Hood's Plan -- Hood's Failure

[trice]

This is according to Jefferson Davis in his 1881 The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government.

Hood's plan:
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... The plan of operations which I had discussed with General Hood while at his headquarters was fully explained to General Beauregard at Augusta, and by him cordially approved. It comprised the occupation of a strong position on the enemy's line of communication by the railroad between Atlanta and Chattanooga, the capture of his depots of supplies and the small garrisons left to guard them. If this, as was probable, should cause Sherman to move to attack us in position, in that case, if the tone of the troops justified it, a battle should be joined ; otherwise, he should retreat toward Gadsden, where supplies would be collected, and, should Sherman follow him so far, then there, on the dividing line of the States of Georgia and Alabama, the largest practicable number of militia and home-guards of both States would be assembled as an auxiliary
force, and there a final stand should be made for a decisive battle. If victorious, as under the circumstances it was hoped we should be, the enemy could not retreat through the wasted country behind him, and must surrender or disperse. If Sherman should not pursue our retiring army to Gadsden, but return to Atlanta to march toward the seacoast, he was to be pursued, and, by our superiority in cavalry, to be prevented from foraging on the country, which, according to our information as to his supplies on hand at Atlanta, and as to his inadequate means of transportation, would be indispensable for the support of his troops. Should Sherman, contrary to that information, have supplies and transportation sufficient to enable him to march across the country, and he should start toward the seacoast, the militia, the local troops, and others who could be employed, should obstruct the roads and fords in his front by felling trees, and, by burning bridges and other available means, delay his progress until his provisions should be consumed and absolute want should deplete if not disintegrate his army. ...
=====
Note that Hood never crossed at Gunter's Landing; that was the original goal. Davis text has the crossing point wrong.

Note that Hood willfully abandoned this plan, moving further and further West until he was so far from Atlanta and Sherman that he could not execute the plan as he had described it.

Davis' comments on how Hood actually acted:
=====
...
To the arguments offered to show that our army could not, after it had reached the Tennessee River, have effectually pursued Sherman in his march through southern Georgia, it is only needful to reply that the -physical difficulties set forth would not have existed, had our army commenced the pursuit from Gadsden.

To make the movement into Tennessee a success, even so far as to recover that country, it was necessary that it should be executed so promptly as to anticipate the concentration of the enemy's forces, but unforeseen and unavoidable delays occurred, which gave fall time for preparation. After having overcome many vexatious detentions, Hood on the 20th of November completed his crossing of the Tennessee River at Gunter's Landing, and moved forward into Tennessee on the route to Nashville, whither Sherman had sent General Thomas for the protection of his depots and communications against an apprehended attack by cavalry under General Forrest.

Most unwilling to criticise the conduct of that very gallant and faithful soldier who, battle-scarred and mutilated, survived the war, and whose recent death our country has so much deplored, I must say after the event, as I did before it, that I consider this movement into Tennessee ill-advised.

Thomas having been sufficiently reenforced in Tennessee to enable him to hold Hood in check, and Sherman relieved from the necessity of defending himself against an active army, and of protecting a long line of railroad communication with a fortified base in his rear, resolved upon his march to the sea, abandoning Atlanta, after having first utterly destroyed that city by fire. ...
=====

In short, Davis thinks Hood blew it. Might be a bit of CYA after the war -- but then there is also this:
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RICHMOND, November 30, 1864.
General BEAUREGARD:
(Care of Col. W. M. Browne, Augusta, Ga.)
Yours of the 24th received. It is probable that the enemy, if short of supplies, may move directly for the coast. When that is made manifest you will be able to concentrate your forces upon the one object, and, I hope, if you cannot defeat his attempt, that you may reduce his army to such condition as to be ineffective for further operations. Until Hood reaches the country proper of the enemy he can scarcely change the plans for Sherman's or Grant's campaigns. They would, I think, regard the occupation of Tennessee and Kentucky as of minor importance.
JEFF'S DAVIS.
=====

Even as the campaign was in progress, Davis understands that moving into TN is a mistake. Hood is the one who cannot figure it out.

