At Spring Hill.
Yes, I don't think we can judge Hood too harshly for his army command tactics based on his performance at the brigade or division level. At those levels, the overall attack plan would generally have been dictated by the corps and army commanders, whether it be a frontal type assault or some sort of flanking maneuver. A brigade or division commander should be judged on his ability to effectively execute line evolutions, understand and evaluate the nature of the local terrain and geography to properly carry out the attack plan, ensure march and battle discipline, coordinate movements within brigades and regiments, rally and inspire his troops, and provide for sufficient ammunition and supplies. Hood may have been qualified to command at brigade and division levels, but higher level responsibility required a series of other attributes for which he was probably lacking.
After a late afternoon reconnaissance, Hood did suggest to Longstreet that Hood be allowed to envelop the exposed left flank of the Union at the Round Tops, leading to the rear of the federal wagon train depot. (This move was reminiscent of a grander flanking move that Longstreet had previously proposed to Lee and that was rejected.) Longstreet, already smarting from his own disapproval by Lee and the clock ticking for starting his assault, summarily disapproved Hood's recommendation. But the main point is that Hood was not necessarily a doctrinaire "frontal assault man," but was capable of developing more creative plans under appropriate conditions.
And perhaps Hood's failing at army command in that instance could be attributed to his apparent lack of attention to detail and failure to ensure that plans were clearly laid out, communicated to subordinate officers, and followed through by the army commander.
I would add that Hood devised an attack plan at Atlanta that was based on Jackson's flank attack at Chancellorsville. Hood's plan had Hardee's Corps carry out an assault on the AotT's left flank, with coordinating moves by Wheeler and Cheatham. While the plan was bold in conception, it failed in its execution due among other things, to problems with marching troops into position, and effective countermeasures taken by General McPherson. But the point being, that Hood was capable of thinking beyond simple, direct assaults.
I believe in those messages Lee also expressed regret at the necessity of relieving Johnston.
I dont think this is a fair statement. He often utilized or recommend flanking movements, but he is most famous for straight on charges, both successful and unsuccessful.
Lee's reply was, ..."I regret the fact stated"...Think his regret was more to do with the statements (by Davis) of Johnston's failure and indications were that he would abandon Atlanta. In his same reply, however, Lee added, ..."It is a bad time to relieve the commander of an army situated as that of Tennessee"...
You may be right, but it should be noted that [more than once] Lee asked for more troops from Texas based on his admiration and reliance upon them.
Well, for one, the proposed flanking movement at Gettysburg, and Hardee's flank march at the Battle of Atlanta.
No worry, I didn't take it as bashing. I just wanted to add what may not have been known about Lee's admiration for the Texas troops.
Bringing the