McClellan "McClellan Letters"

[Nathan Towne]

I would note that I am by no means alone in this judgement. None other than Scott Hartwig takes essentially the exact same position on it as I do. It isn't that I need anyone to agree with me on something, but you get the point.

 

[Lubliner]

but you get the point.

One is a lonely number (Three Dog Night).
Lubliner.

 

[wausaubob]

I would like you to explain your first sentence concerning the execution of a slave trader.

Using primary source material from the official records of the U. S. Navy, Volume 1, Page 11, I have a report of Commander Taylor commanding the USS Saratoga off the coast of North Africa. On April 21, 1861 he writes to the judge of U. S. District Court at New York City about capturing a slave trader, the 'Nightingale of Boston' on her stern. She had hoisted American colors. She was found to have a cargo of 961 slaves. He sent Lieutenant Guthrie with a prize crew to forward the clipper ship to New York with her cargo.
Very much appreciated,
Lubliner.

Nathanial Gordon. https://www.gilderlehrman.org/histo...ry-source/lincoln-execution-slave-trader-1862

 

[Lubliner]

Nathanial Gordon. https://www.gilderlehrman.org/histo...ry-source/lincoln-execution-slave-trader-1862

Thank you. I don't know yet the background of Gordon, nor the ship he was captured with.
But to leave no vacancy, on the Nightingale out of Boston, two men were captured but made their escape two nights later (April 23). One American named Francis Bowen and a Spaniard named Valentino Cortina. The first was captain before the capture, and the second was captain at the time. Whether they lived to ply their trade again in the future is uncertain.
Lubliner.

 

[wausaubob]

I doubt the letter ever happened. It is based on forgetting that the secessionists deliberately split the Democratic party in order to defeat Stephen A. Douglas. Douglas was not anti-slavery, but not sufficiently pro slavery enough to satisfy the secessionists. From that we might conclude that any terms of reunification acceptable to Confederacy would require national slavery. The paid labor states would never have accepted it. The dream world of some officers that there was a modest political dispute that they could resolve was inconsistent with the secessionist crisis.
The alleged content of the letters hint at McClellan's dilemma. He could have won in a united US on the Democratic ticket. But in order for the Confederacy to agree to reunification, his army was going to have to defeat the Confederates.

 

[Lubliner]

any terms of reunification acceptable to Confederacy would require national slavery.

I agree with that to an extent. But once the bloodshed and toll of battles had taken place, McClellan may have had a belief the confederates would honor a negotiable peace without sudden and complete abolition. I do also agree the letter is not legit.
Lubliner.

 

[Jantzen64]

He did. He's secured the landing, and is following Lincoln's instructions to make the army safe and Lincoln will reinforce it.

"Make the army safe" - fulfilled. He's waiting for Lincoln to reinforce it.


It's certainly not within the scope of his official duties - but he's not required to spend all his time, day and night, engaged in his official duties. It would certainly have been well within Lincoln's rights to have opened the letter, read it then, and said "No".

But you seem to be advancing the position that there is no valid avenue by which any member of the US army can offer the President advice that is not strictly military, even unofficially - while, say, a newspaper can.



Perhaps this is a misunderstanding - McClellan is not "attempting to dictate" a policy on behalf of the Administration. He is recommending one; the use of terms like "should" is because he's saying "this is what should happen", but he makes clear that it's his opinion and a possible course of action.

In total and when summarized, this policy amounts to:

- Treat the individual citizens of the seceded states as US citizens (which they remain).
- This is a war, but that shouldn't mean that the US grants extra powers to the President and allows him to ignore existing laws.
- Private property should be protected. (This is basically advocating Wellington's policy towards civilians, as opposed to a policy of taking whatever you want - it doesn't refer solely to slaves.)
Then there's the section about slavery. I'll quote it in full before summarizing:



So basically:
- Soldiers should not either support the master or the slave in a master-slave relationship, except for preventing disorder ("As in other cases").
- Slaves who apply for military protection should get it.
- The Government can permanently appropriate slaves, with compensation (as with any other good taken into military service)
- We could do this to entire states (and he names several states under Union control).
- This avoids the need for new laws and demonstrates to both our own civilians and foreign nations that we're serious about what we're doing and the values we hold to.

This approach is basically a way to free slaves without violating existing law. It's part of the argument McClellan is making about how to treat civilians.