Tim

 

[5fish]

Plan..

Now we need to find Hood's notes on the subject to see if they support Davis contentions about moving into TN or some other historical support.

I worry for Davis was bitter in his last days and his memoirs tend to be self serving works. I still believe if Hood had pushed Schofield into the river then Grant would have to react quickly with troops from somewhere for Thomas in Nashville. It may not have stopped Sherman but it would have become a big problem Grant could not ignore.

If Thomas had been defeat before reinforcement got him then think of the "What if" there could be...

 

[trice]

Now we need to find Hood's notes on the subject to see if they support Davis contentions about moving into TN or some other historical support.

I worry for Davis was bitter in his last days and his memoirs tend to be self serving works. I still believe if Hood had pushed Schofield into the river then Grant would have to react quickly with troops from somewhere for Thomas in Nashville. It may not have stopped Sherman but it would have become a big problem Grant could not ignore.

If Thomas had been defeat before reinforcement got him then think of the "What if" there could be...

Davis' memoirs certainly need to be viewed with skepticism. Joe Johnston's are at least as bad, and Hood's are even worse. All three were playing fast-and-loose with the facts as they spun CYA tales after the war. But if you have to pick one of the three to be the most unreliable, it would be Hood's.

One of the things to be aware of in studying the Civil War is that the details of many works written before the publication of the relevant part of the Official Records are often wrong. Once the book hit the libraries, thousands of veterans grabbed them to check facts -- and lots of stories changed.

Tim

 

[trice]

N...I still believe if Hood had pushed Schofield into the river then Grant would have to react quickly with troops from somewhere for Thomas in Nashville. It may not have stopped Sherman but it would have become a big problem Grant could not ignore.

If Thomas had been defeat before reinforcement got him then think of the "What if" there could be...

As Hood is assaulting Franklin, 2 of Smith's 3 divisions are offloading from the transports in Nashville. The last one disembarks the next day. That is 10,000 veteran reinforcements in Nashville by December 1, before Hood could possibly get there -- and another few thousand arriving by train from Chattanooga-Murfreesboro right after them. In the short term Nashville was safe.

Sherman, meanwhile, has been marching from Atlanta to Savannah since November 15. He has no communications with Grant until he gets to the coast in late December, so Grant will not be pulling any troops from him.

Tim

 

[5fish]

Trice

Here is a quote from Gen. Shofield who believe the assault on his position was justified

"Hood must therefore attack on November 30, or lose the advantage of greatly superior numbers. It was impossible, after the pursuit from Spring Hill, in a short day to turn our position or make any other attack but a direct one in front. Besides, our position, with the river in our rear, gave him the chance of vastly greater results, if his assault were successful, than could be hoped for by any attack he could make after we had crossed the Harpeth. Still more, there was no unusual obstacle to a successful assault at Franklin. The defenses were of the slightest character, and it was not possible to make them formidable during the short time our troops were in position, after the previous exhausting operations of both day and night, which had rendered some rest on the 30th absolutely necessary."

Hood's foe even believed it was a proper move against him at Franklin.


A muse.....

 

[ole]

Schofield's position in Franklin was indeed tenuous. With one exception. It is axiomatic that you do not attack an entrenched enemy without a great advantage in numbers. Hood didn't have that. His available forces that night were roughly equal -- nowhere near an advantage.

Insane is the only word that applies.

ole

 

[trice]

Trice

Here is a quote from Gen. Shofield who believe the assault on his position was justified

"Hood must therefore attack on November 30, or lose the advantage of greatly superior numbers. It was impossible, after the pursuit from Spring Hill, in a short day to turn our position or make any other attack but a direct one in front. Besides, our position, with the river in our rear, gave him the chance of vastly greater results, if his assault were successful, than could be hoped for by any attack he could make after we had crossed the Harpeth. Still more, there was no unusual obstacle to a successful assault at Franklin. The defenses were of the slightest character, and it was not possible to make them formidable during the short time our troops were in position, after the previous exhausting operations of both day and night, which had rendered some rest on the 30th absolutely necessary."

Hood's foe even believed it was a proper move against him at Franklin.


