Nashville Nashville

[footie]

The battle of Nashville started today and I believe it to be the one battle that can allow you to get into the mind of General Grant! For nearly 2 weeks he had been bombarding General Thomas with telegrams to attack Hood! He even picked Thomas' successor(Gen John A. Logan). Grant does all this while in City Point not really knowing the ground, the condition of the armies (both sides) nor, most importantly the weather conditions. Why would this entire scene be played out if he weren't in a panic?

Why a panic? I think he fears how stupid and ridiculous he will look if General Hood defeats Thomas and conquers Nashville while his "pet army," Sherman's, is "making Georgia howl" virtually unopposed. Even the the time and manner of selection of Logan reeks of panic.

Not read much about the reasons for Grant's actions and would welcome information to change my mind. Am a Grant supporter!

 

[Elennsar]

Okay, here's an alternate theory (I don't know enough on the situation to provide too much detail, but tell me if this makes sense):

Grant is impatient for action. "If I was in Thomas's shoes I'd whip Hood, why isn't Thomas doing so..." Thomas is giving excuses and delaying. (Rightly or wrongly isn't the point, I'm trying to give an alternate theory for his behavior, not justify it)

If Grant had panicked, he'd be pressing Thomas to hold Nashville like some godawful metaphor, not to attack Hood.

 

[kenjcruz]

As footie said, Grant didn't know the facts on the ground, he didn't know that Hood was huddled down in an exposed position with a demoralized and out numbered army. Grant had let Sherman walk away from Hood and now his nightmare was Hood slipping away and raiding to the north.

I think Grant only trusted a few generals to be agressive and Thomas wasn't one of them. He had known and fought with Thomas for many years and through several campaigns so he probably had a pretty good read on Thomas.

A little off subject and maybe I should start a new thread ... I've always given Hood the benefit of the doubt for Franklin ... but what was he doing at Nashville?

 

[DWMack65]

The battle of Nashville started today and I believe it to be the one battle that can allow you to get into the mind of General Grant! For nearly 2 weeks he had been bombarding General Thomas with telegrams to attack Hood! He even picked Thomas' successor(Gen John A. Logan). Grant does all this while in City Point not really knowing the ground, the condition of the armies (both sides) nor, most importantly the weather conditions. Why would this entire scene be played out if he weren't in a panic?

Why a panic? I think he fears how stupid and ridiculous he will look if General Hood defeats Thomas and conquers Nashville while his "pet army," Sherman's, is "making Georgia howl" virtually unopposed. Even the the time and manner of selection of Logan reeks of panic.

Not read much about the reasons for Grant's actions and would welcome information to change my mind. Am a Grant supporter!

I read that Grant was under A LOT of pressure from Washington to get Thomas to attack.

 

[Elennsar]

As footie said, Grant didn't know the facts on the ground, he didn't know that Hood was huddled down in an exposed position with a demoralized and out numbered army. Grant had let Sherman walk away from Hood and now his nightmare was Hood slipping away and raiding to the north.

I think Grant only trusted a few generals to be agressive and Thomas wasn't one of them. He had known and fought with Thomas for many years and through several campaigns so he probably had a pretty good read on Thomas.

A little off subject and maybe I should start a new thread ... I've always given Hood the benefit of the doubt for Franklin ... but what was he doing at Nashville?

Hoping for a miracle is one of the least irrational explanations.

 

[TerryB]

One of the more interesting sidelights of the battle I discovered in my research goes like this. Book after book on the subject will state that the guns of Fort Negley were either never fired or that unofficial sources claimed that they may have fired the opening shots. Yet it's incredible how much those guns actually were fired. They were even engaged when Forrest, Morgan and some supporting infantry attacked the city, including "the fort on St. Cloud Hill [Fort Negley]." Forrest even claimed that one of his shells killed five gunners in the fort during this attack in Nov 1862. I could find no confirmation of that, but did learn that Freeman's Battery of Forrest's command suffered casualties in both horses and men and had to be withdrawn. Amazing what a little digging will turn up.

