Hooker in command at Gettysburg?

[121st PA Vols]

I realize questions like this may be repeats for some of the board members, but not for all who are newer to the board. Ok, I won't bring up Sickles. But what about Hooker? Are there any thoughts how the campaign and battle may have gone had Hooker stayed in command? I'm often in the camp of 'what ifs' being a waste of time. But they can be fun and more, forcing you to know a topic maybe better than before by the simple process of examining that proposition. So I think they have value, however limited.
He was an aggressive general with some solid concepts, Chancellorsville. But evidently flawed. See also Chancellorsville! He seemed to have a grasp on his move against Lee with wide dispersal of corps within reasonable support distance of each other while spread in a covering arc to defend Washington and Baltimore. Any thoughts?
** Had some PC issues recently, not knowing if this was a recent topic.

 

[121st PA Vols]

I appreciate your edit. However, I am familiar with Hooker's combat command at Chattanooga. My impression is that Hooker was far more effective as a subordinate / corps leader than as an army commander. Look what happened during the pursuit after Missionary Ridge. He let himself get tunnel vision in a tactically difficult position. I recognize just how difficult it was, but there was a lack of hard driving initiative on Hooker's part. That does not speak well for how he would have coped with the complex Pennsylvania situation.

There is no question that Grant would have managed the advance to the Potomac crossings in a very aggressive manner. Whoever was commanding the Army of the Potomac was going to have to do a great deal of chucking out the command deadwood. Hooker was never going do that.

Yes, that seems to be the consensus view. What a disappointment later in command with Sherman. A squandered opportunity to shine and diminish whatever stigma existed after Chancellorsville.

With duty calling in Florida for the next few weeks I won't be here to participate on the board. South central Florida missed the worst of it with no cattle drowned or killed by lightening. But thanks to everyone for the nice response. See you all in a few!

 

[Rhea Cole]

Yes, that seems to be the consensus view. What a disappointment later in command with Sherman. A squandered opportunity to shine and diminish whatever stigma existed after Chancellorsville.

With duty calling in Florida for the next few weeks I won't be here to participate on the board. South central Florida missed the worst of it with no cattle drowned or killed by lightening. But thanks to everyone for the nice response. See you all in a few!

Stay safe.

 

[Belfoured]

Yes, that seems to be the consensus view. What a disappointment later in command with Sherman. A squandered opportunity to shine and diminish whatever stigma existed after Chancellorsville.

With duty calling in Florida for the next few weeks I won't be here to participate on the board. South central Florida missed the worst of it with no cattle drowned or killed by lightening. But thanks to everyone for the nice response. See you all in a few!

Best of luck.

 

[gary]

I also think Hooker would have been more aggressive in his pursuit of Lee. It would have been an opportunity to either trap Lee or race him to Richmond.

Remember what Ike said about Meade? Meade was appointed to command shortly before the campaign and didn't even get a chance to know his command. Ike said that was much more difficult of a position than Overlord.

That's kind of why I would have more faith in Hooker after Gettysburg (had Hooker been in command there) than Meade.

I met a relative of Meade who apologized, "He won one battle." That one battle was really the ony battle he needed to win.

I do agree with Rhea Cole that Hooker was much more effective as a corps commander than as an army commander. I think the same may be said of Hood as a brigade commander than as a division or army commander.

 

[Belfoured]

I also think Hooker would have been more aggressive in his pursuit of Lee. It would have been an opportunity to either trap Lee or race him to Richmond.

Remember what Ike said about Meade? Meade was appointed to command shortly before the campaign and didn't even get a chance to know his command. Ike said that was much more difficult of a position than Overlord.

That's kind of why I would have more faith in Hooker after Gettysburg (had Hooker been in command there) than Meade.

I met a relative of Meade who apologized, "He won one battle." That one battle was really the ony battle he needed to win.

I do agree with Rhea Cole that Hooker was much more effective as a corps commander than as an army commander. I think the same may be said of Hood as a brigade commander than as a division or army commander.

It's purely a matter of opinion either way but this is the same Joe Hooker who pulled back on May 1 and still far outnumbered Lee on May 5. He nonetheless headed back to Falmouth after ignoring the vote of his subordinates, even though his numbers included one corps that had played no role in the battle. "Fool me once ..." I'm not sure why the relative of Meade "apologized".

 

[Rhea Cole]

It's purely a matter of opinion either way but this is the same Joe Hooker who pulled back on May 1 and still far outnumbered Lee on May 5. He nonetheless headed back to Falmouth after ignoring the vote of his subordinates, even though his numbers included one corps that had played no role in the battle. "Fool me once ..." I'm not sure why the relative of Meade "apologized".