A muse.....

Unfortunately, Schofield isn't too reliable on this either. Hood didn't have "greatly superior numbers". While the defenses at Franklin weren't in good condition, they were a lot better than nothing -- and the approach across 3/4ers of a mile of open field made attacking them even less likely to succeed. Only the blatant mistake in leaving 2 Union brigades exposed out there allowed the Confederates to get to the lines -- without that, it is difficult to believe they would ever have penetrated the Union position. Simply put, the only chance they had was the Union reluctance to fire while the fleeing Yankees and the advancing Rebels were intermixed.

A few quotes from people who were there:

I could easily see all the movements of the Federals and readily trace their line. I saw that they were well fortified and in a strong position. I felt that we would take a desperate chance if we attempted to dislodge them.
Major General Benjamin F. Cheatham

General Cleburne seemed to be more despondent than I ever saw him. Iwas the last one to receive any instructions from him, and as I saluted and bade him good-bye I remarked, 'Well General, there will not be many of us that will get back to Arkansas,' to which he replied, "Well, Govan, if we are to die, let us die like men."
Brigadier Daniel C. Govan

We could see them casting doubting glances in the direction of the formidable foe in our front; and judging from the appearance of their grave and serious looks, we all knew that our commanders in some degree realized the dept of that yawning gulf of destruction which awaited them and us, and which only too soon would engulf us all.
Anonymous Confederate soldier, speaking of the Confederate generals before the assault.

I never saw men put in such a terrible position as Cleburne's division for a few minutes. The wonder is that any of them escaped death or capture.
James Barr, 65th Illinois.

As to the defenses, here is one description:
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The Columbia Pike bisected the works, which at that point were built just in front of the Carter house, a one-story brick dwelling west of the pike, and a large gin-house on the east side. Between the gin-house and the river the works were partly protected in front by a hedge of Osage orange, and on the knoll, near the railroad cut close to the bank, were two batteries belonging to the Fourth Corps. Near the Carter house was a considerable thicket of locust trees. Except these obstructions, the whole ground in front was entirely unobstructed and fenceless, and, from the works, every part of unobstructed and fenceless, and, from the works, every part of it was in plain sight. General Cox's division of three brigades, commanded that day, in order from left to right, by Colonels Stiles and Casement and General Reilly, occupied the ground between the Columbia Pike and the river above the town. The front line consisted of eight regiments, three in the works and one in reserve for each of the brigades of Stiles and Casement, while Reilly's brigade nearest the pike had but two regiments in the works, and two in a second line, with still another regiment behind that. West of the pike, reaching to a ravine through which passes a road branching from the Carter's Creek Pike, was Ruger's division of two brigades — the third, under General Cooper, not having come up from Johnsouville. Strickland's brigade, of four regiments, had two in the works and two in reserve. Two of these regiments, the 72d Illinois and 44th Missouri, belonged to A. J. Smith's corps, and had reported to General Schofield only the day before. A third, which was in reserve, the 183d Ohio, was a large and entirely new regiment, having been mustered into service only three weeks before, and having joined the army for the first time on the 28th. Moore's brigade, of six regiments, had four in the works and two in reserve. Beyond Ruger, reaching from the ravine to the river below, was Kimball's division of the Fourth Corps, — all veterans, — consisting of three brigades commanded by Generals William Grose and Walter C. Whitaker and Colonel Isaac M. Kirby. All the troops in the works were ordered to report to General Cox, to whom was assigned the command of the defenses. General Wood's division of the Fourth Corps had gone over the river with the trains ; and two brigades of Wagner's division, which had so valiantly stood their ground at Spring Hill and covered the rear since, were halted on a slope about half a mile to the front. Opdycke had brought his brigade within the works, and held them massed, near the pike, behind the Carter house. Besides the guns on the knoll, near the railroad cut, there were six pieces in Reilly's works ; four on Strickland's left ; two on Moore's left, and four on Grose's left — in all, twenty-six guns in that part of the works, facing south, and twelve more in reserve, on or near the Columbia Pike.
Henry Stone, in Battes and Leaders of the Civil War

The two batteries covering the RR cut did ferocious execution on the Rebels trying to fight their way through it.



