Maximum firepower.......

[Saphroneth]

But how many of the companies where familiar with it? how many companies was making it before the war for the private market? (as I understand it all government contracts was covered by the government arsenals)

The companies were unfamiliar with it, which is why Springfield production from non-Governmental sources in the first fifteen months of the war was pathetic.

I would argue that The sharp is really not that different from a musket.

Well, it did cost three times as much, which reflects either skill required or materials.

Where the the Spencer is a very different gun. So the retooling time was much bigger in this case.

Burnside's factory was switching from making Burnside breechloaders to Spencer breechloaders, so it's not an enormous difference.

Anyway, Since I don't consider a rifle musket an advantage in most cases over a smothbore, I do think this would have been a better solution.

It might be, but frankly training the men to shoot would also have been better. Even at short range the difference between an untrained man and a trained man can easily be a factor of ten in terms of hits, and I'm pretty sure that's a bigger improvement in hits-per-company-per-minute than arming the lot of them with Sharps rifles.

ED: actually, this deserves further explanation. There's all kinds of possible sources of error in firing a flintlock musket (from the flash of the firing pan, the delay of firing so the weapon's muzzle could drift high, the CEP of the actual weapon itself...) but these are all much diminished in a rifle-musket as it's a percussion weapon with a low CEP. That has implications for short range firing as well as long range, but it also means that (contra to the flintlock days) the dividend from training troops for accuracy at firefight ranges is considerable.

Different nations tried to handle this different ways.
The French had short range training for all ranks (i.e. range shooting) and range estimation for specialists who would be the main ones to deliver long range fire.
The Austrians had range estimation for officers and would pass the range estimation down the chain, and they practiced aiming at known ranges.
The Prussians didn't really consider shooting over a few hundred yards, but they did train everyone to be good at hitting targets within that range (intensive target shooting and range estimation) with the intent being that the skirmish line would clear away enemy skirmishers and then would be able to fire "from the hip" against the enemy main line.
The Russians I know were using the Nessler ball but I'm not sure what their range estimation was like.
The British went a bit mad and trained everyone to be a sharpshooter/sniper, so at almost any firefight range their troops could operate dispersed. Theirs was also the most scientific, and included snapping practice and generally ensuring that the soldier upon firing would (e.g.) "press" the trigger rather than pull it, and would fire when the sight picture was right rather than trying to rush.
And the Union... didn't really try at all. Nor did the Confederacy.


The British system would be the best for producing an effective army, man for man, but frankly just target shooting within a couple of hundred yards would be very beneficial.

 

[byron ed]

how many companies was making it before the war for the private market?

To recognize there was a private market for military grade rifles. Civilians had ordinary access to them.

 

[Saphroneth]

To recognize there was a private market for military grade rifles. Civilians had ordinary access to them.

Wasn't a very big one, though. Total long arm production from all non-governmental sources in the first year of the war was considerably less than a hundred a day, and that includes **** like PS Justice's rifles.

 

[byron ed]

I don't consider a rifle musket an advantage in most cases over a smothbore

Flat out, the advantage a rifled musket has over a smooth bore is much-improved accuracy at longer ranges.

It is the case, however, that some post-modern CW authors are claiming that a rifle musket in the hands of the typical CW soldier was no advantage. In other words most CW soldiers were so bad at shooting it didn't make any difference what gun they had.

 

[Zack]

I think a much more significant impact that advancing the war thirty years would have, assuming either side could take advantage of it, is the introduction of smokeless powder. It made quite a difference in the Spanish-American War. Having an accurate long-range rifle is largely irrelevant when your view is blocked by huge clouds of smoke.

In addition, I'm sure general adoption of the maxim would break down linear tactics, even though they helped with command and control. American soldiers fighting in Cuba in 1898 were quick to spread out when facing Spanish troops well-versed in cover and concealment.

I thereby think @Carronade is right in pointing out that after a few rough battles tactics would adapt.

 

[byron ed]

American soldiers fighting in Cuba in 1898 were quick to spread out when facing Spanish troops well-versed in cover and concealment.

...and who were equipped with Mausers vs the US Krags (1894-98 Springfields)

 

[Zack]

@byron ed It stuns me that when the US was trying to pick a new weapon to be standard issue in 1892 the krag-jørgensen beat out the mauser, whose descendants would be the standard issue German rifle through WWII

 

[byron ed]

@byron ed It stuns me that when the US was trying to pick a new weapon to be standard issue in 1892 the krag-jørgensen beat out the mauser, whose descendants would be the standard issue German rifle through WWII

...an oversight begrudgingly admitted by the US by the time the '03 Springfield was adopted with it's Mauser pattern lock. The US agreed to pay money (perhaps $200,000 or so, need reference) to Mauser even as that firm was supplying Germany with the multitude of rifles that country would employ against the Allies in WW1.

