Farnsworth's Charge

[infomanpa]

Attached is a blow-up of the map in the Bachelder Papers.

I don't see enough landmarks on this map to help me locate the units.

 

[Gettysburg Guide #154]

The more I look at maps of Farnsworth's attack on July 3, the more I wonder two things: Just want was the objective to be gained? In other words, what position (if any) were they trying to take and hold, and what good would have come of it? Certainly an attack on this small scale could not be intended to role up the Confederate left flank. Perhaps it might have been more sensible to try to take Warfield Ridge, with whatever pressure Merritt could supply up Emmitsburg Road, this may have succeeded. A push westward from there may have denied the Confederates the use of Millerstown Road. Or if the idea was to try to cut off Law's Brigade, then we come to the second thing I wonder about. With a little coordination between the Kilpatrick and Fisher, could not the Union infantry on Big Round Top have simultaneously hit Law from the rear. Surely when Law's attention was directed toward the cavalry attack, there would be a weak spot on the line. As it turned out the 4th Alabama left a gap in the line. Fisher, maybe with a little help, might have the isolated 47th and 15th Alabama. This is all speculative "what if" stuff, but these are things that I have wondered about.

 

[infomanpa]

The more I look at maps of Farnsworth's attack on July 3, the more I wonder two things: Just want was the objective to be gained? In other words, what position (if any) were they trying to take and hold, and what good would have come of it? Certainly an attack on this small scale could not be intended to role up the Confederate left flank. Perhaps it might have been more sensible to try to take Warfield Ridge, with whatever pressure Merritt could supply up Emmitsburg Road, this may have succeeded. A push westward from there may have denied the Confederates the use of Millerstown Road. Or if the idea was to try to cut off Law's Brigade, then we come to the second thing I wonder about. With a little coordination between the Kilpatrick and Fisher, could not the Union infantry on Big Round Top have simultaneously hit Law from the rear. Surely when Law's attention was directed toward the cavalry attack, there would be a weak spot on the line. As it turned out the 4th Alabama left a gap in the line. Fisher, maybe with a little help, might have the isolated 47th and 15th Alabama. This is all speculative "what if" stuff, but these are things that I have wondered about.

From Eric Wittenburg's book, apparently Farnsworth's brigade commander, General Kilpatrick believed that the Confederate flank would have been in the process of retreating because of the failed Longstreet's assault. Kilpatrick saw an opportunity to pursue and create chaos in their lines.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

From Eric Wittenburg's book, apparently Farnsworth's brigade commander, General Kilpatrick believed that the Confederate flank would have been in the process of retreating because of the failed Longstreet's assault. Kilpatrick saw an opportunity to pursue and create chaos in their lines.

Just so. Further, Pleasonton had ordered Kilpatrick to demonstrate on the Confederate flank, and he took that to mean, "order a Napoleonic cavalry charge over the worst ground imaginable." Further, there was absolutely no communication or coordination between Kilpatrick and Merritt. Imagine what they might have accomplished had they coordinated their efforts. It's one of the great if's of the war; Longstreet feared that a brigade of cavalry sweeping around that flank would cause havoc in Lee's rear--a valid concern since a lone regiment, the 5th US, nearly got into Lee's rear.

 

[infomanpa]

Just so. Further, Pleasonton had ordered Kilpatrick to demonstrate on the Confederate flank, and he took that to mean, "order a Napoleonic cavalry charge over the worst ground imaginable." Further, there was absolutely no communication or coordination between Kilpatrick and Merritt. Imagine what they might have accomplished had they coordinated their efforts. It's one of the great if's of the war; Longstreet feared that a brigade of cavalry sweeping around that flank would cause havoc in Lee's rear--a valid concern since a lone regiment, the 5th US, nearly got into Lee's rear.

Thanks, Eric. This weekend, I intend to take your driving tours of the south cavalry fields.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

Thanks, Eric. This weekend, I intend to take your driving tours of the south cavalry fields.

Enjoy! Please let me know if you have any questions.

 

[lelliott19]

While the positions of the other batteries of Henry's battalion are noted on the various maps - Bachman & Reilly on all of the maps and Latham on the Bachelder sketch map -- I notice Garden's battery is not notated on any of them. What was their position during this time?