Tim

 

[OpnDownfall]

Hood's Plan--Hood's failure

After Spring Hill, the pursuing confederates were heartened the evidence of a quick flight by the Union army. The Franklin Pike was littered with equipment, dead mules and burned wagons. Union stragglers unabler to keep up with the fast retreating main column, were snapped up during the pursuit.
Hood received word from the advance column that Schofield was still in Franklin, but could be seen frantically trying to cross the Harpeth River.
Clearly an opportunity existed to keep Schofield from reaching Thomas at Nashville. Hood later received a captured dispatch from Thomas to Schofield giving permission for Schofield to fall back to the north side of the Harpeth if he felt he could not stop the Confederate army, which, of course, was exactly how Schofield felt. All evidence observable, indicated that Schofield was only waiting for his bridging to be completed to retreat to Nashville, which was exactly right.
So an attempt to stay Schofield's flight, necessarily, had to be made quickly and efficiently with the time available. It is mid afternoon, and it can, confidently, be expected that Schofield will be gone and in Nashville by morning.
It would take a person confident of his knowledge of Lee, under all circumstances, thatLee would Not have reached Hood's conclusion and that if he did, he would have been more successful than Hood.

 

[trice]

After Spring Hill, the pursuing confederates were heartened the evidence of a quick flight by the Union army. The Franklin Pike was littered with equipment, dead mules and burned wagons. Union stragglers unabler to keep up with the fast retreating main column, were snapped up during the pursuit.

Sure. This is only what would be expected from a Union force making a forced night march to escape a trap -- after having marched all day anyway before that.

I suspect, however, that while the AoT morale might have gone up seeing that, the description you see of it in some quarters is overblown. There are also plenty of descriptions of Confederates somberly considering how bloody the assault was going to be before they started -- including Patrick Cleburne.

Note that Hood's description of an upbeat, enthusiastic Cleburne at Franklin is clearly at odds with the descriptions from surviving members of his staff and divison of a somber and almost despondent Cleburne -- such as Brigadier General Govan.

Hood received word from the advance column that Schofield was still in Franklin, but could be seen frantically trying to cross the Harpeth River.

Schofield was there, and clearly trying to get his wagons and guns across the river. Frantically is a bit strong.

Clearly an opportunity existed to keep Schofield from reaching Thomas at Nashville. Hood later received a captured dispatch from Thomas to Schofield giving permission for Schofield to fall back to the north side of the Harpeth if he felt he could not stop the Confederate army, which, of course, was exactly how Schofield felt. All evidence observable, indicated that Schofield was only waiting for his bridging to be completed to retreat to Nashville, which was exactly right.

The same dispatch also indicates that Thomas wants Schofield to hold on down there if he can, so he can get Smith deployed south of Nashville. What Schofield will actually do is unknown to Hood.

Even if Schofield wants to hold Franklin he would still want to make sure his bridges were intact and his wagons across the river (where they would be out of the way of combat). He would still need to hold the crossing on the river to avoid being outflanked, and so would have his cavalry with some infantry support on the north bank. You have to evaluate all the possibilities, not just the one that fit Hood's idea
.

So an attempt to stay Schofield's flight, necessarily, had to be made quickly and efficiently with the time available. It is mid afternoon, and it can, confidently, be expected that Schofield will be gone and in Nashville by morning.

It is November 30th, and it is 4 PM when the attack starts. Hood would later claim the lack of daylight as one of the reasons the attack failed.

It would take a person confident of his knowledge of Lee, under all circumstances, that Lee would Not have reached Hood's conclusion and that if he did, he would have been more successful than Hood.

No, not really. The evidence is that most of Hood's subordinates (people like Corps commander Cheatham, division commander Cleburne, and brigade commander Govan) thought Hood's plan was a desperate one with little chance of success -- and would certainly lead to massive casualties.

It is launched with barely any preparation and (since Hood had left his guns and trains with S. D. Lee at Columbia when he moved on Spring Hill) essentially no artillery support. IIRR, Hood only had one battery of guns with him. (Yet Hood claims he refrained from using his artillery because of the civilians in the town.)

