McClellan McClellan

[Jimklag]

Please show me photos of the Federal occupation of Richmond in June 1864.

When did I say I had photos of the occupation of Richmond - you said Grant failed to cross the James. Do not try your usual dodge of changing the subject when caught in a boo-boo.

 

[CanadianCanuck]

That does not make me a Grant basher. Grant did capture three Confederate field armies but we can't discount McCellen's achievements in terms of CEVs.

I mean, we can, because CEV's don't result in armies captures or victories obtained.

Direct or indirect, the responsibility for capturing Richmond by Mac required the cooperation of several people, including Lincoln, who retained Blenker's Division and McDowell's Corps from the campaign. If Mac had them, might he not have prevailed?

The short answer is, no.

The long answer is that, despite complaints, Blenker and McDowell were withheld because it was a military necessity (the contentious issue of McClellan's estimates for Washington aside) due to, frankly, the superior strategy pursued by the Confederacy in early 1862. Jackson's Valley Campaign moved men who would otherwise be used in attacking Richmond to the Shenandoah Valley, and inflicted numerous embarrassing defeats on the Federal forces and provided a very real threat to Washington. Not having those troops might allow Jackson in 1862 to do what Early did in 1864.

Even with the extra troops, there is zero guarantee of success in McClellan's plan. He might besiege Richmond, but its equally likely Lee manages to shake him loose with more audacious action.

 

[Jimklag]

I will agree that McClellan had one disadvantage vis-à-vis Grant. His enemy had more troops except at Antietam. But the McClellan fans must also agree that against Grant, Lee had very good intrenchments - a great force multiplier. Grant did not capture Richmond any more than Mac did until after the fighting was about done. But Grant actually did exactly what he set out to do - fight Lee every day, if possible, and wear him down until he could not fight any more. His campaign objective was Lee's army, not Richmond. He openly stated this objective in his orders to Meade, "Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also." That order is in the OR and in Grant's papers was well as Meade's. I believe it is not susceptible of being misunderstood. Why don't we discuss what was McClellan's campaign objective on the Peninsula? Again, it is not necessary to try to tear down Grant just to make Mac look better. Grant was in overall command for 11 moths and his tenure ended in Lee's surrender. McClellan held his command for over a year (16 months) and his tenure ended in dismissal. Grant fully accepted civilian control of the military; McClellan fought it and belittled it every step of the way even to the point of insulting the President. If he had been entirely successful militarily, McClellan's insubordination should still have gotten him dismissed. He was absolutely not entirely successful militarily. I think any fair minded student of the war will agree that the better general was U.S. Grant. I have said in another post why I think McClellan was indispensable - just not as a military practitioner on the battlefield.

 

[1SGDan]

Indeed, but then so did Grant in '64.

No McClellan went back to Washington and Grant went on to Richmond and beyond.

 

[Jimklag]

No McClellan went back to Washington and Grant went on to Richmond and beyond.

Actually, Mac went to New Jersey.

 

[Jimklag]

@67th Tigers makes some true points. McClellan's army killed more of Lee's men than Grant's did. But, that is not the whole story. Except at Antietam, Lee was the attacker and McClellan was the defender in most of their fights. And at Antietam, except for the sunken road, there were no earthworks. Lee was the defender in all the fights against Grant and had intrenchments to boot. It is harder to kill a man in a trench than one who is attacking you in the open. Lincoln withheld troops from McClellan. True, but Mac was his own worst enemy here. He knew how sensitive the president was in 1862 about the safety of Washington - the capture of Richmond may not have been fatal to the Confederacy, but if Washington fell to the rebels, the war was over for all intents and purposes. And McClellan was less than 100% truthful in how he counted the troops he left behind. This is what I mean by cherry-picking or special pleading. It is one thing to present a fact, but present all sides. This is not a criminal trial where the attorneys are not only allowed to but are expected to present only evidence favorable to their clients. This is a history forum where objectivity in the search for truth is the watchword. Per @civilwartalk , there is no rule in these forums requiring a poster to provide evidence or sources for your statements. But, if you do offer sources and evidence, this needs to be true and complete - not just the part that suits your viewpoint.

 

[Deleted User CS]

I think George McClellan was a brilliant tactician and strategist but lacked the fighting and aggressive offensive skills of Robert E. Lee or Stonewall Jackson. He is an easy target to criticize because of the publication of his letters to his wife, Ellen Marcy, who's father by the way was a Colonel who was stationed in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Recent historical scholarship by Dennis Frye has sought to repair McClellan's reputation regarding the Antietam Campaign in which Frye states that the general did make important strategical movements against the Army of Northern Virginia as they moved into Maryland with the expressed goal of heading into Pennsylvania. For example, McClellan was able to cut Lee's forces off at Hagerstown, Maryland, a key tactical location for the Army of Northern Virginia. Also, McClellan was a victim of terrible intelligence from Pinkerton's men who bloviated the number of the enemy's forces as well as receiving bad advice from subordinate officers. Politics, as usual, also played an important part in his down fall. He reminds me of George Patton, who could not keep his big mouth shut in front of the press or his enemies. I hope in the future that Dennis Frye or one of our colleagues at this forum, will write an objective biography of McClellan. David.

