Gen. Price's Raid 1864--Ignored--Why?

[5fish]

In Sept 1864, CS Gen. Price crosses into Missouri from Arkansas with a large force under the notion that they would be treated as liberators by the locals causing an uprising against the federals. This raid or campaign happen during the siege of Petersburg and the fall of Atlanta in the east but little notice of it by history.

What battle was the turning point in Price's Campaign/Raid?

Where happen to being treated as liberators and causing an uprising within Missouri?

What union general should get the credit for turning back General Price's efforts in Missouri?

Why is this action by Price called a raid for his goal was to take St. Louis and Kansas City? He had more diffident goals then Lee did when he enter Pennsylvania in 1863 and that is called a campaign not a Raid.

General Price did not accomplish much more then the destruction of his army. He enter Missouri with 12000 troops and left with only 5000 troops. His raid/campaign had taken St. Louis or Kansas City or both would history ignore it then.

Think, if he had taken St. Louis, it might had changed the election in 1864 in McClellan's favor. (Forget Atlanta)

Another part of history ignored---

 

[5fish]

Well--

History ignores this action and the board ignores this action. Where are all those fans of the civil war fought in the west?

Gen. Price all 290lbs worth deserves some respect....

 

[rivrrat]

My favorite subject.

I think that Fort Davidson was the turning point. Price lost valuable time, and the Yankees were able to organize.

Price was deluding himself with the thoughts of being welcomed. The majority of Missourians were never confederate sympathizers.

Pleasonton and his provasional calvary division.

Some call it an invasion, I agree with them.

I think that if he had been successful it might have cost Lincoln the election. The prospect of the war being extended would have been a last minute issue.

 

[30th_il]

I guess the "Price wasn't right" (rimshot)

 

[Borderruffian]

Prices Raid never had a chance at St Louis and only an outside chance at KC. As Rat has pointed out the majority of Missourians were not sympathizers, especially by this point in the war. The Hard Cores had gone south or were already enlisted and serving in the CS forces.

While Ft Davidson did slow Price up IMO Westport decided it. After Davidson Price still had the ability to advance. After Westport he was in retreat.

Pleasenton certainally deserves a large piece of the credit pie, but then again So does Jim Blunt and in the end the Commander of the Army of the Border Sam Curtis (who gets my vote).

As far as respect for Price. Well Ol' Pap was certainly a good motivator of men and a good speaker, just like any politician. IMO he was a step above where he could have done the most good. Should he be respected well yes but not as a great military mind.

 

[johan_steele]

Price got clobbered from start to finish. It is an interesting campaign to finish w/ some serious marching on both sides. In short I can't think of any campaign where the Armies covered such distances. It's a vindication of sorts for Old Rosie. Though I can't think of any other campaign where the victorious general was almost lynched by his own men.

AJ Smith's boys were a whole different breed.

 

[LadyReb]

Thanks for bringing up the subject.

I have tried for years to find a record of what was happening at Ironton MO on Oct 13, 1864. I have The Civil War in MO Day by Day and the Trans Mississippi Order and Letter Book and nothing is said about why 2 of the 1st Ark (Monroe's) cavalry officers were at Ironton. They were both captured and sent to military prison. One was my great-great grandfather. I know he functioned as a scout at times.

 

[trice]

Ironton

Thanks for bringing up the subject.

I have tried for years to find a record of what was happening at Ironton MO on Oct 13, 1864. I have The Civil War in MO Day by Day and the Trans Mississippi Order and Letter Book and nothing is said about why 2 of the 1st Ark (Monroe's) cavalry officers were at Ironton. They were both captured and sent to military prison. One was my great-great grandfather. I know he functioned as a scout at times.

The Confederates had pushed through Ironton in late September, the Yankees falling back before them. On October 12th, things were going the other wat and the Yankees pushed through Ironton, capturing a Confederate hospital there with 200+ officers and men.

