McPherson's vs Seminary Ridge

[TheKenoshaKid]

I was wondering why, on the 1st day, the I Corps fought so hard for control over Mcpherson's Ridge instead of forming a defense on Seminary Ridge behind them. It seems like Seminary Ridge being farther back would make it easier to connect with the troops showing up north of town on their right. I know they did eventually move back, but only after they were pushed back.
This is what I'm referring to:

To me, the troops on Mcpherson's Ridge look extremely out of place. Wouldn't Seminary Ridge offer a more compact defense?

On the other hand, General Reynolds literally gave his life leading the Iron Brigade in their defense of Mcpherson's Ridge, so obviously I must be missing something.

 

[rpkennedy]

I was wondering why, on the 1st day, the I Corps fought so hard for control over Mcpherson's Ridge instead of forming a defense on Seminary Ridge behind them. It seems like Seminary Ridge being farther back would make it easier to connect with the troops showing up north of town on their right. I know they did eventually move back, but only after they were pushed back.
This is what I'm referring to: View attachment 347757
To me, the troops on Mcpherson's Ridge look extremely out of place. Wouldn't Seminary Ridge offer a more compact defense?

On the other hand, General Reynolds literally gave his life leading the Iron Brigade in their defense of Mcpherson's Ridge, so obviously I must be missing something.

The problem with starting out on Seminary Ridge was that there was no fall back position other than Cemetery Hill on the other side of town. Holding the position on McPherson's Ridge allowed the First Corps' left to conduct a defense in depth and Doubleday thought that he could turn Herbst Woods into something like a fortress. If necessary, they could always fall back to Seminary Ridge and continue opposing the Confederate defense.

Ryan

 

[TheKenoshaKid]

The problem with starting out on Seminary Ridge was that there was no fall back position other than Cemetery Hill on the other side of town. Holding the position on McPherson's Ridge allowed the First Corps' left to conduct a defense in depth and Doubleday thought that he could turn Herbst Woods into something like a fortress. If necessary, they could always fall back to Seminary Ridge and continue opposing the Confederate defense.

Ryan

That's a good point, thanks for helping out!

 

[infomanpa]

The idea was to stall, stall, stall...

 

[datameister]

I was wondering why, on the 1st day, the I Corps fought so hard for control over Mcpherson's Ridge instead of forming a defense on Seminary Ridge behind them. It seems like Seminary Ridge being farther back would make it easier to connect with the troops showing up north of town on their right. I know they did eventually move back, but only after they were pushed back.
This is what I'm referring to: View attachment 347757
To me, the troops on Mcpherson's Ridge look extremely out of place. Wouldn't Seminary Ridge offer a more compact defense?

On the other hand, General Reynolds literally gave his life leading the Iron Brigade in their defense of Mcpherson's Ridge, so obviously I must be missing something.

It is my understanding that Doubleday realized how precarious the situation was and sent a message to Howard. The response was indicative of Howard's leadership, "you can ask Buford for help", or words to that effect. The results speak for themselves.

My source is Stephen Sears and one can cross reference his primary sources.

 

[Poorlaggedman]

Doubleday wrote about it years later. You have to remember Reynolds did not mean to get himself killed so he didn't communicate his intentions to Doubleday so well. He explains why he put and left troops where he did.

See what he said for yourself:
at about 4 hours 16 minutes

On page 158 of the digital file, page 134 of the real page numbers.

Chancellorsville and Gettysburg : Doubleday, Abner, 1819-1893 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Vol. 6

archive.org

I'm not sure if Doubleday says it in here but the 1st Corps artillery chief, Wainwright, in his recently-published diary says that an orderly from Howard (11th Corps, now in charge of field) rode over and emphasized the importance of holding Cemetery Hill but in broken English. Wainwright thought he meant Seminary Hill because of his pronunciation. So they wanted to keep some room to fall back upon if the need arose.

 

[datameister]

Doubleday wrote about it years later. You have to remember Reynolds did not mean to get himself killed so he didn't communicate his intentions to Doubleday so well. He explains why he put and left troops where he did.

See what he said for yourself:
at about 4 hours 16 minutes

On page 158 of the digital file, page 134 of the real page numbers.

Chancellorsville and Gettysburg : Doubleday, Abner, 1819-1893 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Vol. 6

archive.org

I'm not sure if Doubleday says it in here but the 1st Corps artillery chief, Wainwright, in his recently-published diary says that an orderly from Howard (11th Corps, now in charge of field) rode over and emphasized the importance of holding Cemetery Hill but in broken English. Wainwright thought he meant Seminary Hill because of his pronunciation. So they wanted to keep some room to fall back upon if the need arose.

Page 146 of the real pages points out where Doubleday asked for assistance or permission to withdraw. Thanks for the link.