Here's what Corps commander S. D. Lee says of this supposedly weak position: "The enemy fought gallantly and obstinately at Franklin, and the position he held was, for infantry defense, one of the best I have ever seen."

IMHO, there was a chance for a Confederate success, and Hood saw the only way to achieve it. But the chance of that success I think was near 1%. I don't think 100-1 odds justify the slaughter Hood invited. I don't see any indication Lee would have made an attack with such a poor probability of success.

Tim

 

[EricJacobson]

Tim,

I don't feel Davis' version of events is even worth considering. Davis, from the contemporary evidence, available, suffered from a case of the flip flops. Speeches he gave immediately following his late September meeting with Hood at Palmetto, GA (which were printed in at least two newspapers) clearly indicate he knew invading Tennessee was always part of the plan. Davis' problem is that Hood is delayed and once Sherman gets to ripping across Georgia, Davis has a change of heart and thinks Hood should go after Sherman. Unfortunately, Davis can't have it both ways.

Also, let's be fair about crossing the Tennessee River. Hood wasn't just screwing around south of the Tennessee, he was trying to find a feasible crossing point. When he finally finds one at Florence, AL the weather turns on him and he gets delayed there for THREE weeks. Those three weeks were a huge factor and ususally overlooked in any analysis of the Tennessee Campaign. If Hood pushes into Tennessee the first week of November he only has the 4th Corps between him and Nashville. A. J. Smith's 16th Corps isn't even close to Nashville and there are only 8,000 garrison troops in Nashville. What if......

 

[EricJacobson]

Insane is the only word that applies.

ole

Perhaps, but the Rebel attack buckled the center of the Federal defensive perimeter and nearly caved Schofield in. Moscow Carter himself said the Rebels gashed a 200 yard wide hole in the Federal center. That's a mighty big hole. Of course Opdycke's men (who were never supposed to be in reserve anyway) and three regiments of recruits from Ohio and Missouri saved the day.

By the way, it's always fun to self-promote!!! My new book is about those recruits and I can tell you the evidence is overwhelming that Opdycke's guys get way more credit than they deserve. One of those new regiments alone suffered nearly as many casualties as did Opdycke's entire brigade. When the Rebels broke thru the center it wasn't Opdycke's guys who absorbed the initial thrust, it was the Missouri and Ohio recruits.

 

[EricJacobson]

IMHO, there was a chance for a Confederate success, and Hood saw the only way to achieve it. But the chance of that success I think was near 1%. I don't think 100-1 odds justify the slaughter Hood invited. I don't see any indication Lee would have made an attack with such a poor probability of success.

Tim

Remember, there are 5,000 cavalry and about 2,500 infantry north of the Harpeth blocking any potential flanking maneuver, at least three dozen pieces of artillery were present which could have fired into any flanking maneuver, wagons being pushed across the Harpeth were clear evidence Schofield intended to evacuate (which he was going to do at 6 p.m.), daylight is running out, the Federals are only a night's march from Nashville, you have failed to cut them off at Pulaski, Columbia, and Spring Hill, and the news is not good from Virginia and Georgia.

So the big question is what would you have done had you been in Hood's position?

 

[Elennsar]

For me, can't speak for Trice or Ole:

Assuming "not launch this campaign in the first place" is out, and we're down to this...

Find something important to attack, less heavily manned and fortified than Nashville, but make a convincing (if at all possible) feint to keep Schofield and Thomas wondering.

In the here and now, at least wait until the rest of the army is up. My (Hood's) forces are too weak to be able to crush Schofield, even if his lines are penetrated, without being effectively destroyed. Losing Schofield is a Bad Thing for Thomas. But if it costs me a third to half my army to do it, its not worth it, even if I can make the attack work (which is dubious). Even if Schofield is planning on retreating ASAP, those positions he has are worrisome, given the lack of success found in attacking prepared Federal troops before.

The gamble is not worth it.