This is not the most radical pro-emancipation position, but it is notably not on one end of a continuum where the Emancipation Proclamation is on the other end. It is, for example, more liberationist in some respects than the historical Emancipation Proclamation, because it would free most of the slaves which the Union currently has under their control (the only exceptions being those in Delaware and possibly Kentucky) - in contested regions, slaves of rebels are contraband and could apply for military protection, while slaves of loyalists can be compulsorily purchased and manumitted. The Emancipation Proclamation didn't do that - instead, even a year later, Maryland slave owners could get the Fugitive Slave Act enforced in DC... so long as they were loyal.


McClellan then concludes by saying that it would be preferable for military reasons to avoid making a radical statement on slavery, and that it would be preferable for the Union to concentrate their effort rather than disperse it in garrisons.



The usual objection to this is that this demonstrates that McClellan was out of touch, and that "total war" was necessary. Personally I think such a claim (that total war was necessary) is difficult to prove, because of the "it happened, therefore it was necessary" fallacy - we know from more modern examples that an effective way to deal with a rebellion is a combination of "a high concentration of force" (which defeats the main force of the enemy and makes it clear that the legitimate authority is too strong to defeat) and "a conciliatory attitude to those who do not resist" (because that avoids making more enemies).

This is basically what McClellan is arguing for. Slavery gets a lot of the words in the letter because it is a flashpoint that touched off the war, of course.

So is this dictating a course of action? I don't think so. It's suggesting one, but McClellan is not acting without approval - he's suggesting a course of action that the President could officially adopt.

This is, I would submit, an approach more willing to submit to Presidential authority than, say, Butler, who acted.



It's also worth remembering that the events of the last few months had not exactly displayed a consistent US policy that McClellan was arguing to change. There wasn't one and he was arguing there should be, and suggesting an option.



1) the Contraband policy (April, 1861)
2) the Confiscation Act of 1861 (August, 1861)
2a) Reversal of Fremont's emancipation measures (September, 1861)
3) The Act Prohibiting the Return of Slaves (March, 1862)
4) Emancipation in the District of Columbia (April, 1862)
4a) Reversal of Hunter's emancipation measures (May, 1862)
4b) General Butler orders unemployed 'contrabands' expelled from Union Army lines in Louisiana (May, 1862)
5) Prohibition of Slavery in all current and future US territories (June, 1862)

Little Mac admits the letter is beyond the scope of his official duties. No amount of word-smithing and attempted contextualizing can get around that. It's amazing that he finds the time to craft this letter when he views himself "on the brink of eternity" because of the army's "critical" condition. He writes those characterizations in the present tense, notwithstanding whatever it was he did to draw the army into that position. This exemplifies one of the reasons why history has taken such a dim review of the man as a field commander. If the situation was as presently dire as he say it was (and it must have been because he never engages in hyperbole or alarmist overreaction, right?), "the ranking officer of the US Army" can reasonably be expected to be doing everything in his power and energy, 24/7 to salvage the situation, not passively waiting for reinforcements, while he writes to the President about war policy.

As for your position that McClellan wasn't dictating anything, his comment about radical views "rapidly disintegrat[ing] our present Armies" was a clear warning shot, especially given that just several days earlier had accused the Administration of trying to sacrifice the army. And, his contemporaneous outreach to Stanton, attempting to triangulate on the letter confirms this. It's clear that he believed that the army would fight for "none other" than himself. Little Mac was counting on Lincoln being the bumbling rube McClellan thought he was; thankfully for the country, McClellan was wrong.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Little Mac admits the letter is beyond the scope of his official duties. No amount of word-smithing and attempted contextualizing can get around that. It's amazing that he finds the time to craft this letter when he views himself "on the brink of eternity" because of the army's "critical" condition. He writes those characterizations in the present tense, notwithstanding whatever it was he did to draw the army into that position. This exemplifies one of the reasons why history has taken such a dim review of the man as a field commander. If the situation was as presently dire as he say it was (and it must have been because he never engages in hyperbole or alarmist overreaction, right?), "the ranking officer of the US Army" can reasonably be expected to be doing everything in his power and energy, 24/7 to salvage the situation, not passively waiting for reinforcements, while he writes to the President about war policy.

As for your position that McClellan wasn't dictating anything, his comment about radical views "rapidly disintegrat[ing] our present Armies" was a clear warning shot, especially given that just several days earlier had accused the Administration of trying to sacrifice the army. And, his contemporaneous outreach to Stanton, attempting to triangulate on the letter confirms this. It's clear that he believed that the army would fight for "none other" than himself. Little Mac was counting on Lincoln being the bumbling rube McClellan thought he was; thankfully for the country, McClellan was wrong.

