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[wausaubob]

As I read Surdam's book, I realize that blockade running through Wilmington could have sustained Lee's army for several more months. The port had to be completely closed. It would have taken weeks for Sherman to get to Wilmington. Porter and Terry were ready for a second try from the sea in about 17 days. The navy had the ability to shell Fort Fisher into surrender if properly supported, in two days. It would have the army weeks to capture the fort.
Once Wilmington was occupied by the US, the trading through the lines on Norfolk/Richmond axis was the only thing that could sustain Richmond and the Confederate army in Virginia. New Orleans and Memphis were too far from the Confederate capital and KirbySmithdom in Texas was a completely independent operation.
That meant that Wells and Porter could finally win the argument. The end of the war was near. The fastest way to restore the humanitarian situation in Virginia and North Carolina and to save the unionist populations there was to starve and crush Lee's army, and get it over with.
Did closing Wilmington and ending the trading through the lines affect the fighting around Petersburg? That's one for the experts.

 

[Belfoured]

As I read Surdam's book, I realize that blockade running through Wilmington could have sustained Lee's army for several more months. The port had to be completely closed. It would have taken weeks for Sherman to get to Wilmington. Porter and Terry were ready for a second try from the sea in about 17 days. The navy had the ability to shell Fort Fisher into surrender if properly supported, in two days. It would have the army weeks to capture the fort.
Once Wilmington was occupied by the US, the trading through the lines on Norfolk/Richmond axis was the only thing that could sustain Richmond and the Confederate army in Virginia. New Orleans and Memphis were too far from the Confederate capital and KirbySmithdom in Texas was a completely independent operation.
That meant that Wells and Porter could finally win the argument. The end of the war was near. The fastest way to restore the humanitarian situation in Virginia and North Carolina and to save the unionist populations there was to starve and crush Lee's army, and get it over with.
Did closing Wilmington and ending the trading through the lines affect the fighting around Petersburg? That's one for the experts.

"blockade running through Wilmington could have sustained Lee's army for several more months"

I'd be interested in the facts regarding that. I'm skeptical (but don't know) based on the article I posted in another thread from the October 2021 issue of Naval History.

 

[wausaubob]

"blockade running through Wilmington could have sustained Lee's army for several more months"

I'd be interested in the facts regarding that. I'm skeptical (but don't know) based on the article I posted in another thread from the October 2021 issue of Naval History.

Surdam's page 179 numbers for Wilmington from November 1, 1863 to October 25, 1864 were 3,000 tons of meat, 420,000 pairs of boots and shoes, and 137,000 shoulder arms. Lee's army would have shrunk, but it could have survived.
Obviously the blockade probably got tighter once Mobile Bay fell, but not by much. Mobile Bay was never a difficult port to blockade.
The critical days for the Confederate Army of No. Virginia was to get to May 1, 1865 at which point it would benefit from warmer weather and better grass.

 

[wausaubob]

"blockade running through Wilmington could have sustained Lee's army for several more months"

I'd be interested in the facts regarding that. I'm skeptical (but don't know) based on the article I posted in another thread from the October 2021 issue of Naval History.

Can you link to that article?

 

[DaveBrt]

Surdam's page 179 numbers for Wilmington from November 1, 1863 to October 25, 1864 were 3,000 tons of meat, 420,000 pairs of boots and shoes, and 137,000 shoulder arms. Lee's army would have shrunk, but it could have survived.
Obviously the blockade probably got tighter once Mobile Bay fell, but not by much. Mobile Bay was never a difficult port to blockade.
The critical days for the Confederate Army of No. Virginia was to get to May 1, 1865 at which point it would benefit from warmer weather and better grass.

As Sherman crossed into South Carolina, the government supplies and equipment in Charleston were shipped to Columbia, then those and Columbia's supplies had to be moved out of Sherman's path, mostly toward Charlotte.

The report of the evacuation of Charleston shows that nothing usable would have been available for months. Cars had been loaded in great confusion and much time would have been required (with the right men) to put the equipment from the two cities into commission.

Columbia was taken 30 days after Fisher was captured. Numerous communications from mid-February to late March show that enough food was in the SC/NC/VA area to feed Lee's army. It was repeatedly noted that the food could only get to Lee if the RRs were maintained and the enemy kept off them. (And a cavalry raid into western North Carolina in early April took place.) The food would only be supplied by the people if gold was offered.

Adding food and supplies at Wilmington (ie Fisher was still in Confederate hands) would have increased the shipping requirements on the overloaded RRs north of Columbia. The Wilmington & Weldon RR would obviously have been a major target of post-Columbia Sherman and troops landed in Charleston.

