Jackson Telling Lee No

[tony_gunter]

Walking through old veteran stories in Mississippi newspapers, I found a story of Stonewall calling an artillerist to his side at Antietam. He tells him he's going to give him 50 cannons and he wants him to obliterate the Federal extreme right flank.

The artillerist lifts his spy glass and examines the Federal line, dotted by cannon posted on an elevated position and protected by infantry. He determines that Confederate artillery would be at a disadvantage at that distance, so the artillery would need to move up to close range to attack, during which they would be cut to shreds. He doesn't want to tell Jackson no, so he picks at the details.

We only have a handful of artillery nearby, where will I get 50? Where will you draw infantry support for such an action? Jackson says he will get whatever he needs to make it happen, can it be done? He again avoids the question.

"I will be happy to make the attempt."

"That's not what I asked."

"If you give me 50 cannons I will make the attempt."

"Not what I asked."

"I will make the attempt to the best of my ability."

"Yes or no."

The artillerist sighs and then launches into detail about why the attack will never work. Jackson tells him to ride with him. The artillerist follows, and assumes he's about to be relieved of duty, so he begs Jackson for the opportunity to attempt the attack. Instead of riding to his unit, however, he rides to Lee's headquarters.

"Go inside and tell General Lee everything you have told me."

The artillerist walks in to Lee's HQ and retells the story in detail, again begging for the opportunity to make the attack and not be relieved of duty.

It turned out that Lee was the one who had ordered Jackson to make the attack and Jackson had already told Lee no. Shortly after, Lee ordered his army to withdraw.

Is this what Lee was missing at Gettysburg? Someone who could confidently tell him to go **** himself?

I'm not familiar with Antietam historiography, is this story canon?

 

[Belfoured]

Walking through old veteran stories in Mississippi newspapers, I found a story of Stonewall calling an artillerist to his side at Antietam. He tells him he's going to give him 50 cannons and he wants him to obliterate the Federal extreme right flank.

The artillerist lifts his spy glass and examines the Federal line, dotted by cannon posted on an elevated position and protected by infantry. He determines that Confederate artillery would be at a disadvantage at that distance, so the artillery would need to move up to close range to attack, during which they would be cut to shreds. He doesn't want to tell Jackson no, so he picks at the details.

We only have a handful of artillery nearby, where will I get 50? Where will you draw infantry support for such an action? Jackson says he will get whatever he needs to make it happen, can it be done? He again avoids the question.

"I will be happy to make the attempt."

"That's not what I asked."

"If you give me 50 cannons I will make the attempt."

"Not what I asked."

"I will make the attempt to the best of my ability."

"Yes or no."

The artillerist sighs and then launches into detail about why the attack will never work. Jackson tells him to ride with him. The artillerist follows, and assumes he's about to be relieved of duty, so he begs Jackson for the opportunity to attempt the attack. Instead of riding to his unit, however, he rides to Lee's headquarters.

"Go inside and tell General Lee everything you have told me."

The artillerist walks in to Lee's HQ and retells the story in detail, again begging for the opportunity to make the attack and not be relieved of duty.

It turned out that Lee was the one who had ordered Jackson to make the attack and Jackson had already told Lee no. Shortly after, Lee ordered his army to withdraw.

Is this what Lee was missing at Gettysburg? Someone who could confidently tell him to go **** himself?

I'm not familiar with Antietam historiography, is this story canon?

IIRC, Joseph Harsh's account of the issue on September 18 is a bit less dramatic. It appears that on September 18 Lee was considering renewing his offensive. I'd have to check to confirm but my recollection is that Jackson took Steven D. Lee with him to survey the Federal positions and Steven Lee confirmed that it was inadvisable. Jackson then reported this to Robert E. Lee. Operating from memory ...

 

[tony_gunter]

IIRC, Joseph Harsh's account of the issue on September 18 is a bit less dramatic. It appears that on September 18 Lee was considering renewing his offensive. I'd have to check to confirm but my recollection is that Jackson took Steven D. Lee with him to survey the Federal positions and Steven Lee confirmed that it was inadvisable. Jackson then reported this to Robert E. Lee. Operating from memory ...

Ah ... the top of the page is blurry so I couldn't make out whose story this was. This was in fact Stephen D. Lee.

 

[Belfoured]

Ah ... the top of the page is blurry so I couldn't make out whose story this was. This was in fact Stephen D. Lee.

And, of course, I keep mixing "Steven" and "Stephen". He performed capably in his role as commander of an artillery battalion at 2BR and Antietam massing guns before leaving for infantry commands in the West.

 

[Mississippian1861]

Ah yes, S.D. Lee, well known resident of StarkVegas after the war.

