Hancock Commander AOP late June 1863

[milhistbuff1]

What do you believe would have resulted if Lincoln forced the Command of the Army of the Potomac on 2nd Corp Commander Winfield S. Hancock?
Matt

 

[samgrant]

Hancock was the best.

What would have happened?

Maybe Grant would not have to be called in?

????

Would have made a significant differnce of some kind, I would think!

 

[milhistbuff1]

I can say this about it, Due to General Hancock's experiences at and around Chancellorsville in May of 1863, he would have never backed away from a fight he was winning, unlike Hooker and Lil Mac.

 

[ewc]

Are you thinking of a period in particular, Matt? Gettysburg is the first battle for Hancock as a corps commander. To replace Hooker after Chancellorsville, a number of generals were more senior and seasoned and were not anathema to the administration- Reynolds, Meade, and Couch to name a few, as well as having support among the generals themselves. If Meade would have resigned after Gettysburg (administration dissatisfaction with his weak pursuit, for instance,) Hancock could have conceivably been named to command- Reynolds has been killed, Couch is not as highly considered after his criticisms of the politically favored Hooker- save that he himself was severely wounded at Gettysburg and put hors de combat for a while. Perhaps had Grant as the new Commander in Chief been willing to shelve Meade, Hancock might have been considered for the upcoming 1864 campaign, or had something untoward happened to Meade during the campaign. Hancock's wound served to incapacitate him to a degree and finally knock him out of active campaigning towards the end of '64, so his effectiveness in overall command may have been compromised as it was in corps command. However, I am in accord that had he been named to army command, he would have done very well.

 

[milhistbuff1]

ewc, I am basing this on his excellent handling of division level command. Wasnt he the one that suggested that Burny cross further upriver, or was that a Gods and Generals liberty with ACW history? If anything Couch should have stepped aside earlier, if so disillusioned with the slaughter, giving Hancock a chance to inflict serious damage on Lee at Chancellorsville. Commanders like Hancock, Griffin and Chamberlain were of the mold that won the war for the union. All three shared a disgust with the incompetence, thought outside the box, and were willing to go outside regular channels in order to win.

 

[samgrant]

This reminds me of a similar question on another thread about who should have replaced Bragg after the debacle at Chattanooga.

Cleburne was suggested and this was a representative reply:

{ So when Davis finally acts 'outside the box' so to speak, and shakes up the Army of Tennessee, he whiffs. To be sure, he did act when he felt he could no longer afford to hold off, and tapped a man on the scene, a leader who had the pugilistic traits he wanted in the commander of that army-Hood}
{While conceding that Cleburne was popular and a very good fighting general, was he not junior in rank?}
While I do agree that Cleburne was probably a better, and wiser, leader than Hood, and one less prone to 'destroy' his own army to prove a point, or to 'teach' his men a lesson, we need to examine several ideas.
Being a Corps leader didn't prove one could lead an Army, well or otherwise. And I don't think Hood had the personality to be a good Army Commander, but thats My personal opinion.
The issue of Cleburne being junior in rank, even though he was highly thought of by many officers, is interesting. Too many of the officers were too petty to 'allow' a junior from being promoted over themselves, something that makes me think they were more interested in their 'position in life' than they were of finding the Best man for the Job. However, with Cleburne, being a popular personality, many might have done their duty and supported him, something we can surmise but never know for sure.
But, there is something we can be sure of. Davis was too much of a WP man. Being a graduate himself, and having served as Sec. of War, he consided that only a West Pointer could qualify to command an Army. And this mental failing, this unability of looking at the practical results by non-WP officers commanding his Corps, and Divisions prevented him from even considering more than a few for the position. Have to remember, that by this time of the war, he had lost a great many of the officers that filled his 1st qualifier for a high command.
Cleburne vs. Hood. One West Point, one not.
Chuck-just a personal observation.

Now this similar question, with the suggestion of Hancock.

And the predicable reply:

Are you thinking of a period in particular, Matt? Gettysburg is the first battle for Hancock as a corps commander. To replace Hooker after Chancellorsville, a number of generals were more senior and seasoned and were not anathema to the administration- Reynolds, Meade, and Couch to name a few, as well as having support among the generals themselves. If Meade would have resigned after Gettysburg (administration dissatisfaction with his weak pursuit, for instance,) Hancock could have conceivably been named to command- Reynolds has been killed, Couch is not as highly considered after his criticisms of the politically favored Hooker- save that he himself was severely wounded at Gettysburg and put hors de combat for a while. Perhaps had Grant as the new Commander in Chief been willing to shelve Meade, Hancock might have been considered for the upcoming 1864 campaign, or had something untoward happened to Meade during the campaign.

