Firing Tactics : about efficiency and actual use

[CompanyHell]

Hi,

Long time lurker here, and first time poster. I don't know if I post on the correct forum, so please apologize any newbie mistake, and feel free to redirect me to the right place…

I belong to a small but active group of ACW reenactors here in France (mostly infantry, but we also have a small artillery battery, and even some scouting horsemen !), and we work hard in every aspect to achieve a "genuinely" correct depiction of an ACW combat unit, as far as accoutrement, formations and behaviour on the field are concerned.

I'd like to share today one of the great questions that usually raises HUGE debates between us, and for which we couldn't find any documented definitive answer, be it through scholar examination or empiric testing : firing tactics.

More specifically, we debate endlessly on the respective benefits and downsides of the different firing formations as described in the drill manuals (be it Scott's, Hardee's or Casey's) or in the battle reports and accounts. We're talking small units here, platoon or company, but the issue may be relevant for larger formations.

The tricky aspect of this issue is to make a distinction between the theoretical (let's say : drill) approach in which a particular tactics may be presented, and the actual use of it through test of fire, in a context of chaos, confusion, impeded sight, smoke, noise, etc. As such, it appears (through the reading of period after action reports), that some tactics were seldom used, whereas "the manual" would let imagine that it has to be used intensively, and vice versa.

I have summarized below different firing situations, with their supposed respective benefits and downsides (or what we think they could be).

The different cases all share some common points : small unit perspective (as already mentioned), in ordered formation, under command (we therefore don't discuss skirmish formation, or other situations where the soldiers would be allowed to open fire at will).

"Benefits" and "downsides" are to be understood as the immediate advantages/disadvantages awarded to the unit in terms of, among others, firepower, accuracy, casualty rate, enemy fire suppression.

1. Volley fire : we intend in such (maybe to the horror of more scholarly readers) a situation when the whole unit (both ranks) fires at the same time.
Benefits : greatest available firepower, increased probability of hitting numerous targets.
Downsides : by discharging all guns at the same time, the unit is made very vulnerable and exposed during reloading time.

Bottom line : explosive firepower, but you got to have a B plan if your enemy is not neutralized at once (not to say if some flanking enemy unit is lurking in the bushes with loaded guns…)

2. Fire by rank : one whole rank of the unit fires first, followed by the second one ; after firing, the first rank is supposed to load immediately, so as to prepare for a second fire, and so on.
Benefits : good firepower, good probability of hitting numerous targets ; the unit preserves half its firing capability.
Downsides : the loading process is not fast enough to allow for a continuous "suppressive fire" protection ; so there is necessarily a moment when both ranks have fired, and are not finished with loading their guns, making them vulnerable to enemy's fire.

Bottom line : seems a good compromise, but if your enemy is able to use some cover (or go prone, or be swift enough to break and reform) on your first and second rank fire, your whole unit is in danger to be swept off by a deadly returning fire.

3. Fire by squad/platoon : the unit "divides" itself (keeping formation), in two sub-units (usually divisions or platoons for a company), or a series of even number sub-units, which fire alternatively, with both ranks ; after firing, the unloaded sub-unit(s) reload, while the other sub-unit(s) fire(s) on its/their turn.
Benefits : good firepower, continuous suppressive fire, minimal "dead spot" with the whole unit unloaded.
Downsides : may weaken the casualty rate per shot, as there may be increased probability of same targets being hit several times (firepower less "spread out" on a large frontage than fire by rank) ; requires a very well trained and highly responsive unit to be able to execute every steps in a very timely manner.

Bottom line : seems theoretically a good tactics to "suppress" an enemy unit ; may need intensive drill and training to be performed correctly ; appears more suitable to larger formation (regiment in line ?) ; no idea of actual use in combat situation.

