Longstreet's Countermarch: What took so long?

[OldReliable1862]

In the Designer's Notes for the 2014 board game Last Chance for Victory, covering the battle of Gettysburg, Dean Essig devotes several pages to an assessment of Longstreet's performance during the battle (look on pages 9-14 here). I would strongly recommend reading Essig's views here in order to have the context for my questions.

Reading these notes has left with the following questions:
1) Did Longstreet know he was supposed to make an attack in the Peach Orchard area at 9:00 am, when Lee left his headquarters to visit Ewell?

2) Why send his corps so far back and stop them before beginning the flank march? Why did Longstreet not simply send them down the valley west of Seminary Ridge?

3) Why did Longstreet hold up the First Corps' movement just to wait for Law's brigade? Could they not have joined them during the march to the attack position? Why were they placed on the far right of Hood's division, when this made their march even longer?

 

[WScott]

The simple answer to all your questions is, Longstreet didn't want to follow Lee's battle plans.
Longstreet felt sligted by Lee's direct dealings with General Lafayette McLaws. Longstreet wanted all his troops together before starting his march to the left flank (some of them were just getting in to Gettysburg). The actual federal dispositions were significantly different than those reported by the "scouts" forcing a change to the point of attack. Most importantly Longstreet wanted Lee to forego the day 2 battle at Gettysburg and move toward the Frederick Md. area threatening Washington and forcing Meade to come to him.

 

[pmuskett]

Dean writes earlier in the column that he is a game designer, not a historian. The point of his article is to justify his ratings of Longstreet in his game. (WHICH I LOVE HIS GAMES This game has one of the best battlefield maps out there).

I don't agree with the assumption that Longstreet is trying to teach Lee a lesson. That would be a court martial offense. We don't see any meeting between Lee and Longstreet, like we do with Lee and J.E.B. Stuart, which is about as close to a court martial, we see in anything related to Gettysburg. (I may be forgetting something later or earlier.)

Ironically, Longstreet wrote his uncle soon after the battle, he wished he could take the responsibilities of the loss at Gettysburg on his shoulders and not let it rest on Lee. Dean quotes that letter but fails to mention this part.
He also quotes Mclaws's letter to his wife. Omitting the fact that Mclaws's has already requested a transfer from the army or wishing that Beauregard will be sent to assume Corps command. Hood and McLaws's are in a feud relating to articles written after Sharpsburg (Antietam).

I have thought that the reason that Mclaws's and Lee are working together in the troop positioning is related to the battle of Chancellorsville. Mclaws's reported to Lee directly there, as Longstreet was down in SE Virginia. They had established a relationship during that battle and it some ways this seemed to be continuing.

1. Longstreet got the orders to attack at 0900 or so, that morning. No way he could have gotten into position that morning, that quickly to attack that area. The Peach Orchard was to be used as an artillery platform, to support the attack.

2. Not sure why he didn't go directly south. Anderson at 0930, has a brigade tangling with the sharpshooters in Pitzer's woods. The further west route will keep Longstreet's troops further away from the Union line and less chance of discovery. Plus, they follow the route Johnston supposedly took that morning.

3. My thoughts on the waiting are, Longstreet is expected to attack when he gets in position. He wants all available troops to arrive before going into the fight as soon as he arrives in position. If he has to wait for Law, and then attack, again, the Union will discover the move.

Lee took responsibility for the loss at Gettysburg and did so until the day he died. Lee as the commanding officer is overall responsible. He did not censure Longstreet, as far as I know, for failing in any action at Gettysburg. It is only after Lee is made a Saint that Longstreet is blamed.

Just my thoughts on this. It is a game designers' justification for the ratings in his game. Look at the primary sources for a better understanding to what actually happened at Gettysburg.

Phil

 

[gettysburgerrn]

IIRC Lee consented to Longstreet's request to await Law's command...(Im guessing he wanted to wait for them because he was already down Pickett's division and wanted to go in with two full divisions....

Ken

 

[JerryD]

In the Designer's Notes for the 2014 board game Last Chance for Victory, covering the battle of Gettysburg, Dean Essig devotes several pages to an assessment of Longstreet's performance during the battle (look on pages 9-14 here). I would strongly recommend reading Essig's views here in order to have the context for my questions.