I think the retention of an open Wilmington until the W&W RR was cut would have provided only minor relief for Lee's problems. He still had an army that was melting away and an army (Johnston's) that is not mentioned in any of the feeding Lee communications.

 

[Dead Parrott]

Is the issue:

1. The amount of supply available
2. The means to pay for that supply, or
3. The RR logistics to transport it?

 

[wausaubob]

As Sherman crossed into South Carolina, the government supplies and equipment in Charleston were shipped to Columbia, then those and Columbia's supplies had to be moved out of Sherman's path, mostly toward Charlotte.

The report of the evacuation of Charleston shows that nothing usable would have been available for months. Cars had been loaded in great confusion and much time would have been required (with the right men) to put the equipment from the two cities into commission.

Columbia was taken 30 days after Fisher was captured. Numerous communications from mid-February to late March show that enough food was in the SC/NC/VA area to feed Lee's army. It was repeatedly noted that the food could only get to Lee if the RRs were maintained and the enemy kept off them. (And a cavalry raid into western North Carolina in early April took place.) The food would only be supplied by the people if gold was offered.

Adding food and supplies at Wilmington (ie Fisher was still in Confederate hands) would have increased the shipping requirements on the overloaded RRs north of Columbia. The Wilmington & Weldon RR would obviously have been a major target of post-Columbia Sherman and troops landed in Charleston.

I think the retention of an open Wilmington until the W&W RR was cut would have provided only minor relief for Lee's problems. He still had an army that was melting away and an army (Johnston's) that is not mentioned in any of the feeding Lee communications.

As a practical matter that was probably correct.
However the capture of Fort Fisher and occupation of Wilmington had the side benefit for the US of getting rid of Ben Butler.
I think it made much clearer that the end of the war was at hand. Then it became possible to change the policy of trading through the lines, and stick to the change. The peace conference at Hampton Roads followed. It might have put the lame duck Congress in a better frame of mind to pass the 13th Amendment.
The fall of Fort Fisher might have started some realistic thinking among the Confederates about the inevitability of reconstruction, but that's speculation.
I think both belligerents knew it was a war ending battle. That may have been why was so desperately contested.
Once the navy captured Fort Fisher Grant was much more patient. The northward march of Sherman's force was not urgent.
As you note, General Lee's army was filtering away from.
The other change was that once the US occupied Wilmington, Schofield's force could be inserted into North Carolina. That probably reduced Sherman's problems.

 

[Belfoured]

Surdam's page 179 numbers for Wilmington from November 1, 1863 to October 25, 1864 were 3,000 tons of meat, 420,000 pairs of boots and shoes, and 137,000 shoulder arms. Lee's army would have shrunk, but it could have survived.
Obviously the blockade probably got tighter once Mobile Bay fell, but not by much. Mobile Bay was never a difficult port to blockade.
The critical days for the Confederate Army of No. Virginia was to get to May 1, 1865 at which point it would benefit from warmer weather and better grass.

The issues raised by CMDR Schuck in the article I cited weren't focused on whether material was landed at a port. It was what happened next, as some of the posts above point out. In addition, during much of that that time frame the ANV was not the only force that needed supplies. The fact is that as 1864 went on the ANV was facing shortages. (I'll leave aside the impact on Southern civilians). As for that 1865 "better grass", I'm not sure where that would have been located such that the ANV could take advantage. We can exclude the Valley ....

 

[Belfoured]

Can you link to that article?

Here it is. (I'm a member so I can access it freely if I log on but non-members have access limits.)

Economic Warfare: The Union Blockade in the Civil War

The Union Navy's blockade devastated the Confederacy's economy during the Civil War.

www.usni.org

 

[wausaubob]

Surdam agreed with me, but he didn't cite sources:

Between the Lines Trading - Essential Civil War Curriculum

www.essentialcivilwarcurriculum.com

 

[wausaubob]

Here it is. (I'm a member so I can access it freely if I log on but non-members have access limits.)

Economic Warfare: The Union Blockade in the Civil War

The Union Navy's blockade devastated the Confederacy's economy during the Civil War.

www.usni.org

I read that article. I thought he did a good job pointing out the lessons for modern times.

 

[Belfoured]

Surdam agreed with me, but he didn't cite sources:
View attachment 463043

Between the Lines Trading - Essential Civil War Curriculum

www.essentialcivilwarcurriculum.com

With all due respect to Surdam, the ANV was dealing with shortages long before Wilmington was captured in late February 1865. By late Fall 1864 the Valley was long gone as a food source and the already fragile CSA rail network was operating on fumes if at all, with lines destroyed/under Union control and equipment breaking down all over the place. Desertions became a flood.

