McClellan Mission Impossible: Rethinking George B. McClellan

[67th Tigers]

Watching this right now:

https://www.c-span.org/video/?435570-1/symposium-controversial-generals-civil-war

 

[Andrew]

I watched that, along with some of the other speakers. The McClellan talk was not quite as good as the others I saw. The panel discussion was great. I also really enjoyed the Burnside and Butler talks. And John Hennessy, who might be my favorite Civil War speaker, gave an excellent presentation about Joe Hooker. I haven't seen the others yet. Curious to know what other people thought of them.

 

[leftyhunter]

Watching this right now:

https://www.c-span.org/video/?435570-1/symposium-controversial-generals-civil-war

I watched part of it and will finish watching it later. Early on the professor noted that McClellan has a graduating cadet noted in a speech that it is important for officers to be well educated so they will remain civilized.
No doubt McClellan had he remained in command would not of liked the young Colonel George Kirk commander of the 3rd North Carolina Mounted Infantry.
Yet McClellan 's peer Major General John Scohfield has no problems with Col.Kirk.
Maybe McClellan represents an older version of a chivalrous ideal of warfare
Vs arguably more " modern " officers,such has Sheridan,Sherman and Schofield.
By more modern I mean willing to at least not respect the property rights of enemy civilians.
Also McClellan 's views on race relations would not sit well in today's era.
Leftyhunter

 

[leftyhunter]

Watching this right now:

https://www.c-span.org/video/?435570-1/symposium-controversial-generals-civil-war

Would General McClellan be comfortable with supplying Unionist guerrillas with weaponry as would Generals Thomas,Burnside and Schofield plus the Admiral in charge of the Union fleet of South Eastern Florida?
Leftyhunter

 

[Bruce Vail]

What a coincidence. I am finishing Clifford Dowdey's "The Seven Days" this week.

The book seems quite respectful of McClellan abilities.

 

[wausaubob]

I watched that, and found it confirmed most of my views.
I have never cared for quoting letters that General McClellan wrote to his wife. Such letters are a good place to vent ideas that a person would never act upon.
In addition, I think candidate McClellan did the country a significant service by maintaining his candidacy after Sheridan's victories, when the odds were mounting against McClellan.

 

[Saphroneth]

In addition, I think candidate McClellan did the country a significant service by maintaining his candidacy after Sheridan's victories, when the odds were mounting against McClellan.

I've never understood the idea that McClellan was somehow a national traitor for being Lincoln's election opponent. It wasn't something he sought, and when he accepted it he repudiated the peace plank - essentially meaning there were three options:

1) Lincoln was elected.
2) The Democrats stick with McClellan, win, and the CSA is defeated.
3) The Democrats drop McClellan, then have to try to win an election having had a very public party spat with McClellan being none of it.

Essentially, it ensured that getting a pro-peace candidate elected would be as hard for the Democrats as possible.

 

[wausaubob]

I've never understood the idea that McClellan was somehow a national traitor for being Lincoln's election opponent. It wasn't something he sought, and when he accepted it he repudiated the peace plank - essentially meaning there were three options:

1) Lincoln was elected.
2) The Democrats stick with McClellan, win, and the CSA is defeated.
3) The Democrats drop McClellan, then have to try to win an election having had a very public party spat with McClellan being none of it.

Essentially, it ensured that getting a pro-peace candidate elected would be as hard for the Democrats as possible.

And I think most of the generals felt the same way. Lincoln's re-election was the most straight forward way to end the war, but McClellan's way could work too, with terms offered to draw the states out of the Confederacy one by one.
The United States was in a position by September 1864 to knock Georgia and North Carolina out of the war, and isolate South Carolina.
And, the war was not the only issue in 1864. The Democratic Party had much more attractive record with respect to immigrant rights than the Republicans.

 

[leftyhunter]

And I think most of the generals felt the same way. Lincoln's re-election was the most straight forward way to end the war, but McClellan's way could work too, with terms offered to draw the states out of the Confederacy one by one.
The United States was in a position by September 1864 to knock Georgia and North Carolina out of the war, and isolate South Carolina.
And, the war was not the only issue in 1864. The Democratic Party had much more attractive record with respect to immigrant rights than the Republicans.

