Hood's Plan -- Hood's Failure

[EricJacobson]

Eric:

You are completely and absolutely wrong here. You are reading your own sensitivity about Hood into far too much, IMHO. That is as flat as I can put it; I have tried several times to put it more politely.

I have said both positive and negative things about Hood, yet you insist I "have clearly established a willingness to pound on Hood whenever you get a chance". Am I pounding Hood when I praise his tactical eye, or his ability to move troops quickly, or when I point out how that tactical acumen very quickly grasped the only way his attack at Franklin could possibly succeed? When I point out his successful record as a brigade commander, am I pounding Hood?

I asked a question about what the normal, expected weather for November would be because I wanted to know what it should be. That's all: I believe you need information before you make judgements, so I asked for some. Why is an attempt at research an example of pounding on Hood?

Since Hood himself used the weather as a reason/excuse for his difficulties, why is this question so upsetting to you? Shouldn't you welcome someone who wants data on the situation Hood faced before he ventures an opinion?

Instead, you continue to insist that I only asked it to attack Hood. IMHO, You are way too concerned with criticisms of Hood, anjd you appear to rush to attack anyone who ventures an opinion on the man you don't like -- as you yourself seem to acknowledge. Lay off it. Like almost everyone I have ever read about or met, Hood deserved some criticisms and does not deserve others. Your attack-dog response is overdone, that's all.

Tim

Let's see, about the only thing you have ever said about Hood that wasn't pounding was that he was a good brigade commander and he had a good tactical eye. Move troops quickly? Well I guess that's a compliment. Other than that you have taken every single chance to point out what a complete failure Hood was on every microscopic level.

Frankly, your sensitivity about the weather question is bordering on anger. For someone who apparently knows everything about everything, I guess I'm shocked you wouldn't know what the weather was like in northern Alabama or Middle Tennessee in the late fall. Like I said, if the weather was actually bad you would have just used that as another example of Hood's incompetence. But since the weather is normally good, which I pointed out in perfect clarity if you recall, I didn't see you come back and say anything. Once it was clear you couldn't use it as a negative you stopped.

Hood mentioned the weather as a problem, no doubt. Frankly, since it was so much worse than normal, what's your problem with him stating the obvious fact that it hindered his movement? I think you have a problem with variables which come into play and expect everything should play out in some sort of static environment. If something didn't go the way you think it should have, you point it out as an error.

Hood deserves his fair share of criticism. What he doesn't deserve is someone like yourself (speaking of attack dog) who thinks they have ALL the answers and proclaims 144 years later how Hood should have done this, should have done that, etc etc. It's easy when you're sitting on your computer. So in closing, hit me all you want. I think it's about time for you to get off Hood's back.

 

[ole]

Enough!

ole

 

[trice]

Another thing. I have also found it interesting how Schofield believed Hood was justified in attacking at Franklin. In his memors (p. 183-184) Schofield wrote, "These criticisms are founded upon a misapprehension of the facts, and are essentially erroneous." Later (p. 184) he wrote, "I believe, therefore, that there can be no room for doubt that Hood's assault was entirely justifiable."

Schofield is in a particular position here. It is beneficial to Schofield if he praises Hood, and it is hurtful to Schofield if he points out how bad Hood's actions here were. For example, Schofield would not want to emphasize that he was wrong about how many men Hood had, or that he was wrong in withdrawing after inflicting such damage on Hood. As you have agreed, if Schofield simply stays put, the 2nd day at Franklin might be far worse for the Confederacy than the first. In that situation, most generals avoid examining their mistakes too hard (Grant certainly doesn't criticize himself too much at Shiloh or Chattanooga, for example).

Tim, your knowledge of Franklin is top notch, but I don't know how many Federal accounts you have read. I don't mean OR stuff, but letters, memoirs, and National Tribune articles. You will find very few who make your argument about Hood's decision making at Franklin. That doesn't make you wrong, but it does say something about what the guys who were there thought. I find that is where much of the truth lies, not in what you and I think should have or should not have happened.

