Lead The Way! (#2) Answer!

[gunny]

The point is.. YOU have conflicting orders and you have yet to accomplish either one just yet.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

I'll stay with my answer... follow the brigade commander's order and attempt to support the regiment to the right (unless the division commander happens to be co-located with me and I therefore know that he has given his order with full knowledge of my local situation). But I still won't be happy about it.

 

[Jamieva]

I agree with Mark going up the hill leads you wide open to being cut off from your support. I go fufill the brigade commander's order

 

[cash]

Move to the sound of the guns.

 

[Pat Answer]

Additionally--to clarify....

You are APPROACHING the hill you have been ordered to, but not quite at it when you get the conflicting order. Don't know if this will change any thoughts, but making sure this is understood.

I'll modify my answer. The skirmishers are definitely ordered to cover a move to the right and not get drawn into any engagement for the hill itself. My request for additional support in the face of the divisional orders stands.

 

[Georgia Sixth]

I'm groping in the dark due to inadequate intelligence. My superiors are obviously idiots and aren't fighting the same battle. I will not suffer the consequences of their poor decisions. Besides, someone might get hurt if I follow either of their orders, so....I will do the only defensible thing and conduct a strategic withdrawal towards people I know are friendly.
Respectfully,
Joseph E. Johnston

 

[Pat Answer]

I'm groping in the dark due to inadequate intelligence. My superiors are obviously idiots and aren't fighting the same battle. I will not suffer the consequences of their poor decisions. Besides, someone might get hurt if I follow either of their orders, so....I will do the only defensible thing and conduct a strategic withdrawal towards people I know are friendly.
Respectfully,
Joseph E. Johnston

Now I still have a bit of a soft spot for Uncle Joe, but that's funny...

 

[NedBaldwin]

You are the commander of an infantry regiment. You are instructed by your BRIGADE commander to SUPPORT the regiment to your right in its advance.

Problem is: The regiment to your right is already disappearing in the woods and hills to your right-front as you are forming.

Just as you are about to step off, your DIVISION commander directs you to advance to a hill a half mile to your front. As you commence the advance toward the hill, you hear heavy firing to your right. Apparently, the regiment to your right is heavily engaged.

Following the last order received, you continue on toward the hill as the firing on your right reaches a crescendo.

Just as you are arriving at the hill, your BRIGADE commander has sent an order for you to close up to the SUPPORT of the regiment on your right (which is out of view).

What do you do?

1) give courier from commander a return message saying (a) trying to locate regiment on right, will support if able, and (b) Division commander directed you to hill -- does it need to be held? can other unit be sent to relieve?

2) Send aide to locate regiment to right and prepare regiment to follow once more is known

3) send skirmish line up hill to investigate

 

[Tom Elmore]

I would deploy two companies as skirmishers forward to the hill and, if unoccupied, would use that elevation to observe what is happening off to the right to inform my next move. If no useful information can be obtained, I would leave the two companies to hold the hilltop, then right wheel my remaining eight companies, advancing a little to the left of the firing in that direction, with the intent of arriving upon the enemy's flank, hopefully throwing it into confusion while relieving the pressure on the friendly regiment to my right.

 

[Union_Buff]

1. I would send a two-company skirmish line to the crest of the hill in front to see what is in front of me; if the report comes back that it is nothing, I would leave them there to observe the action occuring in the wooded area.

2. Secondly, I would send a courier back to the divisional commander with a note stating my intention to support the regiment in the woods, since it was the initial order given, but that I have sent skirmishers to the crest of the hill.

3. Taking my eight remaining companies, I would advance a bit further left from the firing and then try to either arrive at the enemy's flank or rear and throw him into total confusion and force him to disengage and retreat.

 

[Lost Cause]

The "best-laid plans," or in this case orders, typically go awry after the first bullet is fired. Proceed to the sound of gunfire and simultaneously recon the hill to observe the enemy position; determine the flank of the enemy and strike at vulnerabilities if terrain allow for it. Time would be of the essence.

 

[Youngblood]

Since im already approaching my hill, i would advance on the hill while sending a company to tie in with the outfit to the right and assess and report.
If i went fully to the right that would expose us all to either whats on the hill or what soon could be. IE an artillery battery.
PS these threads are GREAT !

 

[Lost Cause]

The point is.. YOU have conflicting orders and you have yet to accomplish either one just yet.

That is the issue, orders change as the situation changes. My after action report would hopefully explain why my regiment and I were late to the party.

 

[1SGDan]

That is the issue, orders change as the situation changes. My after action report would hopefully explain why my regiment and I were late to the party.

You have to survive to write an AAR.

 

[1SGDan]

I am so glad these types of threads seem to be taking on life. It is so much better to think than recite what you already know

 

[Lost Cause]

You have to survive to write an AAR.

