Federal / Confederate Corps / Division Flexibility

[alan polk]

But that's not an answer to the question.

Why is Stevenson, who's never commanded in a major battle, in command of half of Pemberton's force in the field?

Did Pemberton have the authority to transfer troops from Stevenson to Loring or Bowen so that more experienced commanders command the bulk of the troops?

Tony, I've often thought about this same issue over the years. Never really looked deeply into it though. But given the important positions and confidences that Stevenson held in Pemberton's department, I've just assumed that somewhere beneath all the varied layers of personalities, there must have been found a certain, perhaps even private, "meeting of the minds" between the two regarding perceptions of loyalty, stability, command structure, and strategic outlook. These may have outweighed other considerations like combat-command experience.

In fact— and as far as I know—Stevenson was never accused of being a part of that Loring-Bowen cabal that Grabau describes.

 

[67th Tigers]

Stevenson's Division joined Pemberton as that division. It is "First Division, Army of East Tennessee" and is on loan. It was rushed to Chickasaw Bayou in late December, arriving on 29th December. After Sherman retreated, Johnston told Pemberton to keep it at Vicksburg as a reserve.

 

[Rhea Cole]

But that's not an answer to the question.

Why is Stevenson, who's never commanded in a major battle, in command of half of Pemberton's force in the field?

Did Pemberton have the authority to transfer troops from Stevenson to Loring or Bowen so that more experienced commanders command the bulk of the troops?

You will have to ask President Davis that question. He is the one who transferred Carter Stevenson & his division to Vicksburg.

Why do you keep asking about Loring? He had so little regard for Pemberton that he made no attempt to withdraw into the works & instead marched clear around Grant's army to join up with Johnston. Arguably, that showed good judgement on his part. However, it certainly would not have boded well if Loring had stayed under Pemberton's command.

I have never read anything that reflected badly on Stevenson's reputation. I really don't have a clue what you are getting at.

 

[JohnG0609]

I'm

Did Pemberton have the authority to transfer troops from Stevenson to Loring or Bowen so that more experienced commanders command the bulk of the troops?

Technically, yes he did. His orders dated Sep 30, 1862 directed him to "organize the troops in your department..." Practically, no. The government was very clear Stevenson's division was a loan from Bragg and it is unlikely it would have sanctioned any breaking up of that division.

Realistically, IMO, any issues in and conduct of Stevenson's division were unrelated to the division commander. For instance, IIRC, none of the regiments had been in combat, and Lee assumed command of Tracy's brigade only around May 3 and Cumming assumed command of Taylor's brigade just 3-4 days before Champion Hill. But I also admit I have not studied Stevenson's conduct during the battle.

 

[Mississippian1861]

I'm

Technically, yes he did. His orders dated Sep 30, 1862 directed him to "organize the troops in your department..." Practically, no. The government was very clear Stevenson's division was a loan from Bragg and it is unlikely it would have sanctioned any breaking up of that division.

Realistically, IMO, any issues in and conduct of Stevenson's division were unrelated to the division commander. For instance, IIRC, none of the regiments had been in combat, and Lee assumed command of Tracy's brigade only around May 3 and Cumming assumed command of Taylor's brigade just 3-4 days before Champion Hill. But I also admit I have not studied Stevenson's conduct during the battle.

Some individual regiments of Stevenson's Division did have combat experience. The 3rd TN fought at First Bull Run and some skirmishes in East TN and KY. The 41st Georgia was at the siege of Corinth and was in the thick of the fighting at Perryville before being transferred to Stevenson. The rest of Barton's Brigade had fought at Chickasaw Bayou.

The reason Stevenson commanded the 2nd District is that he was the senior Major General by date of rank, outranking Smith, Forney, & Maury by a few weeks. Loring was senior to Stevenson but seems to have have been used as a mobile force commander and kept outside the area of the 2nd District.

 

[67th Tigers]

Interestingly, Pemberton's force in December '62 has two "Army Corps" in the "Army of Northern Mississippi." The 1st Corps was under van Dorn, and the 2nd under Sterling Price. By orders of 2nd January 1863, they are reorganised thus:

1st Corps -> Loring's Division of Tilghman's and Rust's brigades (the latter being a consolidation of Rust's weak division), and Waul's TX Legion
2nd Corps -> Price's division of Bowen's and Green's brigades (the former being a consolidation of Bowen's division)

The strength at Vicksburg on 10th January '63 is here:

Stevenson: 7,693 (1st Division, Army of East Tennessee. Reserve)
Smith: 6,250 (garrison of Vicksburg. 2 brigades plus river batteries etc.)
Maury: 5,955 (at Snyder's Bluff)

For the siege proper, the divisions were:

Stevenson's: his own division plus Waul's Legion (didn't escape with Loring)
Forney's: Maury's old division, the two brigades which were on Snyder's Bluff
Smith: Reorganised completely
Bowen: Price's old division of 2 bdes (2nd Corps, Army of NMiss)
Loring: Had an additional brigade from Port Hudson attached.

