Ironclad Monitors 1863-1865

[rebelatsea]

...okay, this is even stranger. Your original claim was that Warrior was "exiled to a faraway island colony" and you now seem to be asserting that by that she was turned into a floating school 43 years after completion and into an oil pontoon 68 years after completion.

If that's a failing, what words do we have left for USS Monadnock, turned into scrap metal ten years after completion?

At least Monadnock's armour was the right way round, unlike Onondaga whose belt armour was discovered by the French Navy to be under the backing !

 

[rebelatsea]

Sir, if you have deep pockets and enjoy this era of warship history...

Warrior to Dreadnought: Warship Development, 1860-1905 by David K. Brown

Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905 by Roger Chesneau

Before the Battlecruiser: The Big Cruiser in the World's Navies, 1865-1910 by Aidan Dobson

Battleships in Transition: The Creation of the Steam Battlefleet 1815-1860 by Andrew Lambert

Warships from the Golden Age of Steam: An Illustrated Guide to Great Warships from 1860 to 1945 by David Ross

Steam, Steel and Shellfire: The Steam Warship, 1815-1905 by Robert Gardiner and Andrew Lambert

British Ironclads 1860–75: HMS Warrior and the Royal Navy's 'Black Battlefleet' by Angus Konstam

British Battleships: Warrior, 1860 to Vanguard, 1950. A History of Design, Construction and Armament by Oscar Parkes

British Battleships of the Victorian Era by Norman Friedman

British Cruisers of the Victorian Era by Norman Friedman

Building the Steam Navy: Dockyards, Technology and the Creation of the Victorian Battle Fleet, 1830-1906 by David Evans

The Late Victorian Navy: The Pre-Dreadnought Era and the Origins of the First World Warby Roger Parkinson

Rule Britannia: The Victorian and Edwardian Navy by Peter Padfield

The U.S. Navy and the Origins of the Military-Industrial Complex, 1847-1883 by Kurt Hackemer

The Navy from Wood to Steel, 1860-1890 by Daniel J Carrison

The Old Steam Navy: The Ironclads, 1842-1885 by Donald L. Canney

Gray steel and blue water Navy: The formative years of America's military-industrial complex, 1881-1917 by B. Franklin Cooling

U.S. Armored Cruisers: A Design and Operational History by Ivan Musicant

The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy, 1871-1904 by Theodore Ropp and Stephens S. Roberts

German Naval Strategy, 1856-1888: Forerunners to Tirpitz by David H. Olivier

By Order of the Kaiser: Otto von Diederichs and the Rise of the Imperial German Navy, 1865-1902 by Terrell D. Gottschall

The Kaiser's Battlefleet: German Capital Ships 1871–1918 by Aidan Dodson

'Luxury' Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918 by Holger H. Herwig

Building the Kaiser's Navy: The Imperial Navy Office and German Industry in the Tirpitz Era, 1890-1919 by Gary E. Weir

Cheers and good luck!
USS ALASKA

List edited to add @67th Tigers' suggestion of Before the Ironclad: Warship Design and Development, 1815-1860 by D.K. Brown. Kinda cheap right now on Amazon at $12.50...

You left out "The black Battlefleet" by Admiral Ballard.

 

[Rhea Cole]

HMS Terror was a fully rigged floating battery which sailed across the Atlantic (escorted) to Bermuda and became part of the North Atlantic and West indies Squadron. Mounting 18 - 68pdrs SB behind 4.5" of low moor iron, which was proof against her own ordnance in the trials of 1865. Her steam speed of 5.5 knots was actually exceeded in service, being recorded at 7.5 knots at sea with the fleet off Bermuda. She drew 7.2 ft maximum. She would have made an interesting match for any US monitor and even New Ironsides would have found her a hard opponent. The gun batteries on each side were "slaved" to the centre gun in the same manner as HMS Warrior, you can see the offset marking on the inside of each of her gunports, which enabled concentrated broadsides to be fired.
View attachment 548897

Hindsight suggests that similar vessels would have been a better choice for the CSN, armed with Brooke Rifles, but not rigged.

