Oh, I think it's questionable. As the ranking officer in the army (as Saph points out), he acknowledges that his comments were not "within the scope of my official duties." I've always got a chuckle about the timing. You'd think, with the whole 200,000 man Reb army threatening to destroy the key army of the Republic that he himself built, he might want to focus on solving that little problem.
He did. He's secured the landing, and is following Lincoln's instructions to make the army safe and Lincoln will reinforce it.
"Make the army safe" - fulfilled. He's waiting for Lincoln to reinforce it.
It's certainly not within the scope of his official duties - but he's not required to spend all his time, day and night, engaged in his official duties. It would certainly have been well within Lincoln's rights to have opened the letter, read it then, and said "No".
But you seem to be advancing the position that there is no valid avenue by which any member of the US army can offer the President advice that is not
strictly military, even unofficially - while, say, a newspaper can.
Well, let's see. Butler, being a politician, adopted a practice regarding contraband (escaped) slaves without attempting to dictate a specific broad policy on behalf of the Administration.
Perhaps this is a misunderstanding - McClellan is not "attempting to dictate" a policy on behalf of the Administration. He is recommending one; the use of terms like "should" is because he's saying "this is what should happen", but he makes clear that it's his opinion and a possible course of action.
In total and when summarized, this policy amounts to:
- Treat the individual citizens of the seceded states as US citizens (which they remain).
- This is a war, but that shouldn't mean that the US grants extra powers to the President and allows him to ignore existing laws.
- Private property should be protected. (This is basically advocating Wellington's policy towards civilians, as opposed to a policy of taking whatever you want - it doesn't refer solely to slaves.)
Then there's the section about slavery. I'll quote it in full before summarizing:
Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized. This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves of a particular State, thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time. A system of policy thus constitutional, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.
So basically:
-
Soldiers should not either support the master or the slave in a master-slave relationship, except for preventing disorder ("As in other cases").
- Slaves who apply for military protection should get it.
- The Government can permanently appropriate slaves, with compensation (as with any other good taken into military service)
- We could do this to entire states (and he names several states under Union control).
- This avoids the need for new laws and demonstrates to both our own civilians and foreign nations that we're serious about what we're doing and the values we hold to.
This approach is basically a way to free slaves without violating existing law. It's part of the argument McClellan is making about how to treat civilians.
This is not
the most radical pro-emancipation position, but it is notably not on one end of a continuum where the Emancipation Proclamation is on the other end. It is, for example,
more liberationist in some respects than the historical Emancipation Proclamation, because it would free most of the slaves which the Union currently has under their control (the only exceptions being those in Delaware and possibly Kentucky) - in contested regions, slaves of
rebels are contraband and could apply for military protection, while slaves of
loyalists can be compulsorily purchased and manumitted. The Emancipation Proclamation didn't do that - instead, even a year later, Maryland slave owners could get the Fugitive Slave Act enforced in DC... so long as they were loyal.
McClellan then concludes by saying that it would be preferable for military reasons to avoid making a radical statement on slavery, and that it would be preferable for the Union to concentrate their effort rather than disperse it in garrisons.
The usual objection to this is that this demonstrates that McClellan was out of touch, and that "total war" was necessary. Personally I think such a claim (that total war was necessary) is difficult to prove, because of the "it happened, therefore it was necessary" fallacy - we know from more modern examples that an effective way to deal with a rebellion is a combination of "a high concentration of force" (which defeats the main force of the enemy and makes it clear that the legitimate authority is too strong to defeat) and "a conciliatory attitude to those who do not resist" (because that avoids making more enemies).
This is basically what McClellan is arguing for. Slavery gets a lot of the words in the letter because it is a flashpoint that touched off the war, of course.
So is this dictating a course of action? I don't think so. It's suggesting one, but McClellan is not
acting without approval - he's suggesting a course of action that the President could officially adopt.
This is, I would submit, an approach more willing to submit to Presidential authority than, say, Butler, who acted.
It's also worth remembering that the events of the last few months had not exactly displayed a consistent US policy that McClellan was arguing to change. There wasn't one and he was arguing there should be, and suggesting an option.
1) the Contraband policy (April, 1861)
2) the Confiscation Act of 1861 (August, 1861)
2a) Reversal of Fremont's emancipation measures (September, 1861)
3) The Act Prohibiting the Return of Slaves (March, 1862)
4) Emancipation in the District of Columbia (April, 1862)
4a) Reversal of Hunter's emancipation measures (May, 1862)
4b) General Butler orders unemployed 'contrabands' expelled from Union Army lines in Louisiana (May, 1862)
5) Prohibition of Slavery in all current and future US territories (June, 1862)
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