Saphroneth
Lt. Colonel
- Joined
- Feb 18, 2017
The core logic behind the Peninsular Plan, from a grand strategy sense, is that it's frankly necessary to operate against Richmond at all. It can vary how you attack the Peninsula, but you have to do it unless the enemy you're facing is either totally outgeneralled or totally outclassed - simply put, the defensible rivers of NE Virginia make excellent stopping points where an army can resist twice its own numbers, and you have to clear the rail lines to be able to operate in strength that far south on the Overland route (which means in turn a long, vulnerable flank) and battering through the Richmond defences cannot be quick or easy unless you can get an irresistible siege train into position.
But to get around the defensive positions that can resist the Overland approach requires supply up the York River and its tributaries (Grant used this during the Overland) and to get the siege train into position probably requires waterborne transport or, again, uninterrupted control of the rail lines for a considerable length of time. If Yorktown's still strongly held, then the campaign stalls out at the North Anna or the analogue to it (though it would be necessary to win Spotsylvania, too, as after Spotsylvania Grant shifted supply to the Rappahannock).
It's possible to imagine an Overland analogue in 1864 which included an Urbanna landing as a secondary component, but an 1862 Overland campaign would have seen the Union army with much shallower pockets in terms of manpower - I doubt they could have found the manpower for an overland thrust at the appropriate force concentration while also managing an Urbanna landing. (Certainly not if they were limited to the same resources McClellan had.)
But to get around the defensive positions that can resist the Overland approach requires supply up the York River and its tributaries (Grant used this during the Overland) and to get the siege train into position probably requires waterborne transport or, again, uninterrupted control of the rail lines for a considerable length of time. If Yorktown's still strongly held, then the campaign stalls out at the North Anna or the analogue to it (though it would be necessary to win Spotsylvania, too, as after Spotsylvania Grant shifted supply to the Rappahannock).
It's possible to imagine an Overland analogue in 1864 which included an Urbanna landing as a secondary component, but an 1862 Overland campaign would have seen the Union army with much shallower pockets in terms of manpower - I doubt they could have found the manpower for an overland thrust at the appropriate force concentration while also managing an Urbanna landing. (Certainly not if they were limited to the same resources McClellan had.)