True by the time a hypothetical McClellan is inaugurated it is March 1865. By March 1865 there is simply not much left of the Confederacy. Confederate soldiers are already voting with their feet against the war.
Leftyhunter

 

[Saphroneth]

True by the time a hypothetical McClellan is inaugurated it is March 1865. By March 1865 there is simply not much left of the Confederacy. Confederate soldiers are already voting with their feet against the war.

Essentially I think the only way you can see a McClellan presidency resulting in peace is if the cause of the peace is not actually the McClellan presidency - you'd need:

1) Much less Union progress on the battlefield.
2) A Democratic wave election, not just a good showing for McClellan personally.

Because, that way, the new Congress with Democratic majorities and a peace mandate (because to get a strong Dem bench in 1864 you'd need a strong peace feeling) means McClellan would have reason to feel that there was a mandate for peace instead of reconquest. But the evidence strongly suggests McClellan was more pro-war than his party as a whole.

 

[leftyhunter]

Essentially I think the only way you can see a McClellan presidency resulting in peace is if the cause of the peace is not actually the McClellan presidency - you'd need:

1) Much less Union progress on the battlefield.
2) A Democratic wave election, not just a good showing for McClellan personally.

Because, that way, the new Congress with Democratic majorities and a peace mandate (because to get a strong Dem bench in 1864 you'd need a strong peace feeling) means McClellan would have reason to feel that there was a mandate for peace instead of reconquest. But the evidence strongly suggests McClellan was more pro-war than his party as a whole.

My point is that by March 1865 it was a certainty that the Confederacy would collapse . Once Ft .Fisher fell as @mobile_96 pointed out there was simply no way to feed the Confederate Army at and about Richmond. The Confederacy had already lost territory and internal control in parts of the Confederacy. Desertion is sky high. McClellan did state he would not accept an independent Confederate nation.
In short by March 1865 there was nothing for the Confederacy to negotiate with.
So for practical purposes the Confederacy would either have to surrender or just completely implode regardless of who would become president.
If you have time please get back to me on the other questions I have about McClellan.
I would argue that McClellan was so to speak not a modern General in the sense of General Sherman,Sheridan and those other mentioned generals that encouraged guerrilla warfare .
McClellan was willing to shield civilians from the horrors of war vs other Union generals not so much. For example General Schofield didn't seem to mind the tactics of his subordinate Col.Kirk.
Col.Kirk would most likely of been court martialed under General McClellan.
Leftyhunter

 

[wausaubob]

The United States Army still had plenty of time left after John Fremont abandoned his candidacy in September. They had time left before the election and after the election. They certainly had the resources to force the Confederates to accept terms of surrender.
Moreover McClellan was in a position to offer reunification and temporary continuance of slavery in non-occupied areas, and if the Confederates did not accept that outcome would have been wholly in favor of the moderate Republicans and War Democrats.
McClellan screwed the Copperheads and they had no way out.
If elected he could fairly easily form a coalition for continuation of the war, is just would not have been the same coalition as Lincoln's coalition.

 

[Saphroneth]

My point is that by March 1865 it was a certainty that the Confederacy would collapse .

Which is why my first point came in. For there to be any prospect of Confederate independence or indeed a negotiated peace you'd need the Union to make less battlefield progress so there was something to negotiate with.

I would argue that McClellan was so to speak not a modern General in the sense of General Sherman,Sheridan and those other mentioned generals that encouraged guerrilla warfare .

I think that's quite possible, yes.
Of course, when you say "not a modern general" it's worth remembering that at that time there were laws and customs of war - they just weren't as formalized as modern Geneva Conventions are. It was definitely understood that guerillas were permitted if they acted within the normal laws and customs of war, and not permitted otherwise.
By those lights, the units of GW Kirk (which appear to have acted within the said laws and customs) would be considered legal and it is unlikely he would be court martialled.

 

[leftyhunter]

Which is why my first point came in. For there to be any prospect of Confederate independence or indeed a negotiated peace you'd need the Union to make less battlefield progress so there was something to negotiate with.