4. Fire by file : one file (rightmost) opens fire, followed by the next file, etc. After discharging, files immediately load their guns. When the leftmost file has fired, the first file begins to fire again, etc. (yes, I know that usually the process was supposed to end after the first round, and men were then expected to fire and load at will ; let imagine a repeating movement for sake of the demonstration). Providing the unit has a long enough frontage, one could imagine an "endless", continuous fire, resembling a kind of slow firing automatic weapon (i.e. : considering for the sake of example that each fireshot "lasts" one second, and that the reloading process could take 30 seconds, it takes at least a 30 man frontage to allow the first firing file to be ready to fire again when every file in the unit has fired a first round).
Benefits : continuous suppressive fire, no "dead spot" during which the whole unit is unloaded.
Downsides : small firepower ; needs a minimum frontage to achieve the "machine gun" effect ; requires a very well trained and highly responsive unit to be able to execute every steps in a very timely manner.

Bottom line : seems theoretically a good tactics to "suppress" an enemy unit ; but actual period reports show however that this tactics was very seldom used ; looks like such an effect would be rather difficult to perform in a real combat situation, even with a drilled and trained unit.

A very long "lecture" to get to the point, and ask your opinion, ACW buffs and experts, on the following points :

• Do you agree with my (rough) description of available firing tactics of the time ?...
  
  
• What are your comments on the benefits and downsides ?...
  
  
• What differences between this theoretical toolbox for the field officer, and the actual reality on the ground, as far as efficiency and frequency of use are concerned ?...

Many thanks ! to those who will take some time to share their knowledge and points of view.

Tom
Company L, a.k.a "The 11th Company"

 

[7th Mississippi Infantry]

Hello Tom,
Welcome to CivilWarTalk.
I'm sure some of our reenactors will offer their opinions on your comments.

 

[Tom Elmore]

A scientific approach to firepower, I like it! Just two brief observations from my limited knowledge of mid-1863 tactics in the Eastern theater. The side that gets off the first accurate volley has a decided advantage in having disabled much of their opposition at the outset. As for firing tactics, I seldom read of their being implemented as the manual dictates. Typically a command to commence firing will be communicated by voice or bugle, and thereafter the men load and fire at will. Since everyone loads at different rates, the firing soon assumes a sustained and uniform rate that simultaneously suppresses and results in steady attrition of the opponent. Units possessing the best firing discipline, with calm and deliberate aim, nearly always triumph. This is most clearly illustrated when veterans are matched against untried troops, which invariably results in the latter being slaughtered.

One more observation. A single large regiment with good command and control by the field officers (Colonel in the center, and Lieutenant Colonel and Major managing the two wings) does appear to enjoy an advantage against two regiments, each half as large. I mention it because the average size of a Confederate army regiment was larger than its Federal counterpart in battles like Gettysburg. Perhaps one good commander is better than two good commanders, confirming the old adage, "too many cooks spoil the broth."

 

[AUG]

Welcome! First note that I'm not a reenactor. I have read of few instances in which units fired by volley, by file, etc. in battle, but it seems as though what was often the case, as Tom Elmore stated above, was that a regiment would fire a single volley when they first came into contact with the enemy, and then fired at will. Furthermore, as the fight raged on troops tended to spread out and take cover here and there, all while maintaining some semblance of order but not perfectly dressed ranks.

Here is an excerpt from Berry Benson's "Memoir of a Confederate Scout and Sharpshooter" in which he recounts the fight in Otto's Cornfield at Antietam:
"Advancing through a cornfield, there suddenly rose before us a line of the enemy, whom we drove in disorder at the first fire. Running rapidly forward through the corn, we stopped at the top of the hill and poured a galling fire into the fleeing foe. Many of them stopped in a little hallow in the corn at the foot of the hill, afraid to attempt the passage of the open slope beyond. Into them grouped here in a crouching disorderly line, we poured volley after volley, doubtless with terrible execution. I say volleys, and here was the only time in battle that I now remember firing to be done by command. Maj. Alston many times gave the command, 'Right wing-ready-aim-fire-Load! Left wing-ready-aim-fire!-Load!' with splendid effect, for the line obeyed as a drill."

