he is offering to disband it.

A letter of what he thinks the state legislature still might yet still do......does not suggest some unilateral military coup at all, seems a rather large leap based on little actual evidence.......... I can see Jacksons moves as having been preparing for if the Missouri legislature had acted towards secession........a legal move from the state perspective that perhaps he was indeed hopeful of........but the claim of some plan of a coup without the Missouri legislature seems far more unsubstantiated opinion then based on any real evidence.

 

[Patrick H]

I am somewhat on the fence about Price, he was without a doubt a Conditional Unionist, probably up until the real fighting began. He believed in his political position, and he proved it, and Price most likely went to war still believing in the Union.

I have not thought about the term "conditional unionist" in quite a while, but I believe you are correct in describing Price that way. We had a LOT of conditional unionists in central Missouri at that time.