 

[larry_cockerham]

One of the more interesting sidelights of the battle I discovered in my research goes like this. Book after book on the subject will state that the guns of Fort Negley were either never fired or that unofficial sources claimed that they may have fired the opening shots. Yet it's incredible how much those guns actually were fired. They were even engaged when Forrest, Morgan and some supporting infantry attacked the city, including "the fort on St. Cloud Hill [Fort Negley]." Forrest even claimed that one of his shells killed five gunners in the fort during this attack in Nov 1862. I could find no confirmation of that, but did learn that Freeman's Battery of Forrest's command suffered casualties in both horses and men and had to be withdrawn. Amazing what a little digging will turn up.

Given the fact that the fort was imobile and considerably off-center to the east of town, wonder why Forrest wouldn't have simply "gone around"? There are enough hills to the west to have provided considerable cover depending on his goals.

 

[TerryB]

Given the fact that the fort was imobile and considerably off-center to the east of town, wonder why Forrest wouldn't have simply "gone around"? There are enough hills to the west to have provided considerable cover depending on his goals.

The official story seems to be that the combined attack of Forrest and his infantry supports was a diversion to give Morgan & Basil Duke a chance to burn the rolling stock at Edgefield. Duke decided not to press the attack once he encountered the 16th Ill dug in and putting up stout resistance. He did little damage. Meanwhile Bragg sent an order to Breckenridge to call off the attack. Gen. Negley had been falling back in order to lure the Confederates within range of the fort's guns, and that seemed to be working. I also turned up info in the OR to the effect that a citizen had come in a day or two prior to the attack and tipped off Negley. I'd be real interested to learn who that was, as it might bear on the order to call off the attack. Strangely, perhaps due to this being early in the war, Forrest seems to have thought he could capture the city. He has to have known that Union reinforcements from Kentucky were pouring into the city and that the "siege" was over. (Long answer to a short question)

 

[larry_cockerham]

Since the bridges across the Cumberland were so limited (I think just the railroad bridge with some planking on the sides?) getting to Edgefield would have been challenging. That was the main horse pen area. The depot was on the south bank? Anyway, you're saying it never happened. Forrest spent quite a bit of time on 1st Ave unloading the Confederate stores just after Ft. Donelson fell. He knew the town very well. That should have given him some confidence, but as you stated, lot's of yankees around by then.

 

[TerryB]

Larry, since the cavalry had Nashville surrounded, I'm thinking Morgan came at Edgefield from the East Nashville side. This raid was the closing action in the two month siege. After Perryville, the Union forces could spare troops to lift the siege and they arrived by way of Bowilng Green on the 7th of Nov. This raid is supposed to have happened on the 4th or 5th, depending on which source you believe. Most say the 4th. There is even a sketch online that may be in the collection of the TSLA and it shows all the Union defenses, including the works of the 16th Ill. Even by then the town was heavily fortified. I don't get the sense that Morgan and Forrest were coordinating very well, and Breckinridge would have been in command. I don't get the sense that he was actually on the scene, either, since the infantry supports don't seem to have amounted to much more than a brigade. B. had taken up an advanced post at Murfreesboro, and we know what happened in December.

 

[Rebel from Finland]

http://www.civilwarhome.com/nashvilleIrish.htm Under that you`ll find essay written by Ernest "Irish" Butner considering the Battle of Nashville

 

[larry_cockerham]

Terry, I finally was able to read your Shy article today in the Nashville Retrospect. Great stuff! Your writing style makes this very interesting. It finally made the rack at Couser's today, Dec 22.

 

[larry_cockerham]

http://www.civilwarhome.com/nashvilleIrish.htm Under that you`ll find essay written by Ernest "Irish" Butner considering the Battle of Nashville

As usual, there is no mention of the ICE! Thomas wasn't that cautious, the troops couldn't stand upright.

 

[TerryB]

Terry, I finally was able to read your Shy article today in the Nashville Retrospect. Great stuff! Your writing style makes this very interesting. It finally made the rack at Couser's today, Dec 22.

Thanks for the mention, Larry. Since I was limited to about 1000 words, I had to move at a very fast pace to get everything in, yet still had to do some cutting.