In another excerpt from Berry Benson's memoir he tries to describe what combat in the ACW was like. This ones pretty long so I'll put it in quotes.

"Since I am writing this as a heirloom for Benson 1963 which I hope will go down amongst my descendants for a long time, and since amongst those there will be many who will go through life without ever experiencing the excitement of battle, and who, unless they imbibe very different ideas of these things from what I did in my boyhood, before I had seen for myself, may get quite false notions in regard to it, I want to try to tell something of how the fighting really goes on. I supposed a battle was carried on in the order and style of first-class drill, knees all bent at the same angle and at the same moment, guns leveled on a line that was even as a floor, and every trigger pulled at one moment making a single report.

"For a battle is not a drillroom, nor is battle an occasion for drill, and there is the merest semblance of order maintained. I say semblance of order, for there is an undercurrent of order in tried troops that surpasses that of the drillroom; — it is that order that springs from the confidence that comrades have in each other, from the knowledge that these messmates of yours, whether they stand or lie upon the ground, close together or scattered apart, in front of you three paces, or in rear of you six, in the open or behind a tree or a rock, — that these, though they do not 'touch elbows to the right,' are nevertheless keeping dressed upon the colors in some rough fashion, and that the line will not move forward and leave them there, nor will they move back and leave the line.

"A battle is entered into, mostly, in as good order and with as close a drill front as the nature of the ground will permit, but at the first "pop! pop!" of the rifles there comes a sudden loosening of the ranks, a freeing of selves from impediment of contact, and every man goes to fighting on his own hook; firing as, and when he likes, and reloading as fast as he fires. He takes shelter wherever he can find it, so he does not get too far away from his Co., and his officers will call his attention to this should he move too far. He may stand up, he may kneel down, he may lie down, it is all right; — tho' mostly the men keep standing, except when silent under fire — then they lie down.

"And it is not officers alone who give orders, the command to charge may come from a private in the line whose quick eye sees the opportunity, and who's order brooks then no delay. Springing forward, he shouts 'charge, boys, charge!' The line catches his enthusiasm, answers with yells and fallows him in the charge. Generally it is a wild and spontaneous cry from many throats along the line, readily evoked by the least sign of wavering in the enemy.

"A battle is too busy a time, and too absorbing, to admit of a great deal of talk, still you hear such remarks and questions as 'How many cartridges you got?' — 'My gun's getting mighty dirty.' — 'What's become of Jones?' — 'Looky here, Butler, mind how you shoot; that ball didn't miss my head two inches.' 'Just keep cool, will you; I've got better sense than to shoot anybody.' 'Well, I don't like your standing so close behind me, nohow.' — 'I say, look at Lieut. Dyson behind that tree.' — 'Purty rough fight, ain't it Cap'n?' — 'Cap'n, don't you think we better move up a little, just along that knoll?' — all this mixed and mingled with fearful yells, and maybe curses too, at the enemy.

"And a charge looks just as disorderly. With a burst of yells, a long, wavering, loose jointed line sweeps rapidly forward, only now and then one or two stopping to fire, while here and there drop the killed and wounded; the slightly wounded, some of them, giving no heed but rushing on, while others run hurriedly, half-bent, to the rear. The colors drop, are seized again, — again drop, and are again lifted, no man in reach daring to pass them by on the ground. — colors, not bright and whole and clean as when they came fresh from the white embroidering fingers, but since clutched in the storm of battle with grimy, bloody hands, and torn into shreds by shot and shell."

 

[thomas aagaard]

first thing to know.
If you look in the School of the battalion you will notice that that you have:
Fire by: battalion, Wing, rank, company and file. (not sure about division)
There is no fire by platoon.
the squads is a term used during basic drill. Its not a subdivision used in combat. (unlike in the modern armies)

There is also no "fire at will"

The drill book mention that fire by file is the one that is used the most.
Iam not sure if that is actually a commend made by Hardee or if is is in the original french drill book.