McClellan made it clear in his personal correspondence that he felt that he was wholly within his rights as the commander of a field Army to advise the President as to war policy.

The situation was certainly not ideal, but he had moved to ensure the protection and safety of the Army.

The administration bungled the war effort badly in 1862, which played a very important role in the process which would result in the momentum of the first half of the year was dramatically slowed. Thankfully, the scale of what had been achieved had placed the Confederacy on a path to its destruction and put it in a box from which it never recovered, but nonetheless, enormous mistakes were made which were seriously detrimental to the war effort.

 

[Belfoured]

McClellan made it clear in his personal correspondence that he felt that he was wholly within his rights as the commander of a field Army to advise the President as to war policy.

The situation was certainly not ideal, but he had moved to ensure the protection and safety of the Army.

The administration bungled the war effort badly in 1862, which played a very important role in the process which would result in the momentum of the first half of the year was dramatically slowed. Thankfully, the scale of what had been achieved had placed the Confederacy on a path to its destruction and put it in a box from which it never recovered, but nonetheless, enormous mistakes were made which were seriously detrimental to the war effort.

Of course, the mistakes in 1862 that slowed the momentum were hardly all on one side of the ledger. I also know you didn't mean to extend the point but McClellan made a lot of things "clear in his correspondence". That certainly didn't make those things accurate.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Of course, the mistakes in 1862 that slowed the momentum were hardly all on one side of the ledger. I also know you didn't mean to extend the point but McClellan made a lot of things "clear in his correspondence". That certainly didn't make those things accurate.

Hey,

What I meant by that was merely that McClellan indicated in his correspondence that he actually believed that he was operating well within his rights on this, which I do agree with in terms of offering his views as an Army commander. He must implement what is ultimately decided though, of course.

And yes, McClellan made mistakes, as well. There is no doubt of that.

 

[Lubliner]

And yes, McClellan made mistakes, as well. There is no doubt of that.

McClellan was a Democrat serving a Republican president and congress. His attitude is attributable to these elements since he was called to Washington after Bull Run 1.
Lubliner.

 

[Lubliner]

McClellan was pressing a democratic agenda from the start. He expected full cooperation from the administration for unlimited military and financial support. He did not want any power to meddle with is role of leadership. He saw every infringement the administration pushed back for as an injustice, a conspiracy by the abolitionists, and direct interference with his campaign, both politically and democratically.
If McClellan had actually gotten his way, had Lincoln muzzled the abolitionists and kept his hands from interfering with the plans, would it have been possible for Little Mac to achieve what he aspired to do and be? We will never truly know, but I feel he would have tripped himself up on micromanaging the whole affair. But I can't be sure of that. He just may have become the savior of our country and quelled a rebellion before the damage was done. Who can really say?
Lubliner.

 

[Library Lady]

I was going through the piles of books on the floor last night looking for what I wanted to read next when I came across Partners in Command: The Relationships Between Leaders in the Civil War by Joseph T. Glatthaar. On thumbing through the book, I found an appendix that might have bearing on this issue: "McClellan's Tragic Flaws in the Light of Modern Psychology." The last paragraph sums things up well:

McClellan's psychological baggage impeded his ability to function as army commander and general in chief. Mistrustful by nature, he discovered deliberately threatening or demeaning remarks in innocuous comments. His excessive secrecy, need to dominate, and hypersensitivity to rank and power inhibited his capacity to labor under Lincoln or anyone else - teachers, immediate commanders, railroad presidents, secretaries of war or generals-in-chief. McClellan formed initial or preconceived expectations and clung to them rigidly, obscuring all information that contradicted the original assessments. He grossly exaggerated the strength of obstacles, took extreme precautions, and in failure blamed everyone except himself. Severely critical of others, he reacted bitterly to criticism and justified himself at every turn. These qualities, all characteristic of paranoid personality disorder with narcissistic tendencies, prevented McClellan from performing his duties as commanding general and general in chief satisfactorily.

In the full appendix, it sounds like General McClellan wasn't all that different from his father. Professor Glatthaar gives multiple examples of how McClellan was a very intelligent man who couldn't get along with superiors throughout his life. The exception was Randolph B. Marcy, who would become his father-in-law, but even they went through a rough patch. Interestingly, McClellan had a good impression of Marcy from the get-go, then heard disturbing rumors which were later disproved to McClellan's satisfaction.

