Hooker in command at Gettysburg?

[121st PA Vols]

I realize questions like this may be repeats for some of the board members, but not for all who are newer to the board. Ok, I won't bring up Sickles. But what about Hooker? Are there any thoughts how the campaign and battle may have gone had Hooker stayed in command? I'm often in the camp of 'what ifs' being a waste of time. But they can be fun and more, forcing you to know a topic maybe better than before by the simple process of examining that proposition. So I think they have value, however limited.
He was an aggressive general with some solid concepts, Chancellorsville. But evidently flawed. See also Chancellorsville! He seemed to have a grasp on his move against Lee with wide dispersal of corps within reasonable support distance of each other while spread in a covering arc to defend Washington and Baltimore. Any thoughts?
** Had some PC issues recently, not knowing if this was a recent topic.

 

[Belfoured]

I realize questions like this may be repeats for some of the board members, but not for all who are newer to the board. Ok, I won't bring up Sickles. But what about Hooker? Are there any thoughts how the campaign and battle may have gone had Hooker stayed in command? I'm often in the camp of 'what ifs' being a waste of time. But they can be fun and more, forcing you to know a topic maybe better than before by the simple process of examining that proposition. So I think they have value, however limited.
He was an aggressive general with some solid concepts, Chancellorsville. But evidently flawed. See also Chancellorsville! He seemed to have a grasp on his move against Lee with wide dispersal of corps within reasonable support distance of each other while spread in a covering arc to defend Washington and Baltimore. Any thoughts?
** Had some PC issues recently, not knowing if this was a recent topic.

If I were GM Lincoln, my HC had just been clocked by a 24-point underdog, and now he was whining about his roster, I can't say I'd be confident about the next game.

 

[infomanpa]

This looks like a good question to be posted on the "What If?" forum.

 

[121st PA Vols]

Or maybe not at all! I got into another zone on phone and watching Florida with half the family there. At least, that's my excuse.
But I do wonder if he'd be as aggressive as he was initially at Chancellorsville before backing off. I think he would be per his nature and FAR more than Meade, possibly going after Lee with the 6th or 5th corps to go at a far-flung piece of the army such as Ewell's. Or taking a stab at Lee's rear. to pull Lee back and farther from Ewell. See, it gets fun. In my book of "What Ifs", that would be one of them.
That was my break from reading Varon's Longstreet that I'm enjoying.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

An interesting 'What if?'.

Am not normally into 'what if' analysis, because too much conjecture/speculation is involved. But am interested in this particular question posed because of the focus on Hooker's mindset in field leadership.

One could consider this question from two angles. Firstly, as if Hooker was in the same position as Meade conducting a 'fishhook' shape defense. Or secondly, as if Hooker operated 'carte blanche' from the inception of the battle and orchestrated his own troop movements.

If one accepts 'history tends to repeat itself', then one could consider Hooker's patterns of behavior in command at Chancellorsville (before he got concussed) for finding a possible answer.

Would Hooker have been content to hold and maintain a fishhook shape defensive position and let Lee come to him, or would Hooker have committed his units into massed offensives forcing Lee into the defensive and thereby opening his advancing troops to possible enemy counter-attacks.

It's hard to say. But cannot imagine 'Fighting Joe', while in charge, remaining still in an extended defensive position for too long.

 

[jackt62]

Would Hooker have been content to hold and maintain a fishhook shape defensive position and let Lee come to him, or would Hooker have committed his units into massed offensives forcing Lee into the defensive and thereby opening his advancing troops to possible enemy counter-attacks.

Based on Hooker's performance at Chancellorsville, it would be reasonable to conclude that Hooker would have been comfortable with assuming a defensive posture at Gettysburg. Hooker's offensive ability was restricted to plan development, and not execution. As soon as he met the slightest resistance at Chancellorsville, he lost no time in reforming his corps into a defensive perimeter. Leaving aside missteps including failing to secure the flank of XI Corps and losing effective command and control of Sedgwick's operations, Hooker devised a reasonably powerful defensive position around Chancellorsville crossroads with the army's flanks secured at the Rappahanock River. If Hooker hadn't gone weak-kneed after doing so, abandoning his position and ordering withdrawal across the river, there is a good chance that Lee would have met stiff resistance in assaulting the AotP's final lines. Of course, this also leads one to ask as to whether Hooker would have similarly failed to hold a strong fishhook defense at Gettysburg. On that basis, Meade wins out.

 

[gary]

Had it been Burnside, he would have won. There mere fact there was no water obstacle like Antietam Creek or the Rappahannock meant the feng shiu was working in his favor.

Back to the question, Hooker probably would have fought defensively for the first two days and even counter-attacked after the third. Remember Meade didn't even have time to know his corps commanders whereas Hooker would have had better knowledge of each individual's capability.

 

[121st PA Vols]

I'll get back in more detail later as duty calls presently with the Florida clan. But, thanks for the good views. What I failed to mention about my 'what if' view, perhaps not others, is I started the clock on the question from June 28th, the date Meade did not take command in this scenario. What would Hooker have done thereon?
So, I'll get back to you all later on your views and perhaps more on mine.

 

[121st PA Vols]

I just boldened this for others to see I misstated the original title. Plese see the first paragraph in bold below. Apologies!

