The Peninsula McClellan's Peninsula Plan (earlyFebruary)

[Rebforever]

"blockade and march down the Mississippi".

WHAT???

 

[trice]

There never was such a think as an "Anaconda Plan". It is a post-facto invention. The name itself comes from a satirical cartoon lampooning Scott.

So your objection is that Scott didn't come up with the name?

The Navy of course is going to blockade the coast, because that's what navies do.

Well, sure, a blockade is a normal thing for navies to do. For that matter, one had already been declared in April by Lincoln.

Operational problems mean the Navy won't be mounting a full blockade until well into 1862 after the seizure of Port Royal.

Yes, no one in America had experience with war on a large scale and estimates of requirements tended to be insufficient at that point. In addition, Scott was a soldier, not a sailor, and had no authority over or particular knowledge of naval forces and construction/training times to base this on. For that matter, the War Department and the Secretary of War had no control over the Navy.

Scott in his 3rd May writes to McClellan that his only planned operation is for 60,000 men (the regulars and the advance of the 3-years volunteers) to be carried on 40 transports escorted by 12-20 gunboats some time after 10th November 1861 (because according to Scott the 3 years volunteers who enlisted right at the start of the war won't be ready for the field until then). On the 21st he objects to McClellan's plans again and is suggesting 80,000 men going down the Mississippi on water and overland (the larger part of the force), again at the end of the year. In his 21st May letter Scott informally unites the Dept of Missouri and Dept of Kentucky with McClellan's own and makes him de facto commander of all western forces.

OK

 

[trice]

Quick correction here - Scott's Anaconda plan was to blockade and march down the Mississippi, without offensives across the Continent and relying almost entirely on economic pressure. McClellan's plan is how the war played out anyway, but in a disjointed sense.

Quick correction here: Scott unveiled the Anaconda Plan May 3rd, 1861 (preliminary) and May 21st (final). It was the outline for a 2-year war to defeat and conquer the Confederacy. Political, military and economic isolation via the blockade was certainly a big part of his plan. Your description leaves out Scott's fighting the war in the West by clearing the Mississippi River Valley first while the blockade strangled the Confederacy. The major objection made to Scott's plan was that two years was too slow.

"blockade and march down the Mississippi".

WHAT???

That's just Saphroneth pointing out that I had missed part of his post. He's right; I was doing too many things at once and responded too hastily and without double-checking.

 

[trice]

No, I am referring to the York and James rivers. You need those to have a way of supplying an army before Richmond that doesn't use rail supply via the site of the North Anna battles.

OK. Then maintaining the Magruder's position at Yorktown (and probably the position of Huger around Norfolk to make the Yorktown position work) does not impact the advance I am talking about in any way until and unless it has advanced a considerable distance and already achieved considerable success. If anything, it ties up Confederate troops away from the main effort, which would be a good thing for the Union.

No matter what Magruder/Huger do, the Union will still have access to the lower reaches of the Rappahannock River, including Urbanna, as a potential LOC, and from Urbanna a move on West Point at the head of the York River can be supported. If a Union force does end up at West Point, Magruder's position on the Peninsula is compromised and he will have to consider abandoning the Warwick line (retreating up the Peninsula to Richmond, or up the James to Richmond, or across the James to Norfolk and then to Petersburg-Richmond).

As to supply for the Union: this will not and cannot impact the advance I am discussing for the first month or so of the campaign, at which point things will have changed drastically.

Well, yes, because that's how battles were fought in the American Civil War - at least, by large armies. It's not until the Loudoun Valley campaign that the Army of the Potomac first uses a flying column.

The French armies of the Revolution and Napoleonic Wars had changed all that; men like McClellan were familiar with how it was done and had even seen Scott do it on the way to Mexico City on a small scale. No invention is required: merely application of history.

Wagon logistics, especially in the less developed US, was very bad indeed at allowing mobility.

Yes, generally Sherman found that 3 days haulage from the RR in northern GA was the effective limit where it became too difficult; more than 2 days haulage reduced the force that could be supplied quite a bit. This limited the width of his flanking movements to about 25-30 miles from the RR in either direction.

Assuming that you are supplying your force primarily through the O&A RR and have that working through Warrenton, Culpepper and Orange, where do you see supply problems for this advance?

 

[trice]

The purpose of an advance to the west is to outflank the lines along the rivers. To answer your question about supply down at Richmond, you would first have to tell me what has transpired before that. Has the Confederate army simply fallen back to Richmond? Have they come out and fought the Union to the West while still holding on near Fredericksburg? What have they done?