Only when given the proper authorization to expire through the chain of command beforehand.

 

[Pvt.Shattuck]

This is an actual situation not wholly unlike the one you describe. From the OR of Col. Joel Seaver, 16 NY Vol Inf, Battle of Salem Church, May 3, 1863:

" I received an order from General Bartlett to march my regiment by the right flank to the right side of the road, which was immediately executed. Having gained the right of the Twenty-third New Jersey Volunteers, General Bartlett in person directed me to advance my regiment into the wood and attack the enemy's lines. The wood into which we advanced was a dense thicket of second growth and brush, about 30 yards in width, through which the men could advance but slowly and with the utmost difficulty .

As we entered the wood we encountered a most destructive fire, under which we succeeded in gaining the farther edge of the wood, finding ourselves less than 50 yards from the enemy, we were protected by breastworks and a hedge-row apparently along the side of a road running at right angles with the Plank road. Immediately on our left flank stood Salem Church, a brick edifice, in which was posted a large body of the enemy, which opened a harassing and deadly fire from its windows, and from port-holes in its sides made by removing the brick. "

"Soon after we had gained this position, the regiment on our left retired precipitately, and the enemy advanced along the road and on our left until they had passed my left flank and were gaining my rear. Finding it impossible to hold my position with the line broken on my left, with on one on my right, and without any supporting line, I ordered it my command to fall back slowly.

No sooner had my line commenced to move to the rear than the enemy sprang forward and poured in a hot fire, under which I found it impossible to rally the men with success. I accordingly fell back beyond the range of their guns, where I rallied the regiment under its colors, and proceeded to join the brigade, which had taken its position on the ground near where our line of battle had been first formed."

The regiment was decimated- 24 killed, 12 mortally wounded, 101 wounded, and 17 captured, including my GG Grandfather.

 

[gunny]

ANSWER:

Of course there are an endless number of options as to what you as the commander could or would do, but the point here is concerning ACTION.

ACTION vs. INACTION or DECISIVENESS vs. INDECISION.

This has been a play on a large event that I broke down to a much smaller level to perfectly camouflage the real scenario that played out at DIVISION, CORPS and ARMY level on November 29, 1864. One of my faves!

You played the part of DIVISION commander: Maj. Gen. William B. Bate. He was given orders from his CORPS commander (Frank Cheatham) to advance to the support of Pat Cleburne's division and crush the enemy force confronting Cleburne.

As Cheatham went to place his next division under J. C. Brown into position, HOOD arrived at Bate's position as he was stepping off. Hood directed Bate to move to the pike and sweep toward Columbia (our hill represented this mission).

As Bate moved out and came within sight of the pike, his skirmishers actually commanding it, he got the order from his CORPS commander (Cheatham) to join Cleburne's left - as he had been heavily engaged and was forming for yet another attack.

In light of the two CONTRADICTORY orders, Bate failed miserably. He failed to act at all. Instead of closing up on Cleburne's left (as instructed by courier) or continuing to the pike and sweeping toward Columbia - Bate sat paralyzed as the day faded away.

Soon, darkness cloaked the field, and Bate's inactivity had played a crucial role in the outcome of events.

I was always taught to follow the LAST order received. You - as a commander may be unaware of recent changes on the field, and prompt action will always maintain initiative.

If Bate merely ACTED to accomplish ONE of the two orders he received, the outcome of events may have been very different.

So... the only way you failed this mission is if you failed to ACT.

DECISIVENESS and ACTION are keys to victory on any battlefield. It may not be the perfect action, but it IS action!!

Discipline is described as INSTANT and WILLING obedience to orders. There is the old saying that when your sergeant says duck - you DUCK! You don't know why your ducking, but your life may be saved. Do it and do it fast!

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

I'm reminded of a bit in a book I read once... it's not necessary to go into details, and I'm paraphrasing a bit, but the basic situation was that military officer A had made an ethical decision that got him into trouble with his commander and talked about it with officer B (a higher-ranking officer but not in A's chain of command):

A: Did I do the right thing?

B: You did a right thing. Maybe not the best of all possible right things. A week from now, or perhaps a month, you may think of a better way to handle it; but you acted as you saw fit at the time when action was needed. It's not a good idea to second-guess the man on the scene.

 

[rhettbutler1865]

I would opt for supporting my comrades under fire, might catch the flank of those in contact with them. Eyes on the terrain would assist in this decision. Taking the high ground is an old military axiom and taught to every officer of that era, might be hard to overcome such training and indoctrination but I would still support my comrades on my right. Not doing so might lead to my flank be exposed or finding myself isolated on that very same high ground.

I'm in agreement with this plan...support my comrades. And I agree--they were taught--high ground, high ground!