There is also a question of what Lee's options really were. He was completely out of communication. It wasn't so much a matter of getting between Lee & Washington, it was getting between Lee & the Potomac crossings. The map is compelling. Going eastward there are only so many places Lee could have connected to or withdrawn back to his base.

There was nothing set in stone that the armies would run into each other in Nowhere PA.

That is the problem with speculating about what a couple of hundred thousand men & animals might do instead. Lee might have stepped into the shade & killed by a random falling limb… I know all there is to know about that.

 

[Rebforever]

I just don't know what some here want out of a General.
Meade chewed on General Lee's rear all the way to the Rapidan!

 

[Rhea Cole]

I just don't know what some here want out of a General.
Meade chewed on General Lee's rear all the way to the Rapidan!

You nailed it right on the head, "… on Lee's rear…" How many days were they pinned against the uncrossable Potomac? As Meade so eloquently put it, he only forced Lee out of friendly territory. No wonder Lincoln wept.

 

[gary]

It's purely a matter of opinion either way but this is the same Joe Hooker who pulled back on May 1 and still far outnumbered Lee on May 5. He nonetheless headed back to Falmouth after ignoring the vote of his subordinates, even though his numbers included one corps that had played no role in the battle. "Fool me once ..." I'm not sure why the relative of Meade "apologized".

I think she was embarrassed. I wasn't criticizing Meade either. I did meet another Meade relative when I visted the Carlisle House in Alexandria. She was a capt. and aide-de-camp to some one star general. He said she was more competent than her ancestor.

Meade was overshadowed by Grant in the Overland Campaign. I suppose it's like being a captain aboard the flagship where the ship's skipper has an admiral commanding the squadron/fleet and really determines what your ship does.

 

[Belfoured]

I think she was embarrassed. I wasn't criticizing Meade either. I did meet another Meade relative when I visted the Carlisle House in Alexandria. She was a capt. and aide-de-camp to some one star general. He said she was more competent than her ancestor.

Meade was overshadowed by Grant in the Overland Campaign. I suppose it's like being a captain aboard the flagship where the ship's skipper has an admiral commanding the squadron/fleet and really determines what your ship does.

My hunch is that the guy may not be on the two-star track if that's the state of his "knowledge".

 

[gary]

He was an older guy and may have reached the apex of his career.

 

[BuckPvt]

Hooker would have been further in advance of where Meade was, if for no other reason than there's no messy and confusing change of command in the middle of a campaign.

So the Federal army is probably in the Gettysburg area by June 30th with a decent size force. With the AoP closer to the ANV, the ANV probably isn't stretched from Hagerstown to the Susquehanna River. The Confederate army is probably more unified for an impending battle.

The two likely scenarios for Hooker are:

• Screen the mountain passes and advance down the valley from Carlisle to drive Lee south.
• Screen the head of the valley near Carlisle and force one of the mountain passes to try to trap and destroy Lee.

Either way, you probably get a battle somewhere in the Cumberland Valley, perhaps somewhere between Chambersburg and Greencastle. It's a little harder for Lee to make a bold attack if he's confined to the Cumberland valley, there just isn't much maneuver room to get around the AoP's flanks.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Hooker would have been further in advance of where Meade was, if for no other reason than there's no messy and confusing change of command in the middle of a campaign.

Was there any delay in the pursuit of Lee because of the change of command?

 

[Belfoured]

Was there any delay in the pursuit of Lee because of the change of command?

There certainly does not appear to have been delay in the Federal pursuit. If anything - and this is to Meade's credit - the change seems to have been pretty seamless from that standpoint. I'm not aware that corps commanders unilaterally decided to halt once they got wind of the change or that orders to stop in place were issued.

 

[jackt62]

Hooker would have been further in advance of where Meade was, if for no other reason than there's no messy and confusing change of command in the middle of a campaign.

I'm not sure about that. In fact, Meade handled the change in command without any notable disruptions or problems. As a Corps commander, he was already in the loop as to his own dispositions and the general movement of the army. Moreover, Meade was able to rely on other capable commanders including Reynolds and Buford in advanced positions and lost no time in seconding Hancock to organize resistance when contact with the enemy was made.

 

[steve59p]

I think something has gone wrong with this page. Possibly something on my system but other threads and page 1 of this one still looks OK. However this seems to be screwed up badly with its formatting rather chaotic and the entire page seems to be treated as some sort of reply by me??