Assume the worst. What can the Confederate army do to disrupt your approach?

I don't think there really is a "worst". There are things the Confederates might do and you will have to do something in return.

The Rebels might decide to plunge towards Washington while the main Union army is a bit to the West. I don't think they would (I really doubt Joe Johnston would). Personally, I think the Union commander should like that one and react by turning against the Rebel flank and rear, hoping to defeat them, then drive them up against the Washington defenses and/or the Potomac. Pull that off and the Union will have a free hand in Virginia in the aftermath.

The Rebels might decide to stay in place East of your advance, which means you threaten their flank as you move. The natural thought here is that you turn East to hit their flank and rear, threatening their LOC, and see what develops.

Or the Rebels can pull back (likely, especially for Joe Johnston) to the Rapidan, and then the North Anna. About the time you are approaching Gordonsville for the Union, you have to make decisions about which way to proceed.

By this point, the Confederates have also had to make decisions. Are they concentrating to fight at Gordonsville to the West, or back to the East, closer to the RR from Richmond? Are they splitting into two forces or combining in one?

But all of this involves a lot of decisions. many made on the fly and in the hurly-burly of maneuver and combat.

One example is that the CS army falls back to the area of the North Anna battles, as your supply line must go through there to reach Richmond.

In general, if this means the Union can take Gordonsville, then I suspect the Union would turn East and try to outflank the North Anna line.

I have said that as part of this it seems likely the Union would have moved down the Shenandoah Valley, hopefully as far as Staunton. It seems likely this move starts earlier than (no later than the same time as) the move down the Eastern slope of the Blue Ridge. Clearly that means troops are out there and they came from somewhere. Generally speaking: Fremont's lot, Banks, etc. If it is to be waged first, probably more required; if at the same time as the main advance, probably fewer troops needed in the Valley.

Um... so you're advancing down both sides of the Blue Ridge at once? Doesn't that just mean the part of the army east of the Blue Ridge has no consistent supply route, because there's Confederate troops on top of it?
ED: having read further, you seem to mean moving to Gordonsville.

Yes. Banks was already doing that in real life, moving down the Shenandoah to take Harrisonburg and New Market by March 20. when Jackson has retreated 20 miles to a flanking position at the gap on the Blue Ridge. Doing that secures the flank of the advance on the other side of the Blue Ridge, and Jackson won't be staying up there if another large Union force is not that far away behind him. The only difference here is that McClellan is deploying into northern VA in strength instead of moving his army to Fort Monroe.

If this was part of a plan, of course, things would be done a little different. Banks might have a little more strength and support until he got to that point, or he might be a little later coming down, to act in concert with an advance through Culpepper. Jackson will either be further down the Valley or on the East side of the Blue Ridge -- he won't be staying up at the Gap long with Banks on the Valley side and a Union advance moving towards the other side of the Gap (modern day, roughly where VA-33 crosses Skyline Drive).

Banks, BTW, found supply a little difficult when he got down as far as Harrisonburg and New Market. He'd need some help to get his logistics developed better for this plan. Freemont is out there to the west of the Valley, doing whatever Freemont does after he arrives (March 29?). I'd assume McClellan wanted him to come through McDowell to Staunton, arriving about May 8-15 (real-life battle at McDowell was May 8).

If Johnston wants to use Jackson and Ewell East of the Blue Ridge as McClellan advances, then Banks and Freemont have a free hand in the Valley. In that case, McClellan might pull Shields division back over the Blue Ridge (as Lincoln/Stanton did in real life).

The rest of your post I think we should leave aside until we work through the above parts. Let's try to work on how things might have gone up until about the middle of May, assuming that Confederate responses in troop transfers from outside the area would be about as they were in real-life, just re-arranged to deal with this advance.

I would guess that means (about May 15):

1. Banks has come down the Shenandoah from the North at least to Harrisonburg and New Market. LOC running back to Harpers Ferry.
2. Freemont is approaching Staunton from the West. LOC long and difficult.
3. Jackson and Ewell are East of the Blue Ridge
4. McClellan's main army has advanced through Warrenton, Culpepper and maybe Orange, LOC largely the O&A RR
5. Some Union force is over near Fredericksburg-Aquia Creek, LOC the RR back to Washington
6. Joe Johnston is concentrated in one of:
   1. Along the North Anna with a smaller part at/near Gordonsville
   2. Near Gordonsville with a smaller force along the North Anna
   3. In two large wings, at Gordonsville and somewhere further East, near the RR
   4. LOCs here use the RRs back to Richmond
7. Magruder and Huger are still back at Yorktown and Norfolk, possibly having detached some troops.
8. Confederate RR to Charlottesville from the West threatened or cut by Freemont's advance.

