Hood's Plan -- Hood's Failure

[EricJacobson]

I disagree. Certainly, you can learn a fair amount from the grunt's eye view.

Or you can look at the fact that General Soandso reported that he was unable to move because the roads were muddy.

A teamster grumbling that the roads were muddy that and a general reporting that are telling...exactly the same thing.

I don't want to dismiss the importance of the view of the grunts. But if I was going to write an account on oh, the battle of Stone's River, I'd want to know what Bragg thought far more than what Sam Watkins thought.

I'd be more than willing to read any relevant passage by Watkins or a similiar level, but I think you're greatly overrating the amount that they knew and understood relative to what those on top knew/understood.

Certain, in some ways Watkins had a better view (as an individual) than Bragg, but Bragg's view (and what he did/failed to do because of what he saw/thought he saw) made a much bigger difference to the army.

Picking Watkins here as someone whose writings are on my "to read before I die" list but not on any "to read any time soon" list (mostly because memoirs do not interest me as reading material, just like I'm generally not fond of first person narrative in fiction. Its a taste thing) and as someone who seems to have had a pretty good idea of what he was talking about.

I don't want to sound like a know it all, but if you were going to write a book about Stone's River, or any Civil War battle for that matter, you're going to have to evaluate and use accounts by enlisted men and lower grade field officers.

If you're writing a book solely about strategy and tactics you may not want to know what Sam Watkins or anybody down in the ranks had to say, but otherwise you're going to. If you want to know anything about the details of the actual battle, the combat per se, you're not going to rely on a guy like Bragg or Hood.

 

[Elennsar]

For the details of what a given regiment or brigade or company experienced, yes.

For what Bragg planned and what Bragg failed to do and what Bragg did pull off, not so much.

As to being a know-it-all...

Nah, no worries.

Lesson:
Its important to read both.

Best to find reliable sources than either high or low sources. That seems to sum it up for all of us.

 

[EricJacobson]

I think we're pretty close to saying the same thing, but our approaches are at odds. One might have to push through a dozen enlisted reminiscences to get enough detail to be helpful at the same level as 3 company grade memoirs or one of flag rank. But the combined insights thus available ought to make excellent fodder for a skilled writer.
It's the ratio I was meaning more than an absolute number.

For example, there's one instance of a unit assaulting Snodgrass Hill at Chickamauga, taking it, retreating back down it, then assaulting it again, taking it, and holding it until dark. A memoir from a POW and a speech by a LTC at a reunion agree on this. No mention on the unit marker at Chickamauga, nor by any general.

Now you're talking my language. This is EXACTLY what a writer has to go through. It can be maddening, but the more you have, from all the ranks, only helps the situation. I remember when the first university press passed on my book and then told me I really needed more Confederate regimental reports from the OR. I thought, well this genius clearly had no idea what they are talking about. When I told them there were 100 Southern regiments at Franklin and only 1 regimental report was ever filed, there was this odd silence on the other end of the phone. Then I heard a polite, "Well thank you for that info. Have a nice day."

So based on this lack of info I went searching for anything else I could find to help piece things together reasonably well. And none of it came from upper command. Well, maybe a colonel or two....

 

[EricJacobson]

For the details of what a given regiment or brigade or company experienced, yes.

For what Bragg planned and what Bragg failed to do and what Bragg did pull off, not so much.

As to being a know-it-all...

Nah, no worries.

Lesson:
Its important to read both.

Best to find reliable sources than either high or low sources. That seems to sum it up for all of us.

Yes, more, more, and then some more. Y'all have to read the National Tribune someday if you want to be blown away by accounts from Federal soldiers. It is SOOOO far superior to Confederate Veteran in quality of accounts and numbers.

 

[Elennsar]

And of course the worst of it is sorting out truth from lies.

Franklin is a battle in which very few people in charge of enough to be making important decisions came off well.

Ah, history. Not quite a fable agreed upon, but filled with all too many.

 

[EricJacobson]

And of course the worst of it is sorting out truth from lies.

Franklin is a battle in which very few people in charge of enough to be making important decisions came off well.

Ah, history. Not quite a fable agreed upon, but filled with all too many.

One quick thing about commanders at Franklin and trying to put together the facts and determine to some degree of accuracy what really happened. Here is what exists in the OR for the portion of the Confederate army engaged at Franklin: Three corps commanders - two reports. Seven division commanders - two reports. Twenty-two brigade commanders - ZERO. One hundred regimental commanders - one. I happen to find Gen. Featherston's unpublished report in his papers in Mississippi. So there you have it. With this as a starting point I had to begin to piece together the Confederate army at Franklin.