IMHO, my knowledge of Franklin is subpar for me on a battle I have studied. I know a lot more about Eastern battlefields and actions I have visited and discussed and read about than almost any battle in the West (Well, I am fairly prepared on Chickamauga/Chattanooga, but I've been looking at that one for 40+ years off and on).

In this case, I once spent the best part of six months discussing the Franklin-Nashville campaign online with some people, particularly with my friend Clair. Clair's a West Point grad, class of 1979 I think, live up in KY and is currently doing something as a civilian up at Fort Knox. He is also a bona-fide cavalry nut, having served in that branch and having ancestors in that branch. He likes Hood for all the reasons I have listed, and given his mindset I can see why. To Clair, virtually any professionally-trained officer is better than the best "amateur". His idea of a cavalryman is Custer, Kilpatrick and Pleasonton (Stuart doesn't order enough saber charges); he has told me Buford "turns his stomach", and as to Forrest ... well, an amateur who preferred to fight dismounted just won't cut it with Clair.

But your attitudes are similar to his: Clair would have attacked at Franklin, pretty much like Hood did. He blames the disaster at Spring Hill on everyone but Hood unless you really pin him down. Clair's first reaction to contact with the enemy would usually be a saber charge, and he once proudly told me the vehicle he was in (M-551 Sheridan) became a casualty in about 75% of exercises when he was in the Army.

But you need to understand that Clair is regarded as a far-out iconoclast by other military officers. He is really very bright and quick, knows a lot, loves military history with a passion, but he sings a one-note tune, much like Hood -- and anything he disagrees with is absolute dreck, "turns his stomach", etc. He likes Hood's aggressiveness, so he excuses Hood for just about anything.

In those months of Franklin & Nashville discussions, for example, Clair and I got down to arguing about just how long it took for Forrest to receive his instructions up around Johnsonville -- because he wanted to show that Forrest was responsible for Hood's delays. This got down to figuring out what routes the messages would take and how fast the riders would ride. On Spring Hill, we spent a lot of time on Forrest's actions (generally, Forrest came off well for what he did to Wilson to get there, not so good on what happened at Spring Hill).

At Franklin, Clair's not really opposed to Forrest's flanking movement (Clair's never really opposed to any plan that stars the cavalry). He also has no problem with Hood's attack -- but then Clair is an open admirer of what the military calls "death rides" or "forlorn hopes", things like the Charge of the Light Brigade.

As to Federal accounts, I've probably read what you'd expect outside the OR. Cox's The Battle of Franklin, etc. I normally read higher level accounts than the ones you seem to want, because I am more interested in aspects of command. So I rarely read personal journals and diaries of common soldiers (say anyone below Brigade level, and usually I read above that). Same for biographies.

But Eric, if you want to study and criticize Hood's actions as an Army commander, eyewitness accounts by participants at a single battle are usually the wrong place to be looking. Works of analysis focusing on broader issues and longer periods are where you'll find the most likely information.

Here's one I just picked at random from a Google search: The Making of General John B. Hood: a Study of Command http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA264613&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. This is a US Army War College independent study project from 1993 by a LTC Harry Houchens (who I have never heard of before). I can't say I agree with it completely, particularly the psychological part, and I can point to some detail errors just as you might -- but I'd suggest you take a look at it just to see how military men think about such things.

Tim

 

[Baggage Handler #2]

Eric:

You are completely and absolutely wrong here. You are reading your own sensitivity about Hood into far too much, IMHO. That is as flat as I can put it; I have tried several times to put it more politely.
...

Jeez, cut the guy some slack maybe. I'm not in this one, but I'm also not seeing the inner polemicist here.