Does Joe Johnston:

1. Attack McClellan?
2. Send forces to the Valley to attack Freemont/Banks and stand in place at Gordonsville/North Anna?
3. Stand in place at Gordonsville/North Anna and wait to see what happens?
   
4. Retreat towards Richmond?

 

[ErnieMac]

The maps are Plate 018 of the Official Records Atlas. The Cram map, on the left, was hastily prepared at McClellan's request by Major Thomas J. Cram of General Wool's staff using information they had obtained at the time. The right hand map was prepared under McClellan's orders after Federal troops had advance up the Peninsula. Major differences, especially in the line of the Warwick River.

From what I've read I can't say that I'm surprised that intelligence and maps of the Peninsula were lacking. With the exception of manning coastal fortifications most of the relatively small US Army was out west. There were outstanding topographical engineers (John Fremont, William Emory, George McClellan) laying out routes for future transcontinental railroads or (George Meade) conducting coastal surveys and building lighthouses. Until December, 1861, no one anticipated the need for detailed maps of inland areas. If you lived there you knew where to go, if you didn't live there you probably didn't care.

 

[trice]

View attachment 157692 The maps are Plate 018 of the Official Records Atlas. The Cram map, on the left, was hastily prepared at McClellan's request by Major Thomas J. Cram of General Wool's staff using information they had obtained at the time. The right hand map was prepared under McClellan's orders after Federal troops had advance up the Peninsula. Major differences, especially in the line of the Warwick River.

From what I've read I can't say that I'm surprised that intelligence and maps of the Peninsula were lacking. With the exception of manning coastal fortifications most of the relatively small US Army was out west. There were outstanding topographical engineers (John Fremont, William Emory, George McClellan) laying out routes for future transcontinental railroads or (George Meade) conducting coastal surveys and building lighthouses. Until December, 1861, no one anticipated the need for detailed maps of inland areas. If you lived there you new where to go, if you didn't live there you probably didn't care.

Yes. The only US Army map Cram could find was exactly like that, a survey of the rivers and coasts done in 1818. What surprises me is that with the biggest post in the US Army at Fort Monroe for decades they could not come up with an officer who knew something about the area just 20 miles away.

 

[ErnieMac]

I don't think there really is a "worst". There are things the Confederates might do and you will have to do something in return.

The Rebels might decide to plunge towards Washington while the main Union army is a bit to the West. I don't think they would (I really doubt Joe Johnston would). Personally, I think the Union commander should like that one and react by turning against the Rebel flank and rear, hoping to defeat them, then drive them up against the Washington defenses and/or the Potomac. Pull that off and the Union will have a free hand in Virginia in the aftermath.

The Rebels might decide to stay in place East of your advance, which means you threaten their flank as you move. The natural thought here is that you turn East to hit their flank and rear, threatening their LOC, and see what develops.

Or the Rebels can pull back (likely, especially for Joe Johnston) to the Rapidan, and then the North Anna. About the time you are approaching Gordonsville for the Union, you have to make decisions about which way to proceed.

By this point, the Confederates have also had to make decisions. Are they concentrating to fight at Gordonsville to the West, or back to the East, closer to the RR from Richmond? Are they splitting into two forces or combining in one?

But all of this involves a lot of decisions. many made on the fly and in the hurly-burly of maneuver and combat.



In general, if this means the Union can take Gordonsville, then I suspect the Union would turn East and try to outflank the North Anna line.




Yes. Banks was already doing that in real life, moving down the Shenandoah to take Harrisonburg and New Market by March 20. when Jackson has retreated 20 miles to a flanking position at the gap on the Blue Ridge. Doing that secures the flank of the advance on the other side of the Blue Ridge, and Jackson won't be staying up there if another large Union force is not that far away behind him. The only difference here is that McClellan is deploying into northern VA in strength instead of moving his army to Fort Monroe.