I think that's quite possible, yes.
Of course, when you say "not a modern general" it's worth remembering that at that time there were laws and customs of war - they just weren't as formalized as modern Geneva Conventions are. It was definitely understood that guerillas were permitted if they acted within the normal laws and customs of war, and not permitted otherwise.
By those lights, the units of GW Kirk (which appear to have acted within the said laws and customs) would be considered legal and it is unlikely he would be court martialled.

Put another way would a General McClellan authorize or at least condone General Sheridan burning the Shenandoah Valley?
Would a General McClellan approve of General Blunt creating a free fire zone in Western Missouri by burning down houses per his Special Order #11?
As far as the young Col.Kirk arguably at best Kirk very loosely followed the rules of War. Captain "Tinker" Dave Beatty who received ammo from General Burnside arguably did not follow the rules of War.
Leftyhunter

 

[Specster]

I watched part of it and will finish watching it later. Early on the professor noted that McClellan has a graduating cadet noted in a speech that it is important for officers to be well educated so they will remain civilized.
No doubt McClellan had he remained in command would not of liked the young Colonel George Kirk commander of the 3rd North Carolina Mounted Infantry.
Yet McClellan 's peer Major General John Scohfield has no problems with Col.Kirk.
Maybe McClellan represents an older version of a chivalrous ideal of warfare
Vs arguably more " modern " officers,such has Sheridan,Sherman and Schofield.
By more modern I mean willing to at least not respect the property rights of enemy civilians.
Also McClellan 's views on race relations would not sit well in today's era.
Leftyhunter

Isnt that why he hung Pope out to dry around the end of the 7 days. Pope said he would forage off the land and the CSA took that to mean steal. Mac was appauled as well. Mac said Pope would be destroyed within a week, basically because he deserved it. When Pope got attacked by Jackson and Johnston, Mac did next to nothing to help him. The more I know about Mac the less I like him.....too much politics, to egotistical, never took the blame for his disasters instead laid it off on other officers. Was almost never near the battlefield.

I know Lee had a high opinion of him and he for one should know.....but Im not sure why

 

[Saphroneth]

Put another way would a General McClellan authorize or at least condone General Sheridan burning the Shenandoah Valley?

Given McClellan's combat style was much more Jominian, I think he'd probably see it as unnecessary and indeed a diversion of effort from the actual goal. McClellan's entire military career was focused on three key objectives:
1) Keep Washington safe (as the vital point for the Union), with as little manpower as possible.
2) Go after Richmond (as the vital point for the Confederacy) with as much force as possible.
3) Minimize casualties, especially Union ones.

His concept of operations was pretty simple in most cases, and boiled down to using superior mobility and numbers (where he could get them, which he couldn't always) to operate with short supply lines from friendly territory against a point the enemy must defend - without going straight at the enemy army - and using his superior artillery to force a decision when defensive lines were impossible to outflank.

Isnt that why he hung Pope out to dry around the end of the 7 days.

What?

Pope said he would forage off the land and the CSA took that to mean steal. Mac was appauled as well. Mac said Pope would be destroyed within a week, basically because he deserved it. When Pope got attacked by Jackson and Johnston, Mac did next to nothing to help him. The more I know about Mac the less I like him.....too much politics, to egotistical, never took the blame for his disasters instead laid it off on other officers. Was almost never near the battlefield.

You presumably are conflating the end of the Seven Days (which ended in early July) with the retreat from the Peninsula ordered over McClellan's objections in August. During the retreat McClellan did his best to get his troops to Pope as fast as possible, but he was simply unable to.

Please go into more detail as to the point you think McClellan did something to Pope he should not have done.

(Incidentally, if failing to reinforce someone fast enough is "hanging them out to dry", then Lincoln and his administration hung McClellan out to dry for the whole period from the middle of May to the middle of August!

 

[Saphroneth]

For those who might be interested, here is the main reason why McClellan didn't help Pope.

It was nearly impossible.