This illustration is fascinating in many ways. This position on the stern quarter is where classic naval tactics going back centuries, is exactly where an opponent would be. A knowledge of naval history was not necessary to understand the tactical approach to such a vessel.

Contemporaneously, a delegation of plaines Indian chiefs visiting Washington were given a demonstration of very large coastal defense guns. The chiefs were, by all accounts, deeply amused & unimpressed. When asked why they were dismissive of the great power of the cannon, they answered, "What kind of fool would ride his horse out in front of such a thing?"

Good advice, indeed, you have to admit. In 1801 HMS Speedy demonstrated exactly how an immensely out gunned vessel could achieve victory in a one v one engagement. The marks on the deck for coordinated gun laying was an innovation first introduced by HMS Shannon in her encounter with USS Chesapeake on June 1, 1813. There was nothing special about that.

The CSS Virginia was the mast-less version of the HMS Terror you rightly suggest. Had the USS Monitor not been restricted to 1/2 loads due to uncertified cannon, that engagement would have been very different. In any case, as the riverine gunboats discovered, opening a port the size of a garage door to fire the guns negated the thickness of the armor. The regular openings along the port side in the illustration demonstrates that the vessel is, in fact, effectively unarmored.

This flotilla of reserve Monitors in 1868 is a graphic demonstration of one of the design's strengths. Judging by the men standing next to Neosho's turrret, there was very little for an opponent to aim at. At Nashville, Neosho's stern wheel enclosure & upper works took over 100 hits without significant damage at close range.

The big Royal Navy ships of the period were designed to guard against a French squadron heaving to off some coastal city & pounding away. They were not designed to project power across the Atlantic. The US Monitors, like the excellent riverine USS Neosho, were not blue water vessels at all. The Terror & the Neosho were never going to meet.

That was obviously a good thing on many levels. In any case, as the Confederate casement ironclads clearly demonstrated, a single ship no matter how well armed, was going to be defeated by a flotilla of Monitors. The day of the line of battle ships hammering each other broadside to broadside at pistol range was over. The HMS Terror & all those like her all over the world were relics of a bygone age.

 

[Saphroneth]

The CSS Virginia was the mast-less version of the HMS Terror you rightly suggest. Had the USS Monitor not been restricted to 1/2 loads due to uncertified cannon, that engagement would have been very different.

The Monitor's guns (serial numbers 27 and 28, IIRC) had previously been used on a different vessel, the Dacotah, and were fully proofed. 15 lbs was the full service charge at the time. It is only after Hampton Roads that Dahlgren suggested the use of higher charges, and spent some months doing tests before recommending 30 lbs.
20 lbs was authorized.

The idea that Monitor was using "half" charges at Hampton Road is a very persistent myth, but it is a myth.

Note that 25 lbs is the proof charge for a Dahlgren XI. Firing at 30 lbs would be firing above proof charges!

In any case, as the riverine gunboats discovered, opening a port the size of a garage door to fire the guns negated the thickness of the armor. The regular openings along the port side in the illustration demonstrates that the vessel is, in fact, effectively unarmored.

The big Royal Navy ships of the period were designed to guard against a French squadron heaving to off some coastal city & pounding away. They were not designed to project power across the Atlantic.

...no, gun ports don't mean a ship is unarmoured.

The big RN ships were very much designed to project power. You have this strange mistaken impression of Royal Navy ships as being built to defend the coastline of the British Isles only, while in fact the RN regularly engaged in actions all around the world.

The US Monitors,like the excellent riverine USS Neosho, were not blue water vessels at all. The Terror & the Neosho were never going to meet.

That was obviously a good thing on many levels. In any case, as the Confederate casement ironclads clearly demonstrated, a single ship no matter how well armed, was going to be defeated by a flotilla of Monitors.

The Terror cruised to Bermuda, you know, and was a coast attack ship - if the Neosho was never going to meet the Terror it's because the Neosho would be a no-show anywhere the British wanted to attack.