If this was part of a plan, of course, things would be done a little different. Banks might have a little more strength and support until he got to that point, or he might be a little later coming down, to act in concert with an advance through Culpepper. Jackson will either be further down the Valley or on the East side of the Blue Ridge -- he won't be staying up at the Gap long with Banks on the Valley side and a Union advance moving towards the other side of the Gap (modern day, roughly where VA-33 crosses Skyline Drive).

Banks, BTW, found supply a little difficult when he got down as far as Harrisonburg and New Market. He'd need some help to get his logistics developed better for this plan. Freemont is out there to the west of the Valley, doing whatever Freemont does after he arrives (March 29?). I'd assume McClellan wanted him to come through McDowell to Staunton, arriving about May 8-15 (real-life battle at McDowell was May 8).

If Johnston wants to use Jackson and Ewell East of the Blue Ridge as McClellan advances, then Banks and Freemont have a free hand in the Valley. In that case, McClellan might pull Shields division back over the Blue Ridge (as Lincoln/Stanton did in real life).

The rest of your post I think we should leave aside until we work through the above parts. Let's try to work on how things might have gone up until about the middle of May, assuming that Confederate responses in troop transfers from outside the area would be about as they were in real-life, just re-arranged to deal with this advance.

I would guess that means (about May 15):

1. Banks has come down the Shenandoah from the North at least to Harrisonburg and New Market. LOC running back to Harpers Ferry.
2. Freemont is approaching Staunton from the West. LOC long and difficult.
3. Jackson and Ewell are East of the Blue Ridge
4. McClellan's main army has advanced through Warrenton, Culpepper and maybe Orange, LOC largely the O&A RR
5. Some Union force is over near Fredericksburg-Aquia Creek, LOC the RR back to Washington
6. Joe Johnston is concentrated in one of:
   1. Along the North Anna with a smaller part at/near Gordonsville
   2. Near Gordonsville with a smaller force along the North Anna
   3. In two large wings, at Gordonsville and somewhere further East, near the RR
   4. LOCs here use the RRs back to Richmond
7. Magruder and Huger are still back at Yorktown and Norfolk, possibly having detached some troops.
8. Confederate RR to Charlottesville from the West threatened or cut by Freemont's advance.

Does Joe Johnston:

1. Attack McClellan?
2. Send forces to the Valley to attack Freemont/Banks and stand in place at Gordonsville/North Anna?
3. Stand in place at Gordonsville/North Anna and wait to see what happens?
   
4. Retreat towards Richmond?

OR Atlas Map of Northern Virginia follows:

One thing to note is there is no direct rail communication between Washington DC and Fredericksburg VA or between Washington DC and Richmond VA. Federal operations on the Rappahannock in 1862, 1863 & 1864 used the spur of the RF&P Railroad running between Fredericksburg and Aquia Creek and steamers on the Potomac River as their LOC. Assuming a Federal advance out of DC along the route of the Orange and Alexandria, I cannot see why Johnston would abandon the Fredericksburg area. It would have left him well supplied from Richmond and on the flank of McClellan's line of advance. IMO there would have had to been a significant threat from the south or southeast to pry him away, which is in fact what happened during the Peninsula Campaign.

 

[trice]

OR Atlas Map of Northern Virginia follows:
View attachment 157694
One thing to note is there is no direct rail communication between Washington DC and Fredericksburg VA or between Washington DC and Richmond VA. Federal operations on the Rappahannock in 1862, 1863 & 1864 used the spur of the RF&P Railroad running between Fredericksburg and Aquia Creek and steamers on the Potomac River as their LOC. Assuming a Federal advance out of DC along the route of the Orange and Alexandria, I cannot see why Johnston would abandon the Fredericksburg area. It would have left him well supplied from Richmond and on the flank of McClellan's line of advance. IMO there would have had to been a significant threat from the south or southeast to pry him away, which is in fact what happened during the Peninsula Campaign.

At this point in the war, the US Military Railroads had just been authorized (1/31/62) and Daniel McCallum became Director & Superintendent (2/11/62). Herman Haupt became responsible for the 7-mile Washington & Alexandria on 4/27/62 (which was all the RR the USMRR was running at that point). Haupt, of course, was a bit of a wizard and by May 19 he had rebuilt the Potomac Creek Bridge and built 1,000 feet of wharf over on Aquia, with trains running the 15 miles from there to Fredericksburg.

