Lee's Strategy in the Wilderness

[Carronade]

When Lee learned that the Federals were on the move, he correctly surmised that they would want to get through the Wilderness and fight in terrain where their full fighting power could be brought to bear. He therefore sought to pin them in the Wilderness with the forces he had immediately available, Ewells' and Hill's corps, and to engage more decisively when Longstreet's corps (and Anderson's division of Hill's) arrived.

He sent Ewell and Hill on separate roads, basically to press forward and see what happened. Ewell encountered the Union 5th Corps, with most of the rest of the Union forces in position to support, and deployed to fight. Hill meanwhile marched on several miles further east, only encountering small numbers of Union cavalry and skirmishers until the reached Brock Road. He ended up fighting a very severe battle against increasing numbers of Union soldiers.

The strategy of "advance to contact" ended up putting Hill in a very dangerous position; the Confederates were fortunate that the Union command did not take full advantage of it. They essentially fought two separate battles. They might have done better to have the two corps coordinate, either forming a continuous line or having Hill launch an attack on the flank of Warren's 5th Corps as it was engaged with Ewell.

 

[bdtex]

Great starter post for a thread. My recollection from the one good book that I've read on The Wilderness is that if you are talking about a continuous line connecting the Turnpike and Plank Road,even the Union forces were unable to do that because of the terrain in between the 2.

 

[luinrina]

having Hill launch an attack on the flank of Warren's 5th Corps as it was engaged with Ewell.

Wouldn't that have invited Hancock's II Corps to attack Hill's Corps in the rear if Hill's troops faced north? I doubt Longstreet's troops would have been up quickly enough to prevent Hill's Corps from being destroyed in such a maneuver.

 

[Carronade]

Wouldn't that have invited Hancock's II Corps to attack Hill's Corps in the rear if Hill's troops faced north? I doubt Longstreet's troops would have been up quickly enough to prevent Hill's Corps from being destroyed in such a maneuver.

Good point. I expect Hill or Lee would think to leave some Confederate troops covering the Orange Plank Road against such an eventuality, but by the end of the day they would be fighting Hancock's corps as well as Warren and Sedgewick. Of course that also happened historically. I don't think they would be any worse off in this scenario, and likely better.

Historically Hill's leading division, Heth's, was terribly exposed and fought a hard battle against several times its own numbers. The second division, Willcox's, was sent north to the Chewning Farm area which the Federals had abandoned, but was then pulled into the fighting on the Plank Road. I could envision something like this happening in our scenario, although it would probably be Heth's division attacking through Chewning Farm against Warren's flank and Willcox coming up to either support him or fight on the Plank Road, as the situation developed.

 

[Stone in the wall]

Ewell and Hills flanks were 3 or 4 miles apart separated by mostly impenetrable woods. Unlike the Federals who had the Brock Road in there rear connecting the Orange Plank Road and the Orange Turnpike.

 

[OpnCoronet]

They might have done better to have the two corps coordinate, either forming a continuous line or having Hill launch an attack on the flank of Warren's 5th Corps as it was engaged with Ewell.

Probably true, but, 'coordinate' seems to have been a difficult concept for many AoP Senior commanders. Which they often tended to forget in moments of battles/crises.

 

[rpkennedy]

Probably true, but, 'coordinate' seems to have been a difficult concept for many AoP Senior commanders. Which they often tended to forget in moments of battles/crises.

Coordination was a problem for both sides throughout the war. Nearly every single battle has an example of failed coordination.

Ryan

 

[OpnCoronet]

Coordination was a problem for both sides throughout the war. Nearly every single battle has an example of failed coordination.

Ryan

No argument here, but, in the civil war it seems to me that superior numbers could compensated for this general lack of real coordination. To me, it seems that was only the AoP, that could seldom derive any such advantage to compensate, in comparison with most other Union armies.