 

[Elennsar]

This does, unfortunately, speaking as someone who would rate Hood as a general (as in, general of full rank), as 1.5 out of 5 stars (Varro being a 1 for tactical...well, let's just say Cannae was one sided.)
primarily for being a very poor strategist and inept at handling the "off the field" aspects of command, seem to have boiled into a thing having no relationship to Hood's merits or flaws.

For the record, Lee and Grant are 4s. McClellan or Pope would be a 1. Bragg a 2.

Eric, I respect your judgment and I agree that Hood at times has been treated as someone who was a brainless moron and stoned out of whatever mind he did have.

He deserves better. Much better.

But at the same time, I think it is true that you...unintentionaly, I believe, have become very sensitive to any implication that Hood ever displayed anything that could be called the s-word.

I don't mean this as an attack. But whenever one is trying to be objective about someone who has long been atttacked and criticized, it tends to come out as strongly defensive of the individual, even if one is genuinely trying not to be. Naturally, one is suspicious of the critics and will use what evidence one can (up to one's trust in the source) to point out how it was done well.

Take any defense of Ewell at Gettysburg (on day 1). It almost inevitably winds up as "Ewell did a good thing." Not just "Ewell did not cost Lee the battle."...that we should praise Ewell for not attacking. Or at least consider that a sign of good generalship.

Your defense of Hood, again I believe entirely unintentionally, has slipped in that direction, at least in this conversation. To say that Hood had a good tactical eye, was able to move troops quickly, saw the one way if an attack could possibly succeed that it would do so and tried to take advantage of it, and that he did very well as a brigade command, are not slight compliments. If one looked through the Army of Northern Virginia's brigade commanders, Hood would have to be at the very top. Unfortunately, his division command record does not measure up, but mostly through a lack of action as one, rather than a lack of prowess.

In Georgia and Tennessee...for reasons he could control and reasons he couldn't...he did poorly (simply speaking of "he did not win".).

In regards to the weather...I cannot speak for trice, but in my impression, the reason is "Okay, what should Hood have expected/prepared for as 'this is a given' and what would be reasonable to expect as 'if things go bad'".

If there was an intent to bash Hood over this, I believe it would have been argued about differently.

So...what Ole said. Can we stop making this into a contest between "Hood was not an idiot!" and a percieved "Hood was an idiot!" and return to weighing how well or badly he did with the situation (however unfavorable) he had?

Hood...rightly or wrongly...gambled when he entered Tennessee. The question is...did he act in ways that would maximize what chance of success he did have, or did his actions (and inactions) weaken his position further than it would have been simply by the lack of resources to work with?

In my opinion, the foul weather in and of itself is not a reason to condemn Hood. Hood being unprepared for it, perhaps. Hood calculating everything on the basis of good weather and being unable to adjust to the weather going (unexpectedly) ugly, yes. But both sides had a problem thanks to the nasty weather, one side was able to find the supplies to deal with it and made its plans allowing for it, and one side was unable to, for a variety of controlable and uncontrolable reasons.


To all who read this: Bold italics are meant. I am not interested in this becoming the battle of the historians. That benefits no one...here or there. I am afraid that emotions have been worked up and are trying to usurp the good judgment we are all more than capable of.

 

[EricJacobson]

As to Federal accounts, I've probably read what you'd expect outside the OR. Cox's The Battle of Franklin, etc. I normally read higher level accounts than the ones you seem to want, because I am more interested in aspects of command. So I rarely read personal journals and diaries of common soldiers (say anyone below Brigade level, and usually I read above that). Same for biographies.

But Eric, if you want to study and criticize Hood's actions as an Army commander, eyewitness accounts by participants at a single battle are usually the wrong place to be looking. Works of analysis focusing on broader issues and longer periods are where you'll find the most likely information.

Here's one I just picked at random from a Google search: The Making of General John B. Hood: a Study of Command http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA264613&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. This is a US Army War College independent study project from 1993 by a LTC Harry Houchens (who I have never heard of before). I can't say I agree with it completely, particularly the psychological part, and I can point to some detail errors just as you might -- but I'd suggest you take a look at it just to see how military men think about such things.