 

[Tom Elmore]

While the positions of the other batteries of Henry's battalion are noted on the various maps - Bachman & Reilly on all of the maps and Latham on the Bachelder sketch map -- I notice Garden's battery is not notated on any of them. What was their position during this time?

Garden's battery was in the vicinity of the Peach Orchard:

(Major Haskell's report, from Supplement to the Official Reports) On the morning of July 3 ... I received orders to move two batteries down the Emmitsburg Pike. Taking Latham's and Garden's batteries ... I moved down the Pike to the peach orchard and there put them in position to fire on the enemy's position ..."

It was from there that Captain Garden moved one section forward under Lt. McQueen as described in a recent post. (Captain Garden's letter, The Sumter Herald, August 29, 1902)

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Before reading Gettysburg's Forgotten Cavalry Actions (just finished) I was under the mistaken impression that South Cavalry Field and Farnsworth's Charge were synonymous. I was completely unaware of Wesley Merritt's brigade on Farnsworth's flank.

I think the most seductive part of Andrea Custer's theory is that it places Farnsworth's charge on ground that is less insane to conduct a mounted charge across. Sadly, Kilpatrick really was that stupid.

In 15 years of reading about the Civil War, I've seen a lot of reputations rise and fall over the course of the historiography. Contrasts between public opinion and academic opinion. Wild partisan debates between the fanboys and the haters of certain generals. But I'm doubtful anybody has a positive opinion of Judson Kilpatrick.

 

[on again]

File:Gettysburg South Cavalry Field.png - Wikimedia Commons

commons.wikimedia.org

Map of his charge....
FArnsworth gravesite https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/5842062/elon-john-farnsworth

Brownell killed gravesite https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/25207526/george-s-brownell

Duncan killed gravesite https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/23377424/george-h-duncan

 

[infomanpa]

File:Gettysburg South Cavalry Field.png - Wikimedia Commons

commons.wikimedia.org

Map of his charge....
FArnsworth gravesite https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/5842062/elon-john-farnsworth

Brownell killed gravesite https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/25207526/george-s-brownell

Duncan killed gravesite https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/23377424/george-h-duncan

That's a nice map on the Wikimedia site.

 

[USS ALASKA]

"A hell of a damned fool" Judson Kilpatrick, Farnsworth's Charge, and the Hard Hand of History
Mark A. Snell

Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick's decision to launch a mounted assault with Elon J. Farnsworth's cavalry brigade against the right flank of the Army of Northern Virginia during the late afternoon of July 3, 1863 has been characterized by historians as reckless, fruitless, tragic, ill-conceived, and doomed. The results have been called a fiasco, a sacrifice, and a senseless slaughter. Kilpatrick has been accused of ordering the assault because of his own self-indulgence and his desire to gain eternal glory. What has come to be known as "Farnsworth's Charge" has even been compared to the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava. Two well-respected historians simply called the charge a display of bad generalship. Another historian claimed that Farnsworth's Charge marked the downturn of Kilpatrick's career and stood out as the darkest stain on an already blemished record.

https://npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/9/essay8.pdf

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[Scott Brown]

I'm reluctant to jump in on an old thread, much less 20 plus year old, shall I say "disagreements", but I will say this. Having walked all over Bushman's Hill with Andie (and my friend Phil Laino), she presents a compelling interpretation that is well worth your time to consider.

 

[infomanpa]

I'm reluctant to jump in on an old thread, much less 20 plus year old, shall I say "disagreements", but I will say this. Having walked all over Bushman's Hill with Andie (and my friend Phil Laino), she presents a compelling interpretation that is well worth your time to consider.

20 plus year old thread?? I started this thread less than 5 years ago.

 

[Scott Brown]

20 plus year old thread?? I started this thread less than 5 years ago.

Haha! I meant, of course, the disagreements between Eric and Andie . Unfortunately, it got pretty nasty.

 

[mwalker6043]

I was trekking the area earlier this year. If these are the rock's Capt. Potter of the 18th PA Cavalry was talking about. He said something like, the unit being near big rocks, nearly as big as Devil's Den, the monument is off by a couple hundred yards.