Johnston's recon

speedylee

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Aug 15, 2017
I am looking for responses to the following, so please make your thoughts known:

The question is: What route did Confederate Captain Samuel R. Johnston take at Gettysburg when he was ordered to recon the left flank of the federal line on Cemetery Ridge at about four in the morning on July 2, 1863?

The eminent historian Noah Andre Trudeau wrote a brilliant volume: The Battle of Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage. In that book Trudeau says Johnston reached the Sherfy peach orchard before turning south and heading for the Round Tops.[1] I have not found any quote from Johnston where he specifically claims to have reached the Sherfy peach orchard.

Many students of the battle scoff at the idea that Johnston reached that peach orchard without being discovered by Union scouts or pickets. I am tempted to give Johnston the benefit of the doubt. It is possible that Johnston and the men with him approached the Sherfy property. Remember that Daniel Sickles had not advanced his line by the hour of Johnston’s recon ride. It was still mostly dark at the time when Johnston might have reached the Sherfy peach trees along the Emmitsburg Road. It is possible that he reached the area in question during the outbound leg of his recon without getting caught.

Most of the Union soldiers in the area at that time were not bedded down on the Emmitsburg Road or anywhere near it. They were much closer to the Taneytown Road. The rolling topography and darkness would have made it impossible for Johnston to see conditions along the Taneytown Road from the locations he wrote that he reached. Johnston could have neared the Sherfy land that morning without any Union look-outs discovering the group.

Was it possible for a small group of Confederates to get near the Sherfy land without getting caught? Yes. In fact, I believe Johnston did reach a peach orchard that morning on the outbound leg of his recon ride. But I believe he reached the peach trees on the property belonging to the Bushman family farm along Warfield Ridge. The property is along today’s West Confederate Avenue. From there, Johnston and his small party rode to Round Top and skirted the base of Little Round Top before turning back.

Johnston reported that the only Union soldiers he saw were in a four-man party that was riding north along the Emmitsburg Road. Those men were seen as Johnston and his men cautiously waited before crossing the Road on the way to report to Lee.

In a June 27, 1892 letter to McLaws, Johnston wrote, “It was about 4 AM when I started out, my general route was about the same that General Longstreet took when he made his march. I crossed the creek on the same bridge that he did and turned left at once and turned to the left at once and got on the ridge where you subsequently (got a view of the enemy) … following that ridge in the direction of the round top, where I had a commanding view, then (unclear on handwritten note) road along the base of round top beyond the ground that was occupied by General Hood, and where there was later a cavalry fight. When I thought I had gone far enough, I turned back, of course moving with caution, and when I again got in sight of the Emmettburg (Johnston’s spelling) Road I saw three or four troopers moving slowly and very cautiously in the direction of Gettysburg (north, LE). … I crossed the bridge and took the most direct route regardless of fences to where I had left General Lee.”[2]

The route Longstreet’s column took later that day did not travel to the Sherfy Peach Orchard (not until after the fighting started, anyway). When Longstreet reached Seminary Ridge and deployed his men, he could probably see the Sherfy peach orchard in the distance. By that time, Dan Sickles had advanced his division to the position in the Sherfy peach orchard. It should be noted here that even if Johnston did ride to the Sherfy property on his recon ride, he could not have seen Sickles’ force. Sickles did not advance until long after daylight.

The bridge Johnston wrote about twice is probably the bridge on today’s Millerstown Road near where the road intersects today’s West Confederate Avenue, not far from the modern-day Eisenhower tower.

I believe Johnston and his party turned right shortly after crossing that bridge and headed in a southerly direction. They continued south after passing the Bushman farm before eventually turning left and heading in an easterly direction. The route would have taken them toward the Round Tops. Approaching from the Confederate side of the hill, that is to say from the west, they would have been less likely to encounter federal soldiers. This was in the area where General John B. Hood’s men would later begin their attack. Hood was wounded on a dirt lane that led from the Bushman farm to the Slyder farm and it is very possible that Johnston followed that same little lane toward the Round Tops.