Tim

Couple of quick things:

The article you referred to looks very interesting. I'll be reading it tonight.

As to sources I'll just say this. I understand why you read mostly upper level studies and not diaries, letters, etc from rank and file soldiers. For the purpose of what I set out to do, however, which was to write a book, I had to read everything I could get my hands on. Just so you know, my bibliography for For Cause & For Country contains about 350 individual sources, both from the upper levels of command down to the lowliest private. It is about 15 full pages of sources.

I have found that analyzing everything gives at least me a better understanding of the entire picture because one cannot discount what the average guy who was there actually thought. To be frank, we're just average guys debating about whether a command decision, or decisions, was right or not. We probably have less weight in the argument than the old soldiers do, or did.

This may sound like a silly comparison, but consider Iraq. What percentage of the American population thought the war was going badly at any given time? Not so long ago, and maybe even now, the country was about split 50-50. Even some commanders have come under fire and been accused of all sorts of incompetence, etc. That analysis is from thousands of miles away, removed from the battlefield and the various problems each and every day brings. On the other hand, ask the average soldier what he thinks. You won't find nearly the second guessing that goes on among reporters, authors, bloggers, politicians, etc. Basically, there are far more positive and less likely to second guess and criticize at length.

So what the "real" truth? I can't say for certain, but if I were going to judge a guy like David Petraeus, William Westmoreland, or even John Bell Hood, I would not limit myself just to broad command studies. I'd get right down to the men who did the actual fighting. What they say is often eye opening and sometimes is in direct contradiction to what you would expect.

I think to understand more clearly, you have to evaluate every source you can find.

 

[trice]

Couple of quick things:

The article you referred to looks very interesting. I'll be reading it tonight.

Just one of many. The War College seems to be putting a good many (all?) of the student papers in their archives online. You can find other US military institutions doing the same, as well as some other nations around the world. On this particular paper, I'm not much of a fan of Myers-Briggs Type analysis, so assume I probably disagree with any reliance he puts on that.

As to sources I'll just say this. I understand why you read mostly upper level studies and not diaries, letters, etc from rank and file soldiers. For the purpose of what I set out to do, however, which was to write a book, I had to read everything I could get my hands on. Just so you know, my bibliography for For Cause & For Country contains about 350 individual sources, both from the upper levels of command down to the lowliest private. It is about 15 full pages of sources.

That would be what I would expect of you.

I have found that analyzing everything gives at least me a better understanding of the entire picture because one cannot discount what the average guy who was there actually thought. To be frank, we're just average guys debating about whether a command decision, or decisions, was right or not. We probably have less weight in the argument than the old soldiers do, or did.

The average guy in a battle is very concerned with all the bullets buzzing by his head. He is not studying the actions of his commanders on logistics, and he is not sitting around looking over their shoulders when they have discussions between the generals. For purposes of your book, you acted properly, but for purposes of developing a wide-background view of Hood as an Army commander general, most of what you are referring to would be largely inapplicable. This is a question of focus only.

This may sound like a silly comparison, but consider Iraq. What percentage of the American population thought the war was going badly at any given time? Not so long ago, and maybe even now, the country was about split 50-50. Even some commanders have come under fire and been accused of all sorts of incompetence, etc. That analysis is from thousands of miles away, removed from the battlefield and the various problems each and every day brings. On the other hand, ask the average soldier what he thinks. You won't find nearly the second guessing that goes on among reporters, authors, bloggers, politicians, etc. Basically, there are far more positive and less likely to second guess and criticize at length.

This is the normal situation in history, no different in the Civil War than now, and civilian populations always have different takes on things than soldiers. But back in 2003, most people who had a military background would have said that phases I, II and III of the plan would work out in favor of the US -- and they worked out better than estimated. But Phase IV of that plan was in terrible shape when the war started, and it worked out terribly.

