Forney replaces Maury

[JohnG0609]

Just as things began to enter the final phase of the Vicksburg Campaign MG Maury was ordered on 04.15.63 to take command in East Tennessee. This left that division without a permanent commander, the Brigadiers being Hebert and Moore. It seems apparent that Hebert could have managed the division without a lot of difficulty. He'd been on station north of Vicksburg for some time (6 months?).

But Pemberton then ordered Forney from command of the division comprising the Brigades of Bowen and Green to replace Maury. Interestingly, the order to Forney was addressed to Grand Gulf, where I suppose Forney had gone when his other brigade, Green's, was ordered to reinforce Bowen.

Why the change to Forney and what, if any, impacts do you think it had on Confederate operations?

 

[Mississippian1861]

I'm not sure it made a huge difference in the overall course of the campaign. Interestingly, Maury had been a Lieutenant in the prewar Regiment of Mounted Rifles when William Loring was Colonel of that regiment. Maury had even written a book on Mounted Rifle tactics.

 

[tony_gunter]

From what little I know about Dabney Maury, Forney may have been an upgrade. His experience with engineering and artillery probably made him a good fit for command at Snyder's Bluff and behind the fortifications at Vicksburg.

 

[JohnG0609]

I'm not sure it made a huge difference in the overall course of the campaign. Interestingly, Maury had been a Lieutenant in the prewar Regiment of Mounted Rifles when William Loring was Colonel of that regiment. Maury had even written a book on Mounted Rifle tactics.

I don't generally find much value in hypotheticals, but this one I find intriguing. If Forney had been left in command of the division would he have fought Port Gibson in the same way as Bowen? Interesting thought!

 

[tony_gunter]

I don't generally find much value in hypotheticals, but this one I find intriguing. If Forney had been left in command of the division would he have fought Port Gibson in the same way as Bowen? Interesting thought!

You're from Mississippi, right? How much time have you spent in that terrain?

I think what a lot of people don't understand about it is that many places on those hills can't be scaled without getting on all fours and pulling yourself up with vegetation. How you do that under fire with a rifle in your hands is beyond me.

Bowen's positions may not make sense looking at a map, but make more sense if you get down in the gully and look up.

The Federals may have been still fighting at Magnolia Church in the afternoon of May 1st if someone other than Carr is in the lead. It's a huge red flag for McClernand that he didn't give Carr top accolades for the battle.

I don't know enough about Forney to know what he would have done differently. Was he ever in a similar bind later in the war?

 

[JohnG0609]

From what little I know about Dabney Maury, Forney may have been an upgrade. His experience with engineering and artillery probably made him a good fit for command at Snyder's Bluff and behind the fortifications at Vicksburg.

I think Forney was possessed of some talent. He had a left arm wound that would not heal. He had another surgery on it in January 1863 and requested an extension of his convalescent leave until February. So he only had division command for roughly 60 days while at BBR bridge. Half that time Bowen was detached to Grand Gulf. It seems almost like Forney was a place holder.

I find his transfer to Maury's division a bit interesting because Hebert and Moore were both West Pointers and had acquitted themselves well in combat. On the river defenses were Stevenson, Smith, Barton, Moore, Hebert, et al. That's a pretty fair line up without the addition of Forney. When Stevenson vacated the 2nd District command it fell to Forney as the senior MG. He was senior to Smith by less than a month. But Forney had not been at the river, so who knows what institutional knowledge went with Stevenson. In other words, Forney's interpretation of enemy operations on the West Bank might be vastly different from how Stevenson's more practiced eye might have interpreted it.

If I had to choose a reason I'd say Pemberton wanted Bowen to have the division. Or it could simply be that Forney was not fit for field duty.

I don't know if it means anything at all. I just found it interesting that right at the moment of crisis Pemberton changed 2/5 division commanders and the district commander of the AOR.

 

[JohnG0609]

You're from Mississippi, right? How much time have you spent in that terrain?

I think what a lot of people don't understand about it is that many places on those hills can't be scaled without getting on all fours and pulling yourself up with vegetation. How you do that under fire with a rifle in your hands is beyond me.

Bowen's positions may not make sense looking at a map, but make more sense if you get down in the gully and look up.

The Federals may have been still fighting at Magnolia Church in the afternoon of May 1st if someone other than Carr is in the lead. It's a huge red flag for McClernand that he didn't give Carr top accolades for the battle.

I don't know enough about Forney to know what he would have done differently. Was he ever in a similar bind later in the war?

I am indeed from the area, Raymond to be exact. Interestingly, the first shots of Champion Hill were fired at the Gillespie place, my ggg grandfather's place. His sons, my gg grandfather and his brother, were in Virginia with 12th MS.

Also, Alan Polk's grandparents were my next door neighbors, his aunt was my baby sitter.

