Johnston hold Snake Creek Gap

[Luke Freet]

From all I've heard on the Atlanta Campaign, probably the one point I've seen almost everyone point to as a campaign winning move was to not leave Snake Creek Gap exposed to McPherson's flanking maneuver, letting Sherman threaten Johnston's line of retreat and forcing him to abandon his seemingly impregnable line on Rocky Face Ridge.

Let us say he left a decent division (either Cleburne's or William Walker's divisions, which were Johnston's reserves at Dalton (Chastel, 130)) To hold the gap. Can McPherson break through with the forces at hand? How is the terrain in the area? Does Sherman have another option to outflank Johnston that is practicable?

 

[Luke Freet]

For reference, this would be the confederate returns for just prior to the Campaign. Read the effective total present, and Walker's and Cleburne's divisions number about 5200 men each, to give some perspective on the strength of each command.

In addition I'll include Stephen Davis' map from "A Long and Bloody Task", page 10, to show the general area I am speaking of.

 

[NedBaldwin]

The gap itself is tight terrain. But apparently there were other ways through.
- In October 1864 when Sherman was chasing Hood in the same area, he sent part of his command through "redwine cove" to go over the ridge there
- just south of snake creek gap there is a road to sugar valley from the valley to the west know as the pocket
Look at https://www.battlefields.org/learn/maps/map-resaca-and-vicinity
You can see both roads im referring to.

But lets say he could cover all those approaches - Walker could advance to the west end of the gap and thereby cover the approaches to all three routes...

I think the danger is that now a division was sitting out isolated, far from the telegraph and rail line, as several US corps moved on it. And when would it be placed there? Before the campaign started?

 

[Luke Freet]

The gap itself is tight terrain. But apparently there were other ways through.
- In October 1864 when Sherman was chasing Hood in the same area, he sent part of his command through "redwine cove" to go over the ridge there
- just south of snake creek gap there is a road to sugar valley from the valley to the west know as the pocket
Look at https://www.battlefields.org/learn/maps/map-resaca-and-vicinity
You can see both roads im referring to.

But lets say he could cover all those approaches - Walker could advance to the west end of the gap and thereby cover the approaches to all three routes...

I think the danger is that now a division was sitting out isolated, far from the telegraph and rail line, as several US corps moved on it. And when would it be placed there? Before the campaign started?

Presumably so. Johnston had months to prepare for Sherman's offensive. He could have pre planned this stuff well ahead of the start of the Campaign in May.
Keep in mind as well, Polk's Corps, 2 formed divisions under Loring and French and 2 semi-independent brigades were arriving to the army just as Sherman began to move in. They could act as a reserve for Johnston.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Initially Johnston had a perimeter of Wheeler's cavalry covering Taylors Ridge to the west of Rocky Face, including watching Ships Gap where McPherson came over and the gaps that the 20th Corps came through as shown in the map you shared

As late as May 7th, as the 4th and 14th Corps were moving through Ringgold, Johnston was telling Wheeler to keep cavalry in the valley between Taylors Ridge and Ricky Face that should have hindered McPherson and the 20th Corps from moving to uncover the west end of snake creek gap

but it all moved so fast from there. 20th corps came over Taylor Ridge fast, surprised cavalry outposts and drove them back -- they retreated toward Dug gap, exposing Villanow and the west end of Snake Creek Gap. Ships gap was likewise abandoned by confederate cavalry and McPhersons moved rapidly through it to snake creek gap by night of the 8th. Johnston rushed men in that direction, but it was too little too late.

 

[NedBaldwin]

... 2 semi-independent brigades were arriving to the army just as Sherman began to move in. They could act as a reserve for Johnston.

they did. Cantey was first directed to Rome then redirected to Resaca; Reynolds was directed to Resaca with one regiment moved up to Dug Gap