All that is just to say that the beginnings of the USMRR are beginning to form and would have had an impact here. Probably this timing means Haupt would have been involved with getting the O&A working for this plan, not over at Aquia Creek, in late Arpil and early May. I don't know how that would have progressed, but with Johnston already pulled back by early March, I would guess the RRs would be put into working order out to Manassas Junction first, then hopefully extended along the route Warrenton-Culpepper as the Union advanced. That will require cover along a line to the southeast against Confederate incursions. This requires the AoP to cross the North Fork of the Rappahannock around Rappahannock Station and Kelly's Ford.

As to maintaining a large army at Fredericksburg: Lee's ANV was very hungry there in January-April 1863, so much so that Longstreet was sent to Suffolk to gather supplies and ease the burden at Fredericksburg. The Confederates essentially could not feed a large force sitting directly on the RR 50 miles from Richmond at that point (animals were a particular problem, leading to dispersal of artillery and cavalry). Some large force can be supplied there, but any really large force will have to be scattered more, possibly out towards Gordonsville and Orange C.H.

 

[67th Tigers]

You'd also want to protect your LOC, which would probably require the type of precautions Sherman used later in 1864 to protect his LOC from St. Louis and Louisville through Nashville and Chattanooga to Atlanta; the equivalent in northern Virginia has the advantage of being shorter.

I think you misapprehend the difficulty of the operation.

Sherman's depot was Nashville, some 250 miles from Atlanta, which is closer than Washington-Richmond at 110 miles. To operate the line from Nashville to Atlanta 200 engines and 3,000 rolling stock were needed to supply 100,000 men and 6,000 animals, and the line was double-tracked. This was with massive cuts to Sherman's transportation - he could not move his army away from the railroad in any sense and hence his tactical options were very limited. None of his divisions ever went more than a days march from the rail line, and then only when confronted with an opposed river crossing of the Etowah.

The RF&PRR might only be 110 miles long, but it is single tracked and has a major operational problem in Spring 1862; Fredericksburg and the Rappahannock line are in enemy hands. OTL it took 18 months to get the Army of the Potomac over the Rappahannock line, although this might have been done relatively quickly in November '62 as Lee was divided. However, following Johnston's withdrawal to the Rappahannock/Rapidan he had a large force strongly posted and entrenched.

Operations against the Rappahannock line should really not be started until the Shenandoah is secure, lest the enemy turn you.

To cross the Rappahannock against an entrenched enemy you have only really one option, since (unlike Summer '62) Aquia is in rebel hands and the corps commanders and Barnard object to an amphibious movement. You must advance to the Rapidan down the O&ARR, which has been destroyed. It will take several months to fix the railroad, and even then Haupt estimated in late '62 it could only supply 40,000 troops.

Now, in the autumn of '63 much work was done which allowed Meade's (later Grant's) army to subsist at Culpeper. The Overland Campaign was largely possible because:

1. Fredericksburg was in Union hands, acting as Grant's depot once he crossed the Rapidan
2. Gloucester was in Union hands, allowing Grant to supply from the Rappahannock
3. Yorktown was in Union hands, allowing Grant to supply past the North Anna
4. Charles City was in Union hands, allowing Grant to supply on the James
5. City Point was in Union hands, allowing Grant to supply at Petersburg

In spring '62 none of these things is true. It will take several months to rebuild the O&ARR to Culpeper, and indeed it will probably be June or even July before Haupt can supply (say) 10 divisions at Culpeper. Once there the army needs to get across the Rapidan and starting rebuilding the railroad as they advance.

In '64 Grant did not use the O&ARR after crossing the Rapidan. He took a large train (5,500 vehicles) to immediately feed his army and had a range of 10 days (forage and subsistence). He inclined east and went through the Wilderness away from the O&ARR and started drawing on Union occupied Fredericksburg (coming from Alexandria via rail) which was insufficient to sustain the army. Only when they started drawing on waterborne supply landing at Port Royal did they receive good supplies, and as they moved south they switched their base of supply to White House Landing, then Charles City on the north bank of the James (near Harrison's Landing), and finally to City Point.

The point being, in 1862 the Overland Campaign is impossible, because it required the Peninsula Campaign to gain large areas first to enable the overland movement.

For McClellan the Rappahannock/Rapidan line is a far worse problem than for his successors. There is no easy way to force it, and no easy way to supply past it. In November it may have been possible, if not for the weeks delay imposed on Burnside, that the Federals would have switched base to Fredericksburg. In Spring of '62 this is not possible - Longstreet holds Fredericksburg in force.

