Missionary Ridge

1. Bragg could never have held considering the circumstances.
2.
Cozzens, Peter. The Shipwreck of Their Hopes: The Battles for Chattanooga. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994.

McDonough, James Lee. Chattanooga—A Death Grip on the Confederacy. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984

Woodworth, Steven E. Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga Campaigns. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998.

Sword, Wiley. Mountains Touched with Fire: Chattanooga Besieged, 1863. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.

Powell, David A. Battle Above the Clouds: Lifting the Siege of Chattanooga and the Battle of Lookout Mountain, October 16–November 24, 1863. Emerging Civil War Series. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2017.

Powell, David A. The Impulse of Victory: Ulysses S. Grant at Chattanooga. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Press, 2020.

3. The Chattanooga battlefield is largely gone, particularly Missionary Ridge. There is enough to piece the battle out, so go see it.
 
1. Bragg could never have held considering the circumstances.
2.
Cozzens, Peter. The Shipwreck of Their Hopes: The Battles for Chattanooga. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994.

McDonough, James Lee. Chattanooga—A Death Grip on the Confederacy. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984

Woodworth, Steven E. Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga Campaigns. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998.

Sword, Wiley. Mountains Touched with Fire: Chattanooga Besieged, 1863. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.

Powell, David A. Battle Above the Clouds: Lifting the Siege of Chattanooga and the Battle of Lookout Mountain, October 16–November 24, 1863. Emerging Civil War Series. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2017.

Powell, David A. The Impulse of Victory: Ulysses S. Grant at Chattanooga. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Press, 2020.

3. The Chattanooga battlefield is largely gone, particularly Missionary Ridge. There is enough to piece the battle out, so go see it.
Thank you! Doesn't appear the bibliography has any titles which focus only on MR? Is there such? But still, a great list to work off.
Will follow your advice- and go and see.
 
Just this:

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Need to study up on this pivotal battle. From what little I've gleaned, seems that Bragg should've been able to hold?

Book recommendations? Is there anything to see at the site today?

Bragg's strategic thinking was sound enough. Apart from his inability to get along with subordinates and his brooding and at times lethargic nature, Bragg had a tendency to jump at shadows (tactically speaking). He could shift troops in his extended line to plug/strengthen what he perceived were gaps or weak points in it, leaving the rest of his line stretched thin at points. If determined strong enemy forces relentlessly pressed concurrently these weak sections, it was inevitable that some of these targeted weak points along the line would eventually break. That's what happened here.
 
Need to study up on this pivotal battle. From what little I've gleaned, seems that Bragg should've been able to hold?

Book recommendations? Is there anything to see at the site today?
There is plenty to see. Bragg was not the best the South had to offer (moron) and had he listened to Gen Nathan B Forrest after Chattanooga he NEVER would have had to deal with Missionary Ridge. BTW Grant taking command didn't help the South either.
CWT needs to take a tour of Missionary Ridge
We had a great time when CWT visited Chickamauga. You and @lelliott19 did an amazing job with the group.
 
Anybody who has ever parked in the 45 degree angle lot at Sugars BBQ on Missionary Ridge need not read a book about how preposterous the attack was. The whole thing only lasted about 90 minutes.

I recommend Connolly's Army of the Heartland & Autumn of Glory as a way to really understand why Confederate morale collapsed as it did. The perilous mental state of Bragg's troops was a longtime coming. That is the real story of Missionary Ridge.
 
Bragg's strategic thinking was sound enough. Apart from his inability to get along with subordinates and his brooding and at times lethargic nature, Bragg had a tendency to jump at shadows (tactically speaking). He could shift troops in his extended line to plug/strengthen what he perceived were gaps or weak points in it, leaving the rest of his line stretched thin at points. If determined strong enemy forces relentlessly pressed concurrently these weak sections, it was inevitable that some of these targeted weak points along the line would eventually break. That's what happened here.
There was no way to fortify Missionary Ridge. The deep washes that cut up the face of the slope precluded any mutually supporting bastions. Cannons could not fire downward at greater than 45 degree. Ultimately, there was no officer on either side who seriously anticipated a frontal assault up the face of the ridge. Anybody who has ever seen Missionary Ridge disagrees,
 
Anybody who has ever parked in the 45 degree angle lot at Sugars BBQ on Missionary Ridge need not read a book about how preposterous the attack was. The whole thing only lasted about 90 minutes.

I recommend Connolly's Army of the Heartland & Autumn of Glory as a way to really understand why Confederate morale collapsed as it did. The perilous mental state of Bragg's troops was a longtime coming. That is the real story of Missionary Ridge.

The highly capable and intelligent artillery officer and engineer, E. P. Alexander might have pinpointed best the inherent problems in the ranks of the Army of Tennessee. After recently arriving from Virginia, he assessed the situation and formed a general disdain for the soldiers in Bragg's Army at this time. He complained, ..."This army is far inferior to the Army of Northern Virginia in organization and spirit, and I regret very much that I ever left the latter"... He added, that their ammunition and guns were of even poorer quality than his own. (Alexander's views are reproduced in 'The Shipwreck of their Hopes' by Peter Cozzens, at page 33).
 
He was in Knoxville when Missionary Ridge Battle occured. His presence that day might have made a difference.
When he arrived at the siege scene, he made what I consider was a highly pertinent observation (and comment) about the condition of the Army of Tennessee prior to the Battle of Missionary Ridge (and before being dispatched for Knoxville).

I don't think his presence that day (as an outsider, who was a relatively recent arrival) would have made a material difference, given the pervasive and inherent problems occurring in that Army at the time.
 
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