If you see what I'm getting at, both Hancock and Cleburne were so highly regarded, at least by some of our CWT folks if not their soldiers, that they have been suggested to jump ranks to Army Commander!

Here's my curveball: Head to head, Cleburne vs. Hancock, what do you think?

 

[milhistbuff1]

Sam,
It would be quite a challege for them both, hard to say who would win since both were rather well known for not wasting their men's lives as Mobile 96 so poignantly pointed out with his comments about the AOT and Hood. Its interesting that you mention Cleburne, since both he and Hancock allowed their politics to affect their career. Since Hancock wouldnt put up with Washington they never offered him army during the war as far as I know. Cleburne, did something similar, by openly supporting the arming of slaves relatively early in the war he lost any possibility of promotion to corp command.

Respectfully,
Matt

 

[CChartreux]

"What do you believe would have resulted if Lincoln forced the Command of the Army of the Potomac on 2nd Corp Commander Winfield S. Hancock?" [milhistbuff1]

I love Hancock as much as anybody (the man is awesome!); however, as the years go on will Lincoln take a chance (again!) on finding out whether someone's leadership skills at the Corps level will readily translate to Army Command level? In my mind, there is a huge leap between Corps Command and Army Command; there are different leadership skills required at the overall command level. How Hancock would have done there, in my opinion, is hard to say (this sort of evokes the adage "just because you can play basketball doesn't mean you can coach it"....there's two very different things going on there).

Grant has already proven himself a capable Army Commander...not a Corps Commander. He's already demonstrated his ability to wield an army like a precision instrument--which is exactly what Lincoln needs; Lincoln can't afford any more risk-taking here and has to go with a sure bet. While I love Hancock, it's difficult to know how he'd respond to higher levels of command. To this end, most of these guys are good Corps Commanders (Meade, Hooker, and even Burnside to some extent)...it's when they get over-all command of the Army that the trouble begins for them. It's not an easy job and not everyone is cut out for it; as I said, I think different leadership skills are required for it. Hancock may or may not have had them; it's hard to know.

Just my $0.02!

 

[lrd89]

Hancock is one of my personal heroes. I really wish Lincoln had forced him to take command. Sam I had never considered Cleburne v. Hancock, but have often thought a scenario of Longstreet v. Hancock would be interesting.

Another historic curve ball: In the 1880 Presidential election James Garfield narrowly defeated Hancock. Garfield, who had served as aid to Rosecrans at Chickamauga, was shot July 2, 1881 and died from infection September 19, 1881. What might have been?
Garfield
http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/jg20.html
Hancock
http://www.civilwarhome.com/hanbio.htm

 

[ewc]

Matt- sorry, I missed the June '63 part of the title. I must say, though a very intriguing question to ponder, there was no way Hancock at that time would have been elevated to anything higher than corps command save an independent command at that time. We know him to be an exceptional commander through the light of history. But at the time, Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck could have known no more than that he was a very able commander in the war up to that point. To command an army of this size, handling a corps at the least must have been a necessity for consideration. Reynolds we know was given the choice, Couch probably not, Meade was given no choice, but ordered to the command. It was the right choice, as events proved.

I wouldn't be so hard on Couch. He wanted to act as Hancock did, but was constrained by orders- even though he knew the orders to be the wrong thing. The fault is Hooker's, not Couch's.

As to a Hancock vs Cleburne scenario- would be worth studying, Sherman vs Johnston, Scott vs Santa Anna, Napoleon vs Wellington, Kirk vs Sauron, battle of wily foxes kind of thing. Neat.

 

[milhistbuff1]

ewc,

Wouldn't Hancock and Couches greatest concern be the AOP's survival with the ability to continue the fight as opposed to following orders? If you follow orders, you risk pursuit and being masscred as you try to cross the river. We know Lee's intentions were to attack the day after Hooker retreated. Even if the federals knew nothing about that forthcoming event due to their lack of available cavalry, wouldn't maintaining your lines be far less risky than risking being slaughtered as the AOP crossed the river. Since when does following orders supersede maintaing your army's ability to fight?
Respectfully,
Matt

 

[nbforrest]

Now, this might be heresy, but I'm not sure I've seen enough evidence to back up Hancock's reputation. "Hancock the Superb" seems to be a cliche that is tossed around.

Can someone offer their reasons as to why Hancock was a great corps commander or deserved army command? I might be missing something here.

Perhaps my view of Hancock is colored by his post-Gettysburg actions...his rather precarious health after his Gettysburg wound does seem to taken something out of him....but I think that might be used sometimes as a pass for Hancock's rather lackluster performance in 64, especially in front of Petersburg.

