Industrial Revolution

I corrected those figures, I have no idea why I wrote those numbers because my source showed 100 million for 1850 and 173 million for 1860. Still the revised figures demonstrate a constant increase in production that would continue for many years.
A constant increase during peacetime. It seems a poor assumption that such would be the case during wartime with so much of the populace engaged in the war, less land clearing, less new settlement, and devastation wrought by the war itself. Obviously production had not increased from 1860 to 1866 as demonstrated by what numbers we do have.

Yield was very slow to improve, averaging only 12.3 in the decade following the war, 12.9 in the decade after that, 13.6 in the next, and 13.8 for the fourth decade after.

Perhaps I can find a state by state breakdown of wheat production in the North for the war years. I expect MO and KY production to be way down. The question would be how well did other areas, particularly newly opened ones do with respect to weather, cultivating already improved land, etc. One would expect a big jump in productivity following the war.

I'll go with Gavin Wright and Sam Hilliard, who compared local production with local consumption as part of their basis for concluding that the South as a whole was very close to self-sufficient.

And you are conveniently ignoring the parts of the other links you gave that demonstrate that the Cotton states had a grain and meat deficit in 1860. Then there is that whole well known problem of the cotton areas having to change crops to try to achieve self-sufficiency during the war.

The Gavin Wright article doesn't really say much useful. It gets caught up in cotton/corn ratios and measuring the variance of that rather than anything about actual requirements or known import of other grains.

The Lacy article is more interesting as it demonstrates a large decrease in self sufficiency in the two counties studied in South Carolina from 1850 to 1860. This seems a confirmation of other observed trends.

So go with the other two if you like, but they don't seem to match the data I've seen so far.
 
Some of the problems created or amplified by the Industrial Revolution:

Monopolies and Trusts

Discriminatory railroad rates toward farmers

Corrupt Government, from federal to local

Control of media

Labor problems; low wages, poor working conditions, child labor

Problems of cities; lack of sanitation, sewage systems inadequate, crowding, disease, slums develop

Pollution of the environment

Rapid depletion of natural resources


Some of those aren't a problem in this country now, but most of them are.
 
Two things, wheat was not the major grain consumed in the South and beef wasn't the favorite meat. Beef was considered inferior to pork in the South.

Doesn't matter. There was still consumption of beef, wheat, etc. and some of it was imported from other regions. Additionally, some of the pork was imported as well. If you don't produce enough corn or hogs then you need to supplement it. Hence the issues observed.

The big plantation areas along the Mississippi River and the South Carolina coastal areas weren't self-sufficient in some items such as pork and wheat but South Carolina had plenty of rice.

The Lacy article indicates South Carolina wasn't self sufficient in corn either. Rice is a substitution as well and it is good to note it, but what really matters is the total of all things. This includes what was needed for people and livestock.
 
A constant increase during peacetime. It seems a poor assumption that such would be the case during wartime with so much of the populace engaged in the war, less land clearing, less new settlement, and devastation wrought by the war itself. Obviously production had not increased from 1860 to 1866 as demonstrated by what numbers we do have.

Yield was very slow to improve, averaging only 12.3 in the decade following the war, 12.9 in the decade after that, 13.6 in the next, and 13.8 for the fourth decade after.

Perhaps I can find a state by state breakdown of wheat production in the North for the war years. I expect MO and KY production to be way down. The question would be how well did other areas, particularly newly opened ones do with respect to weather, cultivating already improved land, etc. One would expect a big jump in productivity following the war.



And you are conveniently ignoring the parts of the other links you gave that demonstrate that the Cotton states had a grain and meat deficit in 1860. Then there is that whole well known problem of the cotton areas having to change crops to try to achieve self-sufficiency during the war.

The Gavin Wright article doesn't really say much useful. It gets caught up in cotton/corn ratios and measuring the variance of that rather than anything about actual requirements or known import of other grains.

The Lacy article is more interesting as it demonstrates a large decrease in self sufficiency in the two counties studied in South Carolina from 1850 to 1860. This seems a confirmation of other observed trends.

So go with the other two if you like, but they don't seem to match the data I've seen so far.

No, I've been very careful to make clear that areas of the South weren't self-sufficient in 1860. So I've not ignored anything to that effect. Wright and Hilliard guardedly agree that the South as a whole was able to feed itself in 1860 and they have some pretty good backup for their positions. Your methods are unprovable.
 
Some of the problems created or amplified by the Industrial Revolution:

Monopolies and Trusts

Discriminatory railroad rates toward farmers

Corrupt Government, from federal to local

Control of media

Labor problems; low wages, poor working conditions, child labor

Problems of cities; lack of sanitation, sewage systems inadequate, crowding, disease, slums develop

Pollution of the environment

Rapid depletion of natural resources


Some of those aren't a problem in this country now, but most of them are.
Sounds like a teenage country.
 
OK I GIVE UP! HOW DO I START MY OWN THREAD?

