How is the winner determined?

[raydog9379]

I hate the idea of a draw.

[sorry - I edited my post after you responded to it].

It comes with little participation trophies.

 

[David Knight]

I have enjoyed reading through this thread ( been on holiday so came to it late). It does seem that the real answer to the question is what type of victory or defeat?

By this i mean Tactical or Strategic. There have been many an engagement where the battlefield says that Army A clearly won and then the Strategic situation clearly shows that Army B was the victor.

Not so hot on my Civil War battles to argue with experts but Malvern Hill was clearly a defeat for the CSA tactically. They achieve nothing but mass casualities and a failed attacked. However, The Union Army was only ever going to retreat after the battle and eventually go back to the north bank of the Potomac.

Focusing on the tactical is relevant to determine how to fight battles but to win wars Generals have to win strategically not tactically. Napoleon won the vast majority of his battles but the end result was that the French lost.

 

[Elennsar]

On the other hand, winning tactically can (but does not necessarily) lead to a strategic position being improved - which is why Napoleon was in a strong position up to 1812.

As far as winning battles goes, I think dismissing tactical triumphs as nonimportant is missing something. Yes, it might not alter the big picture, but if we're talking "who won the battle?", with all the responses defeat invokes irrationally and victory invokes irrationally (or perhaps I should say "emotionally"), it matters - especially in a conflict like this where feeling defeated has a greater strategic impact than forfeiting a few acres of bloody soil.

 

[damYankee]

Along those lines, it seems to me that moving the capital to Richmond may have been politically a good tactical move, but strategically it was a disaster. The need to defend Richmond became the focus of the rebellion.
Had the South concentrated it's efforts toward the defense of the industrial and agricultural centers they would have been in a better position.
The loss of Corinth is barely recognized by many, but it along with Vicksburg was a blow the South could not recover from. These were the two key transportation centers, one controlled river transport, the other rail.
While Lee was defending the political center, the industrial center was being eaten up one bite at a time. The better strategy would have been to keep the political center and the industrial center together.

 

[Elennsar]

The Confederacy did keep its political and industrial center together.

Per Two Great Rebel Armies by Richard M. McMurry:
Virginia on the whole is much more industrialized (producing 32.5% of the Confederacy's manufactured goods, and as a specific and very important example more than three times second place Tennessee's production of bar, sheet, and railroad iron) than the rest of the Confederacy and Henrico County in particular if rated solely on its own outproduced Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi,South Carolina, or Texas - and even without Henrico County Virginia is producing twice as much manufactured goods measured by value as Tennessee (in second place).

If we're going to determine the industrial center on the whole, Virginia's manufactured goods by value are nearly equal to the western states (Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Louisiana, Arkansas and Texas) without Texas (with Texas, it's $60,211,736 vs. $50,652,124, without Texas the western states are only $53,634,534). The Carolinas, Georgia, and Florida manage to be 28.8% by value lumped together.

About the only thing "the West" has to justify placing a higher value on any of it over Virginia in industry is East Tennessee's copper mines.

I'm not saying the West should have been forsaken entirely, but Richmond was worth more than Corinth or Vicksburg together (When measuring industry) and would have been even if the capital was somewhere else.

 

[leftyhunter]

Along those lines, it seems to me that moving the capital to Richmond may have been politically a good tactical move, but strategically it was a disaster. The need to defend Richmond became the focus of the rebellion.
Had the South concentrated it's efforts toward the defense of the industrial and agricultural centers they would have been in a better position.
The loss of Corinth is barely recognized by many, but it along with Vicksburg was a blow the South could not recover from. These were the two key transportation centers, one controlled river transport, the other rail.
While Lee was defending the political center, the industrial center was being eaten up one bite at a time. The better strategy would have been to keep the political center and the industrial center together.

I am thinking that a. the CSA just didn't have enough manpower to satisfy the needs of the AnV and AoT. b. there are a fair amount of Unionist guerrillas in Eastern Tn and even some in Ms and that ties down CSA troops to a degree. c. The Union had some decent generals who in the case of Gen. Curtis and Herron could defeat larger CSA forces with smaller Union forces see the battle of Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove. d. One could argue that the CSA generals in the West where maybe not quite the best . I forgot to mention that old Rosey was not half bad and the AoC had Thomas who seemed to be up the task.
Leftyhunter

 

[ole]

The CSA had too many places to defend and too few men to defend them.