 

[zburkett]

The point that is missed in the Wilderness is "Wilderness". I live about ten miles from the battlefield, so have spent a good bit of time there. The short story is Lee knew Grant and wasn't about to let him out and face him on open ground. So he threw everything he had at him to trap him in the Wilderness. Even today we have the fog of battle with radios, overhead observation, etc. Imagine what it was like in brush so thick you couldn't see ten yards. There are no high points for flag communication. The brush was so thick it was difficult to pin point the direction of the sound of the guns. Commanders had to write out orders and hope a junior officer could deliver it to who it was addressed to. BTW there is a lot of second growth "Wilderness" on and around my farm. If any of you would like to try and walk through it get in touch with me.

 

[Carronade]

Probably true, but, 'coordinate' seems to have been a difficult concept for many AoP Senior commanders. Which they often tended to forget in moments of battles/crises.

True, though in this case I was thinking of Lee coordinating his two corps.

Expecting subordinates to coordinate on their own could be considered a dereliction by a commander. Rhea cites an incident as the AofP was advancing on Spotsylvania, in which Meade told Warren to coordinate with Sedgewick. Warren replied "I will not 'coordinate' with General Sedgewick. You may put Sedgewick in command, and he will give the orders and I will obey, or you may put me in command, and I will give the orders and Sedgewick will obey, but I will not 'coordinate' with General Sedgewick." I think Warren had a point.

One of my favorite sayings is from Napoleon, that he would rather entrust command of an army to one bad general than two good ones.

 

[Pat Answer]

No argument here, but, in the civil war it seems to me that superior numbers could compensated for this general lack of real coordination. To me, it seems that was only the AoP, that could seldom derive any such advantage to compensate, in comparison with most other Union armies.

OTOH sometimes numbers actually get in the way... that much more supplies and equipment to move around.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Expecting subordinates to coordinate on their own could be considered a dereliction by a commander. Rhea cites an incident as the AofP was advancing on Spotsylvania, in which Meade told Warren to coordinate with Sedgewick. Warren replied "I will not 'coordinate' with General Sedgewick. You may put Sedgewick in command, and he will give the orders and I will obey, or you may put me in command, and I will give the orders and Sedgewick will obey, but I will not 'coordinate' with General Sedgewick." I think Warren had a point.
One of my favorite sayings is from Napoleon, that he would rather entrust command of an army to one bad general than two good ones.

Your story concerning Warren is apropos to my point, it seems only in the AoP were so many senior commanders so confortable with dogged adherence to the letter of theory and not its spirit.

 

[trice]

The point that is missed in the Wilderness is "Wilderness". I live about ten miles from the battlefield, so have spent a good bit of time there. The short story is Lee knew Grant and wasn't about to let him out and face him on open ground. So he threw everything he had at him to trap him in the Wilderness. Even today we have the fog of battle with radios, overhead observation, etc. Imagine what it was like in brush so thick you couldn't see ten yards. There are no high points for flag communication. The brush was so thick it was difficult to pin point the direction of the sound of the guns. Commanders had to write out orders and hope a junior officer could deliver it to who it was addressed to. BTW there is a lot of second growth "Wilderness" on and around my farm. If any of you would like to try and walk through it get in touch with me.

Good description; I have only one quibble .

The area called The Wilderness in 1863-64 had been a successful iron-making area. Then in late 1830s and 1840s, technology changes and British competition drove most American firms like those into bankruptcy (this was one of the reasons we had the Panic of 1837). By the 1850s what had once been a thriving area was almost completely abandoned. Only one furnace remained in operation. The large workforce had moved away. The farms that had fed the workers dwindled towards nothingness.

The forest area had been widely cut to make charcoal to run the furnaces, year after year after year, for a period of a century. With the iron industry shut down and the workforce gone, with the farms largely abandoned or shrunk down. Woods grew back, but it largely 10-15 years of growth -- vines, brambles, bushes, small evergreens and trees, lots of thorns and stickers. Roads disappeared or became trails; only trails that were in use stayed clear. Probably looked a lot like that second-growth around your farm.