Back again. My heading was misworded with "Hooker in command at Gettysburg". The WHAT IF was meant to be if he was never taken out of command. Sorry. I'm too Gettysburg centric. A more manageable (reasonable?) WHAT IF is if he never left command.
So, the thought there is, and importantly, knowing at the outset he wanted to make a lunge at Richmond and was denied by the administration, that as the campaign developed, ie, up to-through the date of June 28th, he would still at some point attempted to turn Lee by threatening his rear in the Valley.
He had a huge element (an army) on his left in Reynolds, Sickles and Howard, roughly 33,000 with considerable cavalry. A threat on Lee's rear would rein in Lee's northward thrust (Ewell-York, Harrisburg) allowing Hooker to slide his extreme 'right' elements more to his center or take a stab at Ewell's scattered corps or Stuart.
So simply put, how would Hooker have managed the campaign from June 28th on? What does his personality and tendencies suggest. He had a pretty good plan (Burnsides) initially at Chancellorsville and had managed the army well up to June 28th in my view.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Did Reynolds have "wing" command prior to Meade taking over? In other words, is Reynolds still going to show up at Gettysburg on July 1 and be able to summon reinforcements?

Assuming things more or less play out the same on July 1, what is the relationship between Sickles and Hooker? Joe was not an engineer, unlike Meade, and is not necessarily going to object to Dan's proposal to advance to the Peach Orchard, especially if they had a more friendly relationship than Sickles and Meade.

One big difference is I don't see Hooker conducting the kind of pursuit Meade did starting July 5. I don't know that it would have been more effective, but the careful covering of DC by Meade doesn't seem Hooker's style.

How is Hooker's relationship with Pleasanton? Meade had a very traditional view of how cavalry should be used. If Chancellorsville is any indication, Hooker was of the mindset of Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan: cavalry is for raiding not scouting and screening.

 

[121st PA Vols]

Did Reynolds have "wing" command prior to Meade taking over? In other words, is Reynolds still going to show up at Gettysburg on July 1 and be able to summon reinforcements?

Assuming things more or less play out the same on July 1, what is the relationship between Sickles and Hooker? Joe was not an engineer, unlike Meade, and is not necessarily going to object to Dan's proposal to advance to the Peach Orchard, especially if they had a more friendly relationship than Sickles and Meade.

One big difference is I don't see Hooker conducting the kind of pursuit Meade did starting July 5. I don't know that it would have been more effective, but the careful covering of DC by Meade doesn't seem Hooker's style.

How is Hooker's relationship with Pleasanton? Meade had a very traditional view of how cavalry should be used. If Chancellorsville is any indication, Hooker was of the mindset of Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan: cavalry is for raiding not scouting and screening.

No. Meade made him Wing Cmdr.

 

[Kurtlg]

Hooker was losing confidence on his march north to pursue Lee. His correspondence with Lincoln and Halleck sounds like a man who was beginning to make excuses and who was over his head. If he had stayed in command at Gettysburg I think it could have been a disaster. He had lost the confidence of his corps commanders and I just don't see a positive outcome.

 

[Belfoured]

Hooker was losing confidence on his march north to pursue Lee. His correspondence with Lincoln and Halleck sounds like a man who was beginning to make excuses and who was over his head. If he had stayed in command at Gettysburg I think it could have been a disaster. He had lost the confidence of his corps commanders and I just don't see a positive outcome.

The one thing he did learn - the hard way - was to restore central command of the artillery to Hunt. His decision before Chancellorsville turned out to be a debacle. Otherwise, I think Hooker proved himself to be a capable division and corps commander, as well as a guy who generally knew how to organize, but effective army command in the field just wasn't in his tool box.

 

[Rebforever]

Hooker was losing confidence on his march north to pursue Lee. His correspondence with Lincoln and Halleck sounds like a man who was beginning to make excuses and who was over his head. If he had stayed in command at Gettysburg I think it could have been a disaster. He had lost the confidence of his corps commanders and I just don't see a positive outcome.

He lost some brain function brought on by that cannonball at Chancellorville.

 

[AlexPensFan86]

No. Meade made him Wing Cmdr.

According to Edwin Coddington (pg. 122 in my edition)Hooker appointed Reynolds to a wing command on June 25.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Why would Hooker fight a meeting engagement in Nowhere PA? Gettysburg was not an inevitability.

The initial engagement was between John Buford & Harry Heath. They are the ones who turned a trivial skirmish into a battle. If one of them had not been there things would have been radically different.

 

[121st PA Vols]

According to Edwin Coddington (pg. 122 in my edition)Hooker appointed Reynolds to a wing command on June 25.

That was one of Coddington's few mistakes. Meade appointed him 30 Jun per Pfanz and others.

 

[121st PA Vols]

Why would Hooker fight a meeting engagement in Nowhere PA? Gettysburg was not an inevitability.

The initial engagement was between John Buford & Harry Heath. They are the ones who turned a trivial skirmish into a battle. If one of them had not been there things would have been radically different.

Rhea Cole. The question that I initially mistakenly showed as what if "Hooker commanded at Gettysburg" was corrected above to What if he had had not been removed from command Jun 28. Apologies to all. That's a far more interesting and realistic what if.

 

[AlexPensFan86]

That was one of Coddington's few mistakes. Meade appointed him 30 Jun per Pfanz and others.

Good to know. I just read it yesterday, which is why I noticed.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Rhea Cole. The question that I initially mistakenly showed as what if "Hooker commanded at Gettysburg" was corrected above to What if he had had not been removed from command Jun 28. Apologies to all. That's a far more interesting and realistic what if.

I appreciate your edit. However, I am familiar with Hooker's combat command at Chattanooga. My impression is that Hooker was far more effective as a subordinate / corps leader than as an army commander. Look what happened during the pursuit after Missionary Ridge. He let himself get tunnel vision in a tactically difficult position. I recognize just how difficult it was, but there was a lack of hard driving initiative on Hooker's part. That does not speak well for how he would have coped with the complex Pennsylvania situation.

There is no question that Grant would have managed the advance to the Potomac crossings in a very aggressive manner. Whoever was commanding the Army of the Potomac was going to have to do a great deal of chucking out the command deadwood. Hooker was never going do that.