It is, however, generally a bad idea to mix current events into Civil War discussions online, in my experience.

So what the "real" truth? I can't say for certain, but if I were going to judge a guy like David Petraeus, William Westmoreland, or even John Bell Hood, I would not limit myself just to broad command studies. I'd get right down to the men who did the actual fighting. What they say is often eye opening and sometimes is in direct contradiction to what you would expect.

True enough. But often the opinion of the common soldier is biased, uninformed, and wrong as well.

It is just as easy to get lost in the details of a low level, and miss the forest for the trees.

Tim

 

[Baggage Handler #2]

... But often the opinion of the common soldier is biased, uninformed, and wrong as well.

It is just as easy to get lost in the details of a low level, and miss the forest for the trees.

Tim

Forgive me for shoehorning in... but the things you can get from the grunt's eye view you just won't find elsewhere.

Some are details of command life and philosophy, such as Sam Watkins describing how someone up his chain of command invited his (Sam's) father to eat with them. Sam was crestfallen to discover that this officer ate the same kind & amount as his troops. Similarly, his observations on the burning supplies on the retreat from Chattanooga cast a lot of light on why Bragg ultimately failed. These won't be found in official reports.

Other things you can glean are the unintended details, the account of a teamster, for example, gives light on the logistics of moving and feeding a division, the capacity of the roads, and to a certain extent, the ability of the army to move at all.
Of particular interest is the unofficial exchange rate of confederate currency to greenbacks - up to 50:1 in Tennessee in early 1863 down to 1:50 in Andersonville a year later. Not only does this speak volumes about the relative health of the southern economy, but the collapse of the currency in 1864 signifies the beginning of the southern home front's loss of confidence.

If 'twere me, I'd try to get a couple flag rank memoirs, a dozen company grade, and maybe twice that enlisted - of each side.

 

[Elennsar]

I disagree. Certainly, you can learn a fair amount from the grunt's eye view.

Or you can look at the fact that General Soandso reported that he was unable to move because the roads were muddy.

A teamster grumbling that the roads were muddy that and a general reporting that are telling...exactly the same thing.

I don't want to dismiss the importance of the view of the grunts. But if I was going to write an account on oh, the battle of Stone's River, I'd want to know what Bragg thought far more than what Sam Watkins thought.

I'd be more than willing to read any relevant passage by Watkins or a similiar level, but I think you're greatly overrating the amount that they knew and understood relative to what those on top knew/understood.

Certain, in some ways Watkins had a better view (as an individual) than Bragg, but Bragg's view (and what he did/failed to do because of what he saw/thought he saw) made a much bigger difference to the army.

Picking Watkins here as someone whose writings are on my "to read before I die" list but not on any "to read any time soon" list (mostly because memoirs do not interest me as reading material, just like I'm generally not fond of first person narrative in fiction. Its a taste thing) and as someone who seems to have had a pretty good idea of what he was talking about.

 

[EricJacobson]

Tim,

I think we have come to a point were we really do understand where the other is coming from, even if we don't necessarily agree about Hood at Franklin.

Thanks for the exchanges. Perhaps one day you'll read my book and hopefully what I have written there will come across far better than most of my posts.

Eric

 

[Glorybound]

Tim, on that link you provided above I'm unable to get past this screen.(below) I've clicked on the proxy url several times, got nothing, then pasted the link into Google,and still nothing. Am I having a "cookies" problem or something? By the way, this thread is superb quality reading. As always I'm learning here, both from Eric and yourself. I've read only two books on Franklin, one of them being Eric's, which is very informative and worth the read. I'd like to read any and all supplemental material I can find also. Anyway, I feel privileged to be able to read the discourse between you and Eric, Elennsar and others who've posted on this thread.