The quibble: Lee recalled that he had met Grant in Mexico, but could not recall anything in particular about him. (Lee had been a bright and shining star on Winfield Scott's staff, a hero of the war while Grant was just another lieutenant in an infantry regiment). Lee mentioned this when he met Grant at Appomattox. Lee did talk to Longstreet and others who knew Grant before the war about him in 1864, and had studied Grant's campaigns out in the West.

 

[trice]

OTOH sometimes numbers actually get in the way... that much more supplies and equipment to move around.

This is an important point to keep in mind looking at anything happening in The Wilderness. Hardly any way to move troops rapidly or in large masses. Maneuver was very difficult.

 

[rpkennedy]

This is an important point to keep in mind looking at anything happening in The Wilderness. Hardly any way to move troops rapidly or in large masses. Maneuver was very difficult.

That does seem to be a criticism that Rhea has of Grant over the course of his Overland books. On several occasions, he ordered a unit to move to a certain place but never accounted for how long it would take to get there and then complained how much time it took to move that unit. It seemed to drive A.A. Humphreys crazy.

Ryan

 

[Stone in the wall]

Unlike Grant, Lee had fought here before, and greatly out numbered, the ANV had still beaten Hooker. Lee knew The Wilderness would offset Grant's large advantage's in numbers of troops and artillery. Grant gets through into the open, these advantages come back.

 

[trice]

That does seem to be a criticism that Rhea has of Grant over the course of his Overland books. On several occasions, he ordered a unit to move to a certain place but never accounted for how long it would take to get there and then complained how much time it took to move that unit. It seemed to drive A.A. Humphreys crazy.

Ryan

Unlike Grant, Lee had fought here before, and greatly out numbered, the ANV had still beaten Hooker. Lee knew The Wilderness would offset Grant's large advantage's in numbers of troops and artillery. Grant gets through into the open, these advantages come back.

As noted, Grant had never seen the Wilderness before May of 1864. He had served in other places with difficult terrain, though: Mexico, Tennessee, Mississippi. He certainly was not unaware of what it took to move troops in less than ideal conditions.

Reading military history, I think it is normal to see high commanders ordering things done and subordinates complaining the orders are unrealistic. Napoleon said he would sometimes throw tantrums just so his staff and subordinates would hop-to-and-obey without hesitation or debate the next time he gave an order.

Early in the war, Grant had a reputation for being a bit too forgiving with subordinates. Sherman told Grant he was making a big mistake by giving Colonel Robert C. Murphy a 2nd chance in 1862 -- Grant suffered for it (Murphy surrendered Holly Springs, disobeying Grant's orders, when Earl Van Dorn took the place). By 1864-65, Grant was a lot more demanding and less forgiving.

On getting through the Wilderness:

• Lee attacked there for several reason, but he certainly knew that terrain would minimize the Union advantage in numbers and artillery while maximizing the qualities of the ANV.
• Grant and Meade understood what Lee did as well. Their march was designed to move through the Wilderness quickly, shift their LOC to the East, and press on towards Richmond.
• Lee knew that allowing Grant/Meade through the Wilderness easily was good for them and bad for him -- another reason to attack in the Wilderness.
• Grant and Meade would have been happy to get through the Wilderness without a fight -- but they were also more than willing to take Lee on. They had discussed it before starting and were on the same page -- so much that Meade ordered the turn to face Lee before notifying Grant that Lee was coming.
• Lee knew that he had repeatedly upset and overturned Union plans by hitting hard and fast: Seven Days, 2nd Manassas, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville. Faced with a commander he didn't know well, Lee wanted to give him a hard knock and see what Grant would do.

 

[Carronade]

That does seem to be a criticism that Rhea has of Grant over the course of his Overland books. On several occasions, he ordered a unit to move to a certain place but never accounted for how long it would take to get there and then complained how much time it took to move that unit. It seemed to drive A.A. Humphreys crazy.

Ryan

Was Grant being unrealistic, or was the AofP not as responsive as the troops he had commanded in the west?

 

[bdtex]

I live about ten miles from the battlefield

In what direction?

 

[zburkett]

South East. Close to where Rt. 20 and 522 cross.