When Ft. Donelson fell, Nashville was given up. When Corinth was abandoned, Memphis capitulated. That left Vicksburg. There were simply not enough Rebs to cover the ground that needed covering.

l wonder what would have happened if every Confederate soldier was immediately sent to Virginia. The Western Theater was lost anyway. The AotP could not stand against such numbers, especially with the leadership it had.

 

[leftyhunter]

The CSA had too many places to defend and too few men to defend them.

When Ft. Donelson fell, Nashville was given up. When Corinth was abandoned, Memphis capitulated. That left Vicksburg. There were simply not enough Rebs to cover the ground that needed covering.

l wonder what would have happened if every Confederate soldier was immediately sent to Virginia. The Western Theater was lost anyway. The AotP could not stand against such numbers, especially with the leadership it had.

Then would not all the Union troops in the West follow them and encircle the newly reinforced AnV ?
Leftyhunter

 

[damYankee]

The CSA had too many places to defend and too few men to defend them.

When Ft. Donelson fell, Nashville was given up. When Corinth was abandoned, Memphis capitulated. That left Vicksburg. There were simply not enough Rebs to cover the ground that needed covering.

l wonder what would have happened if every Confederate soldier was immediately sent to Virginia. The Western Theater was lost anyway. The AotP could not stand against such numbers, especially with the leadership it had.

The problem is Virginia did not have the industrial power or agricultural production ability that Georgia did.
You are correct though, after the fall of Nashville and Vicksburg best option would have been to pick one place a circle the wagons!
However, if they had not moved the capital to Richmond in the first place that would not have been an issue.

 

[JeffBrooks]

However, if they had not moved the capital to Richmond in the first place that would not have been an issue.

The fall of Richmond would have pretty much doomed the Confederacy whether or not it was the capital.

 

[damYankee]

The fall of Richmond would have pretty much doomed the Confederacy whether or not it was the capital.

Please tell why? Why if the South had kept it's capital and government in Montgomery would the fall of Richmond mean the end to the Confederacy?
Richmond by itself could not be anymore important then Atlanta, New Orleans, Savanha, Vicksburg, Mobile, Nashville, Memphis, Chattanooga, or Montgomery.

 

[JeffBrooks]

Please tell why? Why if the South had kept it's capital and government in Montgomery would the fall of Richmond mean the end to the Confederacy?
Richmond by itself could not be anymore important then Atlanta, New Orleans, Savanha, Vicksburg, Mobile, Nashville, Memphis, Chattanooga, or Montgomery.

New Orleans was as important, the others not as much.

 

[Elennsar]

Please tell why? Why if the South had kept it's capital and government in Montgomery would the fall of Richmond mean the end to the Confederacy?
Richmond by itself could not be anymore important then Atlanta, New Orleans, Savanha, Vicksburg, Mobile, Nashville, Memphis, Chattanooga, or Montgomery.

Regardless of the considerable industrial significance of Virginia and Henrico county specifically? I think not. And that's not even getting into the available manpower for Confederate armies in Virginia.

 

[damYankee]

New Orleans was as important, the others not as much.

With due respect, you do not understand the importance of river transportation in the 1800s. Nor does it seem you grasp the importance of rail roads, iron mills, and the production of gun powder all of which was concentrated in the Deep South without which the people of Richmond would not have lasted a month.

 

[JeffBrooks]

With due respect, you do not understand the importance of rivers towns in the 1800s. Nor does it seem you grasp the importance of rail roads, iron mills, and the production of gun powder all of which was concentrated in the Deep South without which the people of Richmond would not have lasted a month.

Richmond was by far the biggest iron producer in the entire Confederacy.

 

[damYankee]

Richmond was by far the biggest iron producer in the entire Confederacy.

http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-archaeology/civil-war-industry-and-manufacturing
Georgia took that iron and made guns.