And I don't think it's "clearly demonstrated" - not when Palmetto State and Chicora attempted to open the blockade of Charleston, at any rate! The USN blockade squadron retired rather than engage them.

The day of the line of battle ships hammering each other broadside to broadside at pistol range was over. The HMS Terror & all those like her all over the world were design relics of a bygone age.

Well, yes, but it had been replaced by line of battle ships engaging one another at ranges of one to two miles - and would shortly be replaced by ironclads engaging one another broadside to broadside and sometimes ramming one another, as at Lissa.


If by "relics" that you mean that they had a far more fearsome main battery than most US ironclads despite being several years older, and were also shallower draft and more seaworthy, then... sure, "design relics of a bygone age"...

 

[Saphroneth]

Incidentally, rather than being garage door sized, the gunports for Terror were 34 inches by 40 inches - and yes, this was recognized as a weak feature. But the Tonnant, Lave and Devastation displayed how this was still a huge improvement over unarmoured ships - and since the Monitor proved unable to engage at Drewry's Bluff owing to the small vertical size of her gun ports, given the design role of the "floating batteries" was fort attack then vertically large gun ports are actually a benefit in that respect.


It's hardly as if the Virginia was able at very short range to disable Monitor by shooting through her gun ports, after all...

 

[rebelatsea]

No CSS Virginia was not a mastless version of HMS Terror.
The design of her sloping casemate traces back to John L Porter's 1846 coast defence ship and the following plan for the North Carolina CDVs which were ordered by that states navy and then cancelled on transfer to the CSN. both originals were intended to have a uniform ordnance of 5 / 6 large SB guns on pivot mounts .
CSS Virginia's mixed ordnance was dictated by what could be available and a "discussion" between John M Brooke and Porter in which Brooke wanted an all rifled warrant vs Porter's smooth bores.

 

[Saphroneth]

There's also of course that the Terror had significantly stronger iron armour than the Virginia (since it's a single plate rather than multiple), though the lack of backing on the iron-hulled floating batteries was a weak feature. Then again, Monitor also has unbacked armour so in a theoretical Monitor-Terror clash both have spall problems.

Actually, speaking of which, do we have many cases of a Monitor turret (the 8x or 11x 15/16" plates) being hit by a high velocity ball? I know they were kept at a distance at Charleston..

 

[Rhea Cole]

No CSS Virginia was not a mastless version of HMS Terror.
The design of her sloping casemate traces back to John L Porter's 1846 coast defence ship and the following plan for the North Carolina CDVs which were ordered by that states navy and then cancelled on transfer to the CSN. both originals were intended to have a uniform ordnance of 5 / 6 large SB guns on pivot mounts .
CSS Virginia's mixed ordnance was dictated by what could be available and a "discussion" between John M Brooke and Porter in which Brooke wanted an all rifled warrant vs Porter's smooth bores.

It is an analogy, not a simile.

 

[Saphroneth]

It is an analogy, not a simile.

I think it's you believing that Rebelatsea had said something (that Virginia was a version of Terror), when he hadn't...

 

[67th Tigers]

The CSS Virginia was the mast-less version of the HMS Terror you rightly suggest. Had the USS Monitor not been restricted to 1/2 loads due to uncertified cannon, that engagement would have been very different. In any case, as the riverine gunboats discovered, opening a port the size of a garage door to fire the guns negated the thickness of the armor. The regular openings along the port side in the illustration demonstrates that the vessel is, in fact, effectively unarmored.

Gunports are a fact of life. If you want a gun to fire, you have to have a hole to fire through.

Terror's gunports were roughly 1 m2, and about 4% of the side was gunport (i.e. 1 in 25 hits will be at a gunport). This was mainly to allow for high elevation, long range fire. Hardly "effectively unarmoured."

Now let's consider Monitor. Her gunports were small, in fact so small they did not allow the guns to be elevated enough to hit Fort Darling. What is worse, large gunports that might admit a shot, or small gunports that render you completely combat ineffective?