 

[wausaubob]

The issues raised by CMDR Schuck in the article I cited weren't focused on whether material was landed at a port. It was what happened next, as some of the posts above point out. In addition, during much of that that time frame the ANV was not the only force that needed supplies. The fact is that as 1864 went on the ANV was facing shortages. (I'll leave aside the impact on Southern civilians). As for that 1865 "better grass", I'm not sure where that would have been located such that the ANV could take advantage. We can exclude the Valley ....

I don't think Grant and Sherman could have ended the trading between the lines and kept it closed without the navy's political support.
There was too much money involved and too many people in New York that wanted the goods for cotton trade to continue for the generals to end the trade.
Buying cotton with gold or silver was the worst corruption. Grant famous and stupid General Order No. 11 was a reaction to an attempt by Grant's father to get involved in that corrupt practice.
Later in the war, trading goods for cotton at Memphis or New Orleans probably did not help the Confederacy much. It may have helped Forrest maintain his supplies. But for the most part Memphis and New Orleans were too far from the Confederate armies to supply them.
Trading through the lines at Norfolk was a disaster. It never should have been allowed. When Grant gained the upper hand on that issue, and David Porter and Navy Sec'y Wells were able to add the capture of Wilmington to their arguments, the trading through the lines stayed closed. It didn't have to stay closed long. 3 1/2 months later the war was over.

 

[Belfoured]

I don't think Grant and Sherman could have ended the trading between the lines and kept it closed without the navy's political support.
There was too much money involved and too many people in New York that wanted the goods for cotton trade to continue for the generals to end the trade.
Buying cotton with gold or silver was the worst corruption. Grant famous and stupid General Order No. 11 was a reaction to an attempt by Grant's father to get involved in that corrupt practice.
Later in the war, trading goods for cotton at Memphis or New Orleans probably did not help the Confederacy much. It may have helped Forrest maintain his supplies. But for the most part Memphis and New Orleans were too far from the Confederate armies to supply them.
Trading through the lines at Norfolk was a disaster. It never should have been allowed. When Grant gained the upper hand on that issue, and David Porter and Navy Sec'y Wells were able to add the capture of Wilmington to their arguments, the trading through the lines stayed closed. It didn't have to stay closed long. 3 1/2 months later the war was over.

I understand. I just think that material piling up on the docks at Wilmington before that meant little to nothing for the ANV. I haven't read Surdam, but it appears that he hasn't analyzed the issue beyond raw numbers as to what was landed. That material had to then navigate the 260 or so miles between Wilmington and Richmond.

 

[wausaubob]

With all due respect to Surdam, the ANV was dealing with shortages long before Wilmington was captured in late February 1865. By late Fall 1864 the Valley was long gone as a food source and the already fragile CSA rail network was operating on fumes if at all, with lines destroyed/under Union control and equipment breaking down all over the place. Desertions became a flood.

The shortages probably became more severe after the US fleet returned on 01/12/65. The fort fell a few days later. General Lee remarked during the war that his army had become dependent on the blockade runners.

The items you mention were necessary. But the meat coming at Wilmington, as rotten as it was, was essential to the Confederates.
And the capture of the fort gave weight to the argument that cotton trading only had to end for a few months in order to end the war.

 

[wausaubob]

The capture of Fort Fisher probably delayed Duncan Kenner's arrival in France. The news that the last blockade runners' port was closed had definitely reached London by the first week of February 1865.

 

[wausaubob]

I understand. I just think that material piling up on the docks at Wilmington before that meant little to nothing for the ANV. I haven't read Surdam, but it appears that he hasn't analyzed the issue beyond raw numbers as to what was landed. That material had to then navigate the 260 or so miles between Wilmington and Richmond.

There was a good deal of unrealistic thinking in the waning days of the Confederacy. The capture of Fort Fisher was a concrete war ending step. It strengthened Porter's hand, and made the Kenner mission pointless. For some reason the land battles, and even Sherman's march, did not seem to convince the Confederates to give up. As long as it seemed there was some connection to the outsider world, no matter how small, there was a potential for widespread guerilla warfare.

 

[DaveBrt]

This sub-thread on the value of the loss of Ft. Fisher seems to be finished --- can we return to the value of ironclads (ie the OP)?

 

[wausaubob]

This sub-thread on the value of the loss of Ft. Fisher seems to be finished --- can we return to the value of ironclads (ie the OP)?

Sure. The Confederacy had neither the manpower nor the specialists. But that deserves a new thread.

 

[wausaubob]

This sub-thread on the value of the loss of Ft. Fisher seems to be finished --- can we return to the value of ironclads (ie the OP)?

Another possible blockade related topic: 400,000 small arms could be smuggled into the Confederacy, but not 50,000 tons of RR iron per year that the Confederate railroads needed to survive.
The Confederacy ended with usually an adequate supply of firearms, but with railroads that were slower than an army marching on foot.