 

[DWMack65]

I read that Grant was under A LOT of pressure from Washington to get Thomas to attack.

From Horace Porter: Campagning with Grant:


"The anxiety of the authorities at Washington had now become so intense regarding Thomas's delay that Grant became more anxious than ever to have prompt action taken in Tennessee. On the morning of December 7 Stanton sent a despatch to City Point, saying: ". .. Thomas seems unwilling to attack, because it is hazardous — as if all war was anything but hazardous. . . ." The government was throwing the entire responsibility upon General Grant, and really censuring him in its criticisms of Thomas. Grant telegraphed to Washington: "There is no better man to repel an attack than Thomas, but I fear he is too cautious to take the initiative." On the 8th he sent a long despatch to General Thomas, urging him strenuously to attack, picturing the consequences which might follow longer delay, and appealing to his pride and patriotism. He wound up by saying: "Now is one of the finest opportunities ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the enemy. If destroyed, he can never replace it. Use the means at your command, and you can do this, and cause a rejoicing that will resound from one end of the land to another."

Chapter 22

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2001.05.0034%3Achapter%3D22

 

[coltshooter1]

I think Grant was worried that Thomas would set back and fight a defensive battle, stop Hood's attack, inflict casualties and then claim a victory, meanwhile allowing Hood to move the damaged army away. This would have meant the possibility of reinforcements for Lee or Hood's army actually doing good in some way to extend the war. Grant wanted Thomas to do exactly what Thomas eventually did to Hood's army--crush it as a functional fighting force.

 

[larry_cockerham]

Drum Major John Aldon Lunn at Shy's Hill

During the Battle of Nashville, Drum Major Lunn was stationed upon Shy's Hill. When Colonel Shy was killed, he (Lunn) had the presence of mind to rescue the Colonel's horse and watch, taking them to the Colonel's sister before rejoining the retreat. At the Tennessee River, he found that his feet were too frostbitten to make the crossing. While making his way home, he was captured and took the oath in Nashville Dec 22, 1864. He was described as a resident of Williamson County, TN with dark hair and complexion, hazel eyes and stood 5 ft - 6 inches

This was taken from the research notes of Stewart Cruickshank as per Drum Major Lunn's service records. Drum Major Lunn is buried in Rest Haven Cemetery, Franklin, Tennessee.

 

[TerryB]

There used to be a field piece that the Confederates abandoned in their retreat that was set up at or near the reassembled cabins at Woodlawn Cemetery (as a historic curiosity). These cabins and a mansion that burned down 40 or 50 years ago were not originally part of the cemetery. I've seen brochures that show the cannon, but it's not there now. The brochure sort of implies that it was stolen or just disappeared. The area has a duck pond and some cabins and a rock cavern that was used as a spring house to keep things like butter and milk cold. I've been there a few times with my bike, but it annoys me that security always follows me.

 

[larry_cockerham]

There used to be a field piece that the Confederates abandoned in their retreat that was set up at or near the reassembled cabins at Woodlawn Cemetery (as a historic curiosity). These cabins and a mansion that burned down 40 or 50 years ago were not originally part of the cemetery. I've seen brochures that show the cannon, but it's not there now. The brochure sort of implies that it was stolen or just disappeared. The area has a duck pond and some cabins and a rock cavern that was used as a spring house to keep things like butter and milk cold. I've been there a few times with my bike, but it annoys me that security always follows me.

There are at least three batteries of cannoneers still doing demonstrations and re-enactments around Nashville. There must be one of those guys with some knowledge of this cannon. I'll do some checking. (Baxter's, Dewalt's (sp?) and Winstead's)

 

[TerryB]

There are at least three batteries of cannoneers still doing demonstrations and re-enactments around Nashville. There must be one of those guys with some knowledge of this cannon. I'll do some checking. (Baxter's, Dewalt's (sp?) and Winstead's)

Here's a link to the story. http://www.civicscope.org/nashville-tn/WoodlawnMemorialPark

I remember it because I did the editing for it and really didn't do much other than tighten it up and move one or two paragraphs around.