Logistics and Gettysburg

[r_moody]

Amateurs study the battles; generals study the logistics.

All of the Generals that rose to the top and stayed there made logistics a priority. Grant, Sherman, JE Johnston and Lee knew and obeyed their logistics limits. At times they all stretched it to the limits Grant at Vicksburg, Sherman's March to the Sea, JEJ's line from Dalton to Atlanta, Lee's Pennsylvania Raid were logistics stretched to the maximum. The success and failures of these campaigns can be directly tied to the logistics involved.

There is a study of Civil War Railroad Logistics @

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/gabel4/gabel4.asp

You will learn how railroads and steamboats tilted the tide of the war to the North.

Here is an excerpt: "But in 1864, Major General William T. Sherman waged an offensive campaign with an army of 100,000 men and 35,000 animals (see map 1). His supply line consisted of a single-track railroad extending 473 miles from Atlanta to his main supply base at Louisville. Sherman estimated that this rail line did the work of 36,800 wagons and 220,800 mules!"

Trains and steamboats run on wood and water don't need sleep and don't need thousands of teamsters, the savings in forage alone must have been staggering.

Rick

 

[whitworth]

Meade-Under no pressure to attack

Meade, as a new commander, was under no pressure from Washington to attack at Gettysburg. In fact, my theory, is the Army of the Potomac knew the shortages in forage and ammunition that Lee's army had and saw no need to make any desperate attacks.

After the first day of blocking the ANV, the AoP went on the defensive with counter-attacks at Culp's Hill. Block, lock on, and then wait for the attack. That is how I read AoP tactics.

Lee with his back to South Mountain would never find enough forage for his horses and mules to last a week. The worst thing that could happen to the ANV was to get held in place at Gettysburg, where they would run out of supplies, faster than at other locations.

Bad place for a high water mark; Gettysburg.

 

[ole]

Meade, as a new commander, was under no pressure from Washington to attack at Gettysburg. In fact, my theory, is the Army of the Potomac knew the shortages in forage and ammunition that Lee's army had and saw no need to make any desperate attacks.

Interesting theory. It could be correct, or could at least have had something to do with Meade's actions on the first day.

Although Meade was under no political pressure on the first and second day, he most certainly would have been by the fourth, if the second and third days' activities hadn't occurred. However, as you said, Lee was in no position to stay for a fourth. We'll never know, will we? However, Meade took a lot of flak for not pursuing with more vigor.
Ole

 

[samgrant]

1st day - the Union army was not yet consolidated/organized enough to even consider an attack.

 

[larry_cockerham]

Rushing head-long into Lee's army without some thought and preparation, to say the least, was not something Meade was going to consider. I still think Lee was trying to play the final hand at Gettysburg, win or go home. His army could have been best described as tired and hungry.