Underused Civil War generals

[Stryker65]

There were quite a few Civil War generals who were either relieved due to command consolidations or simply transferred without reason -- in my opinion, these generals could have served their respective armies much better in active service than in garrison duties or "awaiting orders."

Some of these include:
- Brig. Gen. Alvin P. Hovey (US): Relieved after his division (1st Div, 23d Corps) was broken up; lauded by Grant for skillful maneuvering at Champion Hill
- Brig. Gen. Hugh B. Ewing (US): Relieved after the downsizing of the 15th Corps from 3-brigade divisions to 2-brigade divisions; Sherman's right-hand man from 1861-1863
- Brig. Gen. Ralph P. Buckland (US): Relieved after the downsizing of the 15th Corps from 3-brigade divisions to 2-brigade divisions; Sherman's top brigade commander at Shiloh
- Maj. Gen. John H. Forney (CS): Relieved after the surrender of Vicksburg; a veteran commander of both Eastern and Western theaters and one of the best division commanders in Pemberton's army.
- Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell (US): Relieved after the post-Mine Run reorganizations; as mentioned in a previous thread, Caldwell had a controversial service history, but that didn't mean that his services were wasted -- he could have been transferred to any number of other theaters.
- Brig. Gen. Erastus B. Tyler (US): Relieved after his brigade of 2-year regiments mustered out; a veteran of Jackson's Valley Campaign who fought well at Fredericksburg.
- Brig. Gen. Nathaniel C. McLean (US): Relieved after the Chancellorsville debacle; a veteran of Jackson's Valley Campaign who saved the 11th Corps at Chancellorsville with his Ohio Brigade.
- Brig. Gen. St. John R. Liddell (CS): Relieved after the post-Chattanooga reorganizations; one of the few officers Bragg, Hardee, and Davis all liked.
- Brig. Gens. Evander M. Law and Jerome B. Robertson (CS): Relieved after a feud with Longstreet; veteran officers who would have served valiantly had they not been relieved by Longstreet.

 

[General JJ]

Adolph von Steinwehr seemed a competent division commander. Sadly he lost his command in the consolidation of the 11th and 12th Corps.

 

[fyrd]

I used to be so much more certain about this subject before I became more familiar with seniority and the personal squabbles that infected both sides. Most of the generals we think as competent and effective now had a heck of a learning curve and benefitted from not being in senior prime time positions early on. 1861-1863 seems to have been a cauldron that burned a lot of general's first and second chances away.

On the union side, I wonder if Irvin McDowell could have done better if transferred out west after First Bull Run. Fitz John Porter's court martial seems to me to have been unfortunate. I also wonder if Joe Hooker should have gotten a full chance at a second act.

Lee not being able to work with Magruder or D.H. Hill struck me as disappointing at one point too.

 

[tony_gunter]

Not relieved, just ended up in backwater assignments.

Samuel Curtis and Eugene Carr

 

[Scott1967]

Not relieved, just ended up in backwater assignments.

Samuel Curtis and Eugene Carr

Yep these two worked really well together , Curtis is hardly known about unless your a civil war buff.

 

[Stryker65]

I used to be so much more certain about this subject before I became more familiar with seniority and the personal squabbles that infected both sides. Most of the generals we think as competent and effective now had a heck of a learning curve and benefitted from not being in senior prime time positions early on. 1861-1863 seems to have been a cauldron that burned a lot of general's first and second chances away.

Case in point: The US Army Register for January, 1863:

How many of these officers were "good" generals? McClellan, Frémont, Halleck, McDowell, Pope, and Hooker weren't, at least in modern perception; Wool, Harney, and Anderson were close-to-retirement old-army holdovers; leaving only Rosecrans and Cooke as the "good" generals in the Regular Army.

 

[Kearny The Magnificent]

Charles Pomeroy Stone wasn't just underutilized, he was wrongfully imprisoned as a scapegoat. But at the start of the war he was essential to defending DC. Stanton and the Radicals in Congress wanted a pound of flesh for Ball's Bluff and took it from a competent officer.

 

[danny]

Mansfield Lovell

 

[tony_gunter]

Case in point: The US Army Register for January, 1863:
View attachment 546500

How many of these officers were "good" generals? McClellan, Frémont, Halleck, McDowell, Pope, and Hooker weren't, at least in modern perception; Wool, Harney, and Anderson were close-to-retirement old-army holdovers; leaving only Rosecrans and Cooke as the "good" generals in the Regular Army.

The more I learn about Rosecrans, the more I think his record as inventor is a succinct metaphor for his military career:

Brilliant, but prone to burning himself

 

[Gwynn Oak Ken]

I agree about Stone.

 

[Stryker65]

Mansfield Lovell

Honestly, a lot of Confederate generals relieved in 1861-1862 work for this category -- Lovell's 2IC Johnson K. Duncan, for instance.

Other officers I find underutilized include Samuel G. French and Allegheny Johnson, who were both kept out of divisional command positions until 1863.

 

[J. Stanley]

- Brig. Gen. Alvin P. Hovey (US): Relieved after his division (1st Div, 23d Corps) was broken up; lauded by Grant for skillful maneuvering at Champion Hill

Based on Earl J. Hess' article, _Alvin P. Hovey and Abraham Lincoln's "Broken Promises": The Politics of Promotion_ , Hovey was not quite the same man as he was in 1862-63. Hovey seemed especially bitter about his long-delayed promotion to major general and the break-up of his "Indiana Legion" and perhaps depressed by the death of his wife in 1863. It's also true his division was not of good quality: according to the Army of the Ohio's medical director, Hovey's Division was made of "old men and boys" with an especially high rate of physical disability.

