Maximum firepower.......

[Saphroneth]

Ammunition expenditure and resupply would be an issue just as it was for Artillery for the belligerents in the Great War.

This actually caused a major change in musketry drill when that kind of weapon came in.

 

[Saphroneth]

...whoops, just realized I forgot to specify!

So this is British-specific but other countries would have had similar concerns.
Their Enfield (rifle musket or carbine) drill was focused on how they used it as a sharpshooter weapon for everyone in the army. There was no "fire" command in the drill book, just "present" and then the soldier decided for themselves when to fire - like a hunter, they picked their moment because you can't keep the rifle "on target" at all times when shooting at long range.

When the Snider came around, though, rate of fire quadrupled. A 70-round ammunition pouch that had previously lasted half an hour would now be expended in about seven minutes, and furthermore there was a tendency noticed in many countries for troops with breechloaders to do what the Prussians called "Schnellfeur" - as soon as they're told they can start firing, they do so and don't stop until they run out of ammunition. This is partly a failure of drill and partly psycholgical - it feels like you're doing something, and what's more once you have fired off all your ammunition you clearly need to resupply and in the interim can stay in cover with a guilt-free conscience.

As such, the doctrinal focus changed entirely. With the Enfield, a soldier could not fire very often and as such needed to start at very long range to get a useful number of chances at a target, as well as not producing much smoke; with the Snider, a soldier who started shooting at maximum rate at an enemy at 700 yards would run out of ammunition by the time they closed to 100 yards or so, and what's more they'd have been firing the last sixty rounds into a fog bank of their own making.

So drill included the "fire" command again, this time as a method of regulating ammunition consumption. The best shots would fire independently, but with only a few of them they wouldn't create too much smoke, and if a target deserved a volley at range it would be commanded by the officer/s. As the enemy got closer, the unit would plan to unleash a short, vicious barrage of close ranged rifle fire, one of such magnitude that it would cause the enemy to break and run as well as probably killing quite a lot of them.

This is almost certainly what was done at Isandlwana - the Zulu met a wall of Martini-Henry fire at close range and just kept coming, probably by outflanking with their bulls-horns.

 

[thomas aagaard]

This is almost certainly what was done at Isandlwana - the Zulu met a wall of Martini-Henry fire at close range and just kept coming, probably by outflanking with their bulls-horns.

Archaeological work done some years back showed that the british had pushed to far out from camp.
Thanks to the brass casings if was rather easy to determine where the british soldiers had been.
Had they been in a good solid line, the brass casings would have fallen think there.
It did not, but was spread over a much much larger area than expected.

The men was effective in a skirmish line and not in close order... with the result that there firepower pr. m of front was rather low. The line was marked by casings.
So the wall of fire was actually not that effective and then the british started to fall back, and this made it even harder to keep up the wall of fire.... and they drop casings all over the place toward the camp..
And yes, the flanking obviously also helped.

 

[67th Tigers]

Archaeological work done some years back showed that the british had pushed to far out from camp.
Thanks to the brass casings if was rather easy to determine where the british soldiers had been.
Had they been in a good solid line, the brass casings would have fallen think there.
It did not, but was spread over a much much larger area than expected.

The men was effective in a skirmish line and not in close order... with the result that there firepower pr. m of front was rather low. The line was marked by casings.
So the wall of fire was actually not that effective and then the british started to fall back, and this made it even harder to keep up the wall of fire.... and they drop casings all over the place toward the camp..
And yes, the flanking obviously also helped.

Yes, they deployed in the extended order formations they trained with to fight other European armies. From the lesson they adopted "artillery formation" for fighting the African natives, which was the old close order two-three rank line. There were essentially "piles" of 35 cases at regular intervals along the initial line. The ca. 700 riflemen got off 35 rounds each before they started to fire-and-maneouvre back towards the camp. i.e. ca. 24,500 rounds, and are estimated (assuming 33% of hits being outright kills, as per European battles) to have 6-9,000 hits from that fire (i.e. 1 in 3 to 1 in 4). The three attacking divisions took ca. 50% casualties to cross the ground. The fourth Zulu division was detached to attack Rorke's Draft. In the melee in the camp proper about 800 Zulu bodies were found and 2-3,000 Zulu bodies were estimated in front of it. The wounded were taken away, and many died of their wounds away from the field.

In European theory such staggering casualties would have repelled the charge. The Zulus however took large quantities of psychoactives (Bushman Poison Bulb) before such a charge that rendered them almost unable to perceive of how deadly their situation was. Hence they charged home despite the fire.

To the Zulus as well as the British, the battle was a disaster. Isandlwana and Rorke's Draft broke the Zulu nations fighting strength completely.

 

[Saphroneth]

Isandlwana and Rorke's Draft broke the Zulu nations fighting strength completely.

"An assegai has been thrust into the belly of the nation" was how I understand Cetshwayo put it.

 

[Sbc]

Archaeological work done some years back showed that the british had pushed to far out from camp.
Thanks to the brass casings if was rather easy to determine where the british soldiers had been.
Had they been in a good solid line, the brass casings would have fallen think there.
It did not, but was spread over a much much larger area than expected.

The men was effective in a skirmish line and not in close order... with the result that there firepower pr. m of front was rather low. The line was marked by casings.
So the wall of fire was actually not that effective and then the british started to fall back, and this made it even harder to keep up the wall of fire.... and they drop casings all over the place toward the camp..
And yes, the flanking obviously also helped.

The series "Secrets of the Dead" aired an episode entitled "Day of the Zulu". In addition to the list above the rifle in question was tested and a conclusion was drawn that it was susceptible to fouling easily and overheating. The battle did take place in a dry, dusty hot environment.

 

[thomas aagaard]

I remember seeing one program about the battle. They spend a good deal of time disproving the myth that the soldiers could not get extra ammo out of the wooden supply boxes.

 

[Sbc]

The Maxim gun was first used by Britain's colonial forces in the 1893–1894 First Matabele War in Rhodesia. During the Battle of the Shangani, 700 soldiers fought off 5,000 warriors with just four Maxim guns. (Wikipedia)

Now I know the Union army was far from being made up of poorly armed 'native' warriors but if the South had maybe waited 30 years, armed itself with maxims and fought a defensive war, would it have won it's independence relatively quickly on the battlefield?

Colorized and sound added

 

[Sbc]

Colorized and sound added

Click on the blue type for the video in post 48