Leland

Accession Number:
ADA264613
Full Text (pdf) Availability:
Size: 2 MB
Handle / proxy Url: http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA264613
Citation Status:
A - Active
Title:
The Making of General John B. Hood: A Study of Command
Fields and Groups :
150600 - Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
150100 - Military Forces and Organizations
050600 - Humanities and History

Corporate Author:
ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
Personal Author(s):
Houchens, Harry W

Report Date:
15 Apr 1993
Media Count:
51 Pages(s)
Organization Type:
A - ARMY
Report Number(s):
XAUSAWC (XAUSAWC)


DescriptiveNote:
Study project,
Monitor Acronym(s):
XA (XA)

Monitor Series:
USAWC (USAWC)

Descriptors:
MILITARY STRATEGY, ZMILITARY STRATEGYZ, HISTORY, ZHISTORYZ, MILITARY COMMANDERS, ZMILITARY COMMANDERSZ, MILITARY TACTICS, ZMILITARY TACTICSZ, FIELD GRADE OFFICERS, ZFIELD GRADE OFFICERSZ, TENNESSEE, ZTENNESSEEZ, TACTICAL WARFARE, ZTACTICAL WARFAREZ, THREATS, ZTHREATSZ, ARMY, ZARMYZ, FAILURE, ZFAILUREZ, UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, ZUNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMYZ, PERSONALITY, ZPERSONALITYZ, WINTER, ZWINTERZ
Identifiers:
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, HOOD JOHN B., CONFEDERACY, ATLANTA, ARMY OF TENNESSEE.
Abstract:
Students of the Civil War are well versed in the operational campaign successes and the generalship of Lee, Grant, and Sherman. A lesser-known campaign, General John B. Hood's invasion of Tennessee during the winter of 1864, may have been the most important one of the war. Hood's record as a tactician was brilliant. For this he received command of the Army of Tennessee as it grappled with Sherman at the gates of Atlanta. After the fall of the city, the Confederacy's options for prolonging the war to exhaust Northern resolve were limited. Although shaken and reduced, Hood's army was the only substantial force available for offensive operations. A threat to Sherman's lines of communications in Tennessee and subsequent victory there might have negated the Union threat to the South's heartland and recovered all that had been lost at Atlanta. This was not to be; Hood all but destroyed his army in the try. This paper is an analysis of the relative fitness of one military leader's character at escalating levels of command. From early life, Hood possessed the traits of personality that were destined to make him a brilliant success at the tactical level, secure his elevation above it, and cause him dismal failure once there. This paper is a journey into the enigma of successful generalship.
Distribution Limitation(s):
01 - APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Source Code:
403565
Document Location:
1 - DTIC AND NTIS
Geopolitical Code:
4219
Distribution Statement:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Citation Updated:
20 Jun 2007

 

[trice]

Forgive me for shoehorning in... but the things you can get from the grunt's eye view you just won't find elsewhere.

Some are details of command life and philosophy, such as Sam Watkins describing how someone up his chain of command invited his (Sam's) father to eat with them. Sam was crestfallen to discover that this officer ate the same kind & amount as his troops. Similarly, his observations on the burning supplies on the retreat from Chattanooga cast a lot of light on why Bragg ultimately failed. These won't be found in official reports.

Other things you can glean are the unintended details, the account of a teamster, for example, gives light on the logistics of moving and feeding a division, the capacity of the roads, and to a certain extent, the ability of the army to move at all.
Of particular interest is the unofficial exchange rate of confederate currency to greenbacks - up to 50:1 in Tennessee in early 1863 down to 1:50 in Andersonville a year later. Not only does this speak volumes about the relative health of the southern economy, but the collapse of the currency in 1864 signifies the beginning of the southern home front's loss of confidence.

If 'twere me, I'd try to get a couple flag rank memoirs, a dozen company grade, and maybe twice that enlisted - of each side.

All interesting and important -- if they apply to what you are trying to learn. But nothing you just mentioned would relate to Hood's ability to handle logistics, for example, which is essential to his ability to command an Army.