The big advantage of firing volleys is the fact that the battalion commander or company commander keep a much tighter control over the men and how much ammo they use.

 

[Albert Sailhorst]

Howdy and Welcome!

 

[Banjo Pete]

Bienvenue et merci pour votre interet dans l'histoire des E.U. !

 

[CompanyHell]

Welcome! First note that I'm not a reenactor. I have read of few instances in which units fired by volley, by file, etc. in battle, but it seems as though what was often the case, as Tom Elmore stated above, was that a regiment would fire a single volley when they first came into contact with the enemy, and then fired at will. Furthermore, as the fight raged on troops tended to spread out and take cover here and there, all while maintaining some semblance of order but not perfectly dressed ranks.

Here is an excerpt from Berry Benson's "Memoir of a Confederate Scout and Sharpshooter" in which he recounts the fight in Otto's Cornfield at Antietam:
"Advancing through a cornfield, there suddenly rose before us a line of the enemy, whom we drove in disorder at the first fire. Running rapidly forward through the corn, we stopped at the top of the hill and poured a galling fire into the fleeing foe. Many of them stopped in a little hallow in the corn at the foot of the hill, afraid to attempt the passage of the open slope beyond. Into them grouped here in a crouching disorderly line, we poured volley after volley, doubtless with terrible execution. I say volleys, and here was the only time in battle that I now remember firing to be done by command. Maj. Alston many times gave the command, 'Right wing-ready-aim-fire-Load! Left wing-ready-aim-fire!-Load!' with splendid effect, for the line obeyed as a drill."

In another excerpt from Berry Benson's memoir he tries to describe what combat in the ACW was like. This ones pretty long so I'll put it in quotes.

Wow, guys !

I wouldn't have expected such responsive and speedy feedback. Thanks for the interest.

Great reference from Aug351, I really appreciate ; this emphasizes a constant feature in firsthand "ground level" reports : the stress on the chaotic nature of combat, which leaved little place for real command and control through clearly articulated orders, and perfectly dressed lines of battles... So maybe one could conclude that all the subtelties we found in the manuals and regulations have little to do with real wartime engagement and rage, specially for unseasoned troops. Moreover, seasoned troops certainly tended to take the most advantages they could from every bit of cover or terrain, this behavior increasing constantly through the course of war, up to the systematic use of fortifications, trenches and breastworks in the final part of the war, limiting "open ground" direct confrontation.

 

[CompanyHell]

first thing to know.
If you look in the School of the battalion you will notice that that you have:
Fire by: battalion, Wing, rank, company and file. (not sure about division)
There is no fire by platoon.
the squads is a term used during basic drill. Its not a subdivision used in combat. (unlike in the modern armies)

There is also no "fire at will"

The drill book mention that fire by file is the one that is used the most.
Iam not sure if that is actually a commend made by Hardee or if is is in the original french drill book.

The big advantage of firing volleys is the fact that the battalion commander or company commander keep a much tighter control over the men and how much ammo they use.

Thanks Thomas for correcting some of my approximations. I must confess I hadn't my copy of "School of the company" and " School of the battalion" before my eyes when writing my post ! As far as "firing by squad/platoon" goes, I was not specifically refering to the terms as they appear in the manuals of the time, but in a more generic sense, where a unit formed in line with some consistancy manages to organize fire by groups of men taking their turns in a somewhat regular and timely manner. If I can recall correctly, this tactics was used quite intensively during the Napoleonic era (at least say so many of my books on the topic) and undoubtedly before and after that.

By the way, The last remark of our Danish comrade reminds me I forgot to mention one of the most important problems our small reenacting troop encounter when firing by file (vs. firing by rank) : quick ammunition shortage. A constant fire of, say, 20 mn (which is huge, and unheard of by ACW "standards") see us consuming well over the average 40 rounds a solder was carrying (and which where often still intact for the most part at the end of the day). Modern reenacting tends to fire far more often than was done during real war, even in the most fierced battles. This could also explain the reluctancy for officers to order such firing tactics (in the dubious occurence it would even be feasable in the battle mayhem), for fear of losing control on the fire rate of their men, and eventually the amunition consumption.