I spent many a happy childhood day in Big Sandy Creek, at Rocky Springs, and Grand Gulf so I completely understand the topography. And a lot of young man days on the sand bar of Bayou Pierre watching them redneck boys jump off the top of the trestle bridge, between it and the high power line into the water that couldn't have been more than chest deep!

 

[Bradley]

Why the change to Forney and what, if any, impacts do you think it had on Confederate operations?

I have in my notes that Maury asked to be relieved because he was laid up with rheumatism. He wanted Hebert to take command. Probably more consequential than even his leaving, is he took with him eight or nine of his staff. Surgeon, Paymaster, Quartermaster, chiefs of Ordnance and Artillery, etc.

 

[JohnG0609]

I have in my notes that Maury asked to be relieved because he was laid up with rheumatism. He wanted Hebert to take command. Probably more consequential than even his leaving, is he took with him eight or nine of his staff. Surgeon, Paymaster, Quartermaster, chiefs of Ordnance and Artillery, etc.

That is interesting, I wasn't aware he had rheumatism. I know as a Virginian he wanted to get back there and East Tennessee was much closer than Mississippi.

I do find it very interesting that he took all the S staff. It would be normal for him to take his personal staff but I think taking the S staff would be an unusual step. Do you have a source for that?

If true, then that would have deprived Forney of a divisional S staff. Did he in turn take the S staff from his old division? If he did, that would have deprived Bowen of a division level S Staff. If Bowen didn't it would be interesting to discover if a division level staff could have put the division in better shape to defend against the enemy landing.

I'd be interested to know if Stevenson's S staff were "dual-hatted" as both district and divisional staff. When Stevenson relinquished district command to Forney and moved with his division to GG/BBR did he take the S staff with him? This would have deprived Forney of both a divisional staff and a district staff.

Why is any of this important? Well recall that the forward movement of the field army was delayed due failure of rations to arrive at Bovina. While this ultimately lands on Forney, it is a staff function. If he didn't have the staff then who is really responsible?

Of course all this falls apart if it proves out that Maury didn't take the S staff. But I've had fun mapping it out in my head!

 

[Mississippian1861]

That is interesting, I wasn't aware he had rheumatism. I know as a Virginian he wanted to get back there and East Tennessee was much closer than Mississippi.

I do find it very interesting that he took all the S staff. It would be normal for him to take his personal staff but I think taking the S staff would be an unusual step. Do you have a source for that?

If true, then that would have deprived Forney of a divisional S staff. Did he in turn take the S staff from his old division? If he did, that would have deprived Bowen of a division level S Staff. If Bowen didn't it would be interesting to discover if a division level staff could have put the division in better shape to defend against the enemy landing.

I'd be interested to know if Stevenson's S staff were "dual-hatted" as both district and divisional staff. When Stevenson relinquished district command to Forney and moved with his division to GG/BBR did he take the S staff with him? This would have deprived Forney of both a divisional staff and a district staff.

Why is any of this important? Well recall that the forward movement of the field army was delayed due failure of rations to arrive at Bovina. While this ultimately lands on Forney, it is a staff function. If he didn't have the staff then who is really responsible?

Of course all this falls apart if it proves out that Maury didn't take the S staff. But I've had fun mapping it out in my head!

Often (but not always) a General officer would take at least part of his staff with him when he changed commands. An example would be Maj. Mayo, Pemberton's chief Ordnance Officer, who had been assigned to Pemberton's staff while he was in SC and came with him to MS.

 

[JohnG0609]

You're right of course and I can see that at the brigade or division level. But Maury was going to take command of a department. A department with a full and functioning staff (I assume) that would have the institutional knowledge and expertise for that department. I admit that I'm not an expert in CSA staff operations but I think at the department level the staff officers were more centrally managed by the War Department. So I don't think, but freely admit that I don't know, the War Department would have approved a wholesale change in a department level staff.

Do you have the source for Maury taking the division staff with him to East Tennessee?

 

[tony_gunter]

That is interesting, I wasn't aware he had rheumatism. I know as a Virginian he wanted to get back there and East Tennessee was much closer than Mississippi.

I do find it very interesting that he took all the S staff. It would be normal for him to take his personal staff but I think taking the S staff would be an unusual step. Do you have a source for that?

If true, then that would have deprived Forney of a divisional S staff. Did he in turn take the S staff from his old division? If he did, that would have deprived Bowen of a division level S Staff. If Bowen didn't it would be interesting to discover if a division level staff could have put the division in better shape to defend against the enemy landing.

What would that look like?

Bowen posted his units within supporting distance of each other on narrow saddleback approaches that guarded both roads to the river. If forced back, his two wings would converge. It's hard to imagine a better defensive position for what was initially two brigades holding off four divisions.

