Grant McClellan and Grant in Virginia

[ReadingThroughHistory]

I'm looking to gather some thoughts and opinions on the actions of McClellan and Grant in their efforts to fight Lee in Virginia. In what ways were they similar (I've heard that Grant used McClellan's plan to capture Petersburg) and what elements made them different? I know that Lincoln butted heads with McClellan quite frequently, but I cannot say that I've heard much about his relationship with Grant. Did Lincoln step back from his attempts to control the military and free up Grant to allow him to do what needed to be done in 1864, or was he still attempting to micromanage? If so, could McClellan have had more success in 1862 with the same type of authority that Grant had?

Also, if anyone is interested in participating in an live discussion about this topic, I'm hoping to find a few willing participants.

 

[Jimklag]

I'm looking to gather some thoughts and opinions on the actions of McClellan and Grant in their efforts to fight Lee in Virginia. In what ways were they similar (I've heard that Grant used McClellan's plan to capture Petersburg) and what elements made them different? I know that Lincoln butted heads with McClellan quite frequently, but I cannot say that I've heard much about his relationship with Grant. Did Lincoln step back from his attempts to control the military and free up Grant to allow him to do what needed to be done in 1864, or was he still attempting to micromanage? If so, could McClellan have had more success in 1862 with the same type of authority that Grant had?

View attachment 143127

Also, if anyone is interested in participating in an online forum discussion about this topic, I'm hoping to find a few willing participants.

The biggest difference is that McClellan didn't particularly want to fight Lee. He wanted to capture Richmond and wouldn't mind terribly if that didn't involve actual fighting.

 

[Jimklag]

The biggest difference is that McClellan didn't particularly want to fight Lee. He wanted to capture Richmond and wouldn't mind terribly if that didn't involve actual fighting.

On the other hand, Grant wanted nothing as much as to get at Lee. Often accused of putting his army through a meat grinder, it was Lee's army that Grant's put through that meat grinder. Lee couldn't replace losses and Grant knew it. Grant's army paid a pretty terrible price but, in the end, the strategy worked.

 

[ReadingThroughHistory]

Very much like a bulldog General Grant was.

 

[amweiner]

Interesting topic, @ReadingThroughHistory. My opinion is that McClellan would've found some reason to stop his advance even without Lincoln trying to armchair quarterback. I think Grant was prepared to get down n' dirty while Mac wasn't - I can't blame him for that, but the reality was that by 1864, down n' dirty was the only way to win.

 

[ReadingThroughHistory]

Interesting topic, @ReadingThroughHistory. My opinion is that McClellan would've found some reason to stop his advance even without Lincoln trying to armchair quarterback. I think Grant was prepared to get down n' dirty while Mac wasn't - I can't blame him for that, but the reality was that by 1864, down n' dirty was the only way to win.

At some point the gloves have got to come off.

 

[captaindrew]

Mac or any of the other previous generals to Grant probably would probably have fallen back after the Wilderness to lick their wounds. I've always wondered how much longer the war would have lasted if Grant hadn't kept pushing ahead no matter what.

 

[jackt62]

McClellan devised an excellent strategic plan, that is an ambitious amphibious landing on the peninsula which combined naval attacks up the York and James Rivers, that avoided the overland slog through Virginia that Grant and other federal commanders used. Problem however was: 1) Lincoln, being overly cautious about the defense of Washington City, held General McDowell's additional force in northern Virginia, 2) McClellan was a timid field commander, whose expertise was in military engineering rather than in coordinating and leading troop movements, 3) the south was fortunate in having Lee assume command and aggressively attach the AOTP during the Seven Days.

 

[wausaubob]

In fact, Grant proposed something similar when he became general in chief in March 1864. Grant hoped to end the war within 10 months by launching multiple, simultaneous attacks against the main Confederate armies in Georgia and Virginia and striking key areas and cities such as Mobile, Alabama, and Virginia's Shenandoah Valley. He also included an amphibious landing up the James River, south of Richmond. Grant's plan was a good one, based upon a clear understanding of the political, strategic, and operational realities facing any Union offensive, and composed of mutually supporting prongs. There is no evidence that Grant, who is rightly praised for delivering the Union victory, was familiar with the details of McClellan's plans. But there is also no disguising the similarity of his plan to McClellan's of August 1861.

http://www.historynet.com/mcclellans-war-winning-strategy.htm

 

[wausaubob]