Sorry to yell, Luddite here, and frustrated. Thanks.
 
OK I GIVE UP! HOW DO I START MY OWN THREAD?

Sorry to yell, Luddite here, and frustrated. Thanks.
In the appropriate forun, you will find, on the right about in the middle, a small box that says "Start New Thread."
 
No, I've been very careful to make clear that areas of the South weren't self-sufficient in 1860. So I've not ignored anything to that effect. Wright and Hilliard guardedly agree that the South as a whole was able to feed itself in 1860 and they have some pretty good backup for their positions. Your methods are unprovable.

No, you've been giving the indication that the areas that were the least self-sufficient were self-sufficient. As for provability, the 1860 self-sufficiency claim falls flat and lacks proof. The links you posted don't offer evidence of what you claim, particularly the Gavin Wright one which seems to go off on a long tangent about crop ratios that don't even address the most basic question about what a sufficiency would be. In several cases the links you gave seem to disprove his assertions. Not sure what the Hilliard comment is about, haven't seen that one.

My methods are provable (or if incorrect, at least partially disprovable) but at present I don't have the additional data/information to do so. I suspect it is out there, but I'm not familiar with the data sources that should be searched. On the other hand, the export data should be solid and provide a very strong indication as there is the initial condition, then a change, then a return to the prior condition with a large response to each change. It's a good screening test, but it takes more information about the whole system to flesh it out and prove the hypothesis. There are some corroborating known conditions that I've pointed out.

At this stage I'll need to see some good, solid, well-presented evidence to agree with the 1860 Southern self-sufficiency claim.
 
No, you've been giving the indication that the areas that were the least self-sufficient were self-sufficient. As for provability, the 1860 self-sufficiency claim falls flat and lacks proof. The links you posted don't offer evidence of what you claim, particularly the Gavin Wright one which seems to go off on a long tangent about crop ratios that don't even address the most basic question about what a sufficiency would be. In several cases the links you gave seem to disprove his assertions. Not sure what the Hilliard comment is about, haven't seen that one.

My methods are provable (or if incorrect, at least partially disprovable) but at present I don't have the additional data/information to do so. I suspect it is out there, but I'm not familiar with the data sources that should be searched. On the other hand, the export data should be solid and provide a very strong indication as there is the initial condition, then a change, then a return to the prior condition with a large response to each change. It's a good screening test, but it takes more information about the whole system to flesh it out and prove the hypothesis. There are some corroborating known conditions that I've pointed out.

At this stage I'll need to see some good, solid, well-presented evidence to agree with the 1860 Southern self-sufficiency claim.

I'm trying to decide which book to get on the subject. It seems from the reviews I've read much data just isn't there and the authors make many assumptions. At this point it'll probably be Sam Hilliard's, Hog Meat and Hoe Cakes: Food Supply in the Old South 1840-1860, not so much for his conclusions but for his research and sources. I can draw my own conclusions.

Here's a middle of the road review of his book:


Hog Meat and Hoecake: Food Supply in the Old South, 1840-1860. By Sam Bowers Hilliard. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972.
Sam Hilliard's book focuses on late antebellum foodstuffs in relation to the Southern United States economy. More specifically, Hilliard brings into question the idea of the South as strictly a cash-crop economy, wholly dependent on other regions of the United States for its food. Rather than reinforce this dependent status, Hilliard argues for southern self-sufficiency, evidencing his conclusions with census data, travel accounts, and the like. Hilliard ultimately provides a compelling argument for a Southern society that, in addition to cash crops, produced and raised crops and livestock for their own sustenance.

Hilliard begins his study by describing the Southern diet. According to the author, the antebellum South provided a variety of foods for Southerners including beef, wheat products, sweet potatoes, rice, turkey, and fish. Southerners consumed pork most often, but Hilliard provides evidence supporting consumption of other meats like turkey, chicken, and even squirrel and opossum. The variety found in southern diets was limited to white southerners—slaves consumed pork rations more than any other meat primarily due to the abundance of swine in the South and slaves' lack of firearms necessary for hunting other animals for food. Southerners also included in their diets fruits like strawberries and peaches that they preserved through canning. Settlements near the sea provided seafood including catfish and oysters, but such foods were limited to ports, and were not often found in inland cities.

The second part of Hilliard's study focuses on the ways in which Southerners acquired the foods they included in their diet. Hilliard argues that the South devoted some effort to maintaining regional foodstuff production. The large consumption of pork, for instance, suggests that Southerners raised swine for consumption. According to the author, swine provided the South with a stable supply of meat. Unlike cattle and sheep, pigs have a high reproduction rate, ensuring Southern farmers a number of pigs for slaughter. Pigs were also relatively easy to care for, and southerners utilized corn—a crop in fairly high rate of production in the South—to feed and fatten the animals. Interestingly, Hilliard finds that where the market for pigs in the South was the greatest, the number of pigs in the region tended to be fewer than at other Southern cities. Hilliard concludes that these pig markets attracted swine trade from other parts of the South, suggesting an intra-regional swine market.

Hilliard demonstrates Southern self-sufficiency as well through beef markets. According to the author, Southern farmers and plantation owners did, indeed, raise cattle for food, milk, and farm production labor (or oxen to pull the ploughs). Southern cattle were not as healthy as cattle raised in Northern regions of the United States. Because beef assumed a secondary status in Southern diets, Southerners imported fewer cattle from the Northwest than they produced for their own use in the South.

Hilliard demonstrates that, consistently, Southern use of pork, cattle, and other foods such as corn (a crop particularly acclimated to the more tropical climates of the South) exceeded interregional trade suggesting that Southerners did, indeed, raise and grow their own food. Certainly, Hilliard acknowledges that the South did import foods from other regions of the United States, and the author emphasizes that food production never became a major industry because of more lucrative cash crop markets like cotton.

The author's argument is compelling, and Hilliard's numbers, including the number of swine and cattle per capita in the South as well as the bushels of corn and wheat Southerners consumed, points to an effort made by southerners to supply themselves with foods they included in their diets. One weakness in Hilliard's argument lies in the author's use of the term "self-sufficient." While Hilliard demonstrates that not all livestock and produce were imported from the Northwest, the author does show that trade did occur between different regions in the United States. Therefore, rather than insisting on a self-sufficient Southern food economy, the author would have been better served to suggest a Southern economy working in conjunction with other regional markets. "Self-sufficiency" implies independence, and the Southern food market was not wholly independent. Nonetheless, Hilliard does make a strong argument for Southern production outside of cash crops.
Sara Crowley
 
This all boils down to the fact that the southern states could have been self-sufficient, but weren't always.

In the normal course of trade, an imbalance was made up by imports. Maybe a little, maybe a lot. But it was not this way or that way, it was both. When fodder and forage were required for horses, it was produced locally or imported. When flour was required, it was produced locally or imported.

I don't see the importance of this thread simply because it kinda stretches more this way than that. The upshot is that it doesn't change things much.

When that silly war started, all such self-sufficiency vanished. GWTW.
 
Seems that folks are generally as self-sufficient as they need to be?

In the long run that is true, because folks will either migrate, adjust, or perish. It is the transition that is painful. The Deep South was shifting more and more into cotton, and wasn't producing enough grains and meat...because until April 1861 it could get much of what was required in domestic trade with other states. But as a hostile entity to those same states it would have to rely on true import or reduce its cotton production substantially. And where it had excess meat (beef in Florida and Texas, swine in some areas), it lacked the infrastructure to move enough of it to the places it was needed. Lack of salt was a major problem for pork. The South did attempt to bridge some of these major gaps, but failed miserably.

The Southern market and crop selection appears to have still been in its pre-secession mode in 1860 and 1861. The war then exacerbated the problems from 1862 on. Union control of the coasts was strong enough by then that salt production (meat preservation) was limited and coastal packet transfers were not practical. Combine this with all the military requirements of the railroad and other internal transportation avenues and regional shortages would become common.

It isn't that the South couldn't do these things, it is that it wasn't doing them.
 
In the long run that is true, because folks will either migrate, adjust, or perish. It is the transition that is painful. The Deep South was shifting more and more into cotton, and wasn't producing enough grains and meat...because until April 1861 it could get much of what was required in domestic trade with other states. But as a hostile entity to those same states it would have to rely on true import or reduce its cotton production substantially. And where it had excess meat (beef in Florida and Texas, swine in some areas), it lacked the infrastructure to move enough of it to the places it was needed. Lack of salt was a major problem for pork. The South did attempt to bridge some of these major gaps, but failed miserably.

The Southern market and crop selection appears to have still been in its pre-secession mode in 1860 and 1861. The war then exacerbated the problems from 1862 on. Union control of the coasts was strong enough by then that salt production (meat preservation) was limited and coastal packet transfers were not practical. Combine this with all the military requirements of the railroad and other internal transportation avenues and regional shortages would become common.

It isn't that the South couldn't do these things, it is that it wasn't doing them.
My statment was an over simplification, I agree. In modern day terms, for example, if a farmer's hay crop fail, he buys hay to feed his livestock. If it keeps failing, he sells the herd and gets a job at Walmart.
 
Interesting subject, and some good posts. Thomas Jefferson's fear was unfounded, the IR actually expanded the demand for agricultural goods, improved production, dry storage, invented cold storage which created year around supplies of seasonal crops giving farmers a year around revenue flow, and developed a world wide transportation system that supports the livelihoods of people around the globe.
Bushel per acre production is at a all time high which is good considering how much farm land we have lost to urban development.
But we are entering a new IR, one that is happening in Asia, the demand for food will make the US agricultural industry more important to our economy, it's the one thing we can still do that few nations can compete with, as Asia's middleclass expands so does the demand for food in Asia. Our technology can be copied, but our climate and rich farm land can not.
 

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