2nd Manassas Lee's Lost Orders

[Andy Cardinal]

The Situation: On August 15, Lee arrives in Gordonsville. Jackson had fought at Cedar Mountain the week before and now Longstreet and his wing have joined him. Lee wants to strike at the "miscreant" Pope immediately.

Pope's army is positioned between the Rapidan and Rappahannock rivers. Lee believes he has not yet been reinforced, but knows he will be soon. Lee wants to strike before this happens. In reality, 2 divisions commanded by Reno have arrived in the area.

Currently Pope commands about 50,000 men.

The Plan: With Pope's army in the V formed by the two rivers, Lee believes he has the perfect opportunity to attack and hopefully destroy Pope before reinforcements arrive. The Rappahannock will make any retreat difficult. Although there are several fords, there are only 3 bridges available for Pope to use.

Lee plans to have cross the Rapidan at the Somerville and Raccoon fords to attack Pope's left. The cavalry will strike behind Pope and destroy the Rappahannock Station bridge.

Lee plans to attack on August 17.

Map from Return to Bull Run p. 36
​

The Delay: R. H. Anderson's division has not arrived and Fritz Lee's cavalry is still in route from Richmond. In fact, Fitz Lee's cavalry is only at Beaver Dam Station, 30 miles away.

Lee postpones the attack until the next day, August 18. Later, he postpones the movement again until late in the day in August 18.

Stuart goes to Verdiersville of the 17th to wait for Fitz Lee's arrival.

Toombs: With the cavalry not in place, Longstreet sends Toombs' brigade to guard Raccoon Ford.

Toombs is not with his men when Longstreet's orders arrive. He is visiting an old friend from Congress.

Colonel Benning carries out the order, sending 2 regiments to guard the ford.

Toombs returns to camp and is angry that the two regiments have been sent without his order. He orders them back to camp. Raccoon ford is unguarded.

The Raid: On August 17 Pope, who is concerned about the vulnerability of his left flank, orders Buford to send 2 regiments across the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford. Buford selects the 1st Michigan and 5th New York, under the command of Colonel Thornton Broadhead. They start at noon and cross the river just after Toombs ordered his two regiments to withdraw.

Thornton is lucky that he does not run into any Confederate infantry. His immediate objective is Verdiersville.

Stuart is sleeping in a house on Verdiersville and waiting for Fitz Lee's arrival. He sends Major Norman Fitzhugh to meet Lee. As Fitzhugh is riding down the Orange Plank Road in the dark, he rides into Broadhead's command and is taken prisoner. He is carrying two satchels.

Broadhead continues to Verdiersville, where Stuart barely escapes capture. (Hearing horses approaching, Stuart says, "Here is Fitz Lee now." Much to his surprise, it is Federal cavalry instead.) Broadhead's men famously capture Stuart's plumed hat.

Stuart and his staff flee the scene. Broadhead returns across the Rapidan.

The Result: Among the papers found on Major Fitzhugh is a copy of Lee's orders to Stuart which outline Lee's plan to destroy Pope's army. Warned, Pope retreats across the Rappahannock. Lee is unable to carry out his plan.

 

[Dead Parrott]

The Situation: On August 15, Lee arrives in Gordonsville. Jackson had fought at Cedar Mountain the week before and now Longstreet and his wing have joined him. Lee wants to strike at the "miscreant" Pope immediately.

Pope's army is positioned between the Rapidan and Rappahannock rivers. Lee believes he has not yet been reinforced, but knows he will be soon. Lee wants to strike before this happens. In reality, 2 divisions commanded by Reno have arrived in the area.

Currently Pope commands about 50,000 men.

The Plan: With Pope's army in the V formed by the two rivers, Lee believes he has the perfect opportunity to attack and hopefully destroy Pope before reinforcements arrive. The Rappahannock will make any retreat difficult. Although there are several fords, there are only 3 bridges available for Pope to use.

Lee plans to have cross the Rapidan at the Somerville and Raccoon fords to attack Pope's left. The cavalry will strike behind Pope and destroy the Rappahannock Station bridge.

Lee plans to attack on August 17.