Pope's mistake was that he attacked without securing his suppy line. This doesn't just mean foraging off the land (which, incidentally, is pretty bloody hard even in harvest time with a large army) but it also means that there is no way to be sure where reinforcements need to be sent. This delayed considerably the process of sending reinforcements to Pope, because nobody knew where he was for the reinforcements to go.

McClellan did his level best to move troops off the Peninsula as fast as possible (once he was actually ordered to do so - Halleck was very coy about giving the order until it was time) but as he was low on transports he could only send them so fast. By the time McClellan himself arrived back everything was chaos.
Via 67th on another thread:






If you read his personal letters he has a sense of foreboding that Pope was going to be destroyed. He personally thinks his forces can save Pope, and wants to get them to him. However, Halleck literally has no idea where Pope is.

Here I should note that the only communications between Pope and the outside world are because of, and via, FJ Porter. Porter landed at Aquia Landing and found Burnside there. Burnside had been ordered to send forward the bulk of his force but had been forbidden from going himself to Pope, like McClellan was a few days later. Porter arranged to send couriers back to Burnside who would forward the news up to Washington. Even this route became compromised.

When McClellan landed it was at Aquia, where 2nd Corps landed. 6th Corps had landed at Alexandria. Everything is confused. Halleck is trying to communicate directly with 6th Corps and failing, directing a botched movement by a brigade and a half against Bull Run Bridge (this force, under Taylor, runs straight into AP Hill's Division and is smashed). Franklin, Smith and Slocum had all left the corps and headed to Washington, leaving Hancock in acting command. On the morning of the 26th, McClellan secures permission to go to Alexandria himself and find out what is happening and goes. Arriving at Alexandria he finds chaos - the corps and division commanders are missing and Halleck is spewing out nonsensical orders to brigadiers. After reordering the situation McClellan grabs a gunboat (USS Ariel) and heads to Washington to confront Halleck directly.

What we know about said meeting comes mainly from Halleck's report. McClellan arrived at Halleck's house (ISTR ca. 0100 hrs) and got him out of bed, demanding Halleck actually take control of the situation. McClellan then rounds up the errant Franklin and his division commanders and returns to Alexandria the next day. His orders from Halleck as of the 27th were to hold fast at Alexandria and to pull in the 2nd Corps (from Aquia), 4th Corps (from the Peninsula) and Cox's division (also at Aquia).

On the afternoon of the 28th, probably after a bollocking from Lincoln and Stanton, Halleck changes his orders again - 6th Corps will march to Pope. This leads to the obvious question of "where is Pope then?". Halleck has no answer but rather pathetically orders McClellan to "find out". Hence McClellan orders 6th Corps to advance the morning of the 29th. Reaching Annandale the lead division commander (Smith) goes firm and asks should he advance further. McClellan simply refers this up via the wire to Halleck, who leaves it upto Smith. Smith does exercise the option that Halleck allowed to him.

The next day (30th) McClellan sends 2nd Corps forward as well, and 6th and 2nd Corps edge their way blindly towards the sound of firing, and Franklin is forming his corps from column into a fighting line along the Cub Run just as Longstreet is hitting Pope's hanging flank. 6th Corps acts as a rearguard, withdrawing to Centreville after Pope's army is past.

The major issues regards said movement were that Halleck literally had no idea what was happening. If he'd simply known where Pope was he could have directed McClellan where to send the forces, but he didn't. The 6th and 2nd Corps had to edge forward in an "advance to contact" rather than marching through a safe rear area. I think this map shows the issue succinctly:

Jackson's corps is between Pope and Franklin. It is actually impossible for Franklin to reinforce Pope, as Lee has already enveloped Pope completely. The question becomes one of an unsupported attack against Jackson independent of Pope.

 

[leftyhunter]

Given McClellan's combat style was much more Jominian, I think he'd probably see it as unnecessary and indeed a diversion of effort from the actual goal. McClellan's entire military career was focused on three key objectives:
1) Keep Washington safe (as the vital point for the Union), with as little manpower as possible.
2) Go after Richmond (as the vital point for the Confederacy) with as much force as possible.
3) Minimize casualties, especially Union ones.