Respectfully

 

[milhistbuff1]

By that reasoning nbforrest, wouldn't that explain the failures on Ewell's part after his losing his leg at Groveton in 1862? your comments are hardly heresy, much like mine on Lee. Injuries are a strange beast, it causes some to lose a part of themselves rendering them ineffective or less effective. Others get aggravated and it motivates them to fight that much harder, ala Santa Ana. I suspect in Hancock's case it enhanced his abilities by providing additional motivation to win battles and end the war.

Respectfully,
Matt

 

[nbforrest]

By that reasoning nbforrest, wouldn't that explain the failures on Ewell's part after his losing his leg at Groveton in 1862? your comments are hardly heresy, much like mine on Lee. Injuries are a strange beast, it causes some to lose a part of themselves rendering them ineffective or less effective. Others get aggravated and it motivates them to fight that much harder, ala Santa Ana. I suspect in Hancock's case it enhanced his abilities by providing additional motivation to win battles and end the war.

I don't think losing a limb equates to declining leadership in all cases. In fact, I don't think Ewell declined at all. He was a solid corps commander and did great at the Wilderness. Howard is another example...he lost an arm in 62 and steadily improved as the war went on.
Hancock was a bit different. He had genuine health ramifications from his wound...it had a necessary to suppurate and discharge blood and pus at inopportune times, prostrating him.
I'm not sure what about his performances in the 64 campaign would suggest that he improved because of his wound. He was out of action a lot of the time. By the time Reams Station, the nadir of the II Corps I suppose, Hancock was physical and mentally exhausted, prompting his removal from command and eventual assignment to the Middle Department.

I don't know how highly you think of Hancock, but I would be interested to hear from you, or anyone else, why Hancock was such a great leader. He was solid, but I'm entirely sure where his reputation for being the best comes from.

Respectfully

 

[CChartreux]

I don't know how highly you think of Hancock, but I would be interested to hear from you, or anyone else, why Hancock was such a great leader. He was solid, but I'm [not] entirely sure where his reputation for being the best comes from.

Respectfully

Umm....er.....because he was, like, a really good looking general? :laugh1: Sorry....I can get away with saying that because I'm female....so, of course, I had to go there! Or.....how about one of the best cursers in the Army?

Hi nbforrest! As kidding aside, I think you raise a good question insofar as pressing the 'what's so great about him' question because it seems easy to encounter a kind of 'cult-worshipping' thing around some of these generals and sometimes we come to find out that all might not be as we would wish (Reynolds and McPherson come to mind; as much as I love them, they regrettably died before we were able to really see what they might have been capable of.....or at least some would say such as a way of explaining Reynolds and McPherson being 'overrated' - I personally haven't decided yet if I'm inclined to such an opinion or not).

Anyway - back to the subject at hand....I'm in the mood to look things up tonight (must be the trytophan in the turkey after a nap!). I should imagine you might not like the first 'answer' out of the shoot, but you might nevertheless appreciate its somewhat 'intangible' suggestion. [Source book I'm using tonight is "The Generals of Gettysburg" author: Larry Tagg; publication 1998, Savas Publishing; 2003 edition Da Capo Press.] The format of this book allows for easy access to brief career biographies that lends itself to your particular question. [Obviously, if anyone else has something, by all means jump in!]

Okay - as I said....first answer - a little vague and fuzzy. His stature. This may seem unimportant at first glance, but Hancock evidently carried himself (he was tall and had a commanding presence naturally) in such a way that evoked obedience and respect nearly automatically. To wit, Tagg describes him as "...Had General Hancock worn citizen's clothes, and given commands in the army to those who did not know him, he would be likely to be obeyed at once, for he had the appearance of a man born to command (p.33)". Obviously, this has something of an 'intangible' quality, but it's psychologically important because of the effect it has on his troops.

As far as sticking to his military accomplishments....Tagg mentions that McClellan (during the Peninsula Campaign) "telegraphed, 'Hancock was suberb today.' The adjective stuck in the public mind....(p.34)". I can't remember offhand what, exactly, Hancock did there....I'd have to re-read that (it just doesn't come to mind now). He was in reserve at Antietam with the Sixth Corps; however, when Richardson was mortally wounded, Hancock was pulled to take over Richardson's First Division, Second Corps (this was when Hancock was a brigade commander) (p.34). Hancock maintained command of the First Division (II Corps) and led them into battle at Fredericksburg (Hancock was wounded there) (p.34) and "The following spring at Chancellorsville, Hancock and his division performed brilliantly while covering the withdrawal of the army on May 2 (p.34)". Hmmm....wounded (again!) with small shell fragments. When Couch (II Corps Commander) refused to serve under Hooker anymore, Hancock (then 39) replaced him as Commander of the II Corps (just six weeks before Gettysburg) (p. 34). Tagg explains also that Hancock was an excellent tactician....placing troops in important places in person; Grant once remarked that he knew of no blunder on the battlefield that Hancock ever made (p.34). Lastly, Hancock got along with Hooker, got along with Meade, got along with Grant....in short: he played well with others and earned the trust of his superiors and subordinates alike (p.34).