Smith's Division, Changes Over Time

December 1862

SD Lee's Bde

1. 3rd MS
2. 4th MS
3. 46th MS
4. 17th LA
5. 22nd LA
6. 26th LA
7. 28th LA
8. 31st LA
9. 3rd Bn MS State
10. Wither's 1st MS Light Arty
11. 2 coys cavalry

Gregg's Bde

1. 10th TN
2. 1st/50th/51st TN (consolidated)
3. 3rd/30th TN (consolidated)
4. 41st TN
5. Wirt Adams' Cavalry

Post of Vicksburg

1. 40th AL
2. Heavy Btys
3. one coy sappers and miners

Gregg's Brigade was sent to Port Hudson, and replaced by Vaughn's Brigade. Vaughn's three regiments had marched from Mobile to Vicksburg in early December, arriving at Grenada ca. 17th December. They were attached to 2nd Corps at the Chickasaw Bayou initially, and then sent to Vicksburg.

31st January 1863

SD Lee's Brigade

• 17th LA
• 26th LA
• 28th LA
• 31st LA
• 4th MS
• 46th MS
• 1st MS Light Arty
• 2 cav coys

Vaughn's Brigade

1. 60th TN (79th)
2. 61st TN (80th)
3. 62nd TN (81st)

Vicksburg Garrison (Beltzhoover)

1. 27th LA (City Provost)
2. 1st LA Hvy Arty
3. 8th LA Hvy Arty Bn
4. 1st TN Heavy Arty
5. additional garrison arty
6. one coy sappers and miners

BG Baldwin was ordered to Vicksburg in this period, and took command of the 1st Bde vice SD Lee. Lee took command of the garrison troops, with two regiments from the 1st Bde added.

The 3rd MS had been moved to Loring.

April 1863

Smith's Division
Divisional Troops

1. Smyth's Partisan Rangers
2. Ward's Light Arty Bn (2 btys)

Baldwin's Bde

1. 17th LA
2. 31st LA
3. 4th MS
4. 46th MS
5. Drew's Bty, 1st MS Light Arty

Vaughn's Bde

1. 60th TN
2. 61st TN
3. 62nd TN
4. Bowman's Bty, 1st MS Light Arty

Garrison of Vicksburg (SD Lee)

1. 26th LA
2. 27th LA
3. 28th LA (later renumbered 29th)
4. 1st LA Heavy Arty
5. 8th LA Heavy Arty Bn
6. 23th LA Heavy Arty
7. 1st TN Heavy Arty
8. 2x TN Btys

 

[Mississippian1861]

Interestingly, Pemberton's force in December '62 has two "Army Corps" in the "Army of Northern Mississippi." The 1st Corps was under van Dorn, and the 2nd under Sterling Price. By orders of 2nd January 1863, they are reorganised thus:

1st Corps -> Loring's Division of Tilghman's and Rust's brigades (the latter being a consolidation of Rust's weak division), and Waul's TX Legion
2nd Corps -> Price's division of Bowen's and Green's brigades (the former being a consolidation of Bowen's division

Those troops were in and around Grenada. Loring's men east of the MS Central Railroad and Price to the west. Maury had been with them but were sent to the Vicksburg area. Price's HQ was in town just around the corner from where my parents live today. The house where Pemberton and Davis met is just a bit further down that street. Tilghman's Brigade was made up of Ft. Donelson exchangees, Rust had a lot of units that had been in Breckenridge's old Reserve Corps at Shiloh.

 

[Intrafinesse]

It seems like Pemberton didn't get a lot of choice in the makeup of his divisions (or didn't feel like he could), since one Division commander (Loring) hated his guts and decided to join Johnston's Army without telling him (basically causing the conditions for the Big Black River fight).

When I read about that I was floored.
You are fighting a war for survival, and he pulled a stunt like that?

 

[Intrafinesse]

Given the Confederate command structure and senior leadership "quality", I don't think a combined CSA force would have defeated Grant. Once Grant takes Haynes Bluff he can be supplied by river, can have minimal forces besieging Vicksburg, and have the bulk of his army ready to fight a relief force. I can't imagine a Southern relief army under Joe Johnston defeating Grant.

Once Grant broke out of Bruinsburg, I don't think the southern leadership/command structure was capable of stopping him.

 

[Rhea Cole]

When I read about that I was floored.
You are fighting a war for survival, and he pulled a stunt like that?

Davis was the legal commander & chief of the Confederate Army. His orders were not a stunt, they were his common & ordinary practice. I suggest reading Connelly's 'Army of the Heartland' & 'Autumn of Glory' history of the Army of Tennessee exclusively form the Confederate POV to get an understanding of just how hands on Davis' management & command was to how the Confederate war was fought.

Have you ever heard of who we would call the Chief of Staff of the Confederate Army? Nobody else has, either. Going over the heads of army, departmental & secretary of war to communicate directly with Davis was routine. The footnotes in Connelly are a blueprint for a comprehensive online search of original sources.

Believe you me, you will find it illuminating.

 

[67th Tigers]

Have you ever heard of who we would call the Chief of Staff of the Confederate Army? Nobody else has, either. Going over the heads of army, departmental & secretary of war to communicate directly with Davis was routine. The footnotes in Connelly are a blueprint for a comprehensive online search of original sources.