Tom

 

[thomas aagaard]

One problem is the fact that we can load faster (if the cartridge do not cause problems) and we don't spend time of actually trying to aim. So we can fire a lot faster than they did. (at 100m you do need to use a few seconds on aiming if you want to hit the target)

One thing I noticed changed after I took over as our 1st Sergeant and change a number of things.
Earlier when we where in a skirmish line we basically just spread out and fired "at will".
But At our last drill event we used the time to do it properly as written in the books.
First we drilled it without powder, but stil moving the hand to the box, then to the mouth... and we used ramrods... to try give everyone an idea about how long it actually take, when you need to use the ramrod and is kneeling.
Then we did it just for a few rounds pr man with powder and no ramrod.. and each man waiting for his comrade to finish loading, so one of the two men always had a loaded weapon...

The later the same day we had a small tactical where we did it by the book (but no ramrods)... and we used a lot less powder than we have done in similar events earlier... Since one man was always waiting.

 

[johan_steele]

I'm not really going to be able to answer the OP questions directly but will just kind of work around them.

Colonel Sanborn of the 4th MN VI would order the first shot be a Regimental volley then shout loud enough for all to here, and I quote, "KILL THEM!" At which time his men would load and fire as they saw fit. The 4th MN VI gained a reputation as "shooters" among their brigade and later their Division. They would lead the US forces into Vicksburg and lead the 15th Corps in the Grand Review so they were doing something right.

A Sgt of the 4th MN had served in the French Foreign Legion, I believe. He was known to have served in North Africa & the Crimea and mentioned being within a muskets length of Colonel Vienot (sp?) when he was killed during one of the assaults. The man was an accomplished drill master for the Regiment. One of his laments was that the men had no interest in the bayonet drill, which he fully believed was one of the most important. The irony is that the Regiment never engaged in full scale hand to hand combat.

One of the things he was noted doing at Iuka (while working as a 2nd Sgt) was dropping down to one knee as the Regiment volleyed. At first several of the men believed he had been wounded. He had dropped to one knee to see under the smoke and get an idea of the effect of the volley. He was also known to call his men "Volt Gears" which some of the men had great fun with. After which he switched to calling them his "Bastards." What is of interest to me is that he even knew the reference Voltiguer as I don't believe there were Voltiguers in the French Army after Napoleon so he would not have been exposed to the term.

I am most familiar with the men of the western theatre. Compared to the eastern theatre US western troops relied much more heavily on skirmishers and were considerably more mobile. As an example in the summer of 1863 the 3rd IA VI covered 113 miles in three days. The 4th MN VI covered just about 250 miles in less than two weeks... while often dealing w/ snow drifts 30' deep. Western troops in general covered a lot more real estate than their comrades in the east.

The discipline of the western troops in particular and US troops in general was nothing like those of the Continent. They were quite physically fit and more than a little rough and tumble. Generally, they could also out march most, particularly the western troops who came from a locale that was more geographically spread out than Europe. Another thing to consider when viewing the ACW would be the typical field of battle. Very rarely were the US forces able to bring their superior artillery to bear as the terrain did not allow it. Trees were and still are quite plentiful and fields were at a premium across most of the areas where the armies campaigned. Places like Shiloh, Chancellorsville, Wilderness etc come to mind. In many cases the ranges were well under 400 yards, in some cases considerably shorter. The battle of Allatoona Pass took place in a VERY confined area, over all not a lot larger than the Olympic Stadium; though in this case more than 10,000 men made great efforts to kill each other for about 8 hours. At the same time some of major battles were over sprawling fields of battle with a lot of movement.

Sieges were of the traditional style with works that were of no surprise to a veteran of the Crimea and Sevastopol. The similarities to fighting on the continent were as interesting as the differences.

