Nathan Towne
2nd Lieutenant
- Joined
- Jan 14, 2023
Hey @trice,
The Heintzelman Journal is contained in his Papers, which are housed at the Library of Congress. His Mexican War Journal has been published, but I do not believe that his journal from the American Civil War has ever been published, unfortunately.
This is certainly not my principle area of expertise, but I have studied the campaign enough and do have enough material to add to this, for sure.
There are a bunch of available accounts of the council(s) that night at the Trent House and they don't all necessarily fully accord with one another. Heintzelman stated in his testimony in front of the JCCW that McClellan essentially outlined two major possible courses of action. First, would be to just fall back towards the James River. Second, would be to launch a major attack. I don't recall whether he specified as to whether McClellan proposed to launch the attack south of the Chickahominy, or not, but that can be easily checked. Heintzelman stated that McClellan was preferential towards the suggestion to launch the attack, if feasible, but was obviously concerned about the risks, noting that the Army could be destroyed if it went awry. Heintzelman stated that he impressed upon McClellan that the wiser and safer course was merely to fall back. Ultimately, that is obviously what McClellan elected to do. I have not personally seen it, but Brian Burton in Extraordinary Circumstances seems to indicate that this accords with the notes which Heintzelman wrote on his copy of McClellan's Report, which is in his Papers, as well. (Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 148-149). Regarding Heintzelman's Journal, I have never seen it personally. William Marvel gave an account of what Heintzelman stated in it in his biography on Porter, Radical Sacrifice, though. Marvel recorded that Heintzelman wrote in his June 27th entry that McClellan had put forward the proposal to abandon the works south of the river and launch a counterstrike north of the river. Marvel recounts that Heintzelman wrote that they would have had to abandon works, wagons, provisions, ammunition, e.t.c., in order to do this. Marvel doesn't state it directly, but from the tenor of what he wrote, the implication is that he takes Heintzelman as having not having been especially optimistic about the idea. (Marvel, Radical Sacrifice, p. 169-170, n. 397). Marvel merely noted that Porter wrote in his personal correspondence that the decision was made that the Army would fall back to the James River and that he relayed in that correspondence that he had spoken up at that point to emphasize that his men were in no position to do so, unless, they were to first receive provisions. Marvel cited here to a compilation of letters from Fifth Corps which was published in 1895 by Richard Tyldon Auchmuty. Furthermore, Marvel recounted that Porter wrote in a letter to Seth Williams the following day, June 28th, that he had stressed that "My men must have provisions…A large portion of the command have none, and they must have them to-night."
The Comte De Paris wrote later in his book that he had heard that McClellan had proposed striking south of the Chickahominy towards Richmond, but that Heintzelman dissuaded him. However, the Comte De Paris does not appear to have actually been there and was merely repeating what he had heard. (Orleans, Voyage en Amerique, 612-613).
I am not really sure from those accounts whether it is discernible what influence Heintzelman had on the ultimate decision that way.
However, there are other accounts which would seem to pose additional challenges. Burton notes that Heintzelman (and presumably the other Corps commanders of the Army) were called to Headquarters that night by McClellan. He indicates that Heintzelman appears to have been requested at Headquarters around 11:00 P.M. that night. His citation appears to be to a copy of a telegram which was sent by McClellan to Heintzelman which is in the McClellan Papers at the Library of Congress. My guess would be that it is timestamped to that effect, but I am unsure on that.
In Thomas Kearney's 1937 biography on Kearney and in Werstein's 1962 biography on Kearney, they seem to note that he went to the Trent House that night and this is where I think the user above was getting that from as far as Heintzelman is concerned, I don't have a copy of either book, but Burton cited to page 294 of Thomas Kearney's biography and to pages 224-225 of Werstein's biography. Basically, the account goes as follows. Heintzelman passed word of the decision to fall back to the James River to his division commanders. Presumably, this would have been after returning from McClellan's Headquarters, I would think. Kearney and Hooker were "incensed" and persuaded Heintzelman to accompany them back to McClellan's Headquarters. According to this account, when there, Kearney pressed upon McClellan for permission to launch an attack against Magruder the next day, which was denied by McClellan. Per this account, Kearney is quoted as having stated that he could go "straight into Richmond" and that "A single division can do it, but to play safe use two divisions-Hooker's and mine." According to this account, Heintzelman seemed to support the suggestion. Now, one of the sources for this appears to be Hiram Berry, who commanded a brigade in Kearney's division. He seems to indicate that he was there in the meeting and recounted that "Phil unloosed a broadside. He pitched into McClellan with language so strong that all who heard it expected he would be placed under arrest until a general court-martial could be held. I was certain Kearney would be relieved of his command on the spot." Now, whether this has any veracity or not, I don't know. Just on the basis of the limited amount which I have seen, I certainly have my doubts, but I am not sure. I don't know of it ever being recounted by McClellan or Heintzelman.
I will take a look at Hebert's biography on Hooker to see if he has anything to say on it when I get the chance.
Bringing the