In a June 28, 1875 letter to James Longstreet, Hood wrote that, “… about twenty minutes after reaching the peach orchard I was severely wounded in the arm, and borne from the field.”[3]

Johnston wrote of having a ‘commanding view’ while on ‘round top.’ The hill we now call Big Round Top had more trees on its north-west facing slopes than did what we call Little Round Top. The most commanding view from either hill is what we call the face of Little Round Top. If Johnston did not ride up the side of Little Round Top, he certainly recognized the potential for watching the battlefield from there.[4]

At the point of the recon where the Johnston group was around the Round Tops, the sun was starting to make itself known.[5] Johnston and his men had to leave the area. He described skirting the base of “round top,” and his desire to get back on the friendly side of the (correctly) Emmitsburg Road. Then came the forced delay while the small number of Union riders went slowly down the road. Later, when Lee asked Johnston directly whether he reached the Little Round Top/Big Round Top area, Johnston answered that he had done so. I believe he did.

The description of crossing the bridge that Johnston said Longstreet’s march later crossed is an important note. Longstreet’s march should have crossed that same little bridge as his men moved to get into position along Seminary Ridge to begin their attack.

To ride south on Emmitsburg Road from the Sherfy property that night probably would have resulted in Johnston being discovered by Union troops. But riding south along Warfield Ridge, passing the Bushman farm and its orchard, would have meant staying within the safe confines of the Confederate lines for an extended period. It would lead to the safer side of Big Round Top and give Johnston a familiar path back to his own lines.

I believe that’s the path he took. Johnston’s words quoted here were written about thirty years after the war. Johnston did not leave a record of the recon ride that was written near the time of the battle. The letters I have read are type-written transcriptions of his hand-written letters in answer to various letters asking about his ride that night. Since that time, the version of events set forth in those letters have gone under great scrutiny.

Can I prove the assertion above? No. But the evidence leads me there. Others, including Trudeau, might disagree. But I believe my summation of the events fits the known facts – that Johnston was ordered to make a recon, he did so without getting caught and that he reported to Lee that he reached the Round Tops – agrees with what Johnston wrote himself.

One final point: When Gerry Prokopovich was nice enough to interview me about my Chickamauga book for his podcast, he asked me why it mattered whether we knew the exact series of events during the fighting on Horseshoe Ridge. It was a great question and the same question could be asked here. Does it really matter what path Johnston’s recon party took at Gettysburg around dawn on July 2, 1863?

Yes, it does matter, because historic accuracy matters.


[1] Trudeau, Noah Andre; The Battle of Gettysburg: A testing of Courage. Of all the books the author has read about Gettysburg, this book stands out for its excellence. A great read.
[2] Samuel R. Johnston letter to McLaws. The author found a type-written transcription of the letter in the Gettysburg National Military Park Visitor Center archives.
[3] John B. Hood letter to James Longstreet, June 28, 1875. The author found a type-written transcription of the letter in the Gettysburg National Military Park Visitors Center archives.
[4] Samuel R. Johnston letter to McLaws. The author found a type-written transcription of the letter in the Gettysburg National Military Park Visitors Center archives.
[5] Johnston’s ride began around four in the morning. He reported to Lee about three hours later. Sunrise on July 2 is typically ten to fifteen minutes before six o’clock in the morning at Gettysburg.
 
Here is my take on it from an excerpt of my upcoming book. Mind you it hasn't been edited yet and I'm not the best writer but the information is there. The manuscript is with the publisher now, just finished it last week.
 

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Wouldn't he have run into the troops from Buford's division though?
Buford was at the Peach Orchard to anchor the Union left and to protect the Emittsburg Road, which was still being used to move Union troops and trains (ammo etc.) to Gettysburg the morning of July 2nd. I doubt he could have actually reached to Peach Orchard. He may have seen it from a safe distance.
 
I am looking for responses to the following, so please make your thoughts known:

The question is: What route did Confederate Captain Samuel R. Johnston take at Gettysburg when he was ordered to recon the left flank of the federal line on Cemetery Ridge at about four in the morning on July 2, 1863?