It's certainly true that the armies of 61-62 were howling mobs of enthusiastic amateurs by 1863 both armies had developed into competent professional armies with a good understanding of logistics and the need for at least a modicum of discipline.

I hope that makes some sort of sense...

 

[DixieRifles]

I'm no expert on tactics and I've reenacted only one weekend event. It seems that after the first volley the firing breaks down into individuals firing at will. When I read accounts of battles, even large battles, it seems that is the firing evolves. You don't read or get the feel that they are firing by rank. There are times where the author will say they fired by rank or volley. Usually this occurs when they are waiting to receive an attack by the enemy or they fire before they charge.

Another observation, which is expressed above, is that the first volley is the most deadly. The rules of War Games allows more fire power on the first volley. I always thought this was because the guns were clean and freshly loaded and the men were fresh and more focused. Now, based upon this discussion, I think the order in the ranks falls apart and the firing is not well coordinated and targets are not as well defined.

 

[CompanyHell]

I'm not really going to be able to answer the OP questions directly but will just kind of work around them.

Colonel Sanborn of the 4th MN VI would order the first shot be a Regimental volley then shout loud enough for all to here, and I quote, "KILL THEM!" At which time his men would load and fire as they saw fit. The 4th MN VI gained a reputation as "shooters" among their brigade and later their Division. They would lead the US forces into Vicksburg and lead the 15th Corps in the Grand Review so they were doing something right.

A Sgt of the 4th MN had served in the French Foreign Legion, I believe. He was known to have served in North Africa & the Crimea and mentioned being within a muskets length of Colonel Vienot (sp?) when he was killed during one of the assaults. The man was an accomplished drill master for the Regiment. One of his laments was that the men had no interest in the bayonet drill, which he fully believed was one of the most important. The irony is that the Regiment never engaged in full scale hand to hand combat.

One of the things he was noted doing at Iuka (while working as a 2nd Sgt) was dropping down to one knee as the Regiment volleyed. At first several of the men believed he had been wounded. He had dropped to one knee to see under the smoke and get an idea of the effect of the volley. He was also known to call his men "Volt Gears" which some of the men had great fun with. After which he switched to calling them his "Bastards." What is of interest to me is that he even knew the reference Voltiguer as I don't believe there were Voltiguers in the French Army after Napoleon so he would not have been exposed to the term.

I am most familiar with the men of the western theatre. Compared to the eastern theatre US western troops relied much more heavily on skirmishers and were considerably more mobile. As an example in the summer of 1863 the 3rd IA VI covered 113 miles in three days. The 4th MN VI covered just about 250 miles in less than two weeks... while often dealing w/ snow drifts 30' deep. Western troops in general covered a lot more real estate than their comrades in the east.

The discipline of the western troops in particular and US troops in general was nothing like those of the Continent. They were quite physically fit and more than a little rough and tumble. Generally, they could also out march most, particularly the western troops who came from a locale that was more geographically spread out than Europe. Another thing to consider when viewing the ACW would be the typical field of battle. Very rarely were the US forces able to bring their superior artillery to bear as the terrain did not allow it. Trees were and still are quite plentiful and fields were at a premium across most of the areas where the armies campaigned. Places like Shiloh, Chancellorsville, Wilderness etc come to mind. In many cases the ranges were well under 400 yards, in some cases considerably shorter. The battle of Allatoona Pass took place in a VERY confined area, over all not a lot larger than the Olympic Stadium; though in this case more than 10,000 men made great efforts to kill each other for about 8 hours. At the same time some of major battles were over sprawling fields of battle with a lot of movement.

Sieges were of the traditional style with works that were of no surprise to a veteran of the Crimea and Sevastopol. The similarities to fighting on the continent were as interesting as the differences.

It's certainly true that the armies of 61-62 were howling mobs of enthusiastic amateurs by 1863 both armies had developed into competent professional armies with a good understanding of logistics and the need for at least a modicum of discipline.