Along the way, I've read a fair number of journals and diaries by soldiers and civilians. It is also fairly hard to miss the extracts from them most modern day historians sprinkle about. But for the subjects I am interested in, it would be far more useful to look at what Generals and staff officers have to say while sliding past the common soldier.

Grunt-level opinions come from a very personal point-of-view. For example, my Dad served in the 96th Division in WWII, a justly famed unit, and one of the regimental commanders was a Colonel May. One day I came across a mention of May's name, with a comment that he was the one of the US Army's finest tactical commanders at that level in WWII, scheduled for a division command in the near future when the war ended. So I asked Dad what he thought of him (different regiment). Dad's opinion wasn't so high; he thought the man got a few too many GIs shot up in his operations. Dad's division took about 12,000 casualties (all causes) on Okinawa, mostly in the rifle companies, so Dad's regiment took quite a few of them; Col. May's regiment took a bit more.

If you want to evaluate that man the way an Army would, you'd give little weight to my Dad's opinion. May's aggressive use of his forces and record of success would be more important, along with all the factors frontline infantrymen don't see or see with a different perspective than a commander needs. I never looked enough to see if there was much of a difference between the regimental commanders; maybe May was clearly better at some things. But the 96th was one of only four US Army divisions to get a Presidential Unit Citation in WWII, so probably the others did pretty good as well.

Tim

 

[trice]

Tim, on that link you provided above I'm unable to get past this screen.(below) I've clicked on the proxy url several times, got nothing, then pasted the link into Google,and still nothing. Am I having a "cookies" problem or something? ...

When I click on the Handle / proxy Url: http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA264613

I get a PDF file that pops opens in a new window. Some secuurity settings in your browser might block that. Try holding down the CTRL or shift key when you click on it.

If you don't have the free ***** Reader program installed on your machine, I'd guess you would see a message about that.

Tim

 

[Baggage Handler #2]

I disagree. Certainly, you can learn a fair amount from the grunt's eye view.

...
Certain, in some ways Watkins had a better view (as an individual) than Bragg, but Bragg's view (and what he did/failed to do because of what he saw/thought he saw) made a much bigger difference to the army.

Picking Watkins here as someone whose writings are on my "to read before I die" list but not on any "to read any time soon" list (mostly because memoirs do not interest me as reading material, just like I'm generally not fond of first person narrative in fiction. Its a taste thing) and as someone who seems to have had a pretty good idea of what he was talking about.

Yeah, I could've been more clear, but if you look again, I suggest a balance of sources from top to bottom.
If you want details on the nature of the assault at Kennesaw, you go to the grunt. Similarly, Bierce's haunting image of Chickamauga (he was a captain attached to Rosecrans) is unmatched by anything in the OR and precious little else in nonfiction:

... to my astonishment I saw the entire country in front swarming with Confederates; the very earth seemed to be moving toward us! They came on in thousands, ...

The thing is, that the point of writing new books about the subject is to convey the ideas in the language of a modern reader.
It's the nuances, the details, the subtle connections that separate a readable work from a government tract on social diseases.

I will leave you with a teaser from Watkins:

Now, Hood sent off all his cavalry right in the face of a powerful army, by order and at the suggestion of Jeff Davis, and was using his cannon as "feelers." O, God! Ye gods! I get sick at heart even at this late day when I think of it.