Even worse, the 15" guns could not actually fit through the gunports of the Passiacs etc. They completely blocked them. This meant (1) the gun could not be aimed, and (2) the smoke from the discharge filled the turret. The workaround for (1) was to look down the 11" gun in the other position, and simply slave the 15" to firing whenever the 11" did. For (2), smoke boxes were added or special 15" with narrower ends were used, which completely blocked the sight picture. The Camanche had 2x 15" and could not aim them because the ports were completely blocked.

Let's consider trying to exploit a gunport. It's a random chance of hitting it; 4% of hits. In the Battle of Hampton Roads, at very close range the Monitor achieved a hit rate of 36%. On average about 1 in 69 shots fired would go through a gunport, or one every 3-4 hours. If that shot is solid, the best that can be hoped for is knocking out the gun in said port and inflicting casualties on that crew. For any real damage shell needs using, and that adds a question of reliability, fuse length etc...

 

[rebelatsea]

There's also of course that the Terror had significantly stronger iron armour than the Virginia (since it's a single plate rather than multiple), though the lack of backing on the iron-hulled floating batteries was a weak feature. Then again, Monitor also has unbacked armour so in a theoretical Monitor-Terror clash both have spall problems.

Actually, speaking of which, do we have many cases of a Monitor turret (the 8x or 11x 15/16" plates) being hit by a high velocity ball? I know they were kept at a distance at Charleston..

Not high velocity balls, but high velocity solid shot from rifled guns which were knocking chunks off the armour.

 

[Saphroneth]

Not high velocity balls, but high velocity solid shot from rifled guns which were knocking chunks off the armour.

Sorry, I know "balls" is a bit of a misnomer when it's a rifle - what I'm wondering is how high velocity the shot was. There's penetration calculations that certainly work on a relative basis.

We know the muzzle velocity of a 68 pounder using the "battering" charge and a 70 lbs wrought iron or steel ball - there was one shot recorded at 2,040 fps, but I think 1,800 fps would be a better figure. That's actually a really ferocious muzzle velocity for this period - what I'm getting at is to ask how high velocity the fastest solid impacts we have that actually did hit a Monitor and how bad it was.

 

[USS ALASKA]

For those in any doubt, look up what happened to HMS Captain - a masted turret ship inspired by US monitors - she lasted just 5 months before capsizing in a storm off Cape Finisterre.

'The Whole History of this Ill-fated Vessel': HMS Captain, the American Civil War, and the Mid-Victorian Struggle for Naval Superiority
Howard J. Fuller, FRHistS
University of Wolverhampton (UK)

Abstract
In 1869 Hugh Childers, the First Lord of the Admiralty, described HMS Captain as the 'crack turret ship' of the British fleet, just before he saw his seventeen-year-old son Leonard ('Lennie') transferred over to the experimental ironclad. With her controversially low freeboard, the Captain was to finally embody all of the salient features of American Civil War monitors, floating the heaviest possible guns behind the best possible armour protection scheme, yet combined with the speed and strategic range of lofty broadside-armed cruisers like HMS Warrior. The Captain could go anywhere and sink anything. But when the vessel capsized in a gale off Cape Finisterre, Spain, on 7 September 1870, taking down Lennie, the ship's nominal designer Captain Cowper Phipps Coles, and close to 500 others, people could only wonder how such a thing could have happened. Historians ever since have likewise questioned how the mid-Victorian Royal Navy could build such a manifestly unstable ship—too low in the water and top-heavy with sails. Both Coles and the 'public' have been blamed for the disaster. Previous studies have neglected the vital role of the American Civil War in both pressuring the Admiralty to maintain British naval supremacy at all costs, and to do so by producing an apex ironclad armed with turrets. From the Trent Affair of 1861 to the Alabama Claims of 1871, the United States posed a unique threat to British global interests and imperial prestige. Just as the original USS Monitor was built to check the Warrior as well as the CSS Virginia, the Captain was meant to command American waters once again if need be.

‘The Whole History of this Ill-fated Vessel’: HMS Captain, the American Civil War, and the Mid-Victorian Struggle for Naval Superiority – International Journal of Naval History

ijnh.seahistory.org

Please use above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA