Impassable Rivers...

[major bill]

Neither defensive works or obstructions can substitute for troops. Isolated forts are often traps for the garrison unless they supported by a mobile force which can break a siege or cause a besieging army to move onto another mission. Obstructions need to have forces protecting them to keep the enemy from removing the obstructions. The way this works is that defensive works and obstructions allow an army to to defend an area with less troops. The army can then concentrate the extra troops and use them at a divisive point of their choosing.

 

[Patrick H]

No snark in my response, but there is certainly some REAL truth to what others have written here. Undoubtedly, it would have been cool to think that the Mississippi and other rivers could have been rendered impassable due to physical barriers embedded in them.

But I don't believe that would have been possible with the Mississippi (perhaps so with a few of the other rivers...I don't know....I don't live near those other rivers). I am reasonably certain it would have been impossible in the Missouri River.

I don't doubt your premise, my friend. I only doubt the practicality of your premise.

Offered with all best regards to you and yours!

 

[AndyHall]

The Confederates did put a chain barrier, supported by hulks, across the Mississippi at Fort Jackson, below New Orleans. It did not present a significant barrier to the passage of Farragut's fleet upriver. The Mississippi is roughly 1,000 yards across at that point, so the "chain" was not a single, forged chain, but a series of anchor chain cables collected from various sources and spliced together. The night before Farragut planned to pass the forts, he sent a gunboat up the river to use explosives to break the chain. The explosives didn't detonate, but the crew found that they could detach a segment of chain and break the barrier that way. The Confederates were unable to repair it in the following 24 hours, and the next night Farragut steamed his fleet through the gap in the barrier.

 

[major bill]

Chains had been put across rivers in other wars, such as the War of 1812. The issue being the floats holding the chain can be sunk or the chain taken off the float unless the chain is protected by artillery. It would take less time to break a chain than it took to erect the chain. The proper use would be to install the chain where a fort could fire its artillery at any ship that stopped and was attempting to break the chain.

 

[DixieRifles]

Grant diverted his advance from the Mississippi River to the Tennessee River and his assault on Ft. Henry and Ft. Donelson. I'm not sure if this was done as a strategic flanking move or because of the chain and forts at Belmont/Columbus. I don't know the sequence of events and his moves. He may have seen problems trying to pass Fort Pillow and the other bluffs north of Memphis.

Grant took Forts Henry and Donelson and continued "up" the Tennessee River to Pittsburg Landing. His gunboats could not continue pass Muscle Shoals, AL, because the natural features of the river blocked this waterway.

Thanks Andy for posting the map of Fort Jackson.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

So what other method that the Confederacy didn't try should they have tried, and why would it have been better than what they did try?

In the long run, the Confederacy could not compete with the Union in naval resources without significant outside aid... and that outside aid would not likely have reached the rivers in any event. But one thing they could have done that would have made their defense a lot stiffer-- put it under one dam n command. Over and over, the Confederates made the error of divided commands along the Mississippi, and they paid the price.

 

[ivanj05]

In the long run, the Confederacy could not compete with the Union in naval resources without significant outside aid... and that outside aid would not likely have reached the rivers in any event. But one thing they could have done that would have made their defense a lot stiffer-- put it under one dam n command. Over and over, the Confederates made the error of divided commands along the Mississippi, and they paid the price.

In that, I totally agree with you. The fact that the Confederacy never managed to solve the issue of command in the West was perhaps the greatest Achilles heel that they had.

 

[Eagle eye]

5fish the CSA used torpedoes on some rivers with some localized success but if left in the water they often wouldn't trigger due to wet powder or disconnected from their anchors & then just float downstream & often end up tangled in shoreline weeds etc. You must also keep in mind that the rivers were vital in moving CSA supplies so blocking most any river would require the dismantling of the barriers for their own watercraft to pass.
IMO the best way the CSA had to disrupt USA use was their employment of Iron Rams & gunboats of all shapes & sizes. IIRC they enjoyed a fair amount of success using that strategy … unfortunately for the CSA they could never manufacture the quantity crafts that they really needed to be more effective. Iron, engines & eventually shipyards were in very short supply.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

One oddity of the riverine war in the West was that the Union effort worked just as well-- arguably even better-- once the Army and Navy commands were separated. But that is largely due to Grant and Sherman's ability to get along with Porter, and that personal coordination secured many of the benefits that a formally unified command would have.

 

[5fish]

A another word for the chains was Boom...


In our revolutionary War we used a chain(Boom) to block Hudson river...

 

[Dilandu]

IMO the best way the CSA had to disrupt USA use was their employment of Iron Rams & gunboats of all shapes & sizes. IIRC they enjoyed a fair amount of success using that strategy … unfortunately for the CSA they could never manufacture the quantity crafts that they really needed to be more effective. Iron, engines & eventually shipyards were in very short supply.

The crews were also a problem. As the Battle of Memphis demonstrated - the Confederacy river forces wasn't very competent (neither were the Union river flotilia - but they eventually improved)

 

[rebelatsea]

The crews were also a problem. As the Battle of Memphis demonstrated - the Confederacy river forces wasn't very competent (neither were the Union river flotilia - but they eventually improved)

"Too much steamboat - not enough Navy"

 

[1stMS-Arty]

Three examples where the Confederacy succeeded in making rivers impassable:

1. Yazoo Pass Expedition- March 11 -16th, 1863. Repeated attempts by Union gunboats to proceed down the Tallahatchie River in Mississippi were thwarted by artillery in Fort Pemberton which was located on ground between the Tallahatchie and Yazoo Rivers. The large ocean going sidewheel steamboat "Star of the West" was also sunk as an obstruction.

2. Sabine Pass, September 8, 1863. Confederate artillery in a battery located at Fort Griffin on the Texas side of the Sabine River repel a Union invasion force of 4 gunboats and 4,000 troops on transports.

3. Red River Expedition, March 10 to May 22, 1864. Certainly the land battles that accompanied this campaign receive more attention than the trials and tribulations of the Federal navy during the same period but to make a long story short...the navy turned back so the Red at some point became impassable...lets let Admiral Porter explain....

When I arrived at Springfield Landing I found a sight that made me laugh. It was the smartest thing I ever knew the rebels to do. They had gotten that huge steamer, New Falls City, across Red River, 1 mile above Loggy Bayou, 15 feet of her on shore on each side, the boat broken down in the middle, and a sand bar making below her. An invitation in large letters to attend a ball in Shreveport was kindly left stuck up by the rebels, which invitation we were never able to accept.

He goes on to say that he was preparing to remove the obstruction when he got word of Bank's retreat after the Battle of Mansfield so we will never know exactly how much more difficulty he would have had proceeding up river.

Beyond the New Falls City there was a dam, possibly another raft across the river, gun batteries at Shreveport, an ironclad, a gunboat and a ram.

 

[frankconrad]

I am not familiar with how flood stage acts on the major rivers of the South, is it just high water or is it a raging flow of water that can sweep everything before it like in the North?

 

[1stMS-Arty]

I am not familiar with how flood stage acts on the major rivers of the South, is it just high water or is it a raging flow of water that can sweep everything before it like in the North?

Well i can't speak for all major rivers of the south but the Red River mostly just produces high water above flood stage....this year it went several feet above flood stage. The river in this photo is far in the background near the treeline...the high water in the foreground is a parking lot for a boat launch...

 

[frankconrad]

Looks pretty calm from here. We are in the hills here, It can be scary just looking at a raging river here.