As someone who spent a lot of time transcribing psych reports in a previous life, this analysis makes sense to me. It also answers the question I had about what he was like when he was chief engineer (builder, not train driver) for the Illinois Central.

PARTNERS IN COMMAND | Kirkus Reviews

An engaging, insightful review of Civil War strategy as seen through the interactions of the conflict's top commanders. Using battlefield dispatches and biographical sketches, as well as a storyteller's instinct for dramatic moments, Glatthaar (History/University of Houston) probes the command...

www.kirkusreviews.com

 

[Lubliner]

I was going through the piles of books on the floor last night looking for what I wanted to read next when I came across Partners in Command: The Relationships Between Leaders in the Civil War by Joseph T. Glatthaar. On thumbing through the book, I found an appendix that might have bearing on this issue: "McClellan's Tragic Flaws in the Light of Modern Psychology." The last paragraph sums things up well:



In the full appendix, it sounds like General McClellan wasn't all that different from his father. Professor Glatthaar gives multiple examples of how McClellan was a very intelligent man who couldn't get along with superiors throughout his life. The exception was Randolph B. Marcy, who would become his father-in-law, but even they went through a rough patch. Interestingly, McClellan had a good impression of Marcy from the get-go, then heard disturbing rumors which were later disproved to McClellan's satisfaction.

As someone who spent a lot of time transcribing psych reports in a previous life, this analysis makes sense to me. It also answers the question I had about what he was like when he was chief engineer (builder, not train driver) for the Illinois Central.

PARTNERS IN COMMAND | Kirkus Reviews

An engaging, insightful review of Civil War strategy as seen through the interactions of the conflict's top commanders. Using battlefield dispatches and biographical sketches, as well as a storyteller's instinct for dramatic moments, Glatthaar (History/University of Houston) probes the command...

www.kirkusreviews.com

As often as medical science has analyzed the wounds of Jackson and Stuart and Lee, it is nice to hear of these psychological assessments begun on McClellan. It would be even nicer for this to spread out among other commanders, professionally diagnosed. Maybe you will run across more in this vein.
Lubliner.

 

[Belfoured]

McClellan was pressing a democratic agenda from the start. He expected full cooperation from the administration for unlimited military and financial support. He did not want any power to meddle with is role of leadership. He saw every infringement the administration pushed back for as an injustice, a conspiracy by the abolitionists, and direct interference with his campaign, both politically and democratically.
If McClellan had actually gotten his way, had Lincoln muzzled the abolitionists and kept his hands from interfering with the plans, would it have been possible for Little Mac to achieve what he aspired to do and be? We will never truly know, but I feel he would have tripped himself up on micromanaging the whole affair. But I can't be sure of that. He just may have become the savior of our country and quelled a rebellion before the damage was done. Who can really say?
Lubliner.

I'd amend that. He was pressing a "Democratic" agenda from the start. He never really understood a "democratic" agenda which recognized that he was commanding an army in a democracy subject to civilian control and that his C-in-C had to be concerned with holding together a mixed set of constituencies in the North - border slave-holding states, to be sure, but also abolitionist sentiment in several states, mercantile interests in NYC, German immigrants, Irish immigrants, etc. That issue is also separate from the completely different issue of whether he had what it takes for effective field command when it came to actual combat with the opponent. While he did demonstrate many skills that would serve as a chief of staff, on the other hand, I think the big obstacle would have been - again - his refusal to fully accept his ultimately subordinate role.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I'd amend that. He was pressing a "Democratic" agenda from the start. He never really understood a "democratic" agenda which recognized that he was commanding an army in a democracy subject to civilian control and that his C-in-C had to be concerned with holding together a mixed set of constituencies in the North - border slave-holding states, to be sure, but also abolitionist sentiment in several states, mercantile interests in NYC, German immigrants, Irish immigrants, etc. That issue is also separate from the completely different issue of whether he had what it takes for effective field command when it came to actual combat with the opponent. While he did demonstrate many skills that would serve as a chief of staff, on the other hand, I think the big obstacle would have been - again - his refusal to fully accept his ultimately subordinate role.

I would respectfully disagree that McClellan did not understand that he was operating subject to civilian control. One only need read the correspondence pertaining to the evacuation of the Peninsula to see that if absolutely mandated to do something which he strenuously objected to, he would fully comply as a soldier of the Republic.

