Fanboy Thread

tony_gunter

2nd Lieutenant
Joined
Feb 19, 2011
Location
Mississippi
Plenty of people have been accused of being fanboys of certain civil war generals, here's your chance to correct the record.

List the negative traits of your favorite generals and point out some of the mistakes they made.

I'll start with McPherson. Wine, women, and song. This guy liked to work hard and play hard. Who knows what he might have accomplished if he had spent as much time trying to figure out how to beat the rebels as he had partying.

He unnecessarily placed himself in danger. The most famous instance of course got him killed, but at least in that instance he was trying to coordinate his troops. At Lake Providence, however, he and his entire command staff, and several of his generals were riding the first boat into the torrent when his men blew the levee. The boat caught a snag and nearly flipped.

He grew overly familiar with Grant and probably damaged his trust as a result. McPherson had been entrusted by Grant during the Vicksburg Campaign to detach from the main body and operate independently against Jackson while Sherman and McClernand held Pemberton in place. However, McPherson ran into Gregg and a mounted infantry unit from the east coast as well as Pemberton's main body of cavalry at Raymond. Clearly, reinforcements were on their way to Jackson from all over the Confederacy, and McPherson with only a single unit of cavalry attached would not have the scouting advantage he had enjoyed so far. Rather than continue as ordered, he stopped at Raymond and DEMANDED Grant turn his entire army towards Jackson, refusing to move until he received a response. It may or may not have been the right call, but Grant would never entrust him with a major independent command again.
 
Eugene Carr

This guy was the shining star of McClernand's corps during the Vicksburg Campaign. He devised an ingenious flanking movement to turn the Magnolia Church position at the Battle of Port Gibson and made the most headway at Champion Hill. When Grant discovered him out in front of the rest of his corps at that battle, he placed Carr in command of the pursuit and Carr commanded at the subsequent Battle of Big Black River Bridge, with Carr totally dominating the Confederates there.

However, Carr was as charismatic as a cactus, and absolutely terrible at self-promotion. His reports in the OR were self-deprecating in the extreme, and one had to dig deeply into the record to even discover that Carr commanded at Big Black River. You just commanded the two divisions present at THE most decisive battle of the campaign, don't you think that deserves a mention in your official report???

On top of that, Carr was the RGIII of ACW generals. When he was healthy, he displayed brilliance, but he was sidelined by injury / illness for most of the war.
 
Last edited:
Banks.

For a guy who was considered the paragon of self made-man, rising from humble beginning to be speaker of the house and governor, he was really insecure. This led him to second guess his own decisions, vacilate, be easily swayed by the distant nagging of Halleck, and long to be considered one of the 'cool kids'. For example when Halleck once wrote him that all the smart military minds were in favor of a plan, Banks quickly decided he wanted that plan also.
 
This could be fun.
For Grant, at Vicksburg, on May 22, 1863, when McClernand claimed his force had achieved a toehold on the Confederate entrenchments, he should have ridden over to McClernand's position and insisted that McClernand demonstrate an observable position.
When the surrender occurred he should have sent the entire Confederate force across the river to a temporary parole camp.
At Chattanooga, when Sherman's attack stalled, he should have waited one additional day, for Hooker to get across the creek on the west end of the ridge, so that the Confederate left was exposed. Of course the Confederates may have simply retreated. Tons of fun to re-fight battles after they occur.
At Spotsylvania, he should have let Meade take care of Hancock and the rest of the army, and he should have found Burnside and sent him marching to the Confederate rear. The United States army should have at least once taken the risk of detaching. That ignores, of course, that risk taking was not allowed in the Virginia theater.
He should have equipped Sheridan's cavalry for fall and winter operations and had Sheridan close out the western counties of Virginia in the winter of '64-65.
When he had Lee at Appomattox, he should have insisted that Lee and some of the others accompany him back to Washington to meet with President Lincoln. A little public humiliation goes a long way to physically demonstrating conquest.
What else?
 
Last edited:
Grant never should have stayed in New York after 1880. The Greek tragedians could have warned him.
 
When he had Lee at Appomattox, he should have insisted that Lee and some of the others accompany him back to Washington to meet with President Lincoln. A little public humiliation goes a long way to physically demonstrating conquest.
Which is probably why Grant didn't do it. He did not need an 'in your face' celebration. His choice not to humiliate his vanquished foe was one of the great decisions in American history.
 