 

[Jimklag]

I think George McClellan was a brilliant tactician and strategist but lacked the fighting and aggressive offensive skills of Robert E. Lee or Stonewall Jackson. He is an easy target to criticize because of the publication of his letters to his wife, Ellen Marcy, who's father by the way was a Colonel who was stationed in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Recent historical scholarship by Dennis Frye has sought to repair McClellan's reputation regarding the Antietam Campaign in which Frye states that the general did make important strategical movements against the Army of Northern Virginia as they moved into Maryland with the expressed goal of heading into Pennsylvania. For example, McClellan was able to cut Lee's forces off at Hagerstown, Maryland, a key tactical location for the Army of Northern Virginia. Also, McClellan was a victim of terrible intelligence from Pinkerton's men who bloviated the number of the enemy's forces as well as receiving bad advice from subordinate officers. Politics, as usual, also played an important part in his down fall. He reminds me of George Patton, who could not keep his big mouth shut in front of the press or his enemies. I hope in the future that Dennis Frye or one of our colleagues at this forum, will write an objective biography of McClellan. David.

David, I respectfully disagree with respect to McClellan's brilliance as a tactician. Other than that you are pretty much right on. I have always stated that my biggest issue with McClellan was his absolute disdain for his civilian superiors - his letters to his wife are just the overt signs of that disdain. To his friends and confidants, he made no secret of his disrespect for Lincoln and Stanton. The night of November 13, 1861 was just the most egregious example. Like Patton, if Mac had been the tactical genius you purport him to be, history would have been much kinder.

 

[67th Tigers]

@67th Tigers makes some true points. McClellan's army killed more of Lee's men than Grant's did. But, that is not the whole story. Except at Antietam, Lee was the attacker and McClellan was the defender in most of their fights. And at Antietam, except for the sunken road, there were no earthworks.

Because there didn't need to be. There are rock outcroppings that form natural breastworks, and this saved the rebels the need to dig.

Here's Mannie Gentile standing at one of them, a 5 ft high natural earthwork:

 

[Jimklag]

Because there didn't need to be. There are rock outcroppings that form natural breastworks, and this saved the rebels the need to dig.

Here's Mannie Gentile standing at one of them, a 5 ft high natural earthwork:

View attachment 294485

Nice. Show me where that terrain was on a battlefield map. What action took place there?

 

[Jimklag]

Because there didn't need to be. There are rock outcroppings that form natural breastworks, and this saved the rebels the need to dig.

Here's Mannie Gentile standing at one of them, a 5 ft high natural earthwork:

View attachment 294485

I have walked that entire battlefield several times and am not familiar with these features in the article you linked. Can you show them on a map? Very interesting.

 

[Norm53]

Because there didn't need to be. There are rock outcroppings that form natural breastworks, and this saved the rebels the need to dig.

Here's Mannie Gentile standing at one of them, a 5 ft high natural earthwork:

View attachment 294485

Is that the Washington Monument in the background?

 

[Jimklag]

Is that the Washington Monument in the background?

Nope. From where he's standing that would be the Philadelphia Brigade monument which is west of the Cornfield. The other tall obelisk at Antietam is the Indiana monument near the visitors center.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I think George McClellan was a brilliant tactician and strategist but lacked the fighting and aggressive offensive skills of Robert E. Lee or Stonewall Jackson. He is an easy target to criticize because of the publication of his letters to his wife, Ellen Marcy, who's father by the way was a Colonel who was stationed in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Recent historical scholarship by Dennis Frye has sought to repair McClellan's reputation regarding the Antietam Campaign in which Frye states that the general did make important strategical movements against the Army of Northern Virginia as they moved into Maryland with the expressed goal of heading into Pennsylvania. For example, McClellan was able to cut Lee's forces off at Hagerstown, Maryland, a key tactical location for the Army of Northern Virginia. Also, McClellan was a victim of terrible intelligence from Pinkerton's men who bloviated the number of the enemy's forces as well as receiving bad advice from subordinate officers. Politics, as usual, also played an important part in his down fall. He reminds me of George Patton, who could not keep his big mouth shut in front of the press or his enemies. I hope in the future that Dennis Frye or one of our colleagues at this forum, will write an objective biography of McClellan. David.

Have you read Rafuse's book? If not, I'd recommend it. I think he does a decent job of emphasizing McClellan's positives while acknowledging his weaknesses.

The other point I'd make is that McClellan was appropriate for the limited war envisioned in 1861. By the end of the Peninsula Campaign, war aims had changed. McClellan was not the man for that new war.

 

[leftyhunter]

I mean, we can, because CEV's don't result in armies captures or victories obtained.



The short answer is, no.