 

[rpkennedy]

I think Ezra Carman has the right of it when he said that statements made by S.D. Lee postbellum needed to be taken with a grain of salt and if no contemporary evidence can be found, to be thrown away. Color me skeptical.

Ryan

 

[RedRover]

It turned out that Lee was the one who had ordered Jackson to make the attack and Jackson had already told Lee no. Shortly after, Lee ordered his army to withdraw.

Is this what Lee was missing at Gettysburg? Someone who could confidently tell him to go **** himself?

Perhaps. Longstreet says after Gettysburg and the attack of July 3, he and Lee only spoke of it once, with Lee asking why he didn't stop it.

E.P. Alexander admitted afterwards, that though he wanted to say something in the negative, he was too enthusiastic to provide Gen. Longstreet with the information necessary to call off the assault.

 

[Belfoured]

I think Ezra Carman has the right of it when he said that statements made by S.D. Lee postbellum needed to be taken with a grain of salt and if no contemporary evidence can be found, to be thrown away. Color me skeptical.

Ryan

That's fair. On the other hand, Harsh was no rogue operator when it came to assessing sources. That said, I'm at work and don't have the book handy so I'm operating solely from memory as to how Harsh referred to it.

 

[tony_gunter]

I think Ezra Carman has the right of it when he said that statements made by S.D. Lee postbellum needed to be taken with a grain of salt and if no contemporary evidence can be found, to be thrown away. Color me skeptical.

Ryan

I know old soldier's tales are probably like old fisherman's tales, the fish get bigger with the distance of time. But the story rings with a bit of truth considering how quickly Stonewall Jackson was to offer his resignation rather than put up with foolishness.

Are there any documented cases of Stephen D Lee fudging the truth in postwar accounts?

 

[Belfoured]

I know old soldier's tales are probably like old fisherman's tales, the fish get bigger with the distance of time. But the story rings with a bit of truth considering how quickly Stonewall Jackson was to offer his resignation rather than put up with foolishness.

Are there any documented cases of Stephen D Lee fudging the truth in postwar accounts?

I looked at Harsh last night. He refers to this in two books - Taken at the Flood and Sounding the Shallows. He is skeptical of some of the details but appears to accept the "big picture" painted by S.D. Lee. I defer to others on Lee's veracity in post-war accounts. If there is "fudging the truth", he would join a very long list.

 

[rpkennedy]

I know old soldier's tales are probably like old fisherman's tales, the fish get bigger with the distance of time. But the story rings with a bit of truth considering how quickly Stonewall Jackson was to offer his resignation rather than put up with foolishness.

Are there any documented cases of Stephen D Lee fudging the truth in postwar accounts?

The "council of war" that he said was conducted after the fighting ended at Antietam. In 1896, S.D. Lee wrote an account about this incident but got the details all wrong. He didn't have the correct people there, the correct timing, nor did he have correct statements that were made. Needless to say, he's not a reliable witness, at least in regards to Antietam and what he wrote after the war. Hartwig has a couple pages that discuss this event and S.D. Lee's account about it.

Ryan

 

[Jamieva]

Isn't this the same proposed attack that Jackson had someone climb a tree to count the regimental flags and at some point Jackson went OK that's enough counting. I know i have heard or read that story somewhere

 

[Belfoured]

Isn't this the same proposed attack that Jackson had someone climb a tree to count the regimental flags and at some point Jackson went OK that's enough counting. I know i have heard or read that story somewhere

I vaguely recall hearing that one but not sure in what context.

 

[Jamieva]

Hartwig page 426 found it

 

[MHHB]

Isn't this the same proposed attack that Jackson had someone climb a tree to count the regimental flags and at some point Jackson went OK that's enough counting. I know i have heard or read that story somewhere

The story is multiply attested and has the ring of truth. My recollection is that Jackson ordered the fellow to climb the tree and report how many flags he saw. The young man is reported to have said "Oceans of them." Jackson then ordered theboy to count them and when he reached a count of 19 it 20, Jackson ordered him to climb down convinced that an assault had no chance of success. The story goes on to say that the next day the youngster was made a courier and was wearing spurs on his bare ankles. I hope that part is true.

 

[Saphroneth]

The story is multiply attested and has the ring of truth. My recollection is that Jackson ordered the fellow to climb the tree and report how many flags he saw. The young man is reported to have said "Oceans of them." Jackson then ordered theboy to count them and when he reached a count of 19 it 20, Jackson ordered him to climb down convinced that an assault had no chance of success. The story goes on to say that the next day the youngster was made a courier and was wearing spurs on his bare ankles. I hope that part is true.

The really interesting thing about this is the degree of attested straggling and disruption that there is on the Union side. For example, we have relatively good data about 1st Corps, and one of the divisions was IIRC down to about 300 men on the afternoon of the 17th (Ricketts I think) at which point each of the 11-12 regimental flags for that particular division represents 25 men. (If the regiments have two colours each, that's about 12 men per flag!)