I thought these excerpts from the OR might be helpful to you:
=====
O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME XLI/1 [S# 83]
AUGUST 29-DECEMBER 2, 1864.--Price's Missouri Expedition.
No. 55.--Report of Brig. Gen. Thomas Ewing, jr., U. S. Army, commanding District of Saint Louis.
...
Our loss at Pilot Knob was about 200 killed, wounded, and missing, and in the several engagements on the retreat to Rolla about 150. Of the missing the most were cut off in detachments and escaped capture, so that our actual loss was about 150 killed and wounded, and 50 captured and paroled. Among our severely wounded were Lieut. Smith Thompson, Fourteenth Iowa; Lieut. John Fessler, First Infantry Missouri State Militia, and Lieut. John Braden, Fourteenth Iowa Infantry, since dead; Maj. James Wilson, Third Cavalry Missouri State Militia, after being wounded was captured on Pilot Knob, and subsequently with six of his gallant men was brutally murdered by order of a rebel field officer of the day. The rebel loss at Pilot Knob, killed and wounded, exceeded 1,500, as is shown by the inclosed letter of T. W. Johnson, surgeon in charge of our hospital there, and also by corroborative testimony gathered since our reoccupation of the post. In the rebel hospital at Ironton, on the 12th instant, we found Colonel Thomas, chief of General Fagan's staff, 3 majors, 7 captains, 12 lieutenants, and 204 enlisted men, representing seventeen regiments and four batteries, all dangerously and nearly all mortally wounded. The rest of the rebel wounded who were not able to follow the army were sent south by General Price, under escort of Colonel Rains' regiment. As to the loss of the enemy in the pursuit and at Harrison I have no knowledge.
...
-----
HEADQUARTERS SAINT LOUIS DISTRICT,
Saint Louis, Mo., October 11, 1864.
Maj. H. H. WILLIAMS,
Mineral Point:

There is a report in circulation, and by many credited, that there was a rebel infantry force three days ago at Fredericktown, 5,000 strong, and a rebel cavalry force at Cook's Settlement, 500 strong. It comes by way of Sainte Genevieve. I attach no importance to the rumor, and as I suppose Colonel McLane's cavalry, which has just been to Ironton for our wounded and will reach Cape Girardeau with them to-morrow, is the force which has been mistaken for rebels. I will have Colonel Hiller send you some cavalry if there is none with Brigadier General McCormick's command now going over from the river counties to the line of the railroad. I wish you to take possession of Pilot Knob with some cavalry and see that the rebels who may be only slightly wounded do not escape. I want all available infantry and citizens employed under direction of engineers of the railroad in reconstructing the bridges. Push the telegraph line through to Pilot Knob as soon as practicable, and open an office there as well as at Mineral Point. Call on the office here for additional operators and instruments.

THOS. EWING, JR.,
Brigadier-General.
-----
O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME XLI/3 [S# 85]
UNION CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN LOUISIANA AND THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI STATES AND TERRITORIES, FROM SEPTEMBER 1, 1864, TO OCTOBER 15, 1864.(*)--#34

HEADQUARTERS SAINT LOUIS DISTRICT,
Saint Louis, Mo., October 11, 1864.
Maj. H. H. WILLIAMS,
Mineral Point:

There is a report in circulation, and by many credited, that there was a rebel infantry force three days ago at Fredericktown, 5,000 strong, and a rebel cavalry force at Cook's Settlement, 500 strong. It comes by way of Sainte Genevieve. I attach no importance to the rumor, and as I suppose Colonel McLane's cavalry, which has just been to Ironton for our wounded and will reach Cape Girardeau with them to-morrow, is the force which has been mistaken for rebels. I will have Colonel Hiller send you some cavalry if there is none with Brigadier General McCormick's command now going over from the river counties to the line of the railroad. I wish you to take possession of Pilot Knob with some cavalry and see that the rebels who may be only slightly wounded do not escape. I want all available infantry and citizens employed under direction of engineers of the railroad in reconstructing the bridges. Push the telegraph line through to Pilot Knob as soon as practicable, and open an office there as well as at Mineral Point. Call on the office here for additional operators and instruments.