The long answer is that, despite complaints, Blenker and McDowell were withheld because it was a military necessity (the contentious issue of McClellan's estimates for Washington aside) due to, frankly, the superior strategy pursued by the Confederacy in early 1862. Jackson's Valley Campaign moved men who would otherwise be used in attacking Richmond to the Shenandoah Valley, and inflicted numerous embarrassing defeats on the Federal forces and provided a very real threat to Washington. Not having those troops might allow Jackson in 1862 to do what Early did in 1864.

Even with the extra troops, there is zero guarantee of success in McClellan's plan. He might besiege Richmond, but its equally likely Lee manages to shake him loose with more audacious action.

If we don't use CEVs then what other metric is an objective way of measuring the performance of a commander and or army by taking factors other then size
in to the equation?

For example no commander of the AoP could inflict has much casualties on the AnV then McCellen either on the offensive or defensive.
Leftyhunter

 

[kel1985]

IMHO
McClellan was good at organizing and preparing troops for service, but I think as a battlefield commander he was overly cautious to the point of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory (think the 7 Days Battles).

 

[Sildesalaten]

George B. McClellan arrives in Washington on July 26 1861, assuming command of what was to become the Army of the Potomac.

During the next weeks and months, until about mid-November perhaps, Lincoln is constantly seeking him out, ever so politely fishing for any scrap of information on his plans McClellan might accidentally let slip. He's pretty much asking for audience with his own general.

McClellan avoids him, dismisses him, even deliberately hides from him. He has the President's ear offered to him on a platter, and goes out of his way to reject it.

If McClellan believes in himself, his plans and his army – as he must do – shouldn't he be doing everything to gain the President's trust and support? Isn't that his duty? Instead, he's doing pretty much the opposite.

It seems to me that this is something McClellan could and should have done differently. If he had, might have gotten those extra divisions a year later.

 

[rbasin]

McClellan.

It's not just Halleck, really, it's also Lincoln, who regularly promised McClellan reinforcements and then reneged. That said Halleck could have sent Burnside's troops up to McClellan in late July (and McClellan had said he'd advance with Burnside's men alone); Halleck opted against it. Thus when given a clear choice (McClellan will advance with these available troops he has been promised for weeks which you have control over) Halleck decided not to take it.

Grant didn't have to bother asking anyone, and could simply order troops into his army to bulk it out. He arguably took too many, but I am strongly of the opinion that if McClellan had been allowed 30,000 reinforcements in June 1862 (which is still tens of thousands fewer than Grant took) then Richmond would have fallen that summer - we know exactly where McClellan was going to put his reinforcements, north of the Chickahominy, and we know that the outflanking move by the Confederates would not have worked with that many extra troops north of the Chickahominy. Thus it becomes an artillery battle along the rail line from Savage's Station to Richmond, and the Union artillery is superior enough to win - that's why Yorktown was abandoned, the weight of artillery support had rendered it untenable.

Let's be clear: Halleck wanted to unite the two armies of McClellan and Pope. Rightfully knowing Lincoln's view on protecting d.c., and that no one had a viable second solution, how can you fault him for doing exactly what he did?

 

[Jimklag]

Because there didn't need to be. There are rock outcroppings that form natural breastworks, and this saved the rebels the need to dig.

Here's Mannie Gentile standing at one of them, a 5 ft high natural earthwork:

View attachment 294485

Just finished reading the article and you've done it again, @67th Tigers . The terrain features your link shows were indeed formidable. But you forgot to mention one little fact. Except for the ravine in the West Woods, these features were occupied bt McClellan's forces, not Lee's. Cherry picking again.

 

[Saphroneth]

I most certainly can and have. History has painted a very clear picture of what happened here. It is universally accepted that the overall responsibility for a military failure is on the Commander. Thus McClellan was a failure here.

So, to be clear, you believe that the overall responsibility for a military failure is on the commander?
But you don't believe it's necessary to explore or analyze any of the specific decisions?

So a commander is Good or Bad based on their ultimate fate, not on anything that led to that? So a good commander would succeed regardless of the number of troops they had, and a bad commander would fail regardless of their resources?

This is a very strange view of military history, and indeed if I'd been told someone held it without seeing it firsthand I likely wouldn't believe it - as it can be rephrased as "a good commander could win with ten men armed with muskets against the entire Chinese Army of 1955".

Before you say I'm putting words in your mouth, this is what's known as a reductio ad absurdam. If you disagree with the quoted statement above, then we both think that the forces available to a commander affect their chances of success; if you agree with it, then I don't think there's any point in further discussion.

In addition, in 2 of 3 major battles Grant fought, his enemy was fully intrenched in well-engineered earthworks that are still there today - what McClellan would have faced if he had attacked Richmond in 1862.

But well-engineered earthworks are something which have a solution in the context of the period. It's why McClellan's foes abandoned the Yorktown line and it's why McClellan was able to take terrain at Oak Grove and Garnetts Hill - the use of superior heavy artillery can negate the defensive artillery and help shoot the attacking forces onto their objectives.
It still means attacking, but it works to gain a little ground at a time - and the Confederates didn't have much ground left to give.