Logistics and Gettysburg

[whitworth]

What if General Robert E. Lee had kept his two corps on the west side of South Mountain, in the Chambersburg area?
What if Lee had realized that Gettysburg and Adams County, PA was one of the worst places he could have picked to do battle with the AoP?

Gettysburg has the same logistical problems in 2006, that it had in 1863.
And nobody, but nobody, in the historical writing arena, seemed to notice.

But then, who ever studied logistics. Not the Confederates; not before Gettysburg.

 

[samgrant]

What if the rebs were at Gburg first, and took that Cemetary Rige line and then, the Yanks approached from north and west (looking for shoes?), would Meade do what Lee did, etc. ...............?

 

[lrd89]

What if the rebs were at Gburg first, and took that Cemetary Rige line and then, the Yanks approached from north and west (looking for shoes?), would Meade do what Lee did, etc. ...............?

I think he would have felt intense pressure from Washington to attack.

 

[milhistbuff1]

yes, but in what fashion? try to lure Lee south to pipe creek, Flank, straight on direct assault etc.. ?
Matt

 

[ole]

Meade would have been under pressure to attack, but even the ninnies in Washington would have to realize that Lee had to move against Meade or slink home. (After gaining a little weight for a day or two.)
Ole

 

[lrd89]

It's hard to say but I doubt a direct assault would have been successful under the circumstances.

 

[ole]

Ird89:
If Lee couldn't assault his way to victory over part of the army on the 1st and 2nd days, how could he expect to assault a consolidated and ready army?

I figure you are right.
Ole

 

[whitworth]

"What if the rebs were at Gburg first...?"

"What if the rebs were at Gburg first...?"

The Battle of Gettysburg would never have happened. The AoP would have set up defensive positions in Maryland.

With the fall of Vicksburg, no pressure would come to Meade to attack.

Logistically, the Confederate army could not stay in Gettysburg more than a week due to logistical problems. Logistics was the reason General Lee spread his corps out, before Gettysburg. Gettysburg was a poor base for the Army of Northern Virginia with its inefficiencies.

 

[lrd89]

Ird89:
If Lee couldn't assault his way to victory over part of the army on the 1st and 2nd days, how could he expect to assault a consolidated and ready army?

I figure you are right.
Ole

Oops, I could have made my post a little clearer. I think if the positions were reversed that Meade would have been under enormous pressure to drive the ANV out of PA and MD. I'm assuming the Pipe Creek Circular wouldn't have existed under this scenario, so I don't think Meade would have went to Pipe Creek. I say he attacks head on and is defeated.

 

[ole]

Ird89:
If Lee had not been surprised at Gettysburg and if he had managed to consolidate his forces before Meade came up, then Meade would have been under pressure to run him out.

Would the pressure have been enough to force him to attack? I don't think so. Meade would have only had to hold off ("maneuvering for position" could have given him days) attacking. Every day he could delay would have been one day closer to the day when the ANV would have had to go home without doing battle -- the ANV simply could not live off the land if it wasn't moving.

I read somewhere recently some projections on how long an army of a given number could exist in a relatively fertile region -- with figures for infantry or cavalry -- static, advancing slowly, or moving fast.The numbers given escape me, but the time was a lot shorter than I had suspected -- days, not weeks. The ANV would have had to move in less than a week.

Two or three days of waiting for an attack and Lee would have had to start back (he couldn't wait the whole week or he'd be marching back without food). No attack necessary.
Ole

 

[lrd89]

I read somewhere recently some projections on how long an army of a given number could exist in a relatively fertile region -- with figures for infantry or cavalry -- static, advancing slowly, or moving fast.The numbers given escape me, but the time was a lot shorter than I had suspected -- days, not weeks. The ANV would have had to move in less than a week.
Ole

Thanks Ole. Do you remember where you saw those projections?
Roger

 

[ole]

Thanks Ole. Do you remember where you saw those projections?
Roger

No. But if it comes back to me, I'll certainly forward it to you.