View attachment 408306
Map from Return to Bull Run p. 36
​

The Delay: R. H. Anderson's division has not arrived and Fritz Lee's cavalry is still in route from Richmond. In fact, Fitz Lee's cavalry is only at Beaver Dam Station, 30 miles away.

Lee postpones the attack until the next day, August 18. Later, he postpones the movement again until late in the day in August 18.

Stuart goes to Verdiersville of the 17th to wait for Fitz Lee's arrival.

Toombs: With the cavalry not in place, Longstreet sends Toombs' brigade to guard Raccoon Ford.

Toombs is not with his men when Longstreet's orders arrive. He is visiting an old friend from Congress.

Colonel Benning carries out the order, sending 2 regiments to guard the ford.

Toombs returns to camp and is angry that the two regiments have been sent without his order. He orders them back to camp. Raccoon ford is unguarded.

The Raid: On August 17 Pope, who is concerned about the vulnerability of his left flank, orders Buford to send 2 regiments across the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford. Buford selects the 1st Michigan and 5th New York, under the command of Colonel Thornton Broadhead. They start at noon and cross the river just after Toombs ordered his two regiments to withdraw.

Thornton is lucky that he does not run into any Confederate infantry. His immediate objective is Verdiersville.

Stuart is sleeping in a house on Verdiersville and waiting for Fitz Lee's arrival. He sends Major Norman Fitzhugh to meet Lee. As Fitzhugh is riding down the Orange Plank Road in the dark, he rides into Broadhead's command and is taken prisoner. He is carrying two satchels.

Broadhead continues to Verdiersville, where Stuart barely escapes capture. (Hearing horses approaching, Stuart says, "Here is Fitz Lee now." Much to his surprise, it is Federal cavalry instead.) Broadhead's men famously capture Stuart's plumed hat.

Stuart and his staff flee the scene. Broadhead returns across the Rapidan.

The Result: Among the papers found on Major Fitzhugh is a copy of Lee's orders to Stuart which outline Lee's plan to destroy Pope's army. Warned, Pope retreats across the Rappahannock. Lee is unable to carry out his plan.

Is it terrible of me that my first thought on this was "now how exactly will Pope manage to screw THIS one up.....?" ....

 

[Stone in the wall]

Is it terrible of me that my first thought on this was "now how exactly will Pope manage to screw THIS one up.....?" ....

This might explain it; General Pope "From now on my headquarters will be in the saddle"
Southerners were tickled by this.
Unkown Confederate; "I hear General Pope says from now on his headquarters would be in the saddle. Ain't that where most people put their hind quarters?"

 

[Saphroneth]

It's kind of interesting to look at this in the light of SO 191. It's not all that uncommon at all to capture orders.


In the Second Bull Run campaigns for the Great Campaigns of the American Civil War board game series, they have a scenario where Lee launches as planned. It's a pretty tricky one for the Union - Longstreet has about 12 miles to go to get to Brandy Station, and McDowell and Sigel have further than that to get past Brandy Station. So a bit of a pell-mell retreat is in the cards.

 

[Stone in the wall]

Opportunities like this don't last forever. Why wait a day on Fitz Lee, and then another day so he can rest his horses? So Lee is short Anderson's Division and Fitz Lee's Brigade. He has enough troops for the flank attack on the 17th, or even the 18th even if Fitz can't burn 1 more bridge.

 

[Saphroneth]

Opportunities like this don't last forever. Why wait a day on Fitz Lee, and then another day so he can rest his horses? So Lee is short Anderson's Division and Fitz Lee's Brigade. He has enough troops for the flank attack on the 17th, or even the 18th even if Fitz can't burn 1 more bridge.

My guess is that it's because Lee doesn't want to fight massively superior numbers of enemy cavalry. The ORBAT I have gives a total of about 7,050 Union cavalry in the AoV on the 18th, and without F Lee it's only about 2,150 Confederate cav; F Lee basically doubles that.

He probably also felt it didn't matter much which day it kicked off as there wasn't anything to tip Pope off, though as things happened he was wrong there.