It was R.E Lee, who was the commanding general. However, like McClellan and Grant, he ended up going into the field and thus no longer was able to provide those functions. For a while, Bragg was brought back to Richmond to perform some of those functions ISTR, like Hitchcock and Halleck filled in for McClellan and Grant...

 

[Intrafinesse]

What if the South put Kirby Smith in charge of the West?
It couldn't be worse than what they had, could it?

 

[Rhea Cole]

What if the South put Kirby Smith in charge of the West?
It couldn't be worse than what they had, could it?

He didn't out rank anybody.

 

[Intrafinesse]

He didn't out rank anybody.

But would he have been a better commander than Bragg or whatever else they had?

 

[Rhea Cole]

But would he have been a better commander than Bragg or whatever else they had?

He was in Kentucky with an independent command at the same time Bragg was. As was typical of many others raised in slaveholding families, Kirby Smith had an almost juvenile sense of self importance that prevented him from subordinating his interests to that of the greater good.

Smith's refusal to coordinate with Bragg in service to the existential objective of bringing Kentucky into the Confederacy disqualifies him from higher command. His subsequent behavior only ratifies his unsuitability.

The Trans Mississippi under Smith became known as "Kirby Smith-dom" because of the very egocentric behavior he had demonstrated during 1862 in Kentucky.

Many historians have noted that the men who were nurtured in the filiopietistic atmosphere of Southern families surrounded by slaves accounts for the exaggerated egocentrism that plagued the Confederate command structure.

My considerably less scholastic reference is to Douglas Adams' "Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy." The chronic squabbling of CSA commanders reminds me of the rocket load of newly landed colonists debating whether or not to adopt the wheel. The hot bone of contention is what color the wheels would be painted.

 

[tony_gunter]

Why it matters: Stevenson doesn't seem to react to the situation on the ground in real time.

Pemberton has issued orders previously that indicates he is withdrawing over the Baker Creek Bridge. But the appearance of two large federal divisions to the north renders those orders obsolete.

Situation on the ground:

Hovey + Logan: 11,000 men
Stevenson: 10,000 men
Stevenson - Reynolds: ~8000 men

At 10:30 when the two divisions are fully deployed and poised to attack, the plan to retreat over the bridge is moot. At this point, Reynolds is about a mile beyond the bridge. No effort was made to recall him to the battle until 3 pm.

Barton is sent instead to Lee's left. But Barton appears to be still under the impression that the objective is to hold the bridge. He overshoots Lee's left, leaves a regiment and his artillery near the bridge, and pitches in.

By this time, Lee is already retreating because Cumming has been routed and his right is exposed. Barton initially makes headway because he's hitting Smith's brigade in flank, but the farther forward he pushes, the closer he comes to Stevenson sitting in Logan's reserve. Barton finds himself overlapped left and right and begins falling back upon the bridge. He barely escapes across the bridge. Now Barton and Reynolds are both removed from the battle.

Logan's line has halted during Barton's attack, so SD Lee returns and skirmishes with them. Cumming makes a final stand at the crossroad against Hovey but is overrun.

There's been about 2 hours of fighting, and Carter Stevenson has maybe 3,000 of his 10,000 men (SD Lee and two regiments of Cumming) in fighting order on the field. At no point does he appear to exercise tactical control of the division, and his brigades have fought three separate piecemeal battles across a 1.5 mile front.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Why it matters: Stevenson doesn't seem to react to the situation on the ground in real time.

Pemberton has issued orders previously that indicates he is withdrawing over the Baker Creek Bridge. But the appearance of two large federal divisions to the north renders those orders obsolete.

Situation on the ground:

Hovey + Logan: 11,000 men
Stevenson: 10,000 men
Stevenson - Reynolds: ~8000 men

At 10:30 when the two divisions are fully deployed and poised to attack, the plan to retreat over the bridge is moot. At this point, Reynolds is about a mile beyond the bridge. No effort was made to recall him to the battle until 3 pm.

Barton is sent instead to Lee's left. But Barton appears to be still under the impression that the objective is to hold the bridge. He overshoots Lee's left, leaves a regiment and his artillery near the bridge, and pitches in.

By this time, Lee is already retreating because Cumming has been routed and his right is exposed. Barton initially makes headway because he's hitting Smith's brigade in flank, but the farther forward he pushes, the closer he comes to Stevenson sitting in Logan's reserve. Barton finds himself overlapped left and right and begins falling back upon the bridge. He barely escapes across the bridge. Now Barton and Reynolds are both removed from the battle.

Logan's line has halted during Barton's attack, so SD Lee returns and skirmishes with them. Cumming makes a final stand at the crossroad against Hovey but is overrun.

There's been about 2 hours of fighting, and Carter Stevenson has maybe 3,000 of his 10,000 men (SD Lee and two regiments of Cumming) in fighting order on the field. At no point does he appear to exercise tactical control of the division, and his brigades have fought three separate piecemeal battles across a 1.5 mile front.

I applaud your after the fact certainty. You have come to a conclusion & are seeking out data that supports it. Inductive logic is its own reward.