I'm thinking it was on another forum. Someone quoted a book on logistics with some foreign-looking calculations on who and what was required per person for an infantry. All I remember was being amazed at the enormous quantities of food food required, and how long a country-side could be expected to provide it. (And that was based on legitimate and semi-legitimate requisitions.) No wonder Lee left Virginia twice to give the state's citizens a chance to harvest something for themselves.

Ole

 

[samgrant]

Ask Mongomery Meigs.

 

[gary]

If Lee got there first, Chamberlain couldn't survive Little Round Top long enough to make a hero of himself, Dan Sickles would not have saved the Union and we would not be raising $$$ to keep the casino out of Gettysburg. In fact, Gettysburg could have been producing cars during WW II for all we know if the battle had not been fought there.

 

[whitworth]

Logistics, logistics and logistics

The Army of Northern Virginia had a three day window to stay in Gettysburg. It ran out of ammunition and it ran out of supplies for the horses and mules.
The AoP's whole logistic system was designed to hold the Confederates in place and prevent a penetration.
The Army of Northern Virginia could not fight for a week, but would have to move out of the area and then captured a good supply of ammunition, to continue.
By the time the ANV reached Gettysburg, a good portion of its army was running on "fumes."

Suspect any historian, who ignores or fails to review logistics at Gettysburg

 

[samgrant]

The Army of Northern Virginia had a three day window to stay in Gettysburg. It ran out of ammunition and it ran out of supplies for the horses and mules.
The AoP's whole logistic system was designed to hold the Confederates in place and prevent a penetration.
The Army of Northern Virginia could not fight for a week, but would have to move out of the area and then captured a good supply of ammunition, to continue.
By the time the ANV reached Gettysburg, a good portion of its army was running on "fumes."

And by the time it left it was ripe for the picking.

 

[r_moody]

I believe that Lee understood logistics very well and knew that he had to keep moving to support his invasion. What is often overlooked is the Unions rail system. It was better managed and of superior quality. As soon as the battle at GB started the rail system was moving tons of equipment to the army from Washington and Baltimore. Had there been a way to get soldiers on the rail Meade would have been able to show a stronger hand from the second day on.
As rich as Penn was at that time the land could not support and army of that size on its own for more than a couple of days. Long and cumbersome supply trains were necessary. Meade could stay but Lee had to go home.
If Lee had a problem it was because they were too spread out. He was fortunate that he was able to consolidate his forces in time.

Rick

 

[samgrant]

I believe that Lee understood logistics very well and knew that he had to keep moving to support his invasion. What is often overlooked is the Unions rail system. It was better managed and of superior quality. As soon as the battle at GB started the rail system was moving tons of equipment to the army from Washington and Baltimore. Had there been a way to get soldiers on the rail Meade would have been able to show a stronger hand from the second day on.
As rich as Penn was at that time the land could not support and army of that size on its own for more than a couple of days. Long and cumbersome supply trains were necessary. Meade could stay but Lee had to go home.
If Lee had a problem it was because they were too spread out. He was fortunate that he was able to consolidate his forces in time.

Rick

True, Herman Haupt quickly got the railroads in order for operations at Gburg.

 

[r_moody]

True, Herman Haupt quickly got the railroads in order for operations at Gburg.

IMO anyone who wants to understand the real power of proper Logistics has to study the north's railroad system and the men who ran it. Haupt was the best railroad man in the country.

The Navy and the Railroads gave the north a one-two punch that the south did not have.

Rick

 

[whitworth]

Gettysburg: Not the Place it seems

I'm of the belief that when discussing Gettysburg, we put it in its "honored" place of what did happen there. As is many wars and battles, it is not the place, but what happens at that place, as it did at Gettysburg.

Gettysburg had no real military value. It was no great supply or industrial center. I think Meade, the AoP had too much information on the logistical shortcomings of the Confederate army, not to attack.

For its time, Gettysburg was undefendable by the Confederates much more than four or five days. The Army of Northern Virginia lacked critical forage supplies for its mules and horses.

Historians ignore the fact that Gettysburg is not a place to find water. Amateurs study the battles; generals study the logistics.