 

[larry_cockerham]

A man walking down the slope from Winstead and Breezy hills must have had a few thoughts concerning the Confederate command. I'l bet most of them are still unprintable even if they were written down. Much of that fancy writing by folks in command during any battle in the war was done to feather one's nest or to plug the air holes caused by truthful writing about the event.

Eric, in his superb book for CAUSE for COUNTRY must have worked his butt off seeking sources. His is the only reference quality document I've seen that spends much time documenting Union forces at the battle. That has been a big help in my own research attempting to learn just what happened at Franklin.

From all accounts, it was nothing good.

 

[EricJacobson]

Thanks Larry.

 

[trice]

One quick thing about commanders at Franklin and trying to put together the facts and determine to some degree of accuracy what really happened. Here is what exists in the OR for the portion of the Confederate army engaged at Franklin: Three corps commanders - two reports. Seven division commanders - two reports. Twenty-two brigade commanders - ZERO. One hundred regimental commanders - one. I happen to find Gen. Featherston's unpublished report in his papers in Mississippi. So there you have it. With this as a starting point I had to begin to piece together the Confederate army at Franklin.

Eric,

Did you have the opportunity to search the National Archives for reports?

Generally speaking, most late-war actions in the OR are short on Confederate reports, for a variety of reasons. People tend not to write them in the midst of a crisis, for one thing, and the Franklin-Nashville Campaign was filled with them, and had few pauses where the officers could sit down to write them. Once it was over, some units were dissolved on furloughs, others were shipped off to face Sherman in the Carolinas, and the working officers were probably overwhelmed with trying to rebuild shattered units and keep their men fed and clothed. Then the war ended. Some Confederate reports seem to have been deliberately destroyed to keep them out of Yankee hands; many officers probably saw no reason to write them anymore.

Then we get into the habit of Civil War commanders to treat HQ records as personal property. McClellan, for example, took a lot of AoP HQ records home with him to NJ when he was relieved (later mostly destroyed in the same housefire that took his unpublished memoirs of the war). Joe Johnston and his chief-of-staff took a lot of AoT records with them in the Summer of 1864 when Johnston was relieved (to prepare Johnston's defense against charges against him, whether in the papers or in formal proceedings, apparently). Even well after the war some important records were wiped out (when Rosecrans died in 1898, the War Department asked his widow what to do with the papers he had stored in their care -- she told them to burn them, so they did).

Also, we know that command casualties were heavy at Franklin. Fifty-three of those 100 regimental commanders became casualties on November 30. IIRR, 14 or 15 generals became casualties. Within a few weeks, the same units went through the disastrous Battle of Nashville and the retreat, with still more casualties, lots of men captured, and probably a lot of stragglers never seen again. Hard to expect a commander in there to sit down to write a reasonable report. Might be some about, though.

Plus, of course, most of the people involved in publishing the OR were probably "Yankees."
Tim

 

[EricJacobson]

Tim,

I sure did. But considering everything there, that doesn't mean I didn't miss something. Frankly, finding Featherston's report was a virtual accident.

I happen to be going to the Archives soon for work on my new book.

Eric

 

[trice]

A man walking down the slope from Winstead and Breezy hills must have had a few thoughts concerning the Confederate command. I'l bet most of them are still unprintable even if they were written down. Much of that fancy writing by folks in command during any battle in the war was done to feather one's nest or to plug the air holes caused by truthful writing about the event.

I remember talking to my Dad a few years ago about an action he was in at a place called Kakazu Ridge on Okinawa. The night before his regiment attacked, he went to a briefing with his captain. A different regiment had attacked the day before, reached the top, and been driven back down by the Japanese.

In the briefing, they were told they had to take Kakazu the next day, even if they took 25% casualties. Dad remembered coming back from the briefing, thinking "25% casualties!" The next day they went up the ridge and got driven back. If you look at the accounts, Dad ended up in the group trapped in the gorge at the base of the ridge that night, about 20 yards or so from where the Sgt. in the mortar squad is awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions. The regiment took a lot of casualties that day, and some more in other attempts to take that place; despite being attacked at different times by three different US divisions, Kakazu Ridge never fell to assault. The Japanese eventually abandoned it when it was outflanked, and pulled back to their next line.

I imagine the thoughts of men in Dad's unit were about the same as those men coming down Winstead and Breezy hills at Franklin, and probably much the same as their thoughts outside Nashville. Dad spent a large part of the next three months going up other hills and cliffs in Okinawa, so his opinion of the WWII General Buckner who commanded the Army there isn't all that good.

Tim