 

[Bradley]

Do you have the source for Maury taking the division staff with him to East Tennessee?

The Vicksburg Whig published the names of Maury's staff going to TN with him on 4/14 and Maury's General Orders #2, which I cannot locate, apparently names at least some. As soon as he arrived in TN, folks like Maj. Floweree are also sending orders on his behalf, per the OR. So far as I can tell, only one of his eight or nine staff may have remained at Vicksburg, this being the surgeon who I think was delivered to Mobile after the surrender with the prisoners who were too sick to leave on their own.

Maury was begging to be let go for a while, at one time mentioning "personal" reasons. Later, he explicitly said he wanted to lead Virginians on Virginia's soil. He only mentioned being laid up with rheumatism to Stevenson on 4/16. This is in the OR.

 

[JohnG0609]

The Vicksburg Whig published the names of Maury's staff going to TN with him on 4/14 and Maury's General Orders #2, which I cannot locate, apparently names at least some. As soon as he arrived in TN, folks like Maj. Floweree are also sending orders on his behalf, per the OR. So far as I can tell, only one of his eight or nine staff may have remained at Vicksburg, this being the surgeon who I think was delivered to Mobile after the surrender with the prisoners who were too sick to leave on their own.

Maury was begging to be let go for a while, at one time mentioning "personal" reasons. Later, he explicitly said he wanted to lead Virginians on Virginia's soil. He only mentioned being laid up with rheumatism to Stevenson on 4/16. This is in the OR.

Dude, that's awesome. You nailed it. I'll take a look, but it sure looks like a decent thread to pull on. Thanks for the input!

 

[Bradley]

it sure looks like a decent thread to pull on

I think so. I speculate in my dissertation that, while I doubt the presence of Maury and his staff would have changed the outcome of things very much, it was very inconvenient timing to happen within days of Porter's transports passing Vicksburg and Grierson's raid kicking off.

 

[JohnG0609]

What would that look like?

Bowen posted his units within supporting distance of each other on narrow saddleback approaches that guarded both roads to the river. If forced back, his two wings would converge. It's hard to imagine a better defensive position for what was initially two brigades holding off four divisions.

Good catch as I didn't add much context to my thought. I wasn't referring to Bowens tactics during the battle but rather the sustainment of his force. In their reports both Bowen and Loring referenced the want of ammunition and food as the main reasons for the retreat. It was just a thought of mine that not having competent, trained division level staff commissary or ordnance officers might have been a contributing factor. I'm assuming the brigade commissary/ordnance officers were focused mostly on distribution and not acquisition and divisional commissary/ordnance officers would have more experience in acquisition.

 

[tony_gunter]

Good catch as I didn't add much context to my thought. I wasn't referring to Bowens tactics during the battle but rather the sustainment of his force. In their reports both Bowen and Loring referenced the want of ammunition and food as the main reasons for the retreat. It was just a thought of mine that not having competent, trained division level staff commissary or ordnance officers might have been a contributing factor. I'm assuming the brigade commissary/ordnance officers were focused mostly on distribution and not acquisition and divisional commissary/ordnance officers would have more experience in acquisition.

if I remember the timeline correctly, Pemberton was the first to express that he couldn't sustain an army south of the Big Black. Wouldn't that point to bigger issues than a lack of experienced staff? Possibly insufficient numbers of wagons?

I've always scratched my head at that one: why is Grant capable of sustaining 40,000 men south of the Big Black but Pemberton can't sustain 18,000?

 

[JohnG0609]

f I remember the timeline correctly, Pemberton was the first to express that he couldn't sustain an army south of the Big Black. Wouldn't that point to bigger issues than a lack of experienced staff? Possibly insufficient numbers of wagons?

I think that was a May 2 message to Loring.

Absolutely, I don't mean to claim staff issues were the proximate cause, they weren't. Grand Gulf got choked off by enemy movements. Porter blockaded GG on 04/21, they couldn't get heavy wagons over the bluff at Hankinson's, and Grierson captured a resupply wagon train. In hindsight it wasn't a really good question on my part. Where I was really tracking was hoping to close the loop on the missing rations at Bovina. I recall a couple authors touched on that as "poor staff work" but without any real explanation of why. And I'm very much a root cause analysis guy.

've always scratched my head at that one: why is Grant capable of sustaining 40,000 men south of the Big Black but Pemberton can't sustain 18,000?

Another Confederate planning assumption that didn't hold up.

But in fairness to Pemberton he may have felt restrained by a War Dept GO prohibiting impressment of civilian resources. He then issued a DMEL GO restating that. The War Dept allowed him the power in an emergency, but Pemberton may have been so sensitive to civ-mil relations after Charleston that he wouldn't dare do it.