Reading these notes has left with the following questions:
1) Did Longstreet know he was supposed to make an attack in the Peach Orchard area at 9:00 am, when Lee left his headquarters to visit Ewell?

2) ? Why send them so far back and stop them before beginning the flank march? Why did Longstreet not simply send the First Corps down the valley west of Seminary Ridge?

3) Why did Longstreet hold up the First Corps' movement just to wait for Law's brigade? Could they not have joined them during the march to the attack position? Why were they placed on the far right of Hood's division, when this made their march even longer?

The march really did not take that long, considering the fact that they had to turn around to keep from being seen from LRT. Compare to how long it took Jackson's flank march at Chancellorsville.

My understanding is that he knew it was a possibility, but Lee was still determining his strategy when he left to see Ewell, and had not yet made up his mind whether the main attack would be on the left or the right. That was the whole purpose of the meeting with Ewell.

Troops march faster on roads rather than across country, so he was looking for roads to get him to his jump off position without being seen from LRT. Also, Longstreet was not familiar with this area and was relying on Capt. Johnson who had done an early morning reconnaissance, who presumably would have known the best way to get the troops into position since he was the only one who had actually traveled and scouted in this area.

Lee consented to waiting for Laws Brigade, so Lee knew exactly what the timing would be for that. Can only assume that Longstreet did not want the brigade get lost on the way to the jump off point, which happened frequently enough to be a concern.

I believe they were on the far right since they were the last brigade and would have been the last troops to fall into place. Managing large bodies of troops necessitated this kind of movement and Longstreet was one of the better generals at handing large bodies of troops.

 

[rpkennedy]

@pmuskett put it as well as I could. There was no expectation of an attack at 0900 as Longstreet's men weren't even on the field at that point (they were still back west of Herr's Tavern) and could not have been ready to attack until some time later. And Lee consented to waiting for Law to catch up, which he did between 1100 and 1200. And, to my mind, it's understandable that Longstreet wanted to wait for Law. As it was, he only had 7 of his 11 brigades available and waiting for another 1500 men makes sense.

Ryan

 

[6thMichCav]

If I recall, Longstreet also wanted the front division to stay in front, so rather than reversing from the rear or segmenting his lines to go immediately west and south, he had the front division turn around with the remaining divisions following like a giant conga line.

 

[CowCavalry]

Didn't Alexander come to the same conclusion about being sighted from LRT and found a path to take with the artillery that would keep them hidden? I have seen the question posed why didn't Longstreet et al coming on later see the same path and the ruts left behind by the guns and follow instead of the time consuming countermarch.

 

[Jamieva]

Didn't Alexander come to the same conclusion about being sighted from LRT and found a path to take with the artillery that would keep them hidden? I have seen the question posed why didn't Longstreet et al coming on later see the same path and the ruts left behind by the guns and follow instead of the time consuming countermarch.

Thats Gary Gallaghers thing. He cannot understand how the infantry didnt see that and just do the same.

 

[CowCavalry]

Thats Gary Gallaghers thing. He cannot understand how the infantry didnt see that and just do the same.

In E.P. Alexander's account:

" They had been instructed to avoid being seen, and finding that the road on which they had been sent came at this point in full view of the signal station, they had halted, in finding themselves already exposed, and sent back to General Lee or Longstreet for orders. For some reason, which I cannot now recall, they would not turn back and follow the tracks of my guns, and I remember a long and tiresome waiting; and at length there came an order to turn back and take another road around by "Black Horse Tavern," and I have never forgotten that name since. My general recollection is that nearly three hours were lost in that delay and countermarch, and that it was about 4 P.M. when Hood became engaged heavily on our extreme right flank......"

 

[thomas aagaard]

I think this case show the huge difference it makes to be fighting in an area you know and/or have friendly locals to guide you... as Lee was use to.
Compared to be fighting without that advantage.

 

[121st PA Vols]

Thats Gary Gallaghers thing. He cannot understand how the infantry didnt see that and just do the same.

No one that knows that area can understand it Jamieva. A benefit of knowing the terrain and or living there, is to see/know Alexander's route was the obvious and ONLY way to go.
You can walk the area and drive it to know this. Make a left turn (East-Southeast) and there's LRT staring at you in the distance a few miles off; 3-4 miles. It's quite an elevated area heading East from the road/fields.