 

[Stone in the wall]

My guess is that it's because Lee doesn't want to fight massively superior numbers of enemy cavalry. The ORBAT I have gives a total of about 7,050 Union cavalry in the AoV on the 18th, and without F Lee it's only about 2,150 Confederate cav; F Lee basically doubles that.

He probably also felt it didn't matter much which day it kicked off as there wasn't anything to tip Pope off, though as things happened he was wrong there.

I thought by August 17 1862 the Cavalry had been expanded to 4 Brigades. But your right at 2nd Manassas I see only Lee and Robinson. Are the other 2 Brigades some where else?

 

[Saphroneth]

I thought by August 17 1862 the Cavalry had been expanded to 4 Brigades. But your right at 2nd Manassas I see only Lee and Robinson. Are the other 2 Brigades some where else?

Hampton is with DH Hill's reinforcing column and doesn't show up until just after the fighting. WH Lee's brigade is created in October.

 

[Stone in the wall]

Much Thanks, for clearing that up for me.

 

[Saphroneth]

I should make clear by the way that those numbers are effectives, not PFD, on both sides of that.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

It's kind of interesting to look at this in the light of SO 191. It's not all that uncommon at all to capture orders.

What makes SO 191 stand out is that they were found on the ground near a former enemy campsite, not on the body of a captured or dead officer or courier.

 

[Saphroneth]

What makes SO 191 stand out is that they were found on the ground near a former enemy campsite, not on the body of a captured or dead officer or courier.

True, though at the same time they were less current than other orders for that very reason - the four sets of captured orders in the NV campaign were:

- Lee's future attack plan
- Pope's dispatch book with his strength, dispositions, plans and expected reinforcements
- Pope's marching orders for the same day as extracted down by McDowell
- Pope's order to form line of battle that same day, to McDowell

While SO 191 was a movement order that effectively expired the day before it was found, though Lee's army was moving behind schedule.

 

[Saphroneth]

While I'm at it, by the way, my count in effectives is:

- Before any reinforcements arrive, but after Cedar Mountain

Jackson/Lee 26,685
Pope 45,218
Pope has a 69% advantage.

- After Longstreet arrives
Lee 58,540
Pope 45,218
Pope has a 23% disadvantage.

- After the PA Reserves and 9th Corps become available to Pope
Lee 58,540
Pope 59,157
Parity.

- After 3rd and 5th Corps become available to Pope
Lee 58,540
Pope 82,603
Pope has a 41% advantage.

And that's basically the strengths both fought the main manoeuvre portion of the campaign with. Pope had a 41% advantage going into it. (The exact % of Pope's advantage is slightly greater if you count the two Kanawha detachments and Piatt's bde, going up to a 48% advantage.)


Counting in addition the troops both sides had en route, if the fighting had not started until DH Hill, 2nd and 9th Corps arrived then it would have been
Lee 84,120
Pope 108,699
Giving Pope a 29% advantage.

 

[Stone in the wall]

Hampton is with DH Hill's reinforcing column and doesn't show up until just after the fighting. WH Lee's brigade is created in October.

Is there any logic to leaving your largest unit following in the rear? Such as F Lee here, or say A P Hill at Cedar Mountain and Sharpsburg. Stuart would have had 75% of his cavalry had he left another Brigade behind and kept F Lee's. Certainly D H Hill didn't need to have 1/2 the cavalry escort him thru friendly territory. Are were they in the hardest position to extract to move on?

 

[Saphroneth]

Is there any logic to leaving your largest unit following in the rear? Such as F Lee here, or say A P Hill at Cedar Mountain and Sharpsburg. Stuart would have had 75% of his cavalry had he left another Brigade behind and kept F Lee's. Certainly D H Hill didn't need to have 1/2 the cavalry escort him thru friendly territory. Are were they in the hardest position to extract to move on?

The basic set of decisions going on relates to McClellan at Harrisons Landing.


As of the end of July, McClellan is an active threat - there is word he may be about to be reinforced (Burnside at Fort Monroe) and so Lee does not allow much of his force to be transferred away from Richmond. Jackson is complaining about risk from Pope, so Lee transfers AP Hill to Jackson but requires AP Hill to be available to rush back down if need be (and forbids Jackson from going past Madison Court House). AP Hill is there to help strike Pope if Pope advances on Gordonsville.