This could be fun.
For Grant, at Vicksburg, on May 22, 1863, when McClernand claimed his force had achieved a toehold on the Confederate entrenchments, he should have ridden over to McClernand's position and insisted that McClernand demonstrate an observable position.
When the surrender occurred he should have sent the entire Confederate force across the river to a temporary parole camp.
At Chattanooga, when Sherman's attack stalled, he should have waited one additional day, for Hooker to get across the creek on the west end of the ridge, so that the Confederate left was exposed. Of course the Confederates may have simply retreated. Tons of fun to re-fight battles after they occur.
At Spotsylvania, he should have let Meade take care of Hancock and the rest of the army, and he should have found Burnside and sent him marching to the Confederate rear. The United States army should have at least once taken the risk of detaching. That ignores, of course, that risk taking was not allowed in the Virginia theater.
He should have equipped Sheridan's cavalry for fall and winter operations and had Sheridan close out the western counties of Virginia in the winter of '64-65.
When he had Lee at Appomattox, he should have insisted that Lee and some of the others accompany him back to Washington to meet with President Lincoln. A little public humiliation goes a long way to physically demonstrating conquest.
What else?

Grant was also one of those guys with all the charisma of a cactus. He was solemn, quiet, and introspective, so he often came across as an unimpressive dullard to observers.

Grant hatched some amazing strategic plans, but his real genius was strategic synthesis, the ability to absorb input from many different sources and implement the best parts into his plans. As a result, a lot of what Grant achieved was suggested by others. Charles Hamilton suggested a diversionary raid deep into Mississippi to distract Pemberton and hamper his ability to reinforce / resupply. Grant would implement this plan using Col. Grierson, and it would become one of the most successful and daring cavalry raids of the war.
 
Which is probably why Grant didn't do it. He did not need an 'in your face' celebration. His choice not to humiliate his vanquished foe was one of the great decisions in American history.
Lincoln was a fairly persuasive President. He would have insisted the Willard Hotel entertain his Confederate guests for a few days.
I think he could have convinced Lee to endorse general acquiescence and maybe that would have distracted President Lincoln's wife for a month or so.
I am not thinking of a Roman triumph, but instead some careful talks about the future of the secessionist states, with the President advocating that greatness sometimes lies in admitting error.
 
Grant was also one of those guys with all the charisma of a cactus. He was solemn, quiet, and introspective, so he often came across as an unimpressive dullard to observers.

Grant hatched some amazing strategic plans, but his real genius was strategic synthesis, the ability to absorb input from many different sources and implement the best parts into his plans. As a result, a lot of what Grant achieved was suggested by others. Charles Hamilton suggested a diversionary raid deep into Mississippi to distract Pemberton and hamper his ability to reinforce / resupply. Grant would implement this plan using Col. Grierson, and it would become one of the most successful and daring cavalry raids of the war.
Grant liked debate. He did not participate, he would listen. People were not able to figure out he processed the debate and recognized which ideas were moving forward.
The best example was the Overland campaign in which he recognized the great value of what McClellan had attempted, but did it another way that eliminated most of the risk.
 
In my "what if" world, I want President Lincoln to meet with General Robert E. Lee. If Generals Scott and Thomas can attend also, so much the better.
 
Lincoln was a fairly persuasive President. He would have insisted the Willard Hotel entertain his Confederate guests for a few days.
I think he could have convinced Lee to endorse general acquiescence and maybe that would have distracted President Lincoln's wife for a month or so.
I am not thinking of a Roman triumph, but instead some careful talks about the future of the secessionist states, with the President advocating that greatness sometimes lies in admitting error.
Thanks for your response.
We sometimes forget that the surrender of the Army Of Northern Virginia was not the end of the rebellion. I am not sure that Lee or any other rebel military leader could have added much to the discussion at this point.
Later, of course, Lee did appear before a Congressional committee and had a chance to share- and 'spin'- his views. I don't know whether that event has been discussed before in this Forum. Maybe it is time for that discussion.
 
Thanks for your response.
We sometimes forget that the surrender of the Army Of Northern Virginia was not the end of the rebellion. I am not sure that Lee or any other rebel military leader could have added much to the discussion at this point.
Later, of course, Lee did appear before a Congressional committee and had a chance to share- and 'spin'- his views. I don't know whether that event has been discussed before in this Forum. Maybe it is time for that discussion.

I didn't know that about Lee! Please start a thread.
 

Learn About Us
About CivilWarTalk
Contact the Webmaster
Meet the Staff
Link to CivilWarTalk
Join Our Community
Register
Browse Forums
View Today's Discussions
Search the Forum
Get Help
FAQ
Student Guide
Forum Rules & Etiquette
Copyright / DMCA

     Contact Us CivilwarTalk on Facebook CivilWarTalk on YouTube CivilWarTalk on Twitter RSS Feed

Bringing the American Civil War and More to Life.
© 1999 - , CIVILWARTALK, LLC - Site Version 10.0

SlaveryTalk.com - SecessionTalk.com - CivilWarTalk.com - ReconstructionTalk.com
Back
Top