If we ignore the problems, and assume that the rebels are compelled to withdraw you have to repair and protect the railroad to get you down to the North Anna, and the RF&PRR isn't ideal. It was not capable of supply Grant's needs in 1864.

It took the Union three years to move from Louisville to Atlanta. An overland movement in 1862 is not very promising at all...

 

[67th Tigers]

As to maintaining a large army at Fredericksburg: Lee's ANV was very hungry there in January-April 1863, so much so that Longstreet was sent to Suffolk to gather supplies and ease the burden at Fredericksburg. The Confederates essentially could not feed a large force sitting directly on the RR 50 miles from Richmond at that point (animals were a particular problem, leading to dispersal of artillery and cavalry). Some large force can be supplied there, but any really large force will have to be scattered more, possibly out towards Gordonsville and Orange C.H.

Almost like McClellan severed the railroads, destroyed the engines and rolling stock, and collapsed the rail bridges in May 1862 isn't it?

 

[trice]

I think you misapprehend the difficulty of the operation.

Nope.

 

[67th Tigers]

Nope.

Why?

 

[trice]

I think you misapprehend the difficulty of the operation.

Nope.

Why?

I was only trying to correct your misapprehensions.

 

[67th Tigers]

I was only trying to correct your misapprehensions.

Which are?

 

[trice]

Which are?

Well, to start out with, your opening sentence was insulting and clearly a misapprehension on your part.

Second, your paragraph on Sherman's supply line has errors. It was clear to me from reading it that I know far more about the issues involved with Sherman's 1864 logistics than you do. I thought about replying to it, but that would lead to a digression from the topic that would help no one. I also decided to refrain from embarassing you on such a petty matter.

The rest of your post showed that you were not reading and understanding what I was posting anyway, so I just decided to let the whole thing slide by cutting it short.

So how about we just go back to you think I misapprehend the supply situation and you are wrong. Then we can get back to the topic.

 

[67th Tigers]

OR Atlas Map of Northern Virginia follows:

One thing to note is there is no direct rail communication between Washington DC and Fredericksburg VA or between Washington DC and Richmond VA. Federal operations on the Rappahannock in 1862, 1863 & 1864 used the spur of the RF&P Railroad running between Fredericksburg and Aquia Creek and steamers on the Potomac River as their LOC. Assuming a Federal advance out of DC along the route of the Orange and Alexandria, I cannot see why Johnston would abandon the Fredericksburg area. It would have left him well supplied from Richmond and on the flank of McClellan's line of advance. IMO there would have had to been a significant threat from the south or southeast to pry him away, which is in fact what happened during the Peninsula Campaign.

I agree.

Johnston moved back to the Rappahanock/Rapidan line and had eight divisions available to defend it.

Fredericksburg was under Holmes' command and then Longstreet's when Holmes was reassigned, They had the following around Fredericksburg:

Whiting's division of 3 bdes (Whiting, Hood and Hampton)
Holmes' division of 4 bdes (French, Walker*, Field and SR Anderson)

and were fortifying the heights behind Fredericksburg that cost Burnside so dear.

The other major corps was occupying the area around the O&ARR bridge across the Rapidan (having burned it and the one over the Rappahannock ISTR) and covering the fords with:

GW Smith's division (GT Anderson, Wilcox* and Toombs)
Longstreet's division of 3 bdes (AP Hill, DR Jones and Pickett, with DR Jones being senior and commanding the division in lieu of Longstreet's assuming a "corps")
Ewell's division (Elzey, Trimble and Taylor)
Early's division of 3 bdes (Early, Rodes and Kershaw)
DH Hill's new division assembled from two slack brigades (Griffith and GB Anderson)
Stuart's cavalry

On the flank is Jackson with his division.

Historically Jeff Davis was going nuts over Burnside and was pulling brigades from other stations to form an army to oppose him. He asked Joe Johnston for Longstreet and his division, but Johnston objected to losing his best division commander. Davis then had Walker and Wilcox pulled from Johnston, Cobb from Magruder and Gregg from SC to add to the NC forces.

Very quickly when McClellan started moving in April Cobb and Wilcox were ordered to Magruder and Gregg, Branch and JR Anderson from the NC force were sent to Northern Virginia where they formed "The Army of the North" with Field's brigade at Fredericksburg and nominally with Ewell's division.