In early August McClellan is still an active threat, though in reality McClellan has been ordered to begin running his forces down and his reinforcements have been transferred elsewhere.

On the 8th of August Lee approves Jackson making an offensive movement (this will be Cedar Mountain). He also begins shifting troops northwards, first Anderson moving north of the James and then from the 9th to the 11th Lee orders Longstreet's twelve brigades to Gordonsville.
This indicates that McClellan is now considered a passive threat. Gordonsville is still close enough for Longstreet to return if need be, but the amount of troops needed close to defend Richmond has diminished - Lee has heard McClellan might be leaving but is still worried that it might be a ruse.

On the 14th, McClellan starts marching down to embark (his army departs Harrisons Landing from the 14th to the 16th). DR Jones (the tail of Longstreet's column) reaches Gordonsville on the 15th.

Longstreet crosses the Rapidan on the 18th, the same day McClellan's troops begin embarking around Yorktown. On the 19th Lee orders DH Hill and McLaws to Hanover Court House, leaving just two divisions worth of troops in Richmond.

On the 23rd, Lee begins the process of calling DH hill, McLaws, and Walker to join him. That same day, McClellan himself leaves the Yorktown area, with three corps (5th, 3rd, 6th) having left before him.


So the answer is that it is intimately tied to the extent to which McClellan is still a threat. Lee phases his pull away from Richmond based on how easily and completely McClellan could return to strike him there.


If there's interest I can show how the troop transfer from Richmond to Northern Virginia happens in terms of estimated regiments to which task per day.

 

[Stone in the wall]

Excellent explanation, Thank You.

 

[Saphroneth]

As an aside I should note that the cavalry breakdown in effectives is:

~2300 with Jackson
~2100 with Longstreet
~1500 with DH Hill

So Hampton's cav is the smallest chunk.

It's also interesting to note that Pope had a huge cavalry allocation, with about 7,000 effectives to start with (about 1/7 of his force was cavalry). This is in comparison to the AoNV which had about 1/15 of the force being cavalry once it all arrived in Northern Virginia, or the AotP on the Peninsula which had about 1/16.

 

[Saphroneth]

Here's something else which I think is interesting, which is the transit time for formations from the Richmond area to Northern Virginia.


Confederate:

Longstreet's corps left Richmond on the 9th-11th with DR Jones only ordered on the 11th, and was complete at Gordonsville on the 15th. It was able to take part in crossing the Rapidan on what was originally planned to be the 17th, which means that a Confederate corps can - functionally speaking - get from "facing McClellan" to "facing Pope" in about a week (6-7 days).

Union:

McClellan's leading units, except for McCall, left Harrisons Landing (after much prep work and sending off of the sick) on the 14th, and began embarking at Yorktown on the 18th. Porter went first.
Discounting McCall (because that one went by ship from Harrisons and there was not the shipping to move many units that way) Porter's corps arrived on the 21st (for Morell and some of Sykes) and 22nd (the rest of Sykes). That's arriving at Aquia Landing, which is 30 miles from Kelly's Ford and thus 30 miles from the operational area.

This seems to me to indicate the problem - even if McClellan's units can start marching instantly, Lee can start moving his own troops from Richmond the same day (let's say it's the 14th). Longstreet can then contribute to Lee's offensive against Pope starting on the 21st, at which point all of the forces moved off the Peninsula are still landing.


I think this means that, unless Lee actively screwed up (i.e. did not detect McClellan abandoning Harrisons Landing for at least 1-2 days), then Pope was always going to have to withdraw from the Rapidan. There's simply no realistic way to guarantee getting the Peninsular troops to him before Lee can use Longstreet in an offensive.




The other problem is then that once both sides have shifted north Pope's situation is worse than it was at the time of Cedar Mountain. His force has, roughly, increased by 130% or so, but Lee's has increased by 200% (i.e. tripled).

 

[John S. Carter]

The Situation: On August 15, Lee arrives in Gordonsville. Jackson had fought at Cedar Mountain the week before and now Longstreet and his wing have joined him. Lee wants to strike at the "miscreant" Pope immediately.

