Chancellorsville Hooker at Chancellorsville

[majveg9]

I was reading abt this campaign and I was wondering did Hooker give any explanation in his official report as to why he stopped his advance the first day, allowing Jackson to strike his flank. I know that its obvious he lost his nerve, but I'm curious as to what he said about it.

 

[FrazierC]

Hooker said that his decision to pull back from his May 1st gains was because he was, "...hazarding too much. I had no alternative but to turn back." He was worried that some of his lead divisions were advancing so fast, that Lee would turn and throw his entire force at Fredericksburg on the isolated elements of the Union vanguard. There is also the quote when he said (something to the extent of), "To be honest, I simply lost faith in 'Fighting Joe'."

 

[Jamieva]

And for some reason I don't quite get, Hooker wanted Lee to attack him. But why you would choose the Wildneress as that ground I do not get.

 

[Carronade]

Launching a potentially decisive offensive usually involves an element of risk. The strategy employed by both Hooker and Lee at C'ville is an excellent example - pinning the enemy with part of your force while another part swings around his flank. There is inevitably a period during which your forces are divided. It's often pointed out how daring it was for Lee to divide his forces; it was daring for Hooker also, although not so dramatically. The solution, however, is not to waver at the crucial moment, but rather to press the attack home decisively.

As the Union flanking force advanced, they uncovered fords across the Rappahannock by which additional Union corps could join them. Pressing the attack brought them closer to reinforcements from the main body around Fredericksburg. The flank attack would actually get stronger as it advanced.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

There is also the quote when he said (something to the extent of), "To be honest, I simply lost faith in 'Fighting Joe'."

I believe this quote supposedly comes from the early part of the Gettysburg Campaign wherein a staff officer claimed to overhear a conversation between Hooker and one of his corps commanders. However, I believe someone (probably Stephen Sears) pointed out that the different corps were spread out during the campaign and the corps Hooker made his HQ with was not close to the corps whose commander participated in the alledged conversation. So it might be apocryphal.

And for some reason I don't quite get, Hooker wanted Lee to attack him. But why you would choose the Wildneress as that ground I do not get.

Hooker didn't set out to fight in the Wilderness; he wanted to get between Lee and Richmond and had to go through the Wilderness to get there. Sedgwick's feint at Fredericksburg didn't fool Lee who moved quickly enough to engage the AotP before most of the army was clear. Having planned to force Lee to attack him, Hooker seems to have chosen to switch to defensive mode ahead of schedule, which was definitely a mistake.

I'm currently reading about the Overland Campaign and it feels to me like the Wilderness had the same problem as Chancellorsville: AotP wants to clear the Wilderness before fighting, Lee moves quicker than anticipated, AotP chooses to accept battle in a place that they shouldn't.

At Chancellorsville, Hooker could have probably rushed reinforcements to his lead elements to hold a position past the Wilderness and/or made use of Meade's unengaged corps near the river. At Wilderness, Meade & Grant could have probably blocked the Orange Turnpike and Orange Plank Road while the rest of the army hurried through the Wilderness and gotten out of the woods before Longstreet arrived.