That he didn't take that route elevates his behavior (stubbornness) to a whole other level. The imprint of so many cannon, limbers, horses, etc, etc....could not be missed!

 

[JerryD]

No one that knows that area can understand it Jamieva. A benefit of knowing the terrain and or living there, is to see/know Alexander's route was the obvious and ONLY way to go.
You can walk the area and drive it to know this. Make a left turn (East-Southeast) and there's LRT staring at you in the distance a few miles off; 3-4 miles. It's quite an elevated area heading East from the road/fields.

That he didn't take that route elevates his behavior (stubbornness) to a whole other level. The imprint of so many cannon, limbers, horses, etc, etc....could not be missed!

I think you are leaping to a rather tall conclusion here. You dont know what he did or did not see and what the imprint looked like. This ignores the fact that the decision to turn around was made Longstreet did not know how long it would take, or that Alexander's route successfully avoided being seen from LRT, or even if they got lost. Longstreet needed the sure thing, and I suspect he relied a great deal on Capt. Johnston at this point. I simply dont believe Longstreet would play games like you imply when a battle was pending. It was his job as Second in Command to express his opinions, strongly even. But I also think that when the decision was made, he put his full effort into carrying it out to the best of his abilities, as evidenced by the ferociousness of the attack he unleashed that very day.

 

[rpkennedy]

Dean writes earlier in the column that he is a game designer, not a historian. The point of his article is to justify his ratings of Longstreet in his game. (WHICH I LOVE HIS GAMES This game has one of the best battlefield maps out there).

I don't agree with the assumption that Longstreet is trying to teach Lee a lesson. That would be a court martial offense. We don't see any meeting between Lee and Longstreet, like we do with Lee and J.E.B. Stuart, which is about as close to a court martial, we see in anything related to Gettysburg. (I may be forgetting something later or earlier.)

Ironically, Longstreet wrote his uncle soon after the battle, he wished he could take the responsibilities of the loss at Gettysburg on his shoulders and not let it rest on Lee. Dean quotes that letter but fails to mention this part.
He also quotes Mclaws's letter to his wife. Omitting the fact that Mclaws's has already requested a transfer from the army or wishing that Beauregard will be sent to assume Corps command. Hood and McLaws's are in a feud relating to articles written after Sharpsburg (Antietam).

I have thought that the reason that Mclaws's and Lee are working together in the troop positioning is related to the battle of Chancellorsville. Mclaws's reported to Lee directly there, as Longstreet was down in SE Virginia. They had established a relationship during that battle and it some ways this seemed to be continuing.

1. Longstreet got the orders to attack at 0900 or so, that morning. No way he could have gotten into position that morning, that quickly to attack that area. The Peach Orchard was to be used as an artillery platform, to support the attack.

2. Not sure why he didn't go directly south. Anderson at 0930, has a brigade tangling with the sharpshooters in Pitzer's woods. The further west route will keep Longstreet's troops further away from the Union line and less chance of discovery. Plus, they follow the route Johnston supposedly took that morning.

3. My thoughts on the waiting are, Longstreet is expected to attack when he gets in position. He wants all available troops to arrive before going into the fight as soon as he arrives in position. If he has to wait for Law, and then attack, again, the Union will discover the move.

Lee took responsibility for the loss at Gettysburg and did so until the day he died. Lee as the commanding officer is overall responsible. He did not censure Longstreet, as far as I know, for failing in any action at Gettysburg. It is only after Lee is made a Saint that Longstreet is blamed.

Just my thoughts on this. It is a game designers' justification for the ratings in his game. Look at the primary sources for a better understanding to what actually happened at Gettysburg.

Phil

As an aside, are those two games (Last Chance for Victory and None But Heroes) the updated versions of Terrible Swift Sword and A Gleam of Bayonets?

Ryan

 

[pmuskett]

As an aside, are those two games (Last Chance for Victory and None But Heroes) the updated versions of Terrible Swift Sword and A Gleam of Bayonets?

Ryan

Different systems. Last Chance and None but Heros is Line of Battle not Great Battles of American Civil War.