If McClellan inclines to an attack on the Rappahannock/Rapidan line one suspects, Wilcox and Walker would be recalled, and Cobb, Gregg, Branch and JR Anderson's brigades would rapidly be sent north, along with Colston's and Pryor's from Norfolk. This would give Johnston 10 divisions to defend a secure river line.

Urbanna was nixed not by Lincoln etc. directly, but by the Corps Commanders. They thought landing at Urbanna was too dangerous and exposed with Johnston behind the Rappahannock. It was them who insisted on Fort Monroe and the Peninsula, which McClellan considered the weakest option. Indeed back in January he'd asked James Shields about Yorktown, and Shields had said it would take six weeks to reduce it and move on.

Because of this I don't see there being any support for a landing on the lower Rappahannock, and it's a grind down the railroads.

 

[trice]

OR Atlas Map of Northern Virginia follows:
View attachment 157694
... Assuming a Federal advance out of DC along the route of the Orange and Alexandria, I cannot see why Johnston would abandon the Fredericksburg area. It would have left him well supplied from Richmond and on the flank of McClellan's line of advance. IMO there would have had to been a significant threat from the south or southeast to pry him away, which is in fact what happened during the Peninsula Campaign.

The reason a force concentrated at Fredericksburg might retreat because of a Federal advance along the O&A is that (as the advance moves to Brandy Station-Culpepper-Orange Court House) the Union is on the western flank of Johnston at Fredericksburg. There is a threat here, that the Union advance would now wheel East and come in on the Rebel left flank and rear.

A year after this contemplated move, Hooker marched the corps of Meade, Howard and Slocum NW to cross the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford, then marched them back SE to strike Fredericksburg. In the maneuver along the O&A RR, McClellan's left would probably be crossing the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford. When McClellan is concentrated at Culpepper, he would be essentially posing the same flank threat Hooker's column did a year later.

As McClellan advances from Culpepper, the potential threat to the Confederate left rear grows. If he gets to the Mitchell's Station/Cedar Mountain area (8 miles from Culpepper), he is about to cross the Rapidan. If he gets to Orange (11 miles from Mitchell's station), he is across the Rapidan and just as far south as Spotsylvania. At some point in that approach, the Confederate commander will need to decide how he is going to react to McClellan's move.

The one thing no Confederate commander should do is to simply sit at Fredericksburg while the Union pushes around his western flank. If he does and McClellan does pivot to the East, then the Rebels are fighting with their backs to the Rappahannock and their only supply line running north-south down the RF&P RR, very vulnerable to interruption. Lose the climactic battle here and the Rebel Army is destroyed, trapped against the river, remnants pushed East and North to disintegrate and die. That's why Johnston would not have just remained there if an advance like this was developing.

An aggressive commander would have either come out and opposed McClellan along the crossings at the North Fork of the Rappahannock/the Rapidan or pushed on the north side of the Rappahannock (to strike at the Union LOC). A very passive or defensive commander would fall back to the North Anna.

Falling back to the North Anna means the Union will very probably push on Gordonsville, which would threaten to turn the North Anna line. As a result, the next decision for the Confederate commander is "Will I fight for Gordonsville?"

In this hypothetical branch (effectively the third option not mentioned by McClellan), the above would be the situation about May 15th. The Yankees would have occupied the Shenandoah down to about Staunton (Fremont and Banks). McClellan is probably 75% south of the Rappahannock with a corps or so on the north bank. I am not sure where Jackson is, other than he will not be at Swift Run Gap anymore; maybe over by Gordonsville, maybe over by Staunton if Johnston decided to fight for the Valley.

None of this ensures success or failure for either side. There are problems here to be solved just to get to these positions. If the commanders did get to these positions, there'd be battles to fight and win, and more problems to solve.

The logistical problem for the Union side is very big. As pointed out, the Yankees will have to repair and protect the A&O RR as they go. There will be a long exposed flank to that RR, in addition to partisan activity along the route. This will require a great deal of very well-organized preparation to start and a lot of dedicated resources to maintain.

The other big problem for the Yankees (not mentioned so far) is their cavalry. They don't really have enough and what they have is not efficient enough. The Rebel cavalry is not yet organized the way it would be in a few more months, but the Yankees would have great difficulty facing them on this campaign in any case.

Even if this has worked out amazingly for the Union (IOW, Johnston has decided to fight back by Richmond and pulled everything off that direction), this would be a major decision point for McClellan. Gordonsville is as far as he would go in this direction. He now would have to turn East.