I remember the morning that General Wheeler's cavalry filed by our brigade, and of their telling us, "Good-bye, boys, good-bye, boys."
The First Tennessee Cavalry and Ninth Battalion were both made up in Maury county. I saw John J. Stephenson, my friend and step-brother, and David F. Watkins my own dear brother, and Arch Lipscomb, Joe Fussell, Captain Kinzer, Jack Gordon, George Martin, Major Dobbins, Colonel Lewis, Captain Galloway, Aaron and Sims Latta, Major J. H. Akin, S. H. Armstrong, Albert Dobbins, Alex Dobbins, Jim Cochran, Rafe Grisham, Captain Jim Polk, and many others with whom I was acquainted. They all said, "Good-bye, Sam, good-bye, Sam." I cried. I remember stopping the whole command and begging them to please not leave us; that if they did, Atlanta, and perhaps Hood's whole army, would surrender in a few days; but they told me, as near as I can now remember, "We regret to leave you, but we have to obey orders." The most ignorant private in the whole army saw everything that we had been fighting for for four years just scattered like chaff to the winds. All the Generals resigned, and those who did not resign were promoted; colonels were made brigadier-generals, captains were made colonels, and the private soldier, well, he deserted, don't you see? The private soldiers of the Army of Tennessee looked upon Hood as an over-rated general, but Jeff Davis did not.

 

[Elennsar]

A dozen (on each side) privates and one general is not "balanced" between generals and privates...though I'll accept you meant "listen to both". Arguing over what someone else meant is a sign of incredible arrogance.

And yes. If you want the details of how it felt, by all means. If you want the details on why it was ordered, this is entirely the wrong level. It should not be overlooked...I just don't feel that it says as much as you seemed to have posted that it does.

Bierce...well, let's just say that great writers are a rare treasure. Writers who know of what they speak who can also present it well are even rarer. He's definately one of that breed.

And I think the last three sentences in that teaser, while possibly assuming more insight into "this would be a disaster" than was obvious at the time to Watkins and his felows, sums it up as well as any general or any historian could ever do.

It was not on a failure, it was a blunder.

 

[Glorybound]

By Trice

Some secuurity settings in your browser might block that

I believe that's what it is Tim, thanks. I'm a little reluctant to go tinkering with the mad doctor Norton's setup, so for the time being at least I'll have to pass up the link but I've saved it. 'Preciate it.

Respectfully,
Leland

 

[larry_cockerham]

I had an ancestor, a Confederate private, age 19 following well behind Hood at Franklin in Lee's Corps. They arrived too late for battle and were assigned to gurard the ordinance. Another ancestor was on the north side of the Harpeth with Gen. Wilson's horses. If it weren't for a little less than stellar performances by command on both sides, I might not be typing this post. Trying to write my own "book" about these two men, I've learned probably far more of what I was looking for through the eyes of the soldiers who were there. The weather was a very big thing (a rare ice storm) and the swollen rivers from far too much rain. Not fit for man nor beast, yet they tried to fight a war.

 

[Baggage Handler #2]

A dozen (on each side) privates and one general is not "balanced" between generals and privates...though I'll accept you meant "listen to both". Arguing over what someone else meant is a sign of incredible arrogance.
...

I think we're pretty close to saying the same thing, but our approaches are at odds. One might have to push through a dozen enlisted reminiscences to get enough detail to be helpful at the same level as 3 company grade memoirs or one of flag rank. But the combined insights thus available ought to make excellent fodder for a skilled writer.
It's the ratio I was meaning more than an absolute number.

For example, there's one instance of a unit assaulting Snodgrass Hill at Chickamauga, taking it, retreating back down it, then assaulting it again, taking it, and holding it until dark. A memoir from a POW and a speech by a LTC at a reunion agree on this. No mention on the unit marker at Chickamauga, nor by any general.

 

[Glorybound]

I only wish you could have known Baggage Handler #1.

Perhaps this isn't the right forum to ask this but I'm intrigued by your username and your signature, BH2. If you've a mind to I'd like to hear the story, as would some others here most likely. Or if you'd like to keep it private you can PM me if you want. Or you can ignore me completely.


Respectfully,
Leland

 

[Elennsar]

Ahhhhh, I get it now. Yeah, agreed. The bits and pieces that form the puzzle are scattered all over. And sometimes some people (of whatever rank) don't mention something, which is itself interesting...and worrisome.