As to Opdycke's men getting more credit than they deserve, that just makes it more insane. Bad enough to have an attack score some success but be pushed back by a counterattack (not exactly surprising, without the forces by the attacker to keep shoving the enemy back in disarray.) Having it absorbed by the defender's lines even with a puncture...not good. Almost Burnsidean.

It's understandable that Hood would want to attack ASAP. But its still a very bad time and place to do so.

 

[trice]

Remember, there are 5,000 cavalry and about 2,500 infantry north of the Harpeth blocking any potential flanking maneuver, at least three dozen pieces of artillery were present which could have fired into any flanking maneuver, wagons being pushed across the Harpeth were clear evidence Schofield intended to evacuate (which he was going to do at 6 p.m.), daylight is running out, the Federals are only a night's march from Nashville, you have failed to cut them off at Pulaski, Columbia, and Spring Hill, and the news is not good from Virginia and Georgia.

So the big question is what would you have done had you been in Hood's position?

Eric, I think that if I were in Hood's position I would never have been in Tennessee in the first place. His invasion was a hare-brained idea.

Given that, I don't think much of his self-imposed necessity to mash his army into a sausage-grinder at Franklin. As I said, I can see the one chance Hood had, and to the credit of his quick tactical eye Hood saw it as well (and undoubtedly much quicker than I would have seen it). It is still a very bad idea, and I still think the odds of success are somewhere close to 1%.

But that's Hood: eight battles, eight embarassing defeats -- and it is always someone else's fault if you listen to Hood.

But with all this hoop-la about Franklin, let's look at this: what happens if Schofield doesn't obligingly scamper off to Nashville that night? Cox thought there was no longer a need, and tried to convince Schofield to remain. What happens if the Sun comes up and Hood's troops are still pinned down outside the Union line, exposed to fire, running out of ammo? Do we see the complete and total destruction of the AoT? Does Hood take 10 or 12 or 15 thousand casualties instead of 7 thousand?

Because Hood was planning just that for the morning, further assaults on a line he had been unable to break. Schofield's retreat saved him from himself. Just what in there is good for the Confederacy, and what does it tell us about John Bell Hood?

Tim

 

[trice]

Remember, there are 5,000 cavalry and about 2,500 infantry north of the Harpeth blocking any potential flanking maneuver, at least three dozen pieces of artillery were present which could have fired into any flanking maneuver, wagons being pushed across the Harpeth were clear evidence Schofield intended to evacuate (which he was going to do at 6 p.m.), daylight is running out, the Federals are only a night's march from Nashville, you have failed to cut them off at Pulaski, Columbia, and Spring Hill, and the news is not good from Virginia and Georgia.

So the big question is what would you have done had you been in Hood's position?

There's no depth to Franklin as a defensive position. Anyone planning to hold the town as a bridgehead would move his wagons, his cavalry, and most of his animals to the North bank., with at least a little infantry as a stiffener for the cavalry. While it is true that Schofield had the wind up and was planning to retreat, that is definitely NOT the only conclusion to be drawn from the movement across the bridges.

Tim

 

[trice]

I don't feel Davis' version of events is even worth considering. Davis, from the contemporary evidence, available, suffered from a case of the flip flops. Speeches he gave immediately following his late September meeting with Hood at Palmetto, GA (which were printed in at least two newspapers) clearly indicate he knew invading Tennessee was always part of the plan. Davis' problem is that Hood is delayed and once Sherman gets to ripping across Georgia, Davis has a change of heart and thinks Hood should go after Sherman. Unfortunately, Davis can't have it both ways.

Crossing near Chattanooga in late October is a lot different than crossing 150 miles to the West 3 weeks later. Preparing supplies and bridges to make your plan work is an essential part of being a military commander; Hood showed himself a total amateur at it. keeping track of the enemy is another routine professional skill; Hood (with a mighty assist from an incomptent Wheeler) failed at that.

I agree that Davis had been looking to getting troops into TN; it just wasn't the plan Hood ended up executing. They were both living in a bit of a fairy-tale world by that point.

