The Peninsula Heintzelman on the Peninsula

[Hoplite]

How did Heintzelman perform as a commander on the Peninsula? The four original corps commanders were pretty pedestrian from most accounts.
However in Sears' book- Lincolns Lieutenants my impression from him is that he thought Heintzelman did a pretty good job and stood out- at least amongst the corps commanders.

 

[bdtex]

What do you think about his performance? Is there something in particular that caused you to ask that question?

 

[Hoplite]

What do you think about his performance? Is there something in particular that caused you to ask that question?

Did I do something wrong?
I thought I was clear. I was always under the impression that he was not a good commander, but as stated in the Sears book, he gives a different impression, so I put it out there to our esteemed forum readers for their opinion.

 

[bdtex]

Did I do something wrong?

Nope. Your OP mentioned somebody else's opinion of his performance. I was just curious what you thought about it.

 

[trice]

I find I don't have much of an impression of Heintzelman at all. I cannot remember anything particularly good or bad about his performance.

He was wounded in the elbow at 1st Bull Run. Struck in the wrist by a spent ball at Glendale and lost the use of his arm for a while as a result. His troops were heavily involved at Williamsburg and Fair Oaks/Seven Pines, then the Seven Days before being sent to Pope where they were in 2nd Bull Run. Not noted as particularly aggressive, but had Hooker and Kearney as division commanders, so his troops were in aggressive actions. Was in favor of attacking in the Seven Days after Gaines Mill. At the end of all that, he was sidelined and the Army seems happy to have let him go.

 

[67th Tigers]

Was in favor of attacking in the Seven Days after Gaines Mill.

This is the opposite of what happened. Heintzelman's journal records it was Heintzelman who took credit for talking McClellan out of attacking.

 

[Belfoured]

This is the opposite of what happened. Heintzelman's journal records it was Heintzelman who took credit for talking McClellan out of attacking.

That was after McClellan had answered Heintzelman's question about the consequences if the Army attacked and lost by stating it would be destroyed. Of course, this "council" took place after McClellan had already informed Goldsborough that he was "obliged" to retreat. "Talking McClellan out of attacking" wasn't much of a challenge. Where did McClellan describe this "council" in his correspondence, his report, his JCCW testimony, or Battles and Leaders? (I left out Own Story because his manuscript only covered up to Hanover Court House).

 

[trice]

This is the opposite of what happened. Heintzelman's journal records it was Heintzelman who took credit for talking McClellan out of attacking.

Interesting. I have not seen Heintzelman's Diary. Is it somewhere online where I can look at a copy?

 

[Hoplite]

Interesting. I have not seen Heintzelman's Diary. Is it somewhere online where I can look at a copy?

Went back and looked at Sears' Lincoln's Lieutenants- for good or bad I guess judging by some comments I read about his works in this forum.

Seven Pines: 'Heintzelman initially reacted to the attack i slow motion, due to the 90 minute delay in reporting from the front. But as he had at Williamsburg, he rushed to the scene, thrust himself into the fighting, pushed reinforcements forward and posted them. McClellan held out his hand-Heintzelman wrote in his diary '& remarked calling me by name, you have done what I expected, you have whipped the enemy'.

For the advance on Old Tavern he put his most experienced lieutenant, Sam Heintzelman and his best troops on the firing line.
'Keep your command as fresh as possible, ready for another battle- I cannot afford to be without Heintzelman, Kearny & Hooker in the next effort'

 

[trice]

Went back and looked at Sears' Lincoln's Lieutenants- for good or bad I guess judging by some comments I read about his works in this forum.

Sears is a well-regarded award-winning historian. Most biographers end up with a strong opinion about their subject (usually they end up either strongly for or strongly against). Sears clearly ended up antagonistic to McClellan, which anyone who reads his work should understand. That does not mean Sears is wrong, just inclined to see the worst in McClellan. His work is well-researched and, considering how long his work has been publicly scrutinized, it has stood the test of time well.

Some people here have an obsession with trying to attack Sears on any mention of his name.

Seven Pines: 'Heintzelman initially reacted to the attack i slow motion, due to the 90 minute delay in reporting from the front. But as he had at Williamsburg, he rushed to the scene, thrust himself into the fighting, pushed reinforcements forward and posted them. McClellan held out his hand-Heintzelman wrote in his diary '& remarked calling me by name, you have done what I expected, you have whipped the enemy'.

From the OR, related to McClellan, Heintzelman and Seven Pines:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,​

New Bridge, May 31, 1862--5 p.m.​

General HEINTZELMAN, Commanding Left Wing:​

You have done what I expected of you in retrieving the disaster of Casey. With the remaining five divisions you should hold your own. I will post everything during the night, so as to be able to cross at New Bridge to-morrow. Tell Kearny, Hooker, and Ord [?] that I expect them to hold firm and repulse every and any attack. Recapture, if possible, any guns taken. Keep me fully informed of all that passes. Let me send to Washington as soon as possible the news that all is right.​

GEO. B. McCLELLAN, ​

Major-general.​

For the advance on Old Tavern he put his most experienced lieutenant, Sam Heintzelman and his best troops on the firing line.
'Keep your command as fresh as possible, ready for another battle- I cannot afford to be without Heintzelman, Kearny & Hooker in the next effort'