 

[CowCavalry]

I think you are leaping to a rather tall conclusion here. You dont know what he did or did not see and what the imprint looked like. This ignores the fact that the decision to turn around was made Longstreet did not know how long it would take, or that Alexander's route successfully avoided being seen from LRT, or even if they got lost. Longstreet needed the sure thing, and I suspect he relied a great deal on Capt. Johnston at this point. I simply dont believe Longstreet would play games like you imply when a battle was pending. It was his job as Second in Command to express his opinions, strongly even. But I also think that when the decision was made, he put his full effort into carrying it out to the best of his abilities, as evidenced by the ferociousness of the attack he unleashed that very day.

I tend to agree with you here; Longstreet may not have wanted to take his corps down a wild goose chase following some wagon ruts for all he knew and wind up miles from where he should have. On the other hand, he knew that Alexander and the artillery had left before his infantry, and he had not run into them coming back, so what else could it have been but wheel ruts from the artillery battalions? Hard to say, not being there or knowing the terrain. That said, these men were seasoned campaigners, and knew what tracks left by several battalions of artillery look like and what general direction these ruts led.

Alexander says " I turned out of the road before reaching the exposed part, and passing through some meadows a few hundred yards, regained the road without coming in sight. "

You would think before turning his columns around and counter marching, he would have sent a rider ahead to scout the path. If the artillery found a path that would not expose them to LRT by detouring a few hundred yards, Longstreet could have done the same it seems.

 

[Jamieva]

I think you are leaping to a rather tall conclusion here. You dont know what he did or did not see and what the imprint looked like. This ignores the fact that the decision to turn around was made Longstreet did not know how long it would take, or that Alexander's route successfully avoided being seen from LRT, or even if they got lost. Longstreet needed the sure thing, and I suspect he relied a great deal on Capt. Johnston at this point. I simply dont believe Longstreet would play games like you imply when a battle was pending. It was his job as Second in Command to express his opinions, strongly even. But I also think that when the decision was made, he put his full effort into carrying it out to the best of his abilities, as evidenced by the ferociousness of the attack he unleashed that very day.

Gary is basing it on Alexander's post war writings as far as following the trail the artillery made. Gary's point is if you go see the ground in person it's pretty obvious you can just go further down the hill and continue on the route unseen. I think he's hinting at McLaws panicked slightly. Backtracking should have been the last resort

 

[JerryD]

Gary is basing it on Alexander's post war writings as far as following the trail the artillery made. Gary's point is if you go see the ground in person it's pretty obvious you can just go further down the hill and continue on the route unseen. I think he's hinting at McLaws panicked slightly. Backtracking should have been the last resort

I've been to that rise in the road and to be honest, I dont know where Alexander went. If he went in front of the ridge he would have been seen. If he went behind the ridge, its not clear when he could have gone over it and not be seen. So it was not obvious to me. And has been noted above, its not certain Longstreet would have recognized some wagon ruts as wagon ruts from Alexander's artillery.

Bottom line is, its a matter of how you view Longstreet. If you think of him as a petty officer seeking to undermine Lee, then I guess you can conclude he willingly made a countermarch that was not called for, for what reason or to what end, I dont really understand what that accomplishes. If you view him as a good corps commander who might be peeved but who would not play games with his men's lives, its hard to reach that conclusion and you think he made the best decision he could based on what he saw. I am in the latter group. If you look at his whole record I just dont think the first characterization is realistic. Not that he was perfect. Far from it. But all in all I think he was doing the best he could.

 

[Poorlaggedman]

Battle of Gettysburg Podcast did a thorough treatment on the Countermarch in James Longstreet at Gettysburg Part 3 starting around 36 minutes in, with more context before that. It's not on their YouTube yet or I'd link it.

People like to blame Longstreet (scapegoat) but nobody gives a **** that A.P. Hill is basically an absentee for the whole battle, with his units doing much poorer execution than any of Longstreet's and any hope of victory July 2nd dissolving with that.

 

[Jamieva]

Battle of Gettysburg Podcast did a thorough treatment on the Countermarch in James Longstreet at Gettysburg Part 3 starting around 36 minutes in, with more context before that. It's not on their YouTube yet or I'd link it.

People like to blame Longstreet (scapegoat) but nobody gives a **** that A.P. Hill is basically an absentee for the whole battle, with his units doing much poorer execution than any of Longstreet's and any hope of victory July 2nd dissolving with that.

Hill was sick that is why his corps was given to longstreet for oversight in both the July 2 and July 3 attacks.