 

[67th Tigers]

15th May? It's unlikely McClellan could even supply a large force at Culpeper. The Railroad needs three months work.

Then Johnston is holding a strong river line and has had time to entrench the fords. McClellan meanwhile has to detach a significant force to protect his right, because one rebel cavalryman with a match can sever the armies lifeline. He also has to picket the entire river line for the same reason.

The Rapidan (because they did not historically make the line of defense there at the Rappahannock) at the rail brigade is a defenders paradise. Nature has created a perfect kill zone for the rebels to occupy, with a natural crossfire, and the bluffs south of the river dominating the north:

Frankly, one division with artillery and enough ammunition could probably repel the whole Federal army. This is exactly what Johnston wanted. ; he entrenched 5 divisions there waiting for McClellan to hopefully put his men in the slaughter pit.

There are really 4 options for crossing the Rapidan/Rappahannock line:

1. Get there first. In November '62 McClellan managed this and held a debouch across the Rapidan with 9th Corps. Longstreet a few days after McClellan was relieved set out to try and push the Federals back across the river, but arrived to find they'd pulled back - Burnside had abandoned the O&A route.

2. Bull across the Rapidan bridge area. No general even tried it was so patently foolish.

3. Bull through Fredericksburg and over Marye's Heights. Burnside tried in Dec '62 and was slaughtered.

4. Cross at Germanna Mills and try and bull through the Wilderness before the rebels crush you like bookends. Hooker tried and failed. Grant tried and had to retreat east to connect with the Federal held Fredericksburg.

None of these is a good option in summer '62. Unlike November '62 Johnston is well entrenched on the Rapidan. The Rapidan Bridge and Marye's Height are horrific killing areas. The best option is like Germanna Ford and doing the Wilderness, and that's a terrible idea unless you have Fredericksburg to siddle over too.

 

[trice]

I agree.

Johnston moved back to the Rappahanock/Rapidan line and had eight divisions available to defend it.

Fredericksburg was under Holmes' command and then Longstreet's when Holmes was reassigned, They had the following around Fredericksburg:

Whiting's division of 3 bdes (Whiting, Hood and Hampton)
Holmes' division of 4 bdes (French, Walker*, Field and SR Anderson)

and were fortifying the heights behind Fredericksburg that cost Burnside so dear.

The other major corps was occupying the area around the O&ARR bridge across the Rapidan (having burned it and the one over the Rappahannock ISTR) and covering the fords with:

GW Smith's division (GT Anderson, Wilcox* and Toombs)
Longstreet's division of 3 bdes (AP Hill, DR Jones and Pickett, with DR Jones being senior and commanding the division in lieu of Longstreet's assuming a "corps")
Ewell's division (Elzey, Trimble and Taylor)
Early's division of 3 bdes (Early, Rodes and Kershaw)
DH Hill's new division assembled from two slack brigades (Griffith and GB Anderson)
Stuart's cavalry

On the flank is Jackson with his division.

Historically Jeff Davis was going nuts over Burnside and was pulling brigades from other stations to form an army to oppose him. He asked Joe Johnston for Longstreet and his division, but Johnston objected to losing his best division commander. Davis then had Walker and Wilcox pulled from Johnston, Cobb from Magruder and Gregg from SC to add to the NC forces.

Very quickly when McClellan started moving in April Cobb and Wilcox were ordered to Magruder and Gregg, Branch and JR Anderson from the NC force were sent to Northern Virginia where they formed "The Army of the North" with Field's brigade at Fredericksburg and nominally with Ewell's division.

If McClellan inclines to an attack on the Rappahannock/Rapidan line one suspects, Wilcox and Walker would be recalled, and Cobb, Gregg, Branch and JR Anderson's brigades would rapidly be sent north, along with Colston's and Pryor's from Norfolk. This would give Johnston 10 divisions to defend a secure river line.

Urbanna was nixed not by Lincoln etc. directly, but by the Corps Commanders. They thought landing at Urbanna was too dangerous and exposed with Johnston behind the Rappahannock. It was them who insisted on Fort Monroe and the Peninsula, which McClellan considered the weakest option. Indeed back in January he'd asked James Shields about Yorktown, and Shields had said it would take six weeks to reduce it and move on.

Because of this I don't see there being any support for a landing on the lower Rappahannock, and it's a grind down the railroads.

ISTM that if the Union is making a major effort like this, there is no threat down along the Peninsula and the Confederates will not be detaching troops to Magruder and Huger.