THOS. EWING, JR.,
Brigadier-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS SAINT LOUIS DISTRICT,
Saint Louis, Mo., October 16, 1864.
Col. J.V. DU BOIS,
Chief of Staff, Jefferson City:

I have sent 800 men under Lieutenant-Colonel Hequembourg to patrol North Missouri Railroad and repair it and the telegraph line at and beyond High Hill, where they have been broken. The work on the Iron Mountain Railroad is being pushed vigorously. It will be open to South Big River by Saturday, and work is going on on five bridges at once. The work on the Southwest Branch of the Pacific Railroad having been placed under the special supervision of Colonel Myers I know but little about it. I have furnished all the details he has asked. Five companies of Second Missouri State Militia reached Pilot Knob to-night from Cape Girardeau. I am guarding the furnace at Iron Mountain and Irondale and have a garrison at Potosi. The fort is being cleaned out. Two 24-pounders are mounted ready for service, which, with the two howitzers from Cape Girardeau, will make it formidable again. Among the Confederate wounded at Ironton are 1 colonel, 1 major, 7 captains, 12 lieutenants, and 200 enlisted men, all severely, and most of them mortally, wounded. I got no report yet from Major Williams as to aggregate of Price's army.

THOS. EWING, JR.,
Brigadier-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS SAINT LOUIS DISTRICT,
Saint Louis, October 17, 1864.
Major-General ROSECRANS,
Jefferson City:

Major Williams fails to get very full information as to the aggregate of Price's command. From Major Surridge, who is in the hospital here, I learn there are three divisions, with an aggregate of 18,000 men and eighteen pieces of artillery. Ten pieces of artillery are in Shelby's division. The divisions are nearly of equal size, Shelby's being the largest. Marmaduke's division has three brigades, under General Clark, Colonel McCray, and Colonel Freeman; Tim Reves commands a regiment in Freeman's brigade. Fagan's division is the best and has three brigades, commanded by General Cabell, Colonel Slemons, and Colonel Dobbin. Shelby's division has but two brigades, but very large ones, commanded by Colonel Shanks and Colonel Jackman. Major Williams in his dispatch says there were four divisions, commanded from right to left, as follows: Shelby, Marmaduke, Fagan, Cooper, and the aggregate was about 20,000, with eighteen pieces of artillery. He says in the hospitals at Ironton the following regiments and batteries were represented: Mounted infantry, Morgan's, Monroe's, Hill's, Coleman's, Witherspoon's, Crandall's, Reves', Boone's, Crawford's, Gordon's, Cochran's, Wright's, Hodge's, and Slayback's; cavalry, Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Missouri; batteries, Zimmerman's, Gentry's, and Wood's. I think the division of Cooper must not be with Price's command, as I have not heard of it as present except through Major Williams.

THOS. EWING, JR.,
Brigadier-General.
=====

 

[LadyReb]

Thank you. Very good information.
In case anyone is interested, here's the composition of Fagan's Division, to which the Arkansas troops were assigned (the Missouri troops were assigned to Marmaduke's Division). I have a special interest in the AR troops.
Cabell's Brigade
4th Arkansas Cavalry -- Col. Anderson Gordon.
6th Arkansas Cavalry -- Col. James C. Monroe.
7th Arkansas Cavalry -- Col. John F. Hill.
8th Arkansas Cavalry -- Col. Thomas J. Morgan.
3rd Arkansas Battalion -- Lieut. Col. Thomas M. Gunter.
16th Arkansas Battalion -- Maj. James L. Witherspoon.
17th Arkansas Battalion -- Lieut. Col. John M. Harrell.
8th Arkansas Field Battery -- Capt. William M. Hughey.
Slemons' Brigade
2nd Arkansas Cavalry -- Col. William F. Slemons.
10th Arkansas Cavalry -- Col. William A. Crawford.
12th Arkansas Cavalry -- Col. John W. Wright.
Carlton's Arkansas Cavalry -- Col. Charles H. Carlton.
Dobbin's Brigade
1st Arkansas Cavalry -- Col. Archibald S. Dobbin.
10th Arkansas Mounted Infantry -- Col. Allen R. Witt.
44th Arkansas Mounted Infantry -- Col. James McGehee.
7th Arkansas Field Battery (section) -- Lieut. Jesse V. Zimmerman.
McCray's Brigade
45th Arkansas Mounted Infantry -- Col. Milton D. Baber.
46th Arkansas Mounted Infantry -- Col. William O. Coleman.
47th Arkansas Mounted Infantry -- Col. Lee Crandall.
15th Missouri Cavalry -- Col. Timothy Reves.
Unattached
23rd Arkansas Mounted Infantry -- Col. Oliver P. Lyles.
30th Arkansas Mounted Infantry -- Col. James W. Rogan.
Anderson's Arkansas Battalion -- Capt. William L. Anderson.