Sorry, getting off point to the thread.

 

[thomas aagaard]

To recognize there was a private market for military grade rifles. Civilians had ordinary access to them.

see this reply.

The companies were unfamiliar with it, which is why Springfield production from non-Governmental sources in the first fifteen months of the war was pathetic.

Civilians might have had access, but clearly the market was really not of any relevant size.

 

[Saphroneth]

Something I've sometimes wondered is about revolvers - the US did have plenty of success putting together revolvers for the civilian market, and if the Colt Revolving Rifle had been a little closer in parts to the Colt revolvers then it might have been possible to mass-produce them in roughly the same profusion the US did historically with revolvers. The long first year saw the production of ~86,000 revolvers, ~54,000 of them being Colts of some sort, and while it would badly affect the cavalry to lose them it would be interesting if the Army of the Potomac could deploy multiple divisions with Colt revolving rifles. (I'm picturing essentially a Colt RR which uses most of the same parts as a Colt pistol.)

Useful for a "storm division", perhaps?

Of course, the chain-fire problem would have to be gotten around, and it's possible the result would just be "Schnellfeur", the Prussian expression for when units with fast-firing weapons just basically shoot off all their ammunition at maximum rate once the fight begins. But it's interesting.

 

[67th Tigers]

The problem the US had was they needed small arms immediately. So desperate were they that they bought the sweepings from the arsenals of Europe. Condemned rifles were sold to the US as they had no choice.

Now, the US had one government factory for making small arms after the capture of Harper's Ferry, Springfield. They were tooled for making the Model 1855 Rifle-Musket in .58, and not that many of them. Running flat out Springfield could make 280 muskets per week at the time, or could equip a regiment per month. The US government contracted for additional machine tools to try and increase the output, many from the UK. In the first 16 months of the war Springfield made 109,810 M1861 rifle-muskets. In the same period the private contractors had delivered on 14,267 M1861's.

Now the Sharps is a bit more complex than a M1861, but the main difference is the need to make the falling breech. The US could have negotiated a licence for the weapon and started manufacturing it themselves, but they'd need completely different tooling.

Arguably if they wanted to go down that route the best course for the ordnance would be to licence the Sharps patent and make their own falling block Springfield.

 

[Saphroneth]

In the same period the private contractors had delivered on 14,267 M1861's.

Actually 9,960. The rest were other types of "army rifle".

As per a post on the blog of a certain fellow...

It has often been assumed, including by the author, that the 14,336 'army rifles with bayonet' are Springfields. In fact, only 9,960 are 'United States Rifles, .58'; 1,763 are varieties of the M1841, listed as 'long range rifles,' 'Harpers Ferry rifles,' 'Yaeger rifles,' 'Mississippi rifles,' and 'rifles with sabre bayonet,' with 9 of these having been converted to the Merrill breech-loading mechanism. A further 2,332 are American built versions of the Enfield, long and short, and 280 are 'United States Rifles, altered to Maynard, .69'. This leaves one other gun, a "Whitney Rifle".

 

[byron ed]

Wasn't a very big one, though. Total long arm production from all non-governmental sources in the first year of the war was considerably less than a hundred a day

Let's say thirty a day. That would mean a yearly average of 10,000 long guns a year made by non-governmental makers. That's 900 guns a month. That should be considered a pretty significant market after all -- except there's no indication that many of those were ordinarily available to, or were purchased by, civilians. Not near enough to be of any relevance to CW outcomes.

 

[Saphroneth]

Let's say thirty a day. That would mean a yearly average of 10,000 guns per day made by non-governmental makers. That's 900 guns a month. If averaged over thirty-six states North and South that's 277 guns available to civilians for each state. That should be considered a pretty significant market after all -- except there's no indication very many of those were actually sold, at least not enough to be of any relevance to CW outcomes.

You misunderstand.

These gun makers had all received enormous armaments contracts - the government would literally buy as many guns as they could provide, generally ordering over 10,000 from a single contractor - and so their production average in the long first year is not their "peacetime" production but their production after fifteen months of expanding capability, working flat out and hiring on more workers (plus purchasing extra barrels from overseas). It's quite possible the yearly production in 1859 was more like 1,000 long arms, which would be about one for every thirty thousand people.

