Jackson's erratic performance during the Seven Days

[Hoplite]

I am new to the Forum and perhaps this was discussed already.

Given Jackson's brilliant performance in the Valley, what (if any) was the reason for him failing during the Seven Days?
As an integral part of Lee's plans, he either failed to appear, was late, or did not readily engage.
Was he sick, or was there some other issue?

 

[rpkennedy]

I am new to the Forum and perhaps this was discussed already.

Given Jackson's brilliant performance in the Valley, what (if any) was the reason for him failing during the Seven Days?
As an integral part of Lee's plans, he either failed to appear, was late, or did not readily engage.
Was he sick, or was there some other issue?

That was Jackson being Jackson. Tactically, he was very hit and miss, even in the Valley. Part of his success was having good subordinates (especially Ewell) and facing very poor opponents (Fremont and Shields for example) in early 1862.

But, for every Chancellorsville or Antietam there was a Fredericksburg or Groveton/Manassas.

Ryan

 

[trice]

I am new to the Forum and perhaps this was discussed already.

Given Jackson's brilliant performance in the Valley, what (if any) was the reason for him failing during the Seven Days?
As an integral part of Lee's plans, he either failed to appear, was late, or did not readily engage.
Was he sick, or was there some other issue?

One major theory is exhaustion and lack of sleep.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Given Jackson's brilliant performance in the Valley, …

Given Jacksons performance in the seven days was he really "brilliant" in the Valley?

 

[Hoplite]

Given Jacksons performance in the seven days was he really "brilliant" in the Valley?

OK feel free to use another adjective.
The point is his performance was markedly during Seven Days than in the Valley

 

[Hoplite]

OK feel free to use another adjective.
The point is his performance was markedly during Seven Days than in the Valley

Sorry- markedly inferior..............

 

[jackt62]

Jackson's historical reputation is likely due to his iconic stature in Confederate mythology. His famous moniker (Stonewall), the Valley Campaign, and the finale at Chancellorsville cemented his name for all time. But the reality may not be as stellar. While in no way diminishing his real military talents, his stumbles are often overlooked or excused to some extent. So while Shenandoah 1862 was an overall successful venture, Jackson faltered at Kernstown and blamed a subordinate (Garnett); at Cedar Mountain Jackson was almost routed by Banks' forces until saved by AP Hill of Jackson's command. And even the famous flank attack at Chancellorsville fizzled out due in part to the tactical disposition of Jackson's force. So Jackson's bungled performance during the Seven Days, whether the result of exhaustion, lack of terrain knowledge, etc., may not be such an outlier after all.

 

[Lubliner]

There was a big change in altitude and possibly weather factors, as well as fatigue and lack of sleep. The shut-down of his metabolic system appears to reflect these factors. I am not a medical expert by any means, but his motivations and inspirations to be deprived of all energy points this way.
Lubliner.

 

[Bruce Vail]

Another analysis is that Lee's plan was unduly complicated and poorly communicated to his senior generals. In other words, Lee's failure to achieve the desired results was his own fault, not that of Jackson or any of Lee's other subordinates. Lee's inexperience in commanding an army of this size, and the fact that he had yet to develop a close personal relationship with his key generals, are cited as support for this analysis. Just saying....

 

[JerryD]

One major theory is exhaustion and lack of sleep.

True, but he performed poorly day after day. You would think after a day or two he would get his energy back. Just speculation, I know, but I have always been suspect of the lack of sleep argument.

 

[dgfred]

I think more like all around inexperience in commanding large groups of men. For everyone.

 

[trice]

True, but he performed poorly day after day. You would think after a day or two he would get his energy back. Just speculation, I know, but I have always been suspect of the lack of sleep argument.

I have a little experience working long hours with little rest. I can recall times when I thought I was doing great work that way and making sharp decisions; sometimes later review and events would show I was not.

How you react to a lack of sleep/rest can very wildly from person to person. Some people cannot do it well or at all. Some seem to be able to thrive on it. Some can do it for a few days or a week or more -- then suddenly hit the wall. I think that may have been the case with Jackson (the Valley Campaign followed by the move to join Lee, punctuated by the journey from his troops to Richmond for the planning session and back). He looks loopy after that.

But Jackson was also an odd duck with a strange diet and odd ideas about health. He may have been very run-down. He acts like it.

Jackson was also never good at understanding terrain without hard work and study -- thus his stress on good maps and his reliance on his mapmaker. The Peninsula is the first campaign where he is in unknown territory, without personal knowledge or worthwhile maps. Here and at Cedar Mountain, Jackson looks like a bad tactician; I think his unfamiliarity with the country is a large part of that.

By contrast, John Bell Hood was a man who seemed able to arrive, glance over the terrain, and immediately see how to use the lay of the land to advantage. I am not a Hood fan, but he was really good at that; Jackson was bad at it. It is a gift some soldiers have and others do not.

 

[Hoplite]

Another analysis is that Lee's plan was unduly complicated and poorly communicated to his senior generals. In other words, Lee's failure to achieve the desired results was his own fault, not that of Jackson or any of Lee's other subordinates. Lee's inexperience in commanding an army of this size, and the fact that he had yet to develop a close personal relationship with his key generals, are cited as support for this analysis. Just saying....

I can understand that, thanks.
Lee was new to command and his plans while logical and sound in theory were dependent upon cooperation between commands.
His army was also organized into divisions, not corps at this time, so he was depending on people like Holmes and Magruder to implement them.
Others failed him true, but it just seemed to me that Jackson did so more than others, and certainly more than I would have expected from him.