This is where that quote comes from in the OR:

CAMP LINCOLN,​

June 24, 1862--6.30 p.m.​

Major-General HEINTZELMAN, ​

Commanding Third Corps:​

​

Dispatch of 6 p.m. received.(+) If it is a possible thing, take advantage of the weakness of the enemy and push your pickets at least to the edge of the next clearing. Please give your personal attention to this, and arrange with General Sumner so that he may maintain constant connection.​

​

I have been all over the right to-day and will open with heavy guns to-morrow. To-morrow night I hope to gain possession of the Garnett field, and by another day of the Old Tavern and some ground in advance. It will be chiefly an artillery and engineer affair.​

Keep your command as fresh as possible, ready for another battle. I cannot afford to be without Heintzelman, Kearny, and Hooker in the last effort.​

​

I have satisfactory communications from the gunboat fleet in James River.​

​

They have done an immense amount of work on our right, but seem to be deceived as to our intentions. All looks well.​

GEO. B. McCLELLAN, ​

Major- Genera1.​

 

[Lubliner]

Most biographers end up with a strong opinion about their subject

The Young Napoleon is a very apt title. Didn't Heintzelman have an adage bestowed on him either during the war or thereafter that stuck?
Lubliner.

 

[Belfoured]

The Young Napoleon is a very apt title. Didn't Heintzelman have an adage bestowed on him either during the war or thereafter that stuck?
Lubliner.

The only one I'm aware of is "Old Sourdough" but I'm not sure that was ever confirmed. He was typical of many of the officers who graduated USMA in his era (1820's). They earned their spurs in a small standing army and their combat leadership experience was the Seminole War and the War with Mexico. They then served in the small antebellum army of scattered western posts and the large ACW commands some got were probably beyond a lot of their skills. But guys like Heintzelman and Sumner could still respond to the "sound of the guns" and even at the corps level they could contribute with aggressive division commanders.

 

[Lubliner]

How did Heintzelman perform as a commander on the Peninsula? The four original corps commanders were pretty pedestrian from most accounts.
However in Sears' book- Lincolns Lieutenants my impression from him is that he thought Heintzelman did a pretty good job and stood out- at least amongst the corps commanders.

From his Wikipedia page;
"...and he did not display any notable leadership or tactical prowess in either the Peninsula Campaign or Second Bull Run, although following the Union retreat from Gaines Mill, he was one of three corps commanders to advocate launching a counterattack against the Army of Northern Virginia.[3]"​

 

[Pollaco]

Williamsburg is about the only real battle that he "stood out". That one later earned him a brevet as Major General.He was placed as a Corps commander largely due to seniority not leadership abilities.

 

[67th Tigers]

From his Wikipedia page;
"...and he did not display any notable leadership or tactical prowess in either the Peninsula Campaign or Second Bull Run, although following the Union retreat from Gaines Mill, he was one of three corps commanders to advocate launching a counterattack against the Army of Northern Virginia.[3]"​

I read that, and it is certainly untrue. Heintzelman's journal records taking pride out of talking McClellan out of a counterattack. If you click on the reference given, it doesn't support the statement in the slightest.

 

[Cavalier]

I was unaware of it, but It seems there is a book, Civil War to the Bloody End: The Life and Times of Major General Samuel P. Heintzleman by Jerry Thompson.

John

 

[trice]

I was unaware of it, but It seems there is a book, Civil War to the Bloody End: The Life and Times of Major General Samuel P. Heintzleman by Jerry Thompson.

John

Thanks for posting this. I was unaware of the book as well until you mentioned it.

Here is a paragraph from it. The time frame is after 1st Bull Run, with Heintzelman recovering from his wound and upset that younger officers are being promoted over him.

Heintzelman was an early advocate for a move up the James to take Richmond. He presented a plan for that to Marcy, the chief-of-staff to McClellan, because he could not get in to see McClellan.

 

[Belfoured]

"Heintzelman's journal records taking pride out of talking McClellan out of a counterattack."

If Heintzelman's Journal says that he "talked McClellan out of" a counterattack, that's exaggeration on his part. It would be helpful to see the exact quote from the Journal. Heintzelman's testimony to the JCCW at p. 355 was more circumspect in that regard. He testified that he asked McClellan what would happen if the attack failed, that McClellan responded that the army would be "lost", and that based on this Heintzelman - of course - advised against an attack. He added that while McClellan told him that he "still felt inclined to risk every[thing] on a battle", he also shared Heintzelman's "opinion". Heintzelman's testimony was that he had been summoned "about 11 o'clock" to meet with McClellan, who was a mile and a half away. Heintzelman apparently was not told by McClellan when he reported to McClellan that McClellan had already sent a message to Goldsborough stating that he was "obliged to fall back" and asking Goldsborough to cover his flank as he did so.

The proposition that "Crazy Ivan" McClellan actually was "inclined to risk all" in an attack late on June 27 is fantasy.

 

[Cavalier]

@trice You're welcome.

John

 

[Lubliner]

The proposition that "Crazy Ivan" McClellan actually was "inclined to risk all" in an attack late on June 27 is fantasy.

I was thinking the same thing. It is easy for him to 'say' he feels inclined, while the whole time knowing good and well he would never do so!
Lubliner.