The eminent historian Noah Andre Trudeau wrote a brilliant volume: The Battle of Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage. In that book Trudeau says Johnston reached the Sherfy peach orchard before turning south and heading for the Round Tops.[1] I have not found any quote from Johnston where he specifically claims to have reached the Sherfy peach orchard.

Many students of the battle scoff at the idea that Johnston reached that peach orchard without being discovered by Union scouts or pickets. I am tempted to give Johnston the benefit of the doubt. It is possible that Johnston and the men with him approached the Sherfy property. Remember that Daniel Sickles had not advanced his line by the hour of Johnston’s recon ride. It was still mostly dark at the time when Johnston might have reached the Sherfy peach trees along the Emmitsburg Road. It is possible that he reached the area in question during the outbound leg of his recon without getting caught.

Most of the Union soldiers in the area at that time were not bedded down on the Emmitsburg Road or anywhere near it. They were much closer to the Taneytown Road. The rolling topography and darkness would have made it impossible for Johnston to see conditions along the Taneytown Road from the locations he wrote that he reached. Johnston could have neared the Sherfy land that morning without any Union look-outs discovering the group.

Was it possible for a small group of Confederates to get near the Sherfy land without getting caught? Yes. In fact, I believe Johnston did reach a peach orchard that morning on the outbound leg of his recon ride. But I believe he reached the peach trees on the property belonging to the Bushman family farm along Warfield Ridge. The property is along today’s West Confederate Avenue. From there, Johnston and his small party rode to Round Top and skirted the base of Little Round Top before turning back.

Johnston reported that the only Union soldiers he saw were in a four-man party that was riding north along the Emmitsburg Road. Those men were seen as Johnston and his men cautiously waited before crossing the Road on the way to report to Lee.

In a June 27, 1892 letter to McLaws, Johnston wrote, “It was about 4 AM when I started out, my general route was about the same that General Longstreet took when he made his march. I crossed the creek on the same bridge that he did and turned left at once and turned to the left at once and got on the ridge where you subsequently (got a view of the enemy) … following that ridge in the direction of the round top, where I had a commanding view, then (unclear on handwritten note) road along the base of round top beyond the ground that was occupied by General Hood, and where there was later a cavalry fight. When I thought I had gone far enough, I turned back, of course moving with caution, and when I again got in sight of the Emmettburg (Johnston’s spelling) Road I saw three or four troopers moving slowly and very cautiously in the direction of Gettysburg (north, LE). … I crossed the bridge and took the most direct route regardless of fences to where I had left General Lee.”[2]

The route Longstreet’s column took later that day did not travel to the Sherfy Peach Orchard (not until after the fighting started, anyway). When Longstreet reached Seminary Ridge and deployed his men, he could probably see the Sherfy peach orchard in the distance. By that time, Dan Sickles had advanced his division to the position in the Sherfy peach orchard. It should be noted here that even if Johnston did ride to the Sherfy property on his recon ride, he could not have seen Sickles’ force. Sickles did not advance until long after daylight.

The bridge Johnston wrote about twice is probably the bridge on today’s Millerstown Road near where the road intersects today’s West Confederate Avenue, not far from the modern-day Eisenhower tower.

I believe Johnston and his party turned right shortly after crossing that bridge and headed in a southerly direction. They continued south after passing the Bushman farm before eventually turning left and heading in an easterly direction. The route would have taken them toward the Round Tops. Approaching from the Confederate side of the hill, that is to say from the west, they would have been less likely to encounter federal soldiers. This was in the area where General John B. Hood’s men would later begin their attack. Hood was wounded on a dirt lane that led from the Bushman farm to the Slyder farm and it is very possible that Johnston followed that same little lane toward the Round Tops.