Also, let's be fair about crossing the Tennessee River. Hood wasn't just screwing around south of the Tennessee, he was trying to find a feasible crossing point. When he finally finds one at Florence, AL the weather turns on him and he gets delayed there for THREE weeks. Those three weeks were a huge factor and ususally overlooked in any analysis of the Tennessee Campaign. If Hood pushes into Tennessee the first week of November he only has the 4th Corps between him and Nashville. A. J. Smith's 16th Corps isn't even close to Nashville and there are only 8,000 garrison troops in Nashville. What if......

What if Hood acted as a competent commander and attended to the supply and bridge requirements when he made his plans?

Tim

 

[EricJacobson]

But with all this hoop-la about Franklin, let's look at this: what happens if Schofield doesn't obligingly scamper off to Nashville that night? Cox thought there was no longer a need, and tried to convince Schofield to remain. What happens if the Sun comes up and Hood's troops are still pinned down outside the Union line, exposed to fire, running out of ammo? Do we see the complete and total destruction of the AoT? Does Hood take 10 or 12 or 15 thousand casualties instead of 7 thousand?

Because Hood was planning just that for the morning, further assaults on a line he had been unable to break. Schofield's retreat saved him from himself. Just what in there is good for the Confederacy, and what does it tell us about John Bell Hood?

Tim

In my book about Spring Hill and Franklin I think it's pretty clear, while I tried to view Hood objectively up thru his decision to attack at Franklin, his decision to try again on the morning of December 1st is desperation, plain and simple. Moreover, he hauls his army up to Nashville. That said, and to address your point/question, if the Federal army stayed in Franklin I think what was left of the Army of Tennessee would have been chewed up. But the sides were pretty evenly matched, even after the losses on December 1st, and most of S. D. Lee Corps had not been engaged. However, one Federal officer in a letter written in 1870 said "the Battle of Nashville was fought at Franklin, Tennessee." Pretty interesting opinion.

I'm sure you won't agree with this, but what I think it tells us about John Bell Hood is what is tells us about many Southern troops in late 1864. They were willing to die, period. Hood had given up about 25% of his body so death wasn't something he shirked from. Pat Cleburne himself said in Oct. 1864, in a speech to his troops, that if the cause to which he believed in was doomed to fail, he hoped he should fall with it. Those are the words of man is willing to die. I'm sure he didn't think Nov. 30, 1864 was the day to do it, but he did. On foot, in front of his men, recklessly charging into the smoke.

 

[EricJacobson]

There's no depth to Franklin as a defensive position. Anyone planning to hold the town as a bridgehead would move his wagons, his cavalry, and most of his animals to the North bank., with at least a little infantry as a stiffener for the cavalry. While it is true that Schofield had the wind up and was planning to retreat, that is definitely NOT the only conclusion to be drawn from the movement across the bridges.

Tim

Tim,

Let's be honest with each. Hood concluded Schofield was going to retreat....and he was right. The decision to attack can be debated, but Hood knew exactly what Schofield was up to as far as evacuating Franklin. Hood knew full well the Federals were going to try and slip away under cover of darkness unless he did something.

Eric

 

[EricJacobson]

Crossing near Chattanooga in late October is a lot different than crossing 150 miles to the West 3 weeks later. Preparing supplies and bridges to make your plan work is an essential part of being a military commander; Hood showed himself a total amateur at it. keeping track of the enemy is another routine professional skill; Hood (with a mighty assist from an incomptent Wheeler) failed at that.


Tim

Hood never had any intention of crossing near Chattanooga. The first place he considers crossing is Guntersville, which is far from Chattanooga.

Eric

 

[EricJacobson]

What if Hood acted as a competent commander and attended to the supply and bridge requirements when he made his plans?

Tim

I'm not quite sure what Hood was supposed to do about bridges beyond what he accomplished. Again, he was ready to cross in the first days of November, but the raging Tennessee River would not allow it. Also, the entire supply system in what remained of the Confederacy was a shambles by late 1864. Hood was having to draw out of central Mississippi and that was no easy task. But frankly, no matter where he went keeping his army supplied was going to be problematic to say the least. But again, what would you have done? It's easy to second guess, but what was a feasible alternative, especially for supplies?

Eric