Intersting article on a Meade Counterattack

[OpnCoronet]

Instead of reinforcing and backing up Sickles' original position, they (along with other units) were forced to attempt to reinforce and hold a significantly weaker and longer position further to the west.

R

Which units reached Sickle's first? From Meade's perspective, was Culp's Hill in closer supporting distance than the other proposed reinforcements?

One wonders how long reinforcements would have taken to reached Sickles' and or Hancock, if Longstreet had fallen upon them under the full impetus of the assault?

 

[OpnCoronet]

Yes, they were in supporting distance, which is why they were committed to a hopleless battle to salvage an unsustainable position. And sending the Twelfth Corps had nothing to do with Meade's nerve, and everything to do with a massive hole in his center that wasn't supposed to be there and was in serious and urgent peril. I'm not arguing that sending nearly an entire corps from right to center wasn't a tactical error, but at the time that error was made the right flank was not in serious trouble. The center, however, had nearly ceased to exist.

In fact, though, the attack was contained, but that does not prove that with the same dispositions. the attack, as originally planned or if Longstreet's Divisions had been allowed to develop their attacks, on the Union MLR, that would have been equally contained.
As noted on another post, the fact Culp's Hill or that reinforcements could have been sent away, was the result of Lee's inability(not for the first or last, time) to get one of his corps commanders to get off the mark in a timely manner or show some apirit and initiative in following orders.

 

[ivanj05]

In fact, though, the attack was contained, but that does not prove that with the same dispositions. the attack, as originally planned or if Longstreet's Divisions had been allowed to develop their attacks, on the Union MLR, that would have been equally contained.
As noted on another post, the fact Culp's Hill or that reinforcements could have been sent away, was the result of Lee's inability(not for the first or last, time) to get one of his corps commanders to get off the mark in a timely manner or show some apirit and initiative in following orders.

Let me be frank here. While we don't know exactly what would have transpired, based on tactics, terrain, and available reinforcements an assault by Longstreet's two divisions with support from Hill against the position Sickles was ordered to occupy by Meade would have in all probability faced a significantly higher degree of difficulty. What we do know with absolute certainty is that the position Sickles took up in the end was unauthorized, unsound, unsustainable, and in taking it up Sickles placed the entire Army of the Potomac in grave peril.

Now, can we please get back to discussing the prospects of a Meade counterattack?

 

[rpkennedy]

Which units reached Sickle's first? From Meade's perspective, was Culp's Hill in closer supporting distance than the other proposed reinforcements?

One wonders how long reinforcements would have taken to reached Sickles' and or Hancock, if Longstreet had fallen upon them under the full impetus of the assault?

Longstreet's units begin to run into the Union skirmishers shortly after 4pm.

The first Fifth Corps unit to be committed was Vincent's Brigade on Little Round Top (about 4:45pm).

Tilton and Sweitzer's Brigades move into the Stony Hill area just west of the Wheatfield about 5pm.

Elements of Weed's Brigade are engaged on Little Round Top around 5:30pm.

Caldwell's Division of the Second Corps is sent into the Wheatfield/Stony Hill area around 6:15pm.

The two Regular Brigades of Ayres' Fifth Corps division are engaged in the Wheatfield/Plum Run Valley area around 7:30pm.

Elements of Hall's and Harrow's Brigades of the Second Corps engage elements of Barksdale's Brigade and Wilcox and Lang's Brigades around 7:30pm.

Willard's Brigade and the 1st Minnesota go into action around 8pm.

Elements of the Pennsylvania Reserves Division and part of a brigade from the Sixth Corps (which had just arrived) attack into the Plum Run Valley around 8pm.

Meade ordered the Twelfth Corps to move to the Union left around 6pm. At that point, the Fifth Corps had, for the most part, been entirely committed on the field (the Regulars were in position by then but didn't attack until later). The leftmost division of the Second Corps had been committed as well as a large number of artillery units from the Artillery Reserve to fill in the holes along Cemetery Ridge. When he orders Slocum to move out, the Sixth Corps had not arrived yet and there were no more reinforcements to move into the line to support Sickles' position or extricate him from the debacle he had placed his men in. Meade was plugging in a large unit from a quiet part of the line (with no idea that Johnson was moving to the Corps' front) to support a corps whose line was falling apart.

R

 

[OpnCoronet]

Let me be frank here. While we don't know exactly what would have transpired, based on tactics, terrain, and available reinforcements an assault by Longstreet's two divisions with support from Hill against the position Sickles was ordered to occupy by Meade would have in all probability faced a significantly higher degree of difficulty. What we do know with absolute certainty is that the position Sickles took up in the end was unauthorized, unsound, unsustainable, and in taking it up Sickles placed the entire Army of the Potomac in grave peril.

Now, can we please get back to discussing the prospects of a Meade counterattack?[/QUOTE]



I thought that was already answered, according to his actions on all three days(and the fourth) Meade had no real intentions of attacking Lee's lines, much less counter attacking and I have noted before actions are the proof of words.

 

[ellsworthpc]

Returning to the original topic of this post, the author's conclusion seems to be that Meade did have a plan to counterattack -- but my reading is that the combat commanders on the left flank were not the equals of the remaining Confederate generals in terms of execution; and later banded together in a sort of "old boys club" to push the blame upwards. Whether Meade's actions at the Potomac showed otherwise, I think "remaining daylight" on July 3 and his lack of knowledge about the AoNV dispositions on Seminary Ridge means that at least a one day hold in place was probably necessary because Longstreet's remaining men held a superior line position against "available troops" and would have likely chewed up much of the strength of V Corp and VI Corp assaulting uphill the same as assaulting uphill had defeated the AofNV attacking from Culp's Hill to the Round Tops. Factor in weather the night of the 3rd and morning of the 4th? I'd have hesitated to attack Longstreet's remaining strength under those conditions as well.