In a June 28, 1875 letter to James Longstreet, Hood wrote that, “… about twenty minutes after reaching the peach orchard I was severely wounded in the arm, and borne from the field.”[3]

Johnston wrote of having a ‘commanding view’ while on ‘round top.’ The hill we now call Big Round Top had more trees on its north-west facing slopes than did what we call Little Round Top. The most commanding view from either hill is what we call the face of Little Round Top. If Johnston did not ride up the side of Little Round Top, he certainly recognized the potential for watching the battlefield from there.[4]

At the point of the recon where the Johnston group was around the Round Tops, the sun was starting to make itself known.[5] Johnston and his men had to leave the area. He described skirting the base of “round top,” and his desire to get back on the friendly side of the (correctly) Emmitsburg Road. Then came the forced delay while the small number of Union riders went slowly down the road. Later, when Lee asked Johnston directly whether he reached the Little Round Top/Big Round Top area, Johnston answered that he had done so. I believe he did.

The description of crossing the bridge that Johnston said Longstreet’s march later crossed is an important note. Longstreet’s march should have crossed that same little bridge as his men moved to get into position along Seminary Ridge to begin their attack.

To ride south on Emmitsburg Road from the Sherfy property that night probably would have resulted in Johnston being discovered by Union troops. But riding south along Warfield Ridge, passing the Bushman farm and its orchard, would have meant staying within the safe confines of the Confederate lines for an extended period. It would lead to the safer side of Big Round Top and give Johnston a familiar path back to his own lines.

I believe that’s the path he took. Johnston’s words quoted here were written about thirty years after the war. Johnston did not leave a record of the recon ride that was written near the time of the battle. The letters I have read are type-written transcriptions of his hand-written letters in answer to various letters asking about his ride that night. Since that time, the version of events set forth in those letters have gone under great scrutiny.

Can I prove the assertion above? No. But the evidence leads me there. Others, including Trudeau, might disagree. But I believe my summation of the events fits the known facts – that Johnston was ordered to make a recon, he did so without getting caught and that he reported to Lee that he reached the Round Tops – agrees with what Johnston wrote himself.

One final point: When Gerry Prokopovich was nice enough to interview me about my Chickamauga book for his podcast, he asked me why it mattered whether we knew the exact series of events during the fighting on Horseshoe Ridge. It was a great question and the same question could be asked here. Does it really matter what path Johnston’s recon party took at Gettysburg around dawn on July 2, 1863?

Yes, it does matter, because historic accuracy matters.


[1] Trudeau, Noah Andre; The Battle of Gettysburg: A testing of Courage. Of all the books the author has read about Gettysburg, this book stands out for its excellence. A great read.
[2] Samuel R. Johnston letter to McLaws. The author found a type-written transcription of the letter in the Gettysburg National Military Park Visitor Center archives.
[3] John B. Hood letter to James Longstreet, June 28, 1875. The author found a type-written transcription of the letter in the Gettysburg National Military Park Visitors Center archives.
[4] Samuel R. Johnston letter to McLaws. The author found a type-written transcription of the letter in the Gettysburg National Military Park Visitors Center archives.
[5] Johnston’s ride began around four in the morning. He reported to Lee about three hours later. Sunrise on July 2 is typically ten to fifteen minutes before six o’clock in the morning at Gettysburg.
Sunrise on July 2, 1863 at Gettysburg came at 4:35 a.m. (calculated for latitude 39 degrees, 50 minutes N and longitude 77 degrees, 15 minutes west). There were no time zones then and high noon occurred when the sun passed the local meridian.

Pendleton's group also started out around 4 a.m., when Venus was a visible morning "star."
 
... Many students of the battle scoff at the idea that Johnston reached that peach orchard without being discovered by Union scouts or pickets. I am tempted to give Johnston the benefit of the doubt. It is possible that Johnston and the men with him approached the Sherfy property. Remember that Daniel Sickles had not advanced his line by the hour of Johnston’s recon ride. It was still mostly dark at the time when Johnston might have reached the Sherfy peach trees along the Emmitsburg Road. It is possible that he reached the area in question during the outbound leg of his recon without getting caught.

Most of the Union soldiers in the area at that time were not bedded down on the Emmitsburg Road or anywhere near it. They were much closer to the Taneytown Road. The rolling topography and darkness would have made it impossible for Johnston to see conditions along the Taneytown Road from the locations he wrote that he reached. Johnston could have neared the Sherfy land that morning without any Union look-outs discovering the group.