I hope that makes some sort of sense...

Most interesting.

Do you have some references from where you picked up the quotes ? I'd like very much to give them a look. I'm especially much interested in the story of this man who knew both European (through is involvement in the Crimean War in the ranks of the Foreign Legion) and American theaters of operations, and French and US regulations.

BTW, and not wanting to be pedantic here, but the the correct French spelling is "voltigeurs" (which litteraly means : "those who do acrobatics/stunt") ; the name is still used today in modern French army for mobile, light motorized reconnaissance specialized units.

Thanks for sharing, indeed.

 

[johan_steele]

Most interesting.

Do you have some references from where you picked up the quotes ? I'd like very much to give them a look. I'm especially much interested in the story of this man who knew both European (through is involvement in the Crimean War in the ranks of the Foreign Legion) and American theaters of operations, and French and US regulations.

BTW, and not wanting to be pedantic here, but the the correct French spelling is "voltigeurs" (which litteraly means : "those who do acrobatics/stunt") ; the name is still used today in modern French army for mobile, light motorized reconnaissance specialized units.

Thanks for sharing, indeed.

I've studied the men of the 4th MN VI pretty heavily. When I first came across the reference to "volt gears" I couldn't figure out what they were talking about. It wasn't until I discovered that the 2nd Sgt had been on the continent in the French army that I put 2 & 2 together and got something other than 6.

It actually solved a mystery to me as men from several other regiment formed in Minnesota had referenced that French or foreign -insert explicit name here- as one of the NCOs assisting the Prussian. The Prussian is well known the other man not so much.

I was able to somewhat flesh out his identity through letters from c & d cos 4th mn. To make matters worse I believe he went by at least two different names.

I'll see if I can pull up some more data on him later today. But en route to church.

Have a good Easter all.

 

[johan_steele]

One thing in addition worth mention is that Earl Hess did some serious research trying to find battles where the 3 aimed shots per minute was actually accomplished for any length of time. IIRC he could only come up with a couple where units fired more than 80 rounds in the entire engagement. Those were mostly western engagements; Shiloh, Chickamauga, & Atlanta. My own research showed Allatoona as the winner for rounds expended; though even then some men only fired 40 rounds through the engagement. He also studied the range of most engagements and opined that most firefight took place at under 200 yards.

 

[johan_steele]

My resources are buried at the moment and at this point I don't think I'll be able to dig them out prior to next weekend. I know the man rather well as he is one of the men I took to base my persona upon. Wheras he spoke English (poorly) French, Dutch, bits of Russian & Turkish I fluently speak only English, bad english and drunkaneese.

I have read a lot of diaries & letters from the men but one of the frustrating things is how rarely the men go into real detail about minutia, tactics and speak of battles past the most general. Like soldiers still today I would say the biggest gripe is about the food, sore feet and incompetent officers etc. I have little doubt that if you were to put soldiers together from multiple eras in the same room and let them talk among each other the talk would quickly devolve into gripes about sore feet, bad food, stupid officers and a desperate need to see a beautiful woman.

Company Hell; I greatly appreciate the info on "voltigeurs" as I had believed them discontinued as a troop type after Napolean. I think I had been studying those men and seen the term spelled out as "volt gears" so often that when I did finally understand it helped explain some confusion and helped my understanding drop into place. Discovering that he went by two different names helped as well; an issue not as uncommon as you might think.

The man would have been quite an asset as he was multi lingual and able to converse with some of the immigrants whose English wasn't up to par. Of note though was that he wasn't literate until fairly late in the war. His grasp of discipline was on line with what he had experienced on the Continent & that did not go over well with the men from Minnesota. As a note the 2nd mutinied at one point over the punishment inflicted upon a soldier from a Regular Regt they were brigaded with. They didn't think hanging a man by his thumbs was an acceptable punishment.