 

[LadyReb]

The MO Governor didn't much like Price.

Shreveport, La. December 24, 1864.

Maj, Gen. Sterling Price,
Provisional Army, Confederate States:

General: The enclosed publication I have deemed necessary, to vindicate Generals Marmaduke and Cabell against injurious charges and to place the late Missouri campaign in a proper light before the public. In performing my imperative official duty in reference to that expedition, I desire to avoid giving unnecessary pain to any one. I therefore frankly state to you that believing myself fully acquainted with all the facts in relation to the return of your son, General Edwin Price, by your advice within the Federal lines in 1862, his subsequent course and the communications between you and him. I design to make a memoir of those facts to the President of the Confederate States and on it and the management of the late expedition to ask from him an order that you cease to be an officer in the provisional army of those states. Such a request (and still more such an order) would perhaps necessitate the giving of more or less publicity to that memoir. With a disposition to enable you to avoid the disagreeable discussions it would occasion, I propose that if you will at once resign your commission in that army, and your position of Missouri bank commissioner (assigning if you think proper, whatever reasons for those steps you may judge best, and such as will not necessitate controversy) and abstain hereafter from any interposition, directly or indirectly, in the military or political affairs of the Confederate States or the State of Missouri, that memoir will be sent as a paper to remain in the secret archives of the government and not used unless necessary to meet such an interposition, or an attack by yourself, or any of your friends, on the Confederate authorities or myself for the action of any of us in this matter. I presume it will be in accordance with your own feelings as it is with mine, that any future intercourse between us shall be only in writing, confined to indispensable official business and an answer to this letter.

I am, general, very respectfully, &c.,
Thos. C. Reynolds,
Governor of the State of Missouri.

 

[5fish]

Revisit--

Revisit:

Prices's move into Missouri is called a raid but he had defined objectives for taking and holding Missouri. So is it call a raid instead of a Campaign??

I do not know why after the battle of Pilot Knob(Ft. Davidson) cause Price to abandon his plans for taking St. Louis and he turned toward Kansas City..

Westport(the Gettysburg of the west) may have ended Price's campaign into Missouri but would not Mine Creek be the death blow. Would not Mine Creeks be what type of death blow Lincoln wanted Meade to do to Lee during his retreat form Gettysburg.

I think that Pleasanton and Blunt should get the loin share of the credit of repulsing Price form Missouri.

Could we not say the 1864 is where modern warfare began. Look at Grant's Overland, Sherman's Atlanta and Price's campaign for they all shared the same continuous fighting for more then a month between two opponents, just like World War One battles.

It were the guerrilla leaders that convinced Price that Missourians would rise up in mass if the confederate army moved into the state...

 

[Borderruffian]

The term raid IMO is just a part of the Trans-Miss. In reality it was a campaign but has been termed a raid probably because it sounds better.

At Mine Creek Price was already in retreat a retreat that started at Westport and continued on thru Marias de Cygnes. Price being Price however refused to believe his bell had been rung and he was defeated. Marmiton River and Second Newtonia were all a fighting withdrawal as was Mine Creek. He was done.