Which might, perhaps, lead to an overestimate of the total Union strength in that area if Private William S. Hood was looking that way - but, hey, if you're counting organizations, that can happen.


On the morning of the 18th, after some recovery of casualties, the ca. 40 infantry regiments in 1st Corps were at about 5,600 men, which is about 140 men per regiment - still not a lot for a flag compared to the average on the field* and a way the flag count can be deceptive.


*assuming the straggling for 1st Corps is typical (Meade said 8,219 taken into the fight of 14,856 nominal PFD) and the force brought about 2/3 of nominal PFD to the field as actual effective infantrymen, then the ca. 180 regiments on the field each represented something in the vicinity of 300-350 infantry effectives.

So those flags might represent half or less that Jackson thinks they do!

 

[Belfoured]

The really interesting thing about this is the degree of attested straggling and disruption that there is on the Union side. For example, we have relatively good data about 1st Corps, and one of the divisions was IIRC down to about 300 men on the afternoon of the 17th (Ricketts I think) at which point each of the 11-12 regimental flags for that particular division represents 25 men. (If the regiments have two colours each, that's about 12 men per flag!)

Which might, perhaps, lead to an overestimate of the total Union strength in that area if Private William S. Hood was looking that way - but, hey, if you're counting organizations, that can happen.


On the morning of the 18th, after some recovery of casualties, the ca. 40 infantry regiments in 1st Corps were at about 5,600 men, which is about 140 men per regiment - still not a lot for a flag compared to the average on the field* and a way the flag count can be deceptive.


*assuming the straggling for 1st Corps is typical (Meade said 8,219 taken into the fight of 14,856 nominal PFD) and the force brought about 2/3 of nominal PFD to the field as actual effective infantrymen, then the ca. 180 regiments on the field each represented something in the vicinity of 300-350 infantry effectives.

So those flags might represent half or less that Jackson thinks they do!

Well, that would certainly be supported by the March 2, 1863 testimony of the officer commanding the Army of the Potomac that on September 17 Lee outnumbered him by 25,000-30,000!!!

 

[Saphroneth]

Well, that would certainly be supported by the March 2, 1863 testimony of the officer commanding the Army of the Potomac that on September 17 Lee outnumbered him by 25,000-30,000!!!

It's hard to get information on enemy strength; film at 11.

I'd argue that McClellan's actual behaviour during the battle (sending in the great majority of his brigades in actual attacks, and preparing another attack with what was left until 9th Corps broke) indicates that he was viewing Lee's actual combat-capable strength as fairly close to the combat-capable strength that Lee actually had, if not actually crediting Lee with less than Lee actually had.

Whether McClellan thought that Lee had 100,000-120,000 by the same definition that McClellan had 87,164? That I'm not so sure of - or, if McClellan did think that, he was also apparently extremely confident in the ability of his army to overcome that numerical disadvantage by dint of tactics and skill. Otherwise the better approach would have been to defend north of Sharpsburg, after all, rather than launch a series of attacks including an attempt at envelopment!

This is why I think McClellan's actions indicate he probably thought that Lee had a manageable amount of combat power, regardless of the numbers involved - we can, after all, see McClellan's actions.


An equally interesting question is whether Jackson seeing a lot of flags persuaded him that the Union right was stronger than it really was...

 

[Belfoured]

It's hard to get information on enemy strength; film at 11.

I'd argue that McClellan's actual behaviour during the battle (sending in the great majority of his brigades in actual attacks, and preparing another attack with what was left until 9th Corps broke) indicates that he was viewing Lee's actual combat-capable strength as fairly close to the combat-capable strength that Lee actually had, if not actually crediting Lee with less than Lee actually had.

Whether McClellan thought that Lee had 100,000-120,000 by the same definition that McClellan had 87,164? That I'm not so sure of - or, if McClellan did think that, he was also apparently extremely confident in the ability of his army to overcome that numerical disadvantage by dint of tactics and skill. Otherwise the better approach would have been to defend north of Sharpsburg, after all, rather than launch a series of attacks including an attempt at envelopment!

This is why I think McClellan's actions indicate he probably thought that Lee had a manageable amount of combat power, regardless of the numbers involved - we can, after all, see McClellan's actions.


An equally interesting question is whether Jackson seeing a lot of flags persuaded him that the Union right was stronger than it really was...

"It's hard to get information on enemy strength; film at 11."

It's not nearly as hard as it apparently was for McClellan. PowerPoint at 12. And such uninformed, rank amateurs as Scott Hartwig have so concluded. Outnumbered by 25,000-30,000 on September 17. In most jurisdictions that would be grounds for a sobriety test.