 

[rpkennedy]

One also has to remember that Doubleday was writing with an agenda after the war. He was relieved of corps command on the night of the 1st by Meade, who hated Doubleday (the feeling was mutual) and who resigned his command with the Army of the Potomac on the 6th when Meade refused to give back the First Corps. All of this was precipitated by Howard's assertion that the First Corps broke first and forced the Eleventh Corps to have to fall back.This essentially ended his career in the field although he would go on to a fairly successful career in the army post bellum but he was certainly interested in defending himself in his writings. The contemporary evidence for Doubleday wanting to vacate McPherson's Ridge is spotty so it's possible that he did but I wouldn't bet on it.

Ironically, Gettysburg was probably Doubleday's finest hour but the shadow still lingered.

Ryan

 

[Poorlaggedman]

He'd have to be insane not to want to withdraw so I definitely believe him. I'm quite sure he was looking to his rear for support in that situation. When you have to hide a brigade in a woodlot and prostrate the other two behind reverse slopes to avoid Confederate artillery, that's a sign that the situation is precarious even before the enemy infantry steps off. Way more compelling to me than the "What would Jackson do" malarkey is the "What would Reynolds do."

 

[Irishtom29]

.Way more compelling to me than the "What would Jackson do" malarkey is the "What would Reynolds do."

No lie.

This raises the question of would it been better if the 1st Corps had withdrawn and it and 11th Corps made their fight on the high grounds south of town.

 

[rpkennedy]

He'd have to be insane not to want to withdraw so I definitely believe him. I'm quite sure he was looking to his rear for support in that situation. When you have to hide a brigade in a woodlot and prostrate the other two behind reverse slopes to avoid Confederate artillery, that's a sign that the situation is precarious even before the enemy infantry steps off. Way more compelling to me than the "What would Jackson do" malarkey is the "What would Reynolds do."

McPherson's Ridge is not a terrible position with the caveat that it needed support since it was susceptible to flanking from both the north and south. A major problem was that prior to Heth's assault on the ridge, Colonel Charles Wainwright stripped the First Corps of artillery so that he could properly defend Seminary Ridge (as indicated in his account about hearing the German aide refer to "Seminary Hill"). This action left the defense of McPherson's Ridge without heavy firepower and reduced the chances of being able to hold. Even with that said, the Confederates who attacked Herbst Woods paid a heavy price for prying the 24th Michigan and 19th Indiana from their position.

Ryan

 

[Gettysburg Guide #154]

With as much as has been written about the need for the Union to hold the high ground to the south of Gettysburg, little consideration has been given to the objective of defending the town. Common sense says that you want to deny an enemy the use of any key crossroad, if at all possible. As the junction point for 10 roads, Gettysburg certainly qualifies as a key crossroad. Looking at Buford's report in the OR as to the activity of his scouting parties on the night of June 30, one gets the sense that he intends to defend the town, and indeed his dispositions are such as to do so. This is not to suggest the importance of the heights south of town were not fully recognized at the outset, but only to suggest that the town would not be given up without a fight.
If an effort is to be made to defend the town, then a defense on Seminary Ridge, at the very edge of the town would be a precarious thing to try. Gamble's men to the west of Gettysburg fought from one ridge to the next for about two hours, until the lead elements of the First Corps of the Army of the Potomac began to arrive. At that point in time, the cavalry was on McPherson Ridge. Naturally enough, the infantry took over the fight at that point.
If you have not been on the ground west of Gettysburg, you need to understand that McPherson Ridge is actually two ridges. The western ridge passes to the west of the McPherson Barn and disappears in Herbst Woods. The ground west of the western McPherson Ridge falls more sharply downward toward Willoughby Run, than does the slope of the ground west of either Eastern McPherson Ridge or Seminary Ridge. Hence, it is more difficult to assail by a force coming from the west, as the Confederates were. In addition, the trees of Herbst Woods gave the Iron Brigade some cover from Confederates artillery to the west and north. To be fair, the men of Stone's Brigade to the north of the Iron Brigade were much more exposed to an artillery cross fire from both the north and west.
There is little question that the advance of the Confederates was slowed for some time by the presence of the two Union brigades on west McPherson Ridge. Lt. Col. Dudley of the 19th IN says that for about an hour, " . . . no Rebel crossed that stream [Willoughby Run] and lived." It seems to me that the fact that the Confederates were fighting up hill at this point was very much to the Union advantage.
In addition, the retreating Union men from Stone's Brigade and the Iron Brigade, supported also by the 151st PA, continued to resist the Confederate attack, at least briefly, on East McPherson Ridge. Biddle's Brigade positioned as it was on East McPherson Ridge to the south of Herbst Woods was also engaged at this time. All of this bought even more time, inflicted more casualties, and burned off more of the day before the retreat back to Cemetery Hill, as compared to a stand on Seminary Ridge alone. It is my belief that a stand on Seminary Ridge alone would not have held out appreciably longer than the stand made after a fighting retreat from McPherson Ridges. The Union troops would have been outflanked to the south regardless of when they moved back to Seminary Ridge.