So, all in all, it would appear we certainly have the makings of great leadership and ability. I think your point earlier about his health issues as a byproduct of his wounds is somewhat worrisome (not that it would necessarily interfere directly, but it might give one (like Lincoln) pause). He certainly demonstrated a pronounced 'follow-through' ability in battle; was in possession of 'natural' leadership skills; and in his ability to get along with nearly everyone, one readily deduces he obviously had a degree of social and political skill necessary (or, at least, highly desired) for leadership roles. Of course, my earlier point was whether or not these readily apparent leadership skills could go beyond Corps Commander level and all the way up to the top...who knows?

Anyway - hopefully all that answers your question satisfactorily; or, at best, gives you some insight in Hancock's qualities.

 

[ole]

[Source book I'm using tonight is "The Generals of Gettysburg" author: Larry Tagg; publication 1998, Savas Publishing; 2003 edition Da Capo Press.]

CC: If Ted Savas published the first, you can bet it is a book to be highly regarded.

We've gone through similar discussions before -- there seems to have been a special, personal spark in the great commanders. There were capable people who did not play well with others. There were incapable people who did. A combination of the two qualities (and several other, as yet undentified characteristics) was apparently rare.

Reynolds made history in an unfortunate manner. We know more about Cleburne and Hancock, so it makes for interesting discussion.

Please keep the thread running. I'm learning.

Ole

 

[ewc]

ewc,

Wouldn't Hancock and Couches greatest concern be the AOP's survival with the ability to continue the fight as opposed to following orders? If you follow orders, you risk pursuit and being masscred as you try to cross the river. We know Lee's intentions were to attack the day after Hooker retreated. Even if the federals knew nothing about that forthcoming event due to their lack of available cavalry, wouldn't maintaining your lines be far less risky than risking being slaughtered as the AOP crossed the river. Since when does following orders supersede maintaing your army's ability to fight?
Respectfully,
Matt

Matt, it simply wasn't done. In the CW, there were instances of orders being followed slowly or badly or not at all even, but never was a commander superceded by a subordinate on the initiative of the subordinate or a group of subordinates that I know of. There were instances of action taken by subordinate commanders contrary to an absent commander (Union Genl HW Benham at Secessionville & Union genl TSeymour at Olustee,) and also of commanders refusing to take orders from a certain superior (Forrest from Wheeler after Dover, from Bragg after Chickamauga), but these were after action. In Couch's case, Hooker was up and about and issuing orders, there was simply no way Couch could supercede him in command, though some Union generals urged it both for Hooker's disability after the pillar fell and for reasons of sense. Hooker's position in the Wilderness protecting the US Ford was by all estimates extremely strong, and had he stayed, Lee's repulse with heavy loss is all but certain. Any movement, retreat or advance, entails risk, but with his defensive position, Hooker was not likely in any grave danger in his withdrawal, ill advised only.

That said, had Couch taken over by Hooker's consent or otherwise, I think a Union victory very likely.

 

[milhistbuff1]

Surely Lincoln knew as well as anyone that military incompetance served no one .Besides it not like Lincoln never picked someone obscure from the ranks. I doubt anyone in Washington or anywhere else in the east for that matter heard of Grant prior to Vicksburg and surely forgot about him between 7/4/63 and his promotion to Lt Gen.
Respectfully,
Matt

 

[ole]

Ed:

Well said!

Defying orders of your superior simply was not and is not done. Right or wrong, orders are to be obeyed or, as you pointed out reluctantly, slightly misinterpreted, delayed or otherwise altered, but obedience is the foundation of the military and direct, obvious contravention is not tolerated, however right the perp might ultimately be.

With our freedom of thought, albeit influenced by fiction, we tend to idolize the rebel who is proven right. The military recognizes no such independent thought and, perhaps, rightly so. There must be someone in charge -- directing the movements within a scope beyond the immediate comprehension of secondary leadership. If that is not understood, no concerted action is possible.

It is likely true that the concerted action may prove to be inappropriate -- history has its ancient and more recent examples. But it remains that any action is more likely to succeed when all elements are in compliance with the goal.

One can easily point to occasions when a rebellious secondary commander contravened his orders -- the movies are full of them. In real life, however, a chain of command simply works.

Ole

 

[milhistbuff1]

The chain of command may be vital to military operations but it is not infalliable.
There have many a general in history who has built their careers on disobeying or at least standing up to superior officers. It may have cost them greatly but allowed them to be remembered by history. Generals like Belisarius, Narses, Patton, Forrest, Jackson.
Respectfully
Matt