There's a reason that the Union ordered 854,000 rifles by December 1861, and there's a reason only 205,000 of them were ever delivered. To come back to the topic of the thread somewhat, the Marsh was a breechloading conversion for the Springfield rifle. 25,000 were ordered in October 1861, and as far as we can tell he delivered none of them - possibly because there were no rifles to be had to convert?

 

[byron ed]

You misunderstand.

I meant to say (and edited my post accordingly) that at 30 guns per day it's a yearly average of 10,000 long guns per year (not per day) made by non-governmental makers.

But in any event thanks for clarifying your point, which I had misunderstood.

 

[Saphroneth]

I meant to say (and edited my post accordingly) that at 30 guns per day it's a yearly average of 10,000 long guns per year (not per day) made by non-governmental makers.

Oh, I got what you meant, I just didn't think it was correct!
I wonder if a good analogy is the Humvee ('Hummer'). At its peak the Humvee H3 was moving 50,000 units a year in the US, with a population for the US over ten times that in the antebellum period - in a more normal year it was more like 30,000.

Certainly the Humvee is for sale and nobody would dispute that, but it shows that something can be for sale and avertised quite heavily without having all that many actually sold.

 

[byron ed]

Oh, I got what you meant, I just didn't think it was correct!

I was using your numbers:

Total long arm production from all non-governmental sources in the first year of the war was considerably less than a hundred a day

isn't thirty considerably less than a hundred? Anyway, regardless of counts, what point are you wanting to make?

something can be for sale and avertised quite heavily without having all that many actually sold.

True. Only repeated advertisements for an item can indicate the item is selling.

 

[Saphroneth]

I was using your numbers:

Yes, and when I said what I did I said it in a general sense - and, more importantly, that was the rate in the whole long first year after the contracts were issued.

Anyway, regardless of counts, what point are you wanting to make?

Mostly that US small arms production was a lot lower than we think of it, so mass production of repeaters or breechloaders is probably right out. Heck, as 67th has noted the governmental armoury running flat out could only average 40 weapons a day before expansion, and that expansion was pretty substantial in scale.

 

[byron ed]

There's some confusion about what quantities or class of arms we are referring to in our rush to "slam dunk" the points we make about the topic. One needs to establish what arms they are referring to. I wish everything could relate only to some military contract, it would be simpler, but there there were many other kinds of provenance at the time:

(a) government armory-built arms intended for issue to troops,
(b) government contracted issue arms intended for issue to troops,
(c) military grade arms available to civilians,
(d) military grade arms available to civilians but purchased per a government contract and intended for issue to troops,
(e) military grade arms available to civilians but purchased by a military unit or individual soldier.

Thrown in the mix are

(f) foreign government armory-built per government contract intended for issue to troops,
(g) foreign government armory-built yet available to civilians,
(h) foreign government armory-built available to civilians but purchased per a government contract and intended for issue to troops.
(i) private built military grade, domestic or foreign, intended for sale to governments

In some of those settings the arms are built to meet a specific military specification, in others they are not built to meet a specific military specification, though they are military grade, some identical to a mil spec., but others only identical in lock construction.

So other relevant categories are

(j) regardless of spec, purchased by governments
(k) arms previously built to a spec but now just inventory for re-built versions of those weapons.

Finally, for any of the above provenance, they can be instead be

(l) surplused and available for government purchase contracts or re-build contracts to spec or offered to civilians, military units, or individual soldiers.

 

[Sbc]

The Maxim gun was first used by Britain's colonial forces in the 1893–1894 First Matabele War in Rhodesia. During the Battle of the Shangani, 700 soldiers fought off 5,000 warriors with just four Maxim guns. (Wikipedia)

Now I know the Union army was far from being made up of poorly armed 'native' warriors but if the South had maybe waited 30 years, armed itself with maxims and fought a defensive war, would it have won it's independence relatively quickly on the battlefield?

Ammunition expenditure and resupply would be an issue just as it was for Artillery for the belligerents in the Great War. Beyond that are numerous fascinating changes in the world the could conceivably plunge most developed nations into conflict.
Italian and German unification upsets the balance of power and traditional alliances in Europe.
Serfdom ends in Russia and Slavery in Brazil.
The age of sail ends and the dreadnought emerges.
Manifest Destiny is nearly complete and the state count is over 45(?).
"Robber Barons " accumulate vast fortunes that in some part hinge on slave labor.
American imperialism expands into the Caribbean to pacify fireeaters.
The scramble for Africa is delayed or accelerated over slavery issues or possible American colonization on that continent.
Just few thoughts that come to mind...