 

[67th Tigers]

I was going through the piles of books on the floor last night looking for what I wanted to read next when I came across Partners in Command: The Relationships Between Leaders in the Civil War by Joseph T. Glatthaar. On thumbing through the book, I found an appendix that might have bearing on this issue: "McClellan's Tragic Flaws in the Light of Modern Psychology." The last paragraph sums things up well:



In the full appendix, it sounds like General McClellan wasn't all that different from his father. Professor Glatthaar gives multiple examples of how McClellan was a very intelligent man who couldn't get along with superiors throughout his life. The exception was Randolph B. Marcy, who would become his father-in-law, but even they went through a rough patch. Interestingly, McClellan had a good impression of Marcy from the get-go, then heard disturbing rumors which were later disproved to McClellan's satisfaction.

As someone who spent a lot of time transcribing psych reports in a previous life, this analysis makes sense to me. It also answers the question I had about what he was like when he was chief engineer (builder, not train driver) for the Illinois Central.

PARTNERS IN COMMAND | Kirkus Reviews

An engaging, insightful review of Civil War strategy as seen through the interactions of the conflict's top commanders. Using battlefield dispatches and biographical sketches, as well as a storyteller's instinct for dramatic moments, Glatthaar (History/University of Houston) probes the command...

www.kirkusreviews.com

As Rowland noted (and I quote more fully):

"A specious line of reasoning underlies these conclusions. Many historians have acted upon their own prejudices and have invoked a form of inductive reasoning to ferret out evidence for preordained conclusions. They have concluded that McClellan was a failure and that he was psychologically incapable of achieving success. Sears and Glatthaar, in particular, extrapolate from selected details in McClellan's past to conclude that the evidence they have uncovered conforms to a pattern-one that, all along, has supported their forgone conclusions. Additionally, the ad hominem nature of their attacks on McClellan's psychological character appears to serve them well in their final verdicts on the military dimensions of the general's performance. By establishing him as a psychological powder keg, they are able to reject any serious consideration of McClellan's strategy. Of all the reasons why McClellan may have been a gravely flawed commander, the exploitation of the psychological model is the most flawed itself, especially when employed by historians who see psychological reasons as the a priori condition for McClellan's failure. And it is so, for reasons beyond mere suspect reasoning."

McClellan was certainly not a politician, and was not particularly interested in the Democratic Party. He voted for the first time in 1860 (for Douglas) because he believed the extremists would tear the country in two. McClellan was a soldier, and he believed active-duty soldiers had no place in politics. Whilst he was a soldier he refused to cast a vote, because he believed he was a servant of the government.

As such, his interactions with Lincoln were correct and proper. As General-in-Chief, in June '62 he asked permission to offer Lincoln his opinion upon the interaction of the political and military spheres - Lincoln assented and McClellan did. The great shame is that after reading the letter, in front of McClellan, Lincoln folded it up, put it in his pocket and "ghosted" McClellan. Lincoln could have taken the opportunity to discuss matters with McClellan, and surely McClellan would have supported Lincoln, because he did exactly that over the Emancipation Proclamation.

Let us remember that, as active General-in-Chief, Scott actually ran for President...

 

[Belfoured]

I would respectfully disagree that McClellan did not understand that he was operating subject to civilian control. One only need read the correspondence pertaining to the evacuation of the Peninsula to see that if absolutely mandated to do something, he would fully comply as a soldier of the Republic.

Respectfully that's too low a bar regarding the point I'm making. Obviously, he wasn't going to violate the Articles of War or commit treason (and to be clear I'm not in Kearney's camp on the latter point). His correspondence, however, reveals someone who had a great deal of contempt for his civilian C-in-C and the administration and to suggest that had absolutely no effect on his judgment isn't reality or human nature.

 

[Lubliner]

Respectfully that's too low a bar regarding the point I'm making. Obviously, he wasn't going to violate the Articles of War or commit treason (and to be clear I'm not in Kearney's camp on the latter point). His correspondence, however, reveals someone who had a great deal of contempt for his civilian C-in-C and the administration and to suggest that had absolutely no effect on his judgment isn't reality or human nature.

I do agree that McClellan would back down when pressed to obey, but he then appeared half-heartedly to take his job in hand. I call it piddling away the effort required because it might prove successful, and it wasn't his plan. He was bullheaded enough to desire full honors for winning the war. Otherwise, he shuffled his feet. Okay, I will take back the stance on being a Democrat, but he truly believed the army should be ruled by army alone, a full separation, such as the church and state. If this assumption is erring, please correct me for it. I will be obliged to reconsider this stance.
Lubliner.