McClellan is to me one of the mysteries of the war. As a young man he was always a mystery. He had the way of inspiring you with the idea of immense capacity, if he would only have a chance. Then he is a man of unusual accomplishments, a student, and a well-read man. I have never studied his campaigns enough to make up my mind as to his military skill, but all my impressions are in his favor. I have entire confidence in McClellan's loyalty and patriotism. But the test which was applied to him would be terrible to any man, being made a major-general at the beginning of the war. It has always seemed to me that the critics of McClellan do not consider this vast and cruel responsibility—the war, a new thing to all of us, the army new, everything to do from the outset, with a restless people and Congress. McClellan was a young man when this devolved upon him, and if he did not succeed, it was because the conditions of success were so trying. If McClellan had gone into the war as Sherman, Thomas, or Meade, had fought his way along and up, I have no reason to suppose that he would not have won as high a distinction as any of us.

Brooks Simpson quoting John Russell Young, quoting Grant.

https://cwcrossroads.wordpress.com/2011/05/11/ulysses-s-grant-reflects-on-george-b-mcclellan/

 

[Rebforever]

Very much like a bulldog General Grant was.

A bulldog gets somewhat crazy when he fights and I don't know if Grant went that far.

 

[Rebforever]

McClellan is to me one of the mysteries of the war. As a young man he was always a mystery. He had the way of inspiring you with the idea of immense capacity, if he would only have a chance. Then he is a man of unusual accomplishments, a student, and a well-read man. I have never studied his campaigns enough to make up my mind as to his military skill, but all my impressions are in his favor. I have entire confidence in McClellan's loyalty and patriotism. But the test which was applied to him would be terrible to any man, being made a major-general at the beginning of the war. It has always seemed to me that the critics of McClellan do not consider this vast and cruel responsibility—the war, a new thing to all of us, the army new, everything to do from the outset, with a restless people and Congress. McClellan was a young man when this devolved upon him, and if he did not succeed, it was because the conditions of success were so trying. If McClellan had gone into the war as Sherman, Thomas, or Meade, had fought his way along and up, I have no reason to suppose that he would not have won as high a distinction as any of us.

Brooks Simpson quoting John Russell Young, quoting Grant.

https://cwcrossroads.wordpress.com/2011/05/11/ulysses-s-grant-reflects-on-george-b-mcclellan/

McCellen was a wooze!!

 

[civilken]

some of the plans might have been similar but that's where the similarities end. McClellan would never have kept the attack up the way grant did . The man just did not have that type of fight in him grant was like a rabid dog. He couldn't get you one way he came back you another way always with a move to the left looking for the opening and when he found it grant would hit you like a jackhammer over and over just look at his other campaigns..

 

[wausaubob]

There were several strategic plans.
The first was Scott's Anaconda plan, which was necessary but not sufficient to produce a victory.
McClellan had two plans, one for driving eastward out of the Kanawa Valley. That would have been very difficult logistically but McClellan thought it could work.
The other McClellan plan was a deep drive through Kentucky and Tennessee. This plan was implemented.
Lincoln wanted McClellan to drive straight down through Virginia. This was the easiest plan to implement, and the least risky, but the most predictable.
McClellan altered Lincoln's plan, and wanted to use the rivers of Virginia to maintain his logistics. This plan required naval dominance in the Chesapeake Bay, and was going to be hard to implement before Norfolk was captured.
If the peninsular campaign worked, it opened the possibility of cutting south of Petersburg and Richmond and besieging Richmond.
Grant combined the safer plan with the eastward lunge. He worked the army south and east, until the option of cutting south and supplying from the James River presented itself.
It was hard aggressive fighting. But he gradually immobilized the Army of Virginia, and drew the Confederate Cavalry away from City Point.
The steps required were risky and the results were dreadful. There is little chance that McClellan lacking in both combat experience and command experience could have put the pieces together.
However Grant never started from scratch. He took ideas that others could communicate from previous campaigns and modified them as circumstances permitted.

 

[leftyhunter]

I'm looking to gather some thoughts and opinions on the actions of McClellan and Grant in their efforts to fight Lee in Virginia. In what ways were they similar (I've heard that Grant used McClellan's plan to capture Petersburg) and what elements made them different? I know that Lincoln butted heads with McClellan quite frequently, but I cannot say that I've heard much about his relationship with Grant. Did Lincoln step back from his attempts to control the military and free up Grant to allow him to do what needed to be done in 1864, or was he still attempting to micromanage? If so, could McClellan have had more success in 1862 with the same type of authority that Grant had?