Pope's army is positioned between the Rapidan and Rappahannock rivers. Lee believes he has not yet been reinforced, but knows he will be soon. Lee wants to strike before this happens. In reality, 2 divisions commanded by Reno have arrived in the area.

Currently Pope commands about 50,000 men.

The Plan: With Pope's army in the V formed by the two rivers, Lee believes he has the perfect opportunity to attack and hopefully destroy Pope before reinforcements arrive. The Rappahannock will make any retreat difficult. Although there are several fords, there are only 3 bridges available for Pope to use.

Lee plans to have cross the Rapidan at the Somerville and Raccoon fords to attack Pope's left. The cavalry will strike behind Pope and destroy the Rappahannock Station bridge.

Lee plans to attack on August 17.

View attachment 408306
Map from Return to Bull Run p. 36
​

The Delay: R. H. Anderson's division has not arrived and Fritz Lee's cavalry is still in route from Richmond. In fact, Fitz Lee's cavalry is only at Beaver Dam Station, 30 miles away.

Lee postpones the attack until the next day, August 18. Later, he postpones the movement again until late in the day in August 18.

Stuart goes to Verdiersville of the 17th to wait for Fitz Lee's arrival.

Toombs: With the cavalry not in place, Longstreet sends Toombs' brigade to guard Raccoon Ford.

Toombs is not with his men when Longstreet's orders arrive. He is visiting an old friend from Congress.

Colonel Benning carries out the order, sending 2 regiments to guard the ford.

Toombs returns to camp and is angry that the two regiments have been sent without his order. He orders them back to camp. Raccoon ford is unguarded.

The Raid: On August 17 Pope, who is concerned about the vulnerability of his left flank, orders Buford to send 2 regiments across the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford. Buford selects the 1st Michigan and 5th New York, under the command of Colonel Thornton Broadhead. They start at noon and cross the river just after Toombs ordered his two regiments to withdraw.

Thornton is lucky that he does not run into any Confederate infantry. His immediate objective is Verdiersville.

Stuart is sleeping in a house on Verdiersville and waiting for Fitz Lee's arrival. He sends Major Norman Fitzhugh to meet Lee. As Fitzhugh is riding down the Orange Plank Road in the dark, he rides into Broadhead's command and is taken prisoner. He is carrying two satchels.

Broadhead continues to Verdiersville, where Stuart barely escapes capture. (Hearing horses approaching, Stuart says, "Here is Fitz Lee now." Much to his surprise, it is Federal cavalry instead.) Broadhead's men famously capture Stuart's plumed hat.

Stuart and his staff flee the scene. Broadhead returns across the Rapidan.

The Result: Among the papers found on Major Fitzhugh is a copy of Lee's orders to Stuart which outline Lee's plan to destroy Pope's army. Warned, Pope retreats across the Rappahannock. Lee is unable to carry out his plan.

First , what was Fitzhugh doing carrying such vital papers, should they have been with Stuart since they were the plans for the battle? They were near Pope Then imagined if the Union cavalry had captured Stuart ! First Fitzhugh ,then Lee's favorite cavalry commander. Causes one to wonder how intelligent Stuart was esp. if one combines these events with Gettysburg and then Brandy Station. If ,large IF, Stuart had Sheridan's cavalry would it had mattered in the last years of the war, with Stuart not being killed .Toombs is a cause why politicians do not make good officers.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

First , what was Fitzhugh doing carrying such vital papers, should they have been with Stuart since they were the plans for the battle? They were near Pope Then imagined if the Union cavalry had captured Stuart ! First Fitzhugh ,then Lee's favorite cavalry commander. Causes one to wonder how intelligent Stuart was esp. if one combines these events with Gettysburg and then Brandy Station. If ,large IF, Stuart had Sheridan's cavalry would it had mattered in the last years of the war, with Stuart not being killed .Toombs is a cause why politicians do not make good officers.

Good question about Major Fitzhugh. I assume Stuart was sending a copy of the orders to Fitz Lee, but I don't really know.