Even before Ft. Davidson there was no chance that Price would take St. Louis. St. Louis was the most heavily defended City in Missouri, Price could have never carried it without controlling the flow of men and material across and down the Mississippi. No Navy no controll of the River. His Delay at Davidson also allowed time to rail in Enrolled Militia to St Louis from other areas and expand the troops defending the area.

 

[whitworth]

Forgotten battle

Forgotten like Franklin Tennessee was forgotten for many, many years.

The defeat of Price at Westport, only confirmed that the Confederacy could never control Missouri and that the Confederate nation would never have 13 stars in its flag, even as early as 1862.

The Confederacy in the West had died long before 1864. At best it could conduct raids; raids that were never successful.

From the Westport Confederate loss, one could easily ask the question? Where did the Confederacy ever get the idea it could control the border states and the territories of the United States?

Margaret Mitchell far surpassed many Civil War historians with her comment in her novel, "Gone With The Wind",
"Why, all we have is cotton and slaves and arrogance..."

The Confederacy had the arrogance to think secession would work. Never realized that bravery alone could not win it the 13 state nation it desired.

 

[whitworth]

Look to Logistics

"I do not know why cause Price to abandon his plans for taking St. Louis and he turned toward Kansas City."

Because of total Confederate inadequacies. The Confederate army could not lay a successful siege of St. Louis or adequately supply an army near St. Louis. The Union army had control of the Mississippi River, and it could move troops and supplies from Illinois, Louisville, Memphis and Vicksburg to shore up St. Louis defenses, via its steamboats.

The Confederate army had a poor supply line in Missouri and couldn't possible match the Union resupply of forage, horses, rations, and ammunition.

 

[The Iron Duke]

Are there any good books available on the Missouri Raid? The only thing I could find on Amazon was Action Before Westport.

 

[captainrlm]

Interesting thread I had not seen before.

How does Price's foray into Missouri compare to Bragg/Smith's campaign to Kentucky in 1862? It sounds similary in terms of the disappointing results regarding Border State recruits joining the Confederate army along the way, but that Bragg & Smith actually had more military success than Price did.

Also, I thought I had read that AJ Smith and his men was recalled & sent to Nashville before the Missouri raid/campaign ended.

 

[Vareb]

In Sept 1864, CS Gen. Price crosses into Missouri from Arkansas with a large force under the notion that they would be treated as liberators by the locals causing an uprising against the federals. This raid or campaign happen during the siege of Petersburg and the fall of Atlanta in the east but little notice of it by history.

What battle was the turning point in Price's Campaign/Raid?

Where happen to being treated as liberators and causing an uprising within Missouri?

What union general should get the credit for turning back General Price's efforts in Missouri?

Why is this action by Price called a raid for his goal was to take St. Louis and Kansas City? He had more diffident goals then Lee did when he enter Pennsylvania in 1863 and that is called a campaign not a Raid.

General Price did not accomplish much more then the destruction of his army. He enter Missouri with 12000 troops and left with only 5000 troops. His raid/campaign had taken St. Louis or Kansas City or both would history ignore it then.

Think, if he had taken St. Louis, it might had changed the election in 1864 in McClellan's favor. (Forget Atlanta)

Another part of history ignored---

Hey, Fish. Was the drop in numbers casualties or deserters?

Well you don't have to answer that let me put it a different way.

Looks like there might have been quite a few deserters.

 

[Scribe]

"I do not know why cause Price to abandon his plans for taking St. Louis and he turned toward Kansas City."

Because of total Confederate inadequacies. The Confederate army could not lay a successful siege of St. Louis or adequately supply an army near St. Louis. The Union army had control of the Mississippi River, and it could move troops and supplies from Illinois, Louisville, Memphis and Vicksburg to shore up St. Louis defenses, via its steamboats.

The Confederate army had a poor supply line in Missouri and couldn't possible match the Union resupply of forage, horses, rations, and ammunition.

The arrival of A.J. Smith's tough veteran corps also had something to do with it.

 

[Battalion]

Price got clobbered from start to finish....

The Confederates started the campaign with several victories- Glasgow, Lexington, Little Blue & Independence.

 

[The Iron Duke]

No book recommendations?