 

[damYankee]

The first of the permanent works undertaken was a first-class powder-mill, the erection and equipment of which were placed in charge of Colonel George W. Rains, of North Carolina, a graduate of the United States Military Academy in the class of 1842. The mill was placed at Augusta, Georgia, and its construction was commenced in September, 1861. The plant was ready to begin making powder in April, 1862, and continued in successful operation until the end of the war, furnishing all the gunpowder needed, and of the finest quality. Competent critics say of this mill, that, notwithstanding the difficulties in the way of its erection and maintenance, it was, for its time, one of the most efficient powder-mills in the world.
Another permanent work erected was a central ordnance laboratory for the production of artillery and small-arms ammunition and miscellaneous articles of ordnance stores. This was decided on in September, 1861, placed in charge of Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Mallet, and located at Macon, Georgia. It was designed to be an elaborate establishment, especially for the fabrication of percussion-caps, friction-primers, and pressed bullets, in addition to heavier ordnance supplies. Special machinery was made in England and shipped, but did not reach its destination in time for use. A large instalment including a most powerful pair of engines, had reached Bermuda when blockade running practically came to an end, near the close of the war.
The third establishment projected to be permanent was a large central armory, equipped with a complete plant of machinery for the fabrication of small arms, and to which the Harper's Ferry machinery, which had been temporarily installed at Richmond and Fayetteville, was to be removed. This was put in charge of Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Burton, who had gained experience at the factory in Enfield, England. It was determined to locate this armory at Macon, also. The buildings were begun in 1863, but they were not so far advanced toward completion as the laboratory when the end of the war arrested the work.
As a consequence of the necessity for immediate supply of arms and munitions to enable the armies to keep the field, resort was had to temporary arsenals and armories-at least they were designated as " temporary," although they were actually permanent, as far as the purposes of the war which the Confederacy waged was concerned.
The work was scattered among a number of available places throughout the South. Herein entered the problem of transportation by rail. The railroads were not very amply equipped at the outbreak of the war, and were overburdened in operation to such an extent that it would have been impossible to transport material to any single point from great distances, or to secure similar transportation for finished products over long lines. It was, moreover, uncertain how far any one place could be depended upon as secure from molestation by the foe. And there was not time for the removal of the plants from the localities in which they were when the Confederacy took possession of them, and various temporary ordnance works grew up about existing foundries, machine-shops, and railroad repair-shops, and at the various United States arsenals and ordnance depots. The chief localities that were thus utilized were Richmond, Virginia; Fayetteville, North Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina; Augusta, Savannah, and Macon, Georgia; Nashville and Memphis, Tennessee; and Montgomery, Alabama; New Orleans and Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Little Rock, Arkansas, and San Antonio, Texas. The events of the war soon compelled the abandonment of some of these, and from time to time others were added to the list, as, for instance, Columbia, South Carolina; Atlanta and Columbus, Georgia; Selma, Alabama, and Jackson, Mississippi. Of these, Atlanta and Selma became most important.
Heavy artillery at the beginning of the war was manufactured only at Richmond at the Tredegar Iron Works. Later in the war, excellent heavy artillery was produced at Selma, first in conjunction with the naval officers, and later by them alone.
Field-artillery was made and repaired chiefly at Richmond and at Augusta, small arms at Richmond and Fayetteville, caps and friction-primers at Richmond and Atlanta, accouterments to a great extent at Macon, while cast bullets and small-arms cartridges were prepared at almost all of the works.
After the Federals took possession of the copper mines of Tennessee, there was great anxiety as to the future supply of copper, both for bronze field-guns and for percussion-caps. The casting of bronze guns was immediately stopped, and all the available copper was utilized in the manufacture of caps. It soon became apparent that the supply would be exhausted and the armies rendered powerless unless other sources of supply were discovered. No reliance could be placed on the supply from abroad, for the blockade was stringent, although large orders had been forwarded. Of course, the knowledge of this scarcity of copper was kept from the public as much as possible. In this emergency, it was concluded to render available, if possible, some of the copper turpentine- and apple-brandy-stills which were in North and South Carolina in large numbers. This work was entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Leroy Broun, commanding the Richmond Arsenal.
http://www.civilwarhome.com/confederateordnance.html

 

[americono]

I always feel it was the side who withdrew. I mean like Sharpsburg sure Lee held, but do we really think he could of survived another day? Nope. Take the second day of Gettysburg if Meade would of withdrew to Piper Creek it wouldn't of matter he held his ground, Meade would of been admitting he wouldn't of survived.

 

[NedBaldwin]

I always feel it was the side who withdrew. ....

Which is why Fremont claimed he beat Jackson in the valley during June 1862 -- after every encounter Jackson withdrew.

 

[brass napoleon]

Which is why Fremont claimed he beat Jackson in the valley during June 1862 -- after every encounter Jackson withdrew.

It's also why Hood claimed he beat Schofield at Franklin.