Was it possible for a small group of Confederates to get near the Sherfy land without getting caught? Yes. In fact, I believe Johnston did reach a peach orchard that morning on the outbound leg of his recon ride. But I believe he reached the peach trees on the property belonging to the Bushman family farm along Warfield Ridge. The property is along today’s West Confederate Avenue. From there, Johnston and his small party rode to Round Top and skirted the base of Little Round Top before turning back...
As for things going bump in the night of July 1 - July 2, I would recommend Pfanz's account of the march of Humphries' division of the Third Corps and how Humphries himself almost rode undetected into the lines of McLaws sleeping division near the Black Horse Tavern.
 
Some scientists attempted to tell correct time by longitude. For every 10 degrees Long you added/subtracted 8 minutes. So 12 noon in Boston was 11:52 in NYC. I'm pretty sure the average farmer didn't bother himself with this. No daylight saving either. A couple of week's ago my wife and I were at Gettysburg. We were on LRT around 7PM and I said the rebs had plenty of daylight left for their attack. My wife turned to me and said," There was no daylight savings back then."
 
Humphreys was within 200 yards of Wilcox's picket when he reached Black Horse Tavern. How the pickets didn't hear his artillery moving is hard to fathom. He did order complete silence on the march but still...
 
My take on it is that Johnston did not go near the Peach Orchard. The Federal skirmish line, noted by both Federals and Confederates alike, was along the Emmitsburg Road. Buford was conducting patrols from there and the Rose Farm vicinity. There was simply too much going on to get close enough and honestly, he didn't need to in order to accomplish his mission, which was to reconnoiter the Federal left.

As to where he went, I agree with your general route. Johnston wrote that he rode "along the ridge" McLaws formed on, suggesting he arrived on Seminary Ridge on the Millerstown Road, then south along Seminary Ridge. I believe he arrived on LRT and did, in fact, see Sickles. There's no account of the report he gave to Lee and even with fog, it's hard to imagine he didn't notice 10,000 Federals in camp, with another corps arriving north of them (2nd Corps). He also noted "a large force" of Federal infantry approaching along the Emmitsburg Road. However, even the Third Corps officers admitted there were no pickets south of their position.

I'd humbly suggest checking out Gettysburg Magazine No. 61 for a more detailed analysis of my own thoughts, if you're interested.
 
The 63rd Pennsylvania occupied the Peach Orchard intersection of the Emmitsburg and Millerstown (aka Wheatfield) roads by about 10 p.m. on July 1 through the late afternoon of July 2.

As for the location of Union cavalry in that vicinity, Graham's brigade passed troops close by their left while moving up the Emmitsburg road between the Sherfy and Klingle residences soon after sunset on July 1. Some accounts from Graham's brigade actually referred to them as Confederates who just watched them pass by, but that's an incredulous observation. Perhaps it was just the dim light. I would guess they were Devin's troopers. Thus to avoid both the 63 PA and Buford's cavalry would require crossing the Emmitsburg road further south.
 
As for things going bump in the night of July 1 - July 2, I would recommend Pfanz's account of the march of Humphries' division of the Third Corps and how Humphries himself almost rode undetected into the lines of McLaws sleeping division near the Black Horse Tavern.
I have stuck to reading original letters and accounts for this project, but thanks for your response.
 
The 63rd Pennsylvania occupied the Peach Orchard intersection of the Emmitsburg and Millerstown (aka Wheatfield) roads by about 10 p.m. on July 1 through the late afternoon of July 2.

As for the location of Union cavalry in that vicinity, Graham's brigade passed troops close by their left while moving up the Emmitsburg road between the Sherfy and Klingle residences soon after sunset on July 1. Some accounts from Graham's brigade actually referred to them as Confederates who just watched them pass by, but that's an incredulous observation. Perhaps it was just the dim light. I would guess they were Devin's troopers. Thus to avoid both the 63 PA and Buford's cavalry would require crossing the Emmitsburg road further south.
Thanks for your reply. It reads as though you agree with my thoughts, at least in general.
 