What I know of the man is that he walked into Ft Snelling with a P53 after having traded with the Indians in the late summer or early fall of 61 and volunteered. When his military experience was discovered he quickly ended up as an NCO. and a drill master. I don't believe he was involved with the 1st MN but believe he was there for the 2-4th MN who he marched off with as part of the NCO cadre. He may or may not have been the regimental armorer as he did receive an extra stipend of pay but for what exactly I've never been able to discover. He was stripped of his rank for a short time while at Ft Abercrombie do to his taking things into his own hands and issuing out a liquor ration. He was a Sgt again by the time they headed south from Ft Snelling.

One of the things I've not really been able to discover is why the US western troops skirmished at such a higher level than their eastern counterparts.

I had a long discussion years ago with a member of a modern hardcore 4th AL living history unit. He was surprised how much better quality the western troops (US & CS) were than their eastern counterparts. Units like the 1st TN, 4th Al, Texas units in general for the CS and Midwestern in particular for US troops were noted as being of higher quality with greater morale. We had all kinds of theories but actually settled on the idea that men from remote rural areas were far more accustomed to greater distances between farms and towns which led them to be healthier. We also agreed that those units were hit much harder by disease during their initial time in service. Knowing this is only opinion I still wonder if anyone has ever really taken the time to do a real study on the subject.

None of which has much to do w/ the OP... but it's still interesting to me.

 

[Patrick H]

Welcome from Missouri. You've launched a very interesting discussion!

 

[bankerpapaw]

Welcome from Arkansas.

 

[thomas aagaard]

one of the frustrating things is how rarely the men go into real detail about minutia, tactics and speak of battles past the most general

I have been trying to find out what drill book the 15th Wisconsin used... In the book about them published in the late 19th century they mention many times that they drill... but there is no mention of what book was used or that they changed it... Hardee is mentioned a number of times.. but that is because he is an enemy corp commander...
So annoying.

When his military experience was discovered he quickly ended up as an NCO. and a drill master.

I know of a dane who joined up at the start of the war in one of the early New York regiments.
He had served as a Dragon during the first Sleswig war (1848-1850) and ended up as sergeant drilling his men in the danish drill he knew. His officers knew nothing about drill and didn't have any drillbooks.

Generally I think any volunteer with military experience would be worth his weight in gold in most early regiments.

One of the things I've not really been able to discover is why the US western troops skirmished at such a higher level than their eastern counterparts.

As you note the men was physically larger.
When you grow up in a very small community you are more use to dealing with any problem by your self. So I think the soldiers are more independent minded and more "we can do this without asking anyone how"

So when infantry came to a small river, they simply pulled down the nearest house and made a bridge... And when they realized that spreading out worked better than massed attacks... they simply did so without asking permission...

The first danish drill for "Jägers" was written in 1789 (based on the work by Johann Ewald who lead "german" riflemen against the colonials... and later became a danish general)
It write in its introduction:

A human who is hired as Field jäger, must before all have a good behavior , loyalty, a good head on his shoulders.*
Also he must have a sharp eye, a healthy body and be quick on this feet.
* directly translates its "a natural good mind"

I think growing up on a farm in the west was simply more likely to make men who was suited for it... than growing up on a farm in the east where there was much shorter distances to the local town... and much more trade, so you where more likely to pay for things instead of doing it your self. (and some Eastern regiments was made up of men from the cities)

In regard to marksmanship, it is an interesting detail that the first chapter is about the rifle and that the first thing a recruit should learn is to maintain his rifle. Chapter two is about how to judge range, chapter 3 about how to shoot at different ranges... and then we can look at the drill...
Compare that to Hardee's that really don't have much about how to actually hit the enemy... despite being a drill book for the use by light infantry.

 

[johan_steele]

I believe the 15th Wisconsin used Scott's manual. If you have not I would suggest first contacting the Wisconsin historical library in Madison & then the Wisconsin veterans museum. I believe they have a good number of documents related to the 15th wi.

As the war progressed the US standardized on Casey's.