However, Hovey was not a good sport during his limited time in the Atlanta Campaign. When Alpheus Williams' Division was under heavy pressure, Hovey declined his request to come up and support his left flank due to how raw his troops were. Williams complained that Hovey only came up to support him once the Confederates were withdrawing, which Hovey presented in his report as a glorious charge. Not a great look for the guy.

John McArthur was definitely underused. He and his brigade fought heroically at Fort Donelson and performed ably in Shiloh and Second Corinth as a brigade and acting division commander. However, he missed out on all the action in Vicksburg, Chattanooga and Atlanta. He was only able to contribute to the Federal cause at the last battles of the war - Nashville and the Siege of Mobile. He deserves the credit for breaking the Confederate position on Shy's Hill at Nashville, which was important, but it feels a waste that such a promising and able division commander was left on the sidelines for two years.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

After reviewing Jacob Cox's personal history, thought he possessed leadership skills, both politically and militarily. He proved to be a capable Union political general in the field. Cox led a brigade very early in the war, and got elevated to division command in the Army of the Potomac during the Maryland Campaign. He took over temporary command of the IX Corps when Reno was killed at South Mountain, then effectively handled Corps command responsibilities at Antietam. Shortly after Antietam, he was appointed to the rank of M-G but his appointment expired in early Mar. '63 due to a politically perceived excess of M-Gs at the time. During most of '63 and early '64 he was relatively inactive in the field. But he returned to active division command again, effectively leading a division of the XXIII Corps of the Army of the Ohio under Schofield, during the Atlanta, Hood's Tennessee and the Carolinas Campaigns (though he did not get reappointed as a M-G until early Dec. '64).

In summary. Cox showed throughout the war, apart from an extended period of absence from active field commands in the middle of the conflict, that he was a solid and competent combat division commander who could also be relied upon to handle the responsibilities of at least temporary corps command, if it were necessary. It seems that Cox's higher field command abilities were not fully-utilized over the entire period of the CW.

 

[rpkennedy]

Honestly, a lot of Confederate generals relieved in 1861-1862 work for this category -- Lovell's 2IC Johnson K. Duncan, for instance.

Other officers I find underutilized include Samuel G. French and Allegheny Johnson, who were both kept out of divisional command positions until 1863.

To be fair to the Confederates, the ankle wound Alleghany Johnson suffered in the Valley kept him out until the Pennsylvania Campaign.

Ryan

 

[Norman Dasinger Jr]

Bragg wanted Forney for his Kentucky Campaign but he was ordered to Mississippi instead

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Thought the proven and highly capable Confederate combat division commander. D. H. Hill, must figure prominently as a candidate for being an under-utilized leading general in the CW. He was detached from the AoNV during the Pennsylvania Campaign, where Lee could have used him as another solid division commander, and possibly upon promotion as even a corps commander (instead of Ewell) at Gettysburg. Shortly after Gettysburg, Hill was re-assigned to the AoT and led a corps at Chickamauga but following a disputation with Bragg and the reorganization of the AoT soon afterwards, he was left without an active command. He later got appointed in mid-'64 to various departmental administrative roles which he held for much of the remainder of the war, and he saw little combat apart from again commanding a division at Bentonville very late in the conflict. Seems like this transfer to largely administrative duties was a great waste of his field command talent.

Although by any objective assessment, it clearly appears his field leadership was under-utilized over the course of the CW, it needs to be realized he was a disagreeable subordinate who probably would have had great difficulty fitting into any larger army command structure for any sustainable period. In other words, there was no real opportunity cost to factor in here. But one can still wonder whether Hill might have made an effective contribution as a corps commander in Lee's army during any of his major campaigns.

Similar considerations of under-utilization of a senior Confederate commander might also be applied to William Hardee in the context of leadership of the AoT. (But Hardee was an unwilling permanent participant for the role).

 

[J. Stanley]

D. H. Hill

While I think D.H. Hill was a good division commander, I think he would have struggled a lot with corps command. To quote his biographer Chris J. Hartley:

"Corps command calls for a leader who can create effective plans, communicate clearly, and inspire followers. It calls for a leader who can earn the respect of his followers. In all of this, D. H. Hill was found wanting."

Hill's performance in North Carolina, the Defense of Richmond during the Gettysburg Campaign and Chickamauga showed his shortcomings: he saw shadows where there were none, he was an a** to his superiors and subordinates and his tactics were strangely deficient in Chickamauga.

Maybe he would have been better than A.P. Hill, but I would not rate him so highly.

 

[J. Stanley]

Andrew A. Humphreys might have been wasted as Meade's Chief of Staff - an excellent field commander and did a good job as CoS after Butterfield was wounded at Gettysburg. I think that if Warren had been relieved at Spotsylvania Court House and replaced by A.A. Humphreys as Grant/Meade considered, it would probably have been an improvement.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Andrew A. Humphreys might have been wasted as Meade's Chief of Staff - an excellent field commander and did a good job as CoS after Butterfield was wounded at Gettysburg. I think that if Warren had been relieved at Spotsylvania Court House and replaced by A.A. Humphreys as Grant/Meade considered, it would probably have been an improvement.

Probably better for the AotP would have been Warren as Chief of Staff and Humphreys as Corps Commander, starting after Gettysburg.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Maybe he would have been better than A.P. Hill, but I would not rate him so highly.

But if D. H. Hill had been appointed as a Corps commander (say, instead of Ewell) at Gettysburg, wonder how he might have responded to Lee's order on day one to take Cemetery Hill, 'if practicable'. (Bearing in mind that Hill was appointed as a L-G shortly afterwards on Jul. 11 although it was not later confirmed).