View attachment 143127

Also, if anyone is interested in participating in an online forum discussion about this topic, I'm hoping to find a few willing participants.

Paging our number one McCellan expert and fan @7th Mississippi Infantry
Leftyhunter

 

[WJC]

McClellan devised an excellent strategic plan, that is an ambitious amphibious landing on the peninsula which combined naval attacks up the York and James Rivers, that avoided the overland slog through Virginia that Grant and other federal commanders used. Problem however was: 1) Lincoln, being overly cautious about the defense of Washington City, held General McDowell's additional force in northern Virginia, 2) McClellan was a timid field commander, whose expertise was in military engineering rather than in coordinating and leading troop movements, 3) the south was fortunate in having Lee assume command and aggressively attach the AOTP during the Seven Days.

I find the contrasting military philosophies (and careers) of Lee and McClellan- both talented engineers- most interesting.

 

[WJC]

There were several strategic plans.
The first was Scott's Anaconda plan, which was necessary but not sufficient to produce a victory.
McClellan had two plans, one for driving eastward out of the Kanawa Valley. That would have been very difficult logistically but McClellan thought it could work.
The other McClellan plan was a deep drive through Kentucky and Tennessee. This plan was implemented.
Lincoln wanted McClellan to drive straight down through Virginia. This was the easiest plan to implement, and the least risky, but the most predictable.
McClellan altered Lincoln's plan, and wanted to use the rivers of Virginia to maintain his logistics. This plan required naval dominance in the Chesapeake Bay, and was going to be hard to implement before Norfolk was captured.
If the peninsular campaign worked, it opened the possibility of cutting south of Petersburg and Richmond and besieging Richmond.
Grant combined the safer plan with the eastward lunge. He worked the army south and east, until the option of cutting south and supplying from the James River presented itself.
It was hard aggressive fighting. But he gradually immobilized the Army of Virginia, and drew the Confederate Cavalry away from City Point.
The steps required were risky and the results were dreadful. There is little chance that McClellan lacking in both combat experience and command experience could have put the pieces together.
However Grant never started from scratch. He took ideas that others could communicate from previous campaigns and modified them as circumstances permitted.

By the time Grant took command, many great plans were available. Part of the reason for his success was that he did not have a self-serving urge to develop his own, unique plan. In modern parlance, he felt no need to 'reinvent the wheel'.
Instead, as you point out, he took what was available and modified it to his needs. And he made it work.

 

[WJC]

some of the plans might have been similar but that's where the similarities end. McClellan would never have kept the attack up the way grant did . The man just did not have that type of fight in him grant was like a rabid dog. He couldn't get you one way he came back you another way always with a move to the left looking for the opening and when he found it grant would hit you like a jackhammer over and over just look at his other campaigns..

With Grant, it was less the plan than the execution.

 

[leftyhunter]

I'm looking to gather some thoughts and opinions on the actions of McClellan and Grant in their efforts to fight Lee in Virginia. In what ways were they similar (I've heard that Grant used McClellan's plan to capture Petersburg) and what elements made them different? I know that Lincoln butted heads with McClellan quite frequently, but I cannot say that I've heard much about his relationship with Grant. Did Lincoln step back from his attempts to control the military and free up Grant to allow him to do what needed to be done in 1864, or was he still attempting to micromanage? If so, could McClellan have had more success in 1862 with the same type of authority that Grant had?

View attachment 143127

Also, if anyone is interested in participating in an online forum discussion about this topic, I'm hoping to find a few willing participants.

A few thoughts.
1. AnV of 1864 was not the AnV of 1862.
The AnV had already list a lit of men and top officers such as Stonewall Jackson.
2. Sherman's March through Georgia would cause a lot of desertion from desperate wives who needed their husbands to look after them. Also many Confederate soldiers saw the writting on the wall.
3.Yes General Phil Sheridan may of been a mean little SOB but he is Grants mean little SOB.Sheridan solved the problem of the Shenandoah Valley. Sheridan may not of been elegant in his approach but " he got her done".
4. The AnV late in the war was dependent on food and munitions via the port at Wilmington, North Carolina. Once that port was captured in January 1865 Union victory was inevitable.
Leftyhunter

 

[WJC]

McCellen was a wooze!!

I don't believe even his opponents called him that (even if they knew what it meant)....