 

[Belfoured]

That was Jackson being Jackson. Tactically, he was very hit and miss, even in the Valley. Part of his success was having good subordinates (especially Ewell) and facing very poor opponents (Fremont and Shields for example) in early 1862.

But, for every Chancellorsville or Antietam there was a Fredericksburg or Groveton/Manassas.

Ryan

This is the answer IMHO. Jackson's skillset was at the operational/maneuver level. He was consistently mediocre when it came to tactics - as you suggest, First Kernstown, McDowell, Port Republic, Cedar Mountain, Brawner's Farm, Day 2 at Second Bull Run, Hamilton's Crossing. Some like to blame his Seven Days record on fatigue, etc. No doubt that played a role but they ignore his pretty consistent record of tactical mediocrity. I've always thought that to some extent a similar case can be made about Sherman.

 

[trice]

I've always thought that to some extent a similar case can be made about Sherman.

IMHO, Sherman was bad on the tactical offensive. On the defensive, his best quality may have been that he seemed to settle in to grim determination when attacked. He was a hard nut to crack.

 

[breckod]

This is the answer IMHO. Jackson's skillset was at the operational/maneuver level. He was consistently mediocre when it came to tactics - as you suggest, First Kernstown, McDowell, Port Republic, Cedar Mountain, Brawner's Farm, Day 2 at Second Bull Run, Hamilton's Crossing. Some like to blame his Seven Days record on fatigue, etc. No doubt that played a role but they ignore his pretty consistent record of tactical mediocrity. I've always thought that to some extent a similar case can be made about Sherman.

Second Manassas is a perfect illustration of the duality of Jackson. When detached independently, he's superb throughout the operational maneuver phase. The moment that the armies start making real contact and bullets start flying, his contributions seem indifferent to negative.

 

[Lubliner]

Jackson was from the northern Virginia area, and the Peninsula was lowland which has its own character. Remember what Lee had encountered as well as other senior officers, the shadow effect of sound that blanked out neighboring areas from the sounds of battle. I am familiar with the White Oak swamp more than I had set out to discover. Getting into those small pockets of briars and brambles with slight rises all around make the echoing sounds from highway traffic appear on all sides. It can almost be hypnotic with its effects. It is possible Jackson succumbed to that disorientation as well.
Lubliner.

 

[NedBaldwin]

I dont think Jacksin was brilliant in the Valley. I think he was lucky.

He was lucky during January - March that US strategy was defensive and their logistics were stretched. So he had freedom to roam around the Romney-Hancock-Winchester area.

He has lucky during April - May in that the Lincoln-Stanton strategy was a mess. Blenker's division was detached from eastern Virginia and sent to Western Virginia, got lost, Rosecrans had to be sent to find it to escort it while at the same time Shields division was detached from the Valley and sent to eastern Virginia. This moving back and forth neutralized three forces (Fremont, Banks, McDowell) all at once and after Shields went east and Blenker went west, Banks was left in the middle, a numerically smaller, isolated forces at Front Royal and Winchester who was easy pickins for Jackson.

He was lucky in June that Shields had lost it and told Carroll not to destroy any bridges and divided his command to deal with phantom threats.

He was lucky in August that Pope was an idiot

He was lucky the following May that Hooker and Howard had their heads up their...

But during the Seven Days he did not have luck on his side

 

[Jamieva]

Physical exhaustion and not familiar with the geography are the 2 main factors. At Gaines mill he gets led down the wrong road I believe by someone who claimed to know the area, but Lee also had maps that were wrong and had his forces concentrating on an area that porters corps was not located at. I give Jackson. A pass on that one.

At mechanicsville he's just late, doesn't communicate anything to Lee and ap hill gets tired of waiting and goes in. This all goes back to the date that they had all agreed to that Jackson could get his forces from the valley in place for the attack and Longstreet was vocal that the timeline was too aggressive. Jackson promised he would be there but he wasn't, ultimately to me that lee com3 into blame there that he has to step in, insider what is reasonable and decide. He put all his trust in Jackson's word because he had performed so well in the valley.

Glendale I think is where the physical exhaustion really kicked in. There are diary entries by those with him of falling fast asleep in the middle of the day. Physical exhaustion clouds how you think.

 

[Jamieva]

I dont think Jacksin was brilliant in the Valley. I think he was lucky.

He was lucky during January - March that US strategy was defensive and their logistics were stretched. So he had freedom to roam around the Romney-Hancock-Winchester area.

He has lucky during April - May in that the Lincoln-Stanton strategy was a mess. Blenker's division was detached from eastern Virginia and sent to Western Virginia, got lost, Rosecrans had to be sent to find it to escort it while at the same time Shields division was detached from the Valley and sent to eastern Virginia. This moving back and forth neutralized three forces (Fremont, Banks, McDowell) all at once and after Shields went east and Blenker went west, Banks was left in the middle, a numerically smaller, isolated forces at Front Royal and Winchester who was easy pickins for Jackson.

He was lucky in June that Shields had lost it and told Carroll not to destroy any bridges and divided his command to deal with phantom threats.

He was lucky in August that Pope was an idiot

He was lucky the following May that Hooker and Howard had their heads up their...

But during the Seven Days he did not have luck on his side

The entire 62 valley campaign is very different if he faces just 1 competent commander on the other side, but he got the 3 stooges against him.