My take on it is that Johnston did not go near the Peach Orchard. The Federal skirmish line, noted by both Federals and Confederates alike, was along the Emmitsburg Road. Buford was conducting patrols from there and the Rose Farm vicinity. There was simply too much going on to get close enough and honestly, he didn't need to in order to accomplish his mission, which was to reconnoiter the Federal left.

As to where he went, I agree with your general route. Johnston wrote that he rode "along the ridge" McLaws formed on, suggesting he arrived on Seminary Ridge on the Millerstown Road, then south along Seminary Ridge. I believe he arrived on LRT and did, in fact, see Sickles. There's no account of the report he gave to Lee and even with fog, it's hard to imagine he didn't notice 10,000 Federals in camp, with another corps arriving north of them (2nd Corps). He also noted "a large force" of Federal infantry approaching along the Emmitsburg Road. However, even the Third Corps officers admitted there were no pickets south of their position.

I'd humbly suggest checking out Gettysburg Magazine No. 61 for a more detailed analysis of my own thoughts, if you're interested.
Thanks for your response. I stuck to reading original letters and accounts for this project.
 
As for things going bump in the night of July 1 - July 2, I would recommend Pfanz's account of the march of Humphries' division of the Third Corps and how Humphries himself almost rode undetected into the lines of McLaws sleeping division near the Black Horse Tavern.
Thanks for your reply.
 
I have stuck to reading original letters and accounts for this project, but thanks for your response.
Those sure are fascinating letters Johnston left us.

I would submit that any interpretation on this recon probably needs to start with what Lee meant by "there".

You also should take a closer look at this whole sunrise issue, and what time sunrise was. As noted by two earlier posts, there was no daylight savings back then.

As for the GB Mag 61 article mentioned above, I highly recommend it. The author stuck to interpreting primary sources, just like you're trying to do here - and more to the point, proposed the same route that you are suggesting Johnston took in your post above.
 
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My take on it is that Johnston did not go near the Peach Orchard. The Federal skirmish line, noted by both Federals and Confederates alike, was along the Emmitsburg Road. Buford was conducting patrols from there and the Rose Farm vicinity. There was simply too much going on to get close enough and honestly, he didn't need to in order to accomplish his mission, which was to reconnoiter the Federal left.

As to where he went, I agree with your general route. Johnston wrote that he rode "along the ridge" McLaws formed on, suggesting he arrived on Seminary Ridge on the Millerstown Road, then south along Seminary Ridge. I believe he arrived on LRT and did, in fact, see Sickles. There's no account of the report he gave to Lee and even with fog, it's hard to imagine he didn't notice 10,000 Federals in camp, with another corps arriving north of them (2nd Corps). He also noted "a large force" of Federal infantry approaching along the Emmitsburg Road. However, even the Third Corps officers admitted there were no pickets south of their position.

I'd humbly suggest checking out Gettysburg Magazine No. 61 for a more detailed analysis of my own thoughts, if you're interested.
I've read your article in Gettysburg Magazine and you offer compelling thoughts of Johnston's recon and perhaps even observing the 3rd Corps.
 
I've read your article in Gettysburg Magazine and you offer compelling thoughts of Johnston's recon and perhaps even observing the 3rd Corps.
Agreed. The GB mag articles by Dave Powell and Bill Hyde, and the GB Seminar paper by Karlton Smith are all well worth reading, but I believe Allen Thompson's recent GB mag piece provides the most thorough analysis on this topic.
 
Thanks for your response. I stuck to reading original letters and accounts for this projec

Thanks for your response. I stuck to reading original letters and accounts for this project.
As did I. It seemed as though you were looking for additional views.
Agreed. The GB mag articles by Dave Powell and Bill Hyde, and the GB Seminar paper by Karlton Smith are all well worth reading, but I believe Allen Thompson's recent GB mag piece provides the most thorough analysis on this topic.
Agreed! I read all three as part of my research. Smith comes closest to my own interpretation, but it is just interpretation at this point. All three are well reasoned and deserve reading and consideration.
 
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