His concept of operations was pretty simple in most cases, and boiled down to using superior mobility and numbers (where he could get them, which he couldn't always) to operate with short supply lines from friendly territory against a point the enemy must defend - without going straight at the enemy army - and using his superior artillery to force a decision when defensive lines were impossible to outflank.




What?



You presumably are conflating the end of the Seven Days (which ended in early July) with the retreat from the Peninsula ordered over McClellan's objections in August. During the retreat McClellan did his best to get his troops to Pope as fast as possible, but he was simply unable to.

Please go into more detail as to the point you think McClellan did something to Pope he should not have done.

(Incidentally, if failing to reinforce someone fast enough is "hanging them out to dry", then Lincoln and his administration hung McClellan out to dry for the whole period from the middle of May to the middle of August!

Interesting points.
I guess the whole bad rap against McClellan is that he didn't win enough decisive victories with the manpower he had.
McClellan for example never equalled Grant at say Ft.Henry and Donaldson. Maybe that is not a fair comparison but perception is reality. Grant other then Cold Harbor wins all his battles or in the case of the Overland Campaign at least does not retreat and moves forward.
I can accept the argument that Lincoln should of given McClellan more men for the Peninsula Campaign.
Sears and most likely others have made the argument that McClellan instead of waiting for his army to be perfectly in order could of won a more substantial victory at Antietam.
I will try to finish the lecture. No doubt McClellan is a very interesting and controversial figure.
Leftyhunter

 

[Saphroneth]

I guess the whole bad rap against McClellan is that he didn't win enough decisive victories with the manpower he had.

Which is to say, generally outnumbered.

Grant other then Cold Harbor wins all his battles or in the case of the Overland Campaign at least does not retreat and moves forward.

So does McClellan, though, in most cases. McClellan wins most of his battles in the Seven Days and is otherwise pretty much undefeated - and in the Seven Days he has half the men relative to the enemy that Grant has in the Overland.

I can accept the argument that Lincoln should of given McClellan more men for the Peninsula Campaign.

Good, because most of the army was making it too!

Sears and most likely others have made the argument that McClellan instead of waiting for his army to be perfectly in order could of won a more substantial victory at Antietam.

The question is how, though - Lee's army largely arrived before McClellan's did, and McClellan did not have an overwhelming advantage at Antietam at any point. In fact, going by effectives the numbers are surprisingly close to even - and we know McClellan ordered in almost his entire force, in fact so many he was all but out of reserves, while Lee still had some fresh troops left.

ED: actually, Antietam pretty clearly shows the difference between the evaluations of Grant and McClellan. Grant is considered to be a successful general during the Overland because he kept moving and campaigning after an offensive loss. McClellan's Antietam was fought with a less favourable force ratio for the Union, McClellan kept campaigning after an offensive loss if you want to call it that (he only stopped because Halleck refused him the funds to bridge the Potomac, and obviously when the enemy is on the other side of a river you kind of need to be able to cross the river) and he's considered not to be a successful general.

 

[Bruce Vail]

Isnt that why he hung Pope out to dry around the end of the 7 days. Pope said he would forage off the land and the CSA took that to mean steal. Mac was appauled as well. Mac said Pope would be destroyed within a week, basically because he deserved it. When Pope got attacked by Jackson and Johnston, Mac did next to nothing to help him. The more I know about Mac the less I like him.....too much politics, to egotistical, never took the blame for his disasters instead laid it off on other officers. Was almost never near the battlefield.

I know Lee had a high opinion of him and he for one should know.....but Im not sure why

Having just finished a book on the Battle of the Seven Days, I can tell you why: Despite having an excellent plan, good commanders in place, and an ample supply of men, Lee was unable to destroy McClellan at the battles before Richmond. McClellan adroitly slipped away from Lee's traps, and did some severe damage to Lee's army in the process. McClellan basically ruined the Confederacy's best chance to a successful conclusion of the war.

This, by the way, is not my own personal opinion but rather the thesis elaborated by the author of